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Abstract
This thesis examines some issues at the heart of theoretical macroeconomics, 
namely the possibility of establishing a predictive theory of individual behaviour 
and transforming it into a theory of the economy using aggregation. As regards 
individual behaviour, the basic idea in economics is that homo economicus follows 
the prescriptions of the expected utility theory. The thesis argues that the expected 
utility theory takes the agent’s view of the economy as given, and is silent about 
how he models his choice situation and defines his decision problem. As a 
consequence, it is of only a minor contribution to the analysis of economic 
phenomena.
To explain how the agent learns about the economy and thus models his choice 
situation, new classical economists have relatively recently proposed that the agent 
behaves like a statistician. That is, like a statistician, he theorises, estimates, and 
adapts in attempting to learn about the economy. The usefulness of this hypothesis 
for modelling the economy depends on the existence of a ‘tight enough’ theory of 
statistical inference.
To address this issue, the thesis proposes a preliminary conjecture about how a 
statistician perceives and models a choice situation: the statistician regards 
measurable features of the environment as realisations of some random variables, 
with an unknown joint probability distribution. He first uses the data on these 
quantities to discover the joint probability distribution of the variables and then 
uses the estimate of the distribution to uncover the causal structure of the variables. 
If the resulting model turns out to be inadequate, the initial set of variables is 
modified and the two phases of inference are repeated. This setting allows the 
separation of probabilistic inference issues from those of causal inference.
The thesis studies both stages of learning from data to argue why there cannot be a 
‘tight enough’ theory of statistical learning. As a result, the marriage of the 
hypothesis that the agent behaves like a decision scientist with the one that he 
behaves like a statistician is not of much help in predicting behaviour and 
modelling the economy. The thesis next turns to the other issue relating to the 
move from a theory of individual behaviour to a theory of the economy. It argues 
that to explain economic phenomena it is necessary to view the economy as a 
society of interactive, and heterogeneous, agents. However, the regularities 
emerging in such a society are not directly related to the laws operating at the 
micro level. The connection between the individual and the aggregate levels is 
highly complex.
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Introduction
"As economics pushes on beyond 'static' it becomes less like 
science, and more like history." (Hicks, 1979: xi)
Modem economies consist of millions of heterogeneous decision-making units 
interacting with each other, facing different choice situations and acting according to 
a multitude of different mles and constraints. The interaction of the decision-making 
units at the micro level gives rise to certain regularities at the economy level, which 
form the subject matter of macroeconomics. The complexity of modem economies 
makes it impossible to build an analytic model that represents the behaviour of all the 
basic decision-making units populating the economy. In modelling the economy, it is 
inevitably necessary to leave many details out, introduce aggregate variables, and 
focus on the relations among the aggregates. Macroeconomics is therefore primarily 
the study of aggregates.
The study of the economy at the aggregate level presents a number of difficulties. 
For practical reasons, the economy cannot be subjected to controlled experiments to 
establish causal relations true of economic aggregates. Economists have to rely on 
statistical analysis of aggregate data to study the causal relations true of the 
aggregates. Statistical analysis alone, however, is inadequate for causal inference, 
and must always be supported with substantive information regarding the underlying 
structure to yield new causal conclusions. Moreover, aggregate economic data are 
inherently imprecise, rendering the outcomes of statistical analysis in 
macroeconomics even more uncertain. These difficulties raise the issue of how it is 
possible in macroeconomics to acquire the non-sample information needed for 
modelling the structure of the economy.
In response to this question, several competing approaches to macroeconomics have 
emerged. The so-called theoretical macroeconomics, championed by new classical 
economists, suggests that none of the methodological problems arise at the individual 
level. So, we can start by establishing a theory of individual behaviour, which 
explains how the agent interacts with the economy, defines his choice situation, and
thus makes a decision. Once we have established a theory of behaviour, we can 
transform it into a theory of the economy as a whole using aggregation procedures. 
Since the theory is directly derived from the rules of individual behaviour, it 
correctly specifies the causal structure of the economy. Aggregate data can then be 
used to transform the theory into a quantitative model of the economy, describing the 
economic structure.
The enterprise of deriving the correct macroeconomic theory from microeconomic 
theory -  or the microfoundations project -  rests on two assumptions. The first is that 
we have, or it is possible to establish, an empirically adequate theory of individual 
behaviour. The other is that the theory can be transformed into a theory of the 
economy using aggregation procedures, without having to introduce any substantive 
assumption about the structure of the economy.
As regards individual behaviour, the basic idea in economics is that homo 
economicus follows the prescriptions of decision theory, understood in terms of one 
or another expected utility theory, in particular the theory of subjective expected 
utility. The theory of expected utility, in all the variants on offer, takes the agent’s 
view of the economy as given, and says nothing about how he predicts future values 
of economic variables. To fill this theoretical vacuum, new classical economists have 
set forth the rational expectations hypothesis, which identifies the agent’s subjective 
beliefs about the economy with the mathematical expectations implied by the true 
economic model. This gives rise to a view of the economy as a society in which 
everyone, except the econometricians, knows the structure of the economy. On this 
basis, the new classical paradigm defines economics as the enterprise to derive 
observable economic phenomena from two fundamental assumptions: (1) people are 
expected utility maximisers and (2) they maximise their expected utility with respect 
to the true model of the economy.
Theoretical problems with the rational expectations hypothesis have led to a slow 
paradigm shift in new classical economics that aims to remove the information 
asymmetry existing between the econometricians and people in a rational
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expectations economy by suggesting that, like econometricians, market participants 
also lack knowledge of the true economic model, and must learn it from available 
economic data. The new paradigm has been dubbed the bounded rationality 
paradigm, after Herbert Simon (1955, 1956). Though the idea of bounded rationality 
is relatively old, a unanimous interpretation of the paradigm is yet to emerge. One 
leading interpretation, set forth by new classical economists, conceives of the 
economy as a society of ‘intuitive statisticians’, where everyone, like 
econometricians, theorises, estimates, and adapts in attempting to learn about 
probability distributions that, under rational expectations, they already know 
(Sargent, 1993:3). So understood, the paradigm replaces the second principle of new 
classical economics with the assumption that agents maximize their expected utility 
with respect to models that, like econometricians, they construct from economic data. 
We will refer to the proposal that homo economicus behaves like an econometrician 
as the intuitive statistician hypothesis of bounded rationality.
This thesis studies several foundational issues relating to the theoretical approach to 
macroeconomics or, more specifically, the microfoundations project.
Chapter 1 begins with defining some key concepts in macroeconomics, outlines 
several arguments for the necessity of theory in modelling the economy, and 
characterises the theoretical approach in some detail. To pave the way for defining 
some basic controversies in macroeconomics, the chapter then reconstructs the so- 
called atheoretical approach to macroeconomics, which stands at the other extreme 
end of the spectrum of views on the nature and scope of macroeconomics. The view 
rejects both suppositions of theoretical macroeconomics. It argues that current 
theories of individual behaviour lack precision and substantial difficulties face any 
attempt to make them precise. More importantly, because of individual heterogeneity 
and interaction among decision-making units in the economy, the view rules out any 
simple, and useful, relation between the individual and economy levels. As a 
consequence, it confines the scope of macroeconomics to establishing models that 
efficiently summarise data, and are useful for short run predictions. In one reading, 
the approach rejects the very existence of aggregate relations suitable for a causal
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account. The contrast between these views reveals that the issues regarding theories 
of economic behaviour and those about the link between the micro and macro levels 
are the most basic topics in macroeconomics. Of equal importance is the conjecture 
that one can sensibly talk of structural relations at the economy level.
Chapter 2 studies the contribution of rational choice theories to economic theorising 
by concentrating on Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility. Using the 
framework of the theory, the chapter distinguishes between several phases of human 
decision making, which include (i) modelling the choice situation, (ii) defining the 
decision problem, and (iii) solving the problem. In light of this, the chapter 
distinguishes between two possible types of theories of behaviour: choice-based 
theories of behaviour and learning-based theories of behaviour. The rational choice 
theories on offer fall into the category of choice-based theories of behaviour; they 
take for granted how the agent models his choice situation and defines his decision 
problem, and only explain how he solves a well-defined decision problem. So, in 
modelling behaviour using these theories, a host of substantive assumptions are 
needed to specify the agent view of his choice situation, and the problem he is trying 
to solve. These assumptions concern the agent’s view of the causal structure of the 
environment, his values, beliefs, needs, and goals.
The chapter then demonstrates that the resolution of economic controversies 
primarily hinges on how the agent models his choice situation and defines his 
decision problem, rather than on the specific method by which he solves the problem. 
In fact, the rational choice theories are consistent with all sides of any substantive 
controversy in economics, and contribute very little to economic analysis. Substantial 
results, usually attributed to these theories, are the implications of the assumptions 
made about how people specify their choice situation, and redefine it when faced 
with changes in the economy or new information. As a consequence, a theory of 
economic behaviour cannot take as given the structure of the choice situation and 
how the agent defines his decision problem. Economics is thus in need of a learning- 
based theory of behaviour, which explains how the agent models his choice situation, 
defines his decision problem, and redefines it as a result of experience. The chapter
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ends with an analysis of the rational expectations hypothesis to explain why the 
hypothesis fails to eliminate the necessity of a learning-based theory of behaviour in 
theoretical economics.
Chapter 3 begins studying the intuitive statistician hypothesis. The usefulness of this 
hypothesis for modelling and thinking about the economy depends on whether there 
exists a ‘tight enough’ theory of statistical inference. To address this issue, the thesis 
proposes a preliminary conjecture about how a statistician perceives and models a 
choice situation: The statistician regards measurable features of the environment as 
realisations of some random variables, with an unknown joint probability 
distribution. He first uses the data on these quantities to discover the joint probability 
distribution of the variables and next uses the estimate of the distribution to uncover 
the causal structure among the variables. If the resulting model turns out to be 
inadequate, the initial set of variables is modified and the two phases of inference are 
repeated. This setting allows the separation of probabilistic inference issues from 
those of causal inference.
Central to learning the joint probability distribution of a set of variables is model 
specification (formulation), not estimation or hypothesis testing. Whether there is a 
‘tight enough’ theory of statistical learning critically thus depends on whether or not 
there is a ‘tight enough’ theory of model formulation. Having said this, to study the 
issue of model formulation at its most general level, the chapter turns to 
nonparametric inference, which theoretically seeks to design algorithms that receive 
data on a set of variables and yield the model that, given the data, best approximates 
the underlying mechanism. The framework explains why there cannot be such 
algorithms, highlights intrinsic limitations of model-free inference, and establishes 
the necessity of probabilistic background information for building interpretable 
statistical models. With the data* samples normally available, one must begin with a 
parametric model to obtain an interpretable model of the data, which raises the 
question of where the parametric models come from.
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Chapter 4 studies the topic of statistical learning from the perspective of the Bayesian 
theory, which is said to allow the incorporation of background information into 
inference. The chapter first looks at some critical issues at the foundation of the 
Bayesian theory to explain why the theory, as stands, cannot be a theory of learning, 
and is only concerned with coherent analysis. As a result, to explain central aspects 
of inference such as model specification, empirical model assessment, and re- 
specification analysis, one has to go beyond the boundaries of the Bayesian theory. 
Having done this, the chapter draws on several themes in the relatively recent 
statistical literature to reconstruct a broader theory of Bayesian inference, which 
takes some steps in explaining the central aspects of inference traditionally left out in 
the Bayesian literature, including model formulation. Reflecting on the requirements 
and limits of the broader theory, the chapter considers the possibility of establishing 
a ‘tight enough’ theory of parametric inference, and brings to the fore some 
important implications for the bounded rationality program.
Chapter 5 studies the second phase of statistical learning relating to inference about 
causal structure. The chapter concentrates on the graph-theoretic approach to causal 
inference in order to investigate the possibility of a data-driven approach to causal 
inference. By data-driven we mean any effort to draw causal conclusions from 
probabilistic data using only general subject-matter-independent principles 
supposedly linking causation and probability. A claim for a data-driven approach to 
causal inference raises two separate issues. The first is whether there are universal 
principles connecting probabilistic and causal dependencies. The other is whether the 
principles are sufficient for inferring from the joint probability distribution of a set of 
variables the causal structure generating the distribution. The chapter takes up both 
topics, and by reflecting on the limits of data-driven causal inference outlines an 
account of causal inference from observational data.
The analysis in these last three chapters helps us judge if there can be a ‘tight 
enough’ theory of statistical learning, explaining all the general phases of learning 
from data.
16
Chapter 6 studies the other element of the microfoundations project that has to do 
with the move from a theory of individual behaviour to a theory of the economy. The 
chapter starts with a critique of the representative agent modelling approach to the 
study of the economy, explaining why understanding large-scale economic 
phenomena calls for thinking of the economy as a society of interactive 
heterogeneous individuals. Having done so, it investigates some basic issues that 
individual heterogeneity and interdependencies create for theoretical study of the 
economy. Individual heterogeneity and interdependencies existing in modem 
economies fundamentally undercut the conception of the economy underlying the 
microfoundations project. In fact, they sever any simple, direct, and useful link 
between the micro and macro levels, casting doubt on the very existence of stable 
relations at the economy level, which are suitable for a causal account.
The thesis concludes by highlighting some of the implications that arise from the 
chapters for the bounded rationality program in particular, and for the study of the 
economy in general. The marriage of the hypothesis that the agent behaves like a 
decision scientist with the hypothesis that he behaves like an intuitive statistician is 
not of much help in predicting the course of the economy.
Several disclaimers apply to this thesis. A good part of this thesis concerns modelling 
bounded rationality. However, it is only concerned with certain foundational issues 
regarding one interpretation of the bounded rationality project. The thesis does not 
touch on the literature on learning in games. It does not cover the literature that 
models adaptive learning without assuming that the agent forms a mental model of 
his choice situation. Nor does it explain how introducing bounded rationality helps 
explain economic phenomena not explainable within the framework of full 
knowledge and rationality. Though our analysis highly relevant to these matters, they 
are subjects for future research.
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Chapter I
Theoretical versus Atheoretical Macroeconomics
Concepts and Controversies
1 Introduction
Human beings in society have no properties but those which are derived
from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of the individual man.
In social phenomena the Composition of Causes is the universal law (J.S.
Mill, 1974 [1874]: 879).
The study of fluctuations in aggregate measures of economic activity and prices over 
relatively short periods (business cycle theory) and development of the economy over 
the long run (growth theory) constitutes what we call macroeconomics. The objective 
is to understand the causes of economic fluctuations and growth, forecast the future 
course of the economy, and aid analysis of state policies. Following tradition, we may 
categorise major objectives of macroeconomics under the headings of explanation, 
forecasting, and policy analysis. These objectives call for a quantitative model, which 
for most purposes must represent the causal structure of the economy. In 
macroeconomics, a major methodological issue is, therefore, the understanding of the 
causal structure of the economy.
A modern economy consists of millions of individual decision makers, firms, and 
institutions, each solving different decision problems under diverse circumstances and 
subject to distinct social and economic constraints. This complexity makes it 
practically impossible to build a model which represents the behaviour of all the basic 
decision making units of the economy. In modelling the economy, we inevitably need 
to leave out many details of the decision-making units, introduce aggregate variables, 
and focus on the relations of the aggregates. For this reason, macroeconomics is 
primarily the study of aggregates.
The study of the economy at the aggregate level presents a number of methodological 
difficulties. To begin with, for practical reasons, it is impossible to subject the 
economy to controlled experiments. This impossibility deprives macroeconomics of a 
reliable method for causal inference which is available to other scientific fields. 
Economists inevitably have to rely on statistical analysis of aggregate data to study the 
causal structure of the measured variables. However, statistical analysis is inadequate 
for causal inference, and has to be supported with domain-specific information 
regarding the structure under study to yield new causal conclusions. This raises the
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issue of how, in macroeconomics, we can acquire the subject-matter information 
necessary for a causal analysis of aggregate data.
There are two major reactions to these methodological limitations. On the one hand, 
there is the view that acknowledges the limitations involved in directly studying 
aggregate data but argues that they can be overcome indirectly. We can, so goes the 
argument, start by studying how individuals make their decisions, and thereby 
establish a theory of individual behaviour. Once we have established a theory of 
individual behaviour, we can transform it through aggregation into a qualitative 
theory of the economy. Having done this, with the help of statistical methods, we can 
use aggregate data to estimate the model parameters and thus establish a quantitative 
model. Since the model is derived from the rules of individual behaviour or other 
basic decision making units, it correctly specifies the causal structure of the economy, 
which is needed for the purposes of explanation and policy evaluation. We call this 
approach theoretical macroeconomics.
The other response argues that current theories of individual behaviour lack precision 
and substantial difficulties face any attempt to make them precise. Moreover, many 
complex issues arise in aggregating individual behaviour, relating to the 
heterogeneity of behaviour and interactions among decision makers. The aggregation 
difficulties rule out any simple relationship between the individual and the economy 
level, undermining the proposal of theoretical economics for establishing causal 
structure. Econometricians can build models that summarise economic data but 
cannot establish whether a model represents the economic structure. Aggregate data 
are also imprecise. This imprecision further weakens the reliability of macroeconomic 
models as'a tool for policy analysis. Economists must accept irresolvable differences 
among themselves and limit their claims to conclusions that follow from the analysis 
of imprecise aggregate data, which is the only objective ground in macroeconomics. 
We call this view atheoretical macroeconomics.
This chapter explains some central notions in economics, elaborates on some of the 
limitations of statistical analysis for causal inference, and briefly reconstructs the
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above two approaches to macroeconomics. The objective is to provide a glimpse of 
some basic controversies in macroeconomics and highlight the importance of the 
questions studied in this thesis.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 defines macroeconomics, its subject 
matter and objectives. Section 3 discusses three arguments for the necessity of theory 
in macroeconomic analysis; all concern the boundaries of statistical analysis for 
causal inference. Section 4 sketches out the theoretical approach to macroeconomics, 
also known as the microfoundations program, and describes the assumptions 
underlying the program. Section 5 outlines the main features of the atheoretical 
approach and contrasts it with theoretical economics. Section 6 concludes with an 
outline of the issues studied in the thesis.
2 Macroeconomics
Macroeconomics studies recurring patterns discernible at the aggregate economic 
level, aiming to build a model that serves to explain why such patterns occur, predict 
their future developments, and analyse how policy interventions might affect them. 
This section first defines the fundamental notions of structure and structural model. It 
then characterises the objectives of macroeconomics and the features that a model 
should possess to serve as a means for achieving the objectives. In doing this, we 
follow the view of macroeconomics developed by the early econometricians working 
in the Cowles Commission.
2.1 Macroeconomic Structure
The variables used to describe an economy originate in the decisions made by its 
components - numerous individuals, firms, institutions, and governments.1 Families 
make decisions about what to consume and when, how many hours to work, and what
1 The following view of the economy is borrowed from Granger 1990a.
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to invest in; firms make decisions about unemployment, production, pricing, 
marketing, borrowing, investment, and so forth. We can consider the input and output 
variables of these decision-makers as the basic variables of the economy. Often, the 
eventual outcome of the decisions is not quite what was planned: poor health may 
disrupt work, or a supply shortage may result in a lower production than expected. It 
is therefore sensible to model the decision outputs of an individual or institutional 
decision-maker as a function of its prominent input variables plus a stochastic 
residual vector. The vector of all input and output variables of all participants in the 
economy and their linking functions form the microstructure of the economy. We 
denote the microstructure by (m, r), where m and r stand for the vector of micro­
variables and micro-relations respectively. In place of (/n, r), the economic literature 
often refers to the triple (m , r, p) as the true economic data generating mechanism, 
where p  is the joint probability distribution of the micro-variables m (Granger, 
1990a:7; Hendry and Ericsson, 1991:18; Spanos, 1986:661-72).
The immense number of micro-variables and relations in any modem economy makes 
it impossible to consider the behaviours of all decision-making units in a model. 
Modelling an economy requires introducing aggregate variables and focusing on the 
patterns that emerge at the aggregate level. A central assumption in economics is that 
the microstructure (m, r, p) leads to a unique macrostructure (M, R, P), where M  
stands for the set of aggregate input and output variables, R for the relations among 
the aggregates, and P for the joint probability distribution of the aggregate variables 
(Epstein, 1987:65). This macrostructure is the subject matter of macroeconomics. 
Thus, macroeconomics is defined as the study of the aggregative relations that emerge 
from decisions and interactions of the basic decision-making units of the economy. By 
contrast, microeconomics is defined as the study of the behaviour of the basic 
decision-making units of the economy in which no aggregation is involved. The 
presence of aggregation is what separates these fields of study from each other 
(Keynes, 1936:292-3).2
2 See Janssen (1993, ch. 1) for various notions of macroeconomics.
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The above view of the subject matter of macroeconomics is consistent with 
mainstream economics that postulates the existence of recurring and stable relations at 
the aggregate level. However, there are several notions of macroeconomic structure 
and a host of views on the nature of the relation between the micro and macro 
structure. We continue by explicating a notion of structure found in the writings of the 
early econometricians working in the Cowles Commission, which will serve as a 
benchmark for defining alternative notions of structure and characterising some key 
controversies in macroeconomics.3
2.1.1 Structural Models
Early econometricians rarely defined the notion of structure explicitly. Instead, they 
focused on the related notion of structural model. It is convenient to first describe this 
notion and then use it to define the concept of structure. Consider the simple 
stochastic equation
Y = a  + fiX + £, (2.1)
where Y is the response variable, X  is the regressor, and £ is the error term with mean 
zero.4 This equation is commonly used to represent the regression of Y on X, giving 
the mean of the distribution of Y conditional on a particular value of X, i.e., 
E(Y IX  = x) (Greene, 1990, ch.10). As a regression equation, (2.1) describes the 
association between X  and Y in the population from which the data are sampled. As 
opposed to this usage, the equation may also be used for predicting the effects of 
(hypothetical) interventions in X  on Y. If the equation correctly predicts how the 
values of Y change as we intervene to change the values of X, it is called structural 
(Hurwicz, 1962:236-7). A difference between (2.1) as a regression equation and (2.1) 
as a structural equation is that in the former case the equation may cease to hold as
3 For the history of the Cowles Commission Foundation see Darnell et al. (1990) and Epstein (1987).
4 We adopt the usual convention of denoting random variables by upper-case letters, and their values 
by the corresponding lower-case letters. Likewise, we denote random vectors by bold upper-case 
letters and their values by the corresponding bold lower-case letters.
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soon as changes are made to X  whereas in the latter case the equation is invariant to 
interventions made to the values of X. Another way to state this notion of structural 
equation in the context of simple equation (2.1) is the following, which is borrowed 
with small changes from Pearl (2000:160):
Definition: An equation Y = a  + pX + e is said to be structural if in an ideal 
experiment where we control X  to x and any other set Z of variables (not containing X 
or Y) to z, the value of Y would be independent of z and is given by a  + fix + e .
This notion of structural equation captures the core of the manipulability conception 
of causation (Woodward, 1999). On this view of causality, variable X  causes variable 
Y if it is possible at least in a hypothetical experiment to change Y by manipulating X. 
So, the claim that equation (2.1) is structural means that it expresses a causal relation. 
In that case, the parameter ft in (2.1) reflects the causal effect of X  on Y, contrary to a 
regression equation in which ft only represents the degree of association between X 
and Y in the population. The terms ‘structural’ and ‘causal’ are used interchangeably 
in what follows.5
Econometricians refer to the variables on the right hand side of a structural equation 
as exogenous', variable X in equation (2.1) is exogenous if intervening to set X  = x 
gives the same result for Y as observing X  = x . Similarly, the variable on the left- 
hand side of a structural equation is called endogenous. Exogeneity also has weaker 
meanings in the literature. It sometimes refers to a variable whose value is not 
explained within the model but is supplied to it and sometimes refers to a variable 
which is statistically independent of the error term in the equation. We use 
‘exogeneity’ to refer to the first notion, i.e., as an independent variable in a structural 
equation (Engle, Hendry, and Richard, 1983).
The early econometricians generalised the notion of a structural equation to systems 
of equations. An equation system forms a structural model if each equation in the
5 See Hurwicz (1962) for the connection between causal and structural relations.
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system is structural and remains invariant to changes that invalidate other equations 
in the model.6 In light of the definition of a structural equation as a causal relation, 
each equation in a structural model represents an autonomous causal mechanism that 
can be modified without undermining the mechanisms represented by other equations 
in the model. As an illustration, consider a simple version of the model of demand 
and price determination in economics, which has been discussed by many authors 
including Goldberger (1992) and Pearl (2000:27):
Q = ctx P + J3X 7 + £x (2.2a)
P = a 2Q + /12W + £ 2 (2.2b)
where Q is the quantity of household demand for product A, P is the unit price of A, I 
is household income, W is the wage rate for producing A, and £x and £2 are error 
terms, representing unmodelled factors that affect quantity and price respectively. 
This model is structural if equation (2.2a) correctly forecasts the effects on Q of 
(hypothetical) interventions in P or 7, and equation (2.2b) correctly predicts the 
effects on P of interventions in Q or wage W. Moreover, interventions invalidating 
(2.2a) must not invalidate (2.2b) and vice versa.7 If we change the values of the 
parameters a x and /?, by intervening in the mechanisms determining the household 
income 7, the change must not affect a 2 and fi2. The mechanisms represented by 
these equations must be unrelated. In short, what makes this model structural is that
each equation characterises an autonomous causal mechanism, one equation
describing the causal process determining the demand for A and the other the process
o
determining the price for A.
6 A broader notion of structural model is found in Koopmans (1949 [1971]).
7 A requirement necessary for this exercise is that £, be independent of P, £2 independent of Q, and 
£{ independent of £2.
8 For further discussion see Goldberger, 1992; Aldrich, 1987; Pearl, 2000; and Woodward, 1999.
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This concept of structural model reveals the notion of structure implicit in the 
writings of the Cowles Commission econometricians. According to these researchers, 
a structure consists of a set of autonomous causal relations that can be utilised 
separately for intervening in the state of the economy. Koopmans, a leading member 
of the Commission, recapitulates this concept of structure in the following passage:
The study of an equation system derives its sense from the postulate that there 
exists one and only one representation in which each equation corresponds to 
a specific law of behaviour (attributed to a specific group of economic agents) 
... Any discussion of the effects of changes in economic structure, whether 
brought about by trends or policies, is best put in terms of changes ip 
structural equations. For these are the elements that can, at least in theory, be 
changed one by one, independently. For this reason it is important that the 
system be recognisable as structural equations (quoted in Epstein, 1987:65).
From this perspective, the subject matter of macroeconomics is the study of 
autonomous causal relations true at the economy level, emerging from the 
interactions of individual decision makers with each other and with the environment. 
In what follows, we will refer to this viewpoint as the received view, and use it as a 
benchmark to define and compare some alternative views on the nature and scope of 
macroeconomics.
2. 2 Macroeconomic Objectives
To complete the description of the received view, it is also vital to expound on the 
objectives traditionally set for macroeconomics. This demands an understanding of 
the framework within which economic analysis is usually carried out. In its simplest 
form, consider an economy whose state at time t can be described by an endogenous 
variable Yt and an exogenous variable X t .9 The dynamics of the economy is 
described by a difference equation:
9 The description to follow draws on Lucas (1976) and Cooley et al. (1984).
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Yl+l= f ( Y (, X „ e , £ t ) (2.3)
where Q is a parameter vector defining the function /, and the disturbance term 
(random shock) £t has probability distribution P(£t). The description of the 
economy is completed by specifying the mechanism generating the exogenous 
variable X , , shown by
X t =g(Z"A,e, )  (2.4)
where Zt denotes the only variable affecting X t , A a parameter vector defining the 
function g, and et a disturbance term with probability distribution Q(et) .10 The 
functions /  and g are taken to be fixed but not directly known or at least not fully 
known. Data on X t and Yt is used to estimate 6 and A , as well as the parameters of 
the distributions P(£t) and Q(et). This fitted model is then used for prediction, 
policy analysis and explanation.
2.2.1 Prediction
Given an estimate of the parameters in the model (2.3), the task in prediction is to 
estimate the expected value of Yt+l when the values of Yt and X t are given. For the
time being, the presence of Yt can be overlooked. Depending on how the value of X t 
is given, three categories of prediction can be distinguished. First, there are cases 
where the actual value of X t is known and the model is used to predict Yl+l. Such
predictions are called ex post predictions, since the actual value of X t is already 
known. Secondly, there are cases where the actual value of X t is not yet known, and 
one instead uses guessed values of X t to predict future values of Yt . Such predictions
10 Z, may be the same as YL.
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are called ex ante forecasts. In both ex ante and ex post prediction, one acts as an 
observer. Thus, if the model closely approximates the associations in the population 
during the periods for which the predictions are made, it will correctly forecast future 
values of Yt , regardless of whether it is structural or not.11 A regression model is
sufficient for ex ante and ex post prediction, and no understanding of the causal 
mechanism generating Y and X  is required.
Besides these types of predictions, the concern in economics is often conditional 
prediction; that is, the objective is to predict the likely value y/+I that would arise if
X t could be set at a value different from its actual value. Since conditional prediction
implies setting the values of an exogenous variable through intervention, the model 
must be structural or, in other words, invariant to the intervention to predict the 
outcome of the intervention. A regression model of the observed regularities is not 
adequate; one needs an understanding of the structure generating the data (Lucas and 
Sargent, 1979:298).
2.2.2 Policy Analysis
The objective in policy analysis is to design changes in the economy that take it to a 
desired state. In its simplest form, a policy consists of a change in the value of a 
policy variable, say X t , to alter the value of the target variable Y,+l ~ a policy 
variable is an exogenous variable whose values can be modified through state 
intervention. Analysis of such a policy involves predicting alternative values of Yt+i
that would arise if X t were set at values different from its actual value. If such 
predictions were possible, the future values of Yt could be estimated for various 
values of X t to find a value that would yield the desired result.
More often, a policy change is defined as a change in the mechanism that determines 
a policy variable. In the context of our simple economy, this concept of policy 
intervention amounts to a change in the mechanism
11 Fair (1987:271) defines various notions of predictions.
28
X t =g(Z„X,et). (2.4)
The underlying idea is that each set of possible values for the parameters X defines a 
possible mechanism for X t . A policy change then consists of a change in the values 
of these parameters to influence the course of the economy (Tinbergen, vol.2 
1939:18). The analyst considers a different set of values for X than the actual values 
to define an alternative mechanism for X t . Having done so, he uses the rule to
generate a sequence of hypothetical values {xt } and recursively inserts them in the 
model (2.3) to simulate the course of the economy under the rule. The exercise is 
repeated for plausible values of X to select a rule with the desired outcome. A crucial 
requirement for the success of this exercise is that the model (2.3) remains invariant 
to changes in the policy rule (2.4). If a change in the mechanism generating X, 
undermines the relation (2.3) that governs the behaviour of the endogenous variable 
Yt , then an estimated version of (2.3) will not correctly predict the course of the 
economy under alternative policy rules (Lucas, 1976).
Policy analysis in either sense involves setting the values of the exogenous variables 
by intervention, and, for that reason, the relations in the model must be causal. 
Another equally important point is that if policy change involves a regime (rule) 
change, other relations in the model must be invariant to the modification in order to 
be of any use in predicting the policy outcomes. If one modifies equation (2.4), 
equation (2.3) must be invariant to the modification in order to be of any use in 
simulating the course of the economy.
2.2.3 Explanation
Another related concern in economics is to understand why certain particular facts are 
as they are. For instance, it is of utmost significance for policy analysis to understand 
why the inflation rate was at 2.5% in the UK last year or why an increase in the
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interest rate by 1% did not have the expected effect on the housing market. Still 
another concern, also related to policy analysis, is to understand the regularities that 
emerge at the economy level. To give an example, the Western economies post World 
War II displayed a trade-off between the rate of inflation and unemployment, known 
as the Phillips curve. The curve suggests that an increase in inflation is followed by a 
decline in unemployment. Any use of this regularity as a means for designing and 
evaluating employment policies demands understanding why the relation exists and, 
equally important, under what circumstances it may cease to hold. These queries fall 
under the general heading of explanation. We draw on some basic issues in the 
philosophical literature to find out what constitutes an adequate explanation of a 
particular fact. This will help us understand the features that a model should have in 
order to play a role in the explanation of economic phenomena.12
An early theory of scientific explanation, put forward by Hempel and Oppenheim 
([1948] 1965), defines an explanation of a particular fact as an argument to the effect 
that the phenomenon to be explained was to be expected by virtue of certain 
explanatory facts (Hempel, 1965:336).13 The premises in the argument constitute the 
explanans (that which does the explaining) and the conclusion is the explanandum 
(that which is explained). Hempel requires that the explanans include at least one 
lawful generalisation. This view of explanation has become known as the inferential 
view, since it identifies an explanation with an argument. Schematically an 
explanation in this approach takes the form:
True statements of initial conditions "I Explanans
Laws -*
Statement of what is to be explained. Explanandum
12 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to touch on the question of what constitutes a satisfactory 
explanation of a law or regularity. A seminal paper on this topic is Friedman (1974). Chapter 6 can 
also be viewed as an exercise in explanation of regularities.
13 The following analysis of explanation is based on Salmon (1998, chapter 19).
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Hempel distinguishes two models of explanation of particular facts. For contexts in 
which universal laws are available, such as the physical sciences, he proposes his 
deductive-nomological (D-N) model of explanation. A D-N explanation is a valid 
argument whose premises include at least one universal law and which deductively 
entails the explanandum. To give a well-known example, according to Hempel, we 
can explain why John has Down's syndrome by deducing the fact from the initial 
condition that John's cells have three copies of chromosome 21 and the law that any 
person whose cells have three copies of chromosome 21 has Down's syndrome. It is 
an essential characteristic of a D-N explanation that its explanans should include at 
least one lawful generalisation; accidental generalisation, Hempel says, do not 
explain.
For contexts such as macroeconomics in which generalisations are usually statistical, 
Hempel introduces his inductive statistical (I-S) model of explanation which proceeds 
by subsuming the event-to-be explained under a statistical law. An I-S explanation is 
also an argument, with the difference that its premises do not logically entail the 
explanandum, and are only required to confer a high probability on it. In a simple 
example from Hempel, if one asks why John rapidly recovered from his streptococcus 
infection, an I-S explanation is that he took a dose of penicillin, and almost all strep 
infections clear up quickly upon administration of penicillin. This, in Hempel’s view, 
forms an adequate explanation since the explanans are true and confer a high 
probability on the explanandum.
Unlike in a D-N explanation, the explanans in an I-S explanation do not logically 
entail the explanandum but are required to confer a high probability on it. This 
difference leads to a host of distinct issues for the I-S model of explanation which 
originate from the reference class problem. According to Hempel, an inductive 
statistical argument must refer to at least one statistical law to be an adequate 
explanation. The law gives the probability of the explanandum E given that it is a 
member of a reference class C. The problem is that the reference class C is usually 
inhomogeneous in the sense that it can be partitioned in a way that affects the 
probability of the explanandum. For instance, the generalisation in the explanation of
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John's recovery is stated in terms of the class of people who take penicillin after 
having strep infection. In this class, the frequency of quick recovery from strep 
infection is high and thus, according to Hempel, we can explain John's recovery by 
the fact that he has taken penicillin. But this class can be partitioned into two 
subclasses: one subclass consisting of people with strep infection who are resistant to 
penicillin and the other consisting of those who are not. If John is a member of the 
former subclass, taking penicillin no longer explains his recovery, despite the fact that 
in both explanations the premises can be true. In general, an event is a member of 
many classes. Depending on the class chosen to subsume the event, we can explain 
the same event (John's recovery) with different degrees of probability, or even 
explain contradictory events (non-recovery). This raises the question as to how to 
choose a reference class to explain an event.
To address this question, Hempel adds that an I-S explanation must refer to a 
statistical generalisation that is stated in terms of a 'maximally specific' reference 
class to be satisfactory. By this, he essentially means that given our background 
knowledge it must not be possible to partition the class C in a nontrivial way that 
affects the conditional probability of the explanandum. To be precise, the class C is 
said to be maximally specific if the probability of the explanandum E is the same in 
any of its subclasses; that is, if P(E / C,) = P(E / C.) for any i and j, where
(C1,C2,...,CII) is any partition of C. According to Hempel, an I-S explanation is then
adequate if the explanans are true, confer a high probability on the explanandum, and 
satisfy the requirement of maximal specificity.14
A problem with the maximal specificity requirement is that not all partitions affecting 
the probability of the explanandum are permissible. For example, given that John has 
lung cancer, that he has worked in a chemical factory where many employees have 
contracted lung cancer, that he has nicotine stained fingers, and that the frequency of 
lung cancer among people with nicotine stained fingers is higher, the requirement 
calls for using the statistical generalisation that provides the probability of lung cancer
14 On this account, the original explanation given above for John's quick recovery fails to satisfy the 
maximal specificity requirement because the class of people who take penicillin can be partitioned in a 
way that changes the conditional probability of John's recovery.
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among employees with nicotine stained fingers. But this partition is not permissible, 
since having nicotine stained fingers and having lunge cancer could be the effects of a 
common cause (heavy smoking), and an effect of a common cause does not explain 
another effect of the same cause. The moral of this story is that for an argument to be 
explanatory the explanans must be causally relevant to the explanandum. Mere 
statistical association is not sufficient (Salmon, 1998:309).
Another problem with the I-S model of statistical explanation is that it is symmetrical. 
Given a statistical association between Gaussian random variables X and Y which 
have no common causes, but X  causes Y, the I-S model implies that one can explain X  
by Y or Y by X. This implication goes against the intuition that, while causes explain 
effects, effects do not explain causes (Granger, 1988:17; Sobel, 1995:13). The 
conclusion is that the mere presence of a stable statistical correlation is not adequate 
for a statistical argument to be explanatory. An adequate explanation must relate the 
explanandum to its causes.
These considerations expose the difficulty of developing a theory of explanation of 
particular facts that makes no reference to causal relations. An explanation of a 
particular fact must give information relating to the causal process that has generated 
it. As Lewis (1986) notes, to explain a particular fact is to give information about its 
causal history. In general, whenever we try to explain a particular phenomenon, it 
must be shown that (1) the explanatory events are actually true, (2) the events are 
causes of the explanandum, in that if they were present and there were no 
preventative causes, the explanandum would occur too, and in addition (3) the events 
are actually the causes of the explanandum in the sense that if they had not been 
present in the situation under study the explanandum would not have occurred.15 The 
reason for the inclusion of this last condition is that for any event there might be 
> several sets of sufficient causes that could bring it about. Explanation of particular 
facts, therefore, calls for knowledge of the causal structure, and a model must be 
structural to be useful in explaining particular phenomena.
15 This is true if no other sufficient set of causes is present.
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To summarise the received view of macroeconomics, there is a structure behind the 
aggregate data, consisting of autonomous causal relations that, at least hypothetically, 
can be manipulated independently of each other. The prime task of macroeconomics 
is then defined to be understanding and modelling of the structure. In addition, all the 
objectives traditionally set for macroeconomics, namely ex ante and ex post 
prediction, conditional prediction, policy analysis and explanation, are considered as 
achievable.
3 The Need for Theory
A query for the received view is how the structure of the economy can be discovered. 
Natural sciences usually appeal to the method of controlled experiments to uncover 
causal relations. Economists are not in a position to subject the economic system to 
controlled experiments and must resort to statistical methods to analyse aggregate 
data. Yet, statistical analysis is inadequate for causal inference from sample data. 
There are three lines of arguments in the literature for this inadequacy of statistical 
methods, and hence the necessity of economic theory in macroeconomics. A brief 
study of these arguments sheds light on the reasons behind the emergence of 
competing approaches to macroeconomics.
3.1 Statistical Control
A major argument for the necessity of theory in macroeconomics is based on the 
inadequacy of the regression method for causal inference (henceforth, RMCI). The 
method of regression stands at the heart of econometrics and many controversies in 
macroeconomics relate to this method. It is, therefore, worthwhile explaining in some 
detail how the method is used for causal inference and why it fails in establishing 
causation. There are many discussions of the method as well as its limitations. We 
will draw on Simon (1954), Clogg and Haritou (1997), Spirtes, Glymour and 
Schemes (1998), Pearl (2000), and Spirtes (2000) to describe the method, and explain 
why it fails.
34
We first concentrate on the simple regression equation (2.1), and then extend the 
analysis to cases where there are several regressors involved. Since in the following 
the first moment of the variables is of no interest, we assume that the variables are 
measured around their mean, and drop the intercept from the equation. Equation (2.1) 
then becomes:
Y -  fix  +e (3.1)
Regression analysis is concerned with estimating the parameter f i , and the conditions 
under which an unbiased, efficient (minimum variance) and consistent estimate can 
be obtained from the data. To use this as a method of causal inference, one has to 
explain the conditions under which such an estimate of fi  can be taken as an estimate 
of the effect of X  on Y, as well as how the conditions can be established in practice. 
Accordingly, thee are three issues to address for a full view of the possible role of 
regression in causal inference. The first concerns the conditions under which an 
unbiased, efficient and consistent estimate of fi  can be obtained from the data. The 
second concerns the conditions under which the estimate can be taken as an estimate 
of the effect of X  on Y. Finally, the third concerns the possibility of establishing these 
conditions in practice. We will review the answers given to these questions by 
econometricians, and then explain why the regression method is unable to establish 
causation.
To estimate f i , users of the RMCI turn to the theory of ordinary least squares. This 
theory makes a number of assumptions about the error term e to ensure an efficient, 
unbiased and consistent estimation. To begin with, it assumes that the expected value 
of ei conditional on observation X ( is zero; that is, E{e / jc#) = 0. This implies that
the unconditional mean E{e) is zero. Likewise, the same condition implies that ei 
and X { are uncorrelated; namely, Cov(xi,£i) = 0. This last implication is known as 
the orthogonality condition. Given the linearity of (3.1), the orthogonality condition
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ensures that a least squares estimate of is unbiased. The theory also requires that 
observations on X  provide no information about the variance and covariance of the 
error term £. This means that the errors associated with the observations must have 
constant variance a 2 and be uncorrelated with each other. Under these conditions, a 
least-squares estimator of [5 is shown to be efficient, unbiased and consistent.
Econometricians and social scientists add one or two requirements to the 
orthogonality condition to identify an unbiased estimate of ft with the effect of X  on 
Y. Herbert Simon, in his celebrated article (1954), requires X  to precede Y. By this, he 
intends to rule out bi-directional causation between X and Y. Others also require that 
X  can indeed be a causal variable so as to exclude nonsense inferences like inferring 
that having nicotine stains on one's finger causes lung cancer. Therefore, according to 
the users of the RMCI, a least squares estimate of the coefficient of X  coincides with 
the effect of X  on Y if X is uncorrelated with e , X  precedes Y, and X  can indeed be a 
causal variable. The validity of this answer, Simon maintains (1954), can easily be 
shown in the context of the simple regression equation (3.1). Suppose /? in (3.1) 
represents the effect of X  on Y. If we multiply the equation through by X  and take 
expectations of both sides, we will have
Cov(X, Y) = J3V(X) + Cov(X, e ) , (3.2)
where Cov(X,Y) is the covariance of X  and Y, V(X) is the variance of X, and 
Cov(X,£) covariance of X  and £.  If X and £ are uncorrelated, the least squares 
estimate /3xy will be equal Cov(X,Y) /V(X) , which is the same as f i , the effect of 
X  on Y. That is,
PXY = Cov(X ,Y) /V(X)  = J3
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However, if the condition fails, ftXY and /? will no longer be the same. Implicit in 
this analysis is that every correlation has a causal explanation, in the sense that it 
arises either because of a direct causal connection or because of unmeasured common 
causes. So, if the existence of unmeasured common causes is ruled out by assuming 
the orthogonality condition, a correlation between X  and Y reveals the presence of a 
direct causal connection. Evidently, if the world contained spurious correlations, 
which could not be explained by reference to latent common causes, the orthogonality 
condition would not justify inferring from a correlation between X  and Y that either X 
causes Y or Y causes X. Such a conclusion would demand first ruling out all possible 
non-causal explanations.16
This brief description of the RMCI shows how the regression method is used to 
establish causation. Given the conditions, one simply regresses Y on X. If the least 
squares estimate fiXY differs from zero, X  is said to cause Y, and if it is zero, X  is said 
not to cause Y. The success of this method depends, on the one hand, on the adequacy 
of the conditions and, on the other, on the possibility of establishing them in practice. 
The first topic, that is, the adequacy of the conditions, falls outside the scope of this 
chapter.17 Instead, we study the second issue. All the three conditions demand a 
careful analysis. But, to keep the discussion short, we confine ourselves to an 
examination of the orthogonality condition, as this will suffice to explain why the 
RMCI fails.
The RMCI comes with a method for establishing the orthogonality condition. To 
explain the method, it is vital to note that this condition differs from other familiar 
statistical assumptions underlying a regression model, such as the linearity of the 
function linking X  and Y or the normality of the distribution of Y. The validity of 
these assumptions can be checked by using observations on X  and Y. In fact, for 
arbitrarily large samples, there are statistical algorithms that discover the functional
16 See N. Cartwright (1989) for a full discussion.
17 Woodward (1999) and Pearl (2000) have argued that the orthogonality condition is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for causal interpretation of a regression equation.
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form of the relation between X and Y, and estimate the correct density function of Y. 
In contrast, observations on X  and Y contain no information on the validity of the 
orthogonality condition. This follows from the fact that the true disturbances £i 
associated with observations (xity,) are never known. In practice, we can only 
estimate the residuals el =(yi —yi) % with yt being the predicted value of yr  
However, if we use, for example, the least squares method to estimate /?, the 
residuals et are automatically uncorrelated with xr  Thus, one cannot uses the
residuals to establish the condition (Clogg, et al., 1997:94).18 In this sense, the 
condition is not a statistical assumption.
Faced with this limitation, econometricians have tried to establish, or at least support, 
the validity of the orthogonality condition by bringing in variables other than X  and Y. 
To understand the philosophy behind this attempt, one should note that the error term 
£ in equation (3.1), when taken as a structural relation, stands for the effects of 
omitted variables on Y. Any correlation between X and £ is, therefore, said to 
indicate the presence of latent common causes for X  and Y. Such variables are 
referred to as confounders.19 This interpretation suggests that the correlation between 
X  and £ can be eliminated by including all the confounders of X  and Y in the 
regression of Y on X. In that case, the error term £ will be uncorrelated with X, and if 
other conditions are in place, an estimate of fi  will coincide with the effect of X on 
Y. It has thus been suggested that the orthogonality condition can be established by 
searching for all the confounders of X  and Y, and including them in the regression of 
y  on X. To estimate the effect of X  on Y, it is not enough to estimate the simple 
regression equation (3.1). Instead, it is necessary to regress Y on X  and all the 
confounders of X  and Y. An estimate of the regression coefficient of X  in this
18 The ordinary least squares regression coefficient of X  is given by E(YX)/E(XX). If  we define f t  as 
equal to E(YX)/E(XX), we have
£ = Y — pX,
X e  = XY -  J3(XX),
E(X£) = E(YX) -  pE{XX)  = 0.
19 In other words, a confounder of X  and Y  is a variable that is a cause of both X  and Y.
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equation corresponds with the effect of X  on Y. The process of regressing on 
confounders is often called conditioning or statistical control.
The reasoning behind this claim can be illustrated by considering the case, where
0C\there is only one confounder Z for X and Y. Suppose the process generating Y can be 
described by model (3.3):
X = qZ  + £{ (3.3a)
y = p x  + jz  + e2 ' (3.3b)
where Cov(ey, e2) = 0 , and a , f i , y are different from zero. Z in this model is a 
common cause of X  and Y. If we estimate (3.1) in place of equation (3.3b), X and £ 
will be correlated, and a least squares estimate of the coefficient of X  will differ from 
/?. To see this, we simply need to multiply (3.3b) through by X  and take expectations 
of both sides to get
Cov(X,Y)  = j3V(X) + a jV(Z) .
We then have
* Cov(X,Y) pV(X) + a jV (Z )
V(X)  V(X)
However, if Z is included in the regression of Y on X, the orthogonality condition is 
satisfied and the least squares estimate of ft  can be equated with the effect of X  on Y, 
as shown below:
* _ Cov(X,Y/Z)  _ Cov(X,Y)V(Z)-Cov(X,Z)Cov(Y,Z)
Pxy/z -  V ( x f Z )  ~ V(X)V(Z) -Cov(X,Z)2
20 This example is borrowed with some changes from Spirtes et al. (1998).
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P ( V ( X ) - a 2V(Z))
V ( X ) - a 2V(Z)
The example illustrates that regression on a confounder eliminates bias; it turns an 
otherwise biased estimate into an unbiased one.
The problem with this reasoning, of course, is that the set of confounders of X  and Y 
is not known. In practice, statisticians inevitably replace the set of confounders of X 
and Y with a set of potential confounders, namely, a set of measured variables that 
precede X  and Y and can possibly affect them. It is held that by controlling for 
potential confounders, one is likely to control for the real confounders, and eliminate 
possible correlation between X  and e (Black, 1982:31). Thus, one is advised to 
control for as many potential confounders as one can to achieve a reliable estimate of 
the effect of X  on Y. The longer the list of potential confounders included in the 
regression of Y on X, the more reliable is said to be the estimate:
One must include in the equation fitted to data every ‘optional’ concomitant 
[potential confounder] that might reasonably be suspected of either affecting 
or merely preceding Y given X -  or if the available degrees of freedom do not 
permit this, then in at least one of several equations fitted to the data (Pratt 
and Schelifer, 1988:44).21
In this way, multivariate regression has come to dominate macroeconomics. To 
estimate the effect of X  on Y, Y is regressed on X  and a few other variables thought 
likely to affect both X  and Y. The estimate of in the equation with all the potential 
confounders, whose inclusion affects the estimate of f3 , is taken to represent the 
effect of X  on Y. The RMCI can also be generalised to regression equations with 
multiple regressors. For a causal interpretation of a multivariate regression equation, 
all the regressors are required to precede the response variable Y and to be 
uncorrelated with the error term. Similarly, to establish the orthogonality condition,
21 The phrase inside the bracket is added.
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one has to control for all the confounders of the regressors and the response variable 
(Clogg et al., 1997:94).
3.1.1 Limitations of Statistical Control
Critiques have questioned the adequacy of the RMCI from a variety of perspectives. 
Most of these criticisms relate to the limitations of statistical control in practice. One 
limitation arises from the small number of variables measured in practice. To state the 
critique precisely, let C be the complete set of potential confounders for X  and Y. The 
plausible idea of statistical control is that if we could control for all the variables in C, 
we would be able to control for all the real confounders of X  and Y, and estimate the 
effect of X on Y. But the set C is never completely known. What one measures in 
practice is a proper subset of C, which may exclude some or even all of the actual 
confounders of X  and Y. As a result, conditioning on measured confounders can never 
guarantee the truth of the orthogonality condition, and a non-zero estimate of fi can 
always be due to latent common causes. The RMCI on its own fails to distinguish 
between cases of genuine causal connection and spurious correlation (Pearl, 
2000:186).
Another problem is that conditioning on a measured variable, which is not a 
confounder but is taken as a potential confounder, can turn a consistent estimate of 
the effect of X  on Y into an inconsistent estimate. This occurs whenever one controls 
for a barren proxy', that is, a variable Z that is correlated with factors that influence X  
and Y but itself has no effect on X  and Y. As an illustration, consider the following 
example studied by Pearl (2000), Spirtes et al. (1998), and Spirtes (1997). Suppose 
that our set of measured variables consists of {X, Y, Z), X  precedes Y, and that Z
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precedes both X  and Y. Also, suppose that the causal structure of these variables is 
given by the model below (Figure 1),
X = U] + £x 
Z — ccU, + U 2 + £z 
Y = j3X + )U2 + e y X Y Y = Death
U| = Smoking 
U2 = Age
Z = Nicotine stains 
X = Lung cancer
Figure 1
where £x, £z and £y are independent error terms, U { is an unmeasured common cause
of X and Z, and U2 is an unmeasured common cause of Y and Z. Further, suppose that 
the unmeasured variables are uncorrelated with the error terms. In this setting, if Y is 
regressed on X alone, the least squares estimate of fi  is consistent. However, if Y is 
regressed on both X  and Z, the estimate of fi is no longer consistent, and normally 
differs from the effect of X on Y. This can be seen from the least squares estimate of fi 
in the regression equation of Y on X and Z. To this end, we first note that 
Cov(X,Z)  = aV(Ux) and Cov(Y,Z) = fi(aV(Ul)) + ^V(U2) . Let Cov(X,Z) = p  and 
)V(U2) = T. Then we have
which generally differs from f i . The estimate is consistent only if either p  or T is zero.
from zero. “[T]here is no sense in which one is ‘playing safe’ by including rather than 
excluding ‘potential confounders’ in the conditioning set; conditioning on these variables 
could change a consistent estimate into an inconsistent estimate” (Spirtes, 1997:7). One 
cannot simply condition on any measured variable that precedes X and Y. Before 
conditioning, it must be ensured that the variable is not a barren proxy and doing this
AX Y / Z  ~^ Cov(X,Y/Z) ^  Cov(X,Y)V(Z )- Cov(X,Z)Cov(Y,Z) XY/Z V ( X / Z ) V(X)V(Z) -Cov(X,Z)2
f iV(X)V(Z)-p(pf i  + r ) _ p r
V ( X ) V ( Z ) - p 2 V ( X ) V ( Z ) - p 2
Otherwise, fi might be zero but the least squares estimate A ™  significantly different
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obviously necessitates some knowledge about the causal relation between the 
measured and unmeasured variables affecting X  and Y. Such knowledge cannot be 
obtained from statistical analysis of data on the measured variables.
Another related point is that a potential confounder must itself satisfy the 
orthogonality condition (Clogg, et al., 1997:98). To be precise, to control for a 
potential confounder Z in estimating the effect of X  on Y, Z  must also be uncorrelated 
with the error term. Since this requirement cannot be assumed a priori, one needs to 
bring in new variables to ensure that Z and £ are uncorrelated. This, of course, 
requires making new orthogonality assumptions. It is thus never possible to establish 
the orthogonality condition by controlling for measured potential confounders 
(Freedman, 1987:307). To terminate the regression, one must rely on substantive 
domain specific information. This necessity of subject-matter information in 
establishing causation is viewed as a key reason for the essential role of theory in 
macroeconomics.
3.2 The Identification Problem
A second argument for the necessity of theory in macroeconomics relates to the 
conditions under which the parameters of a model are fully determined by the joint 
probability distribution of the observables in the model -  the so-called identification 
problem. Historically, a common belief in economics has been that the values of 
important economic variables such as demand and supply for a good are 
simultaneously determined, and for that reason the economy is said to be best 
represented by a simultaneous equations model. Because of feedback, the error terms 
across the equations in a simultaneous equation model are not usually uncorrelated. 
Consequently, applying the ordinary least squares method to the model does not yield 
consistent estimates of the parameters. To achieve consistent estimates, the model 
must first be transformed into a system of regression equations or, in other words, a 
reduced form model, where the errors across the equations are independent. In this 
context, the identification problem is the problem of inferring the parameters of the
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underlying simultaneous equations model (structural model) from the parameters of 
the regression model (Manski, 1995). However, it is usually the case that a large, and 
often infinite, set of parameter values of the structural model is consistent with the 
parameters of the reduced form model, making it impossible to infer the parameters 
of the structural model from those of the reduced form model.22 The identification 
problem thus has no purely statistical solution.
In the context of simultaneous equations models, the identification problem can be 
resolved by imposing restrictions on the variables that enter into each equation. In a 
linear structural model, if one can exclude from each equation one variable that enters 
into other equations, none of the model equations can be written as a linear 
combination of the others, and the model becomes identifiable (Koopmans, 1949 
(1971): 169). One arguably needs to rely on non-sample (domain-specific) 
information to decide which variable to exclude from or include into an equation. 
Likewise, in recursive models, identifiability calls for the orthogonality condition and 
the independence of the disturbance terms across the equations (Boudon, 1968:208; 
Blalock, 1968:167).23 These conditions, as argued earlier, are not statistical 
assumptions; they can be justified only by means of domain-specific information, 
another reason for the essential role of theory in modelling the economy.
It should be noted that the identification problem is different from the causal 
inference problem, as there could be more than one identifiable causal model 
consistent with a data set. Recursive models are always identifiable if the disturbance 
terms satisfy the orthogonality condition and are independent across the model 
equations. But there are usually many identifiable recursive causal models consistent 
with a data set. This lack of uniqueness leads to a quandary regarding which is the 
true causal model. A solution to the identification problem is not, therefore, a solution 
to the causal inference problem.
22 For an example, see Koopmans (1949 [1971]: 169).
23 A thorough analysis of the identification problem is given in Manski (1995).
44
3.3 The Lucas Argument
The last two arguments reveal some of the limitations of statistical analysis for causal 
inference. The economic literature also provides a third important argument for the 
necessity of theory, which is based on the inadequacy of knowledge of the existing 
structure for policy analysis. Various statements of this argument are found in the 
writings of early econometricians, including Haavelmo (1944), Koopmans (1947), 
and Hurwicz (1962). However, it was Lucas who most forcefully stated the argument 
in his critique of econometric policy evaluation (1976), and supported it by means of 
various graphic examples. Lucas’ critique is primarily directed at what he calls the 
conventional theory of policy evaluation built around a model of the economy 
essentially similar to the one described earlier. Recall the economy had a single 
endogenous variable Yt , whose law of motion was given by the difference equation
In this setting, Lucas interprets a policy change as a change in the rule governing the 
policy variable X t , which involves setting the parameters A at values different than 
their actual values. Thus, in evaluating policies, the analyst contemplates a set of 
values for A different than the actual values, derives a sequence of values for X t 
using the new rule, and recursively inserts them into the fitted model (3.5a) to predict 
future values of Yt+{. The exercise is carried out for different values of A to select a 
rule that produces the desirable result.
This practice, Lucas argues, is fundamentally flawed, as it assumes that the economic 
structure (f,6) prior to the policy change (call it the old structure) and the structure 
afterwards (call it the new structure) are the same. The structure, however, emerges
(3.5a)
and the rule (law) governing the policy (exogenous) variable X t by
X t = g(Z,,A,e,). (3.5b)
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from and is sensitive to the decision rules (supply and demand functions) of the 
agents. As we change a policy regime, we change the environment in which the 
agents operate, altering the constraints restricting their choice behaviour. The agents 
recognise the change and modify their decision rules. This invalidates the structural 
model fitted to the data collected prior to the intervention, rendering it useless for 
predicting the course of the economy under the new policy regime. And so, statistical 
analysis alone, Lucas argues, cannot provide the information requisite for policy 
evaluation, because econometric analysis can at most offer knowledge of the 
prevailing structure from which the data have been sampled. Evaluating non-trivial 
policies, however, calls for knowledge of the new structure emerging from the policy 
change, for which no data are yet available, and hence whose discovery falls outside 
the domain of statistics.
To elaborate on what is involved in inferring the new structure, let f*u stand for a 
structural relation true of the economy prior to the policy change and f ^ w stand for 
the relation true after the change. Each new relation f'new theoretically depends on the 
old relation / 0'w and the policy; i.e.,
f L = M f L  policy). (3.6)
Hurwicz (1962) calls these mappings modification function. Thus, in addition to the 
knowledge of the old structure, inferring the new structure requires knowledge of the 
modification functions (j)i , which map each old relation / 0'u into a new relation f ^w.
These functions cannot be inferred by statistical analysis of the data generated by the 
old structure, and one needs a theory to explain how people react to the policy and 
how that affect the structural relations currently true of the economy. To put it 
somewhat differently, Lucas’ argument points to another important aspect of the 
inadequacy of statistical analysis for causal inference. It states that for evaluating 
actions and policies not only it is essential to know whether a relationship of interest 
is causal but it is also essential to know the conditions under which it remains
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invariant. Such knowledge requires more than analysis of the data generated by the 
current structure. It demands understanding the chance-setup leading to the relation. 
The issues of whether a relation is causal and the conditions under which it remains 
invariant are distinct matters (see also Cartwright, 1995).
The Lucas critique has been criticised on several grounds. Notably, it has been argued 
that the critique only applies to interventions involving a change in a policy rule but 
such changes are very rare (Sims, 1982). Or it has been said that people are slow in 
absorbing the effects of policy changes and, therefore, in practice, statistical models 
closely approximating the prevailing structure give reliable short-run forecasts of the 
policy outcomes. These criticisms, even if true, do not weaken the logical force of 
Lucas’ argument. The point is that if a policy change could shift the structure, for 
predicting the policy outcomes, one would first have to predict the emerging 
structure, which cannot be achieved by statistical analysis of the data sampled from 
the structure prior to the change.
This section has studied three arguments for the necessity of subject matter 
information in modelling the structure. A central question in macroeconomics is 
whether there is an alternative procedure for acquiring the theoretical information 
necessary for modelling the structure. Reflection on this question has led to several 
rival approaches to macroeconomics. The remainder of this chapter reconstructs two 
competing approaches, which span the spectrum of views on the scope and nature of 
macroeconomics.
4 The Theoretical Approach
The first approach is theoretical macroeconomics. The general idea of this approach 
is present in the writings of the early members of the Cowles Commission, including 
Koopmans (1947b) and Marshack (1953), as well as other early economists such as 
Jevons (1871) and Hicks (1939). A rigorous and systematic statement of the 
approach, however, emerged as a result of new classical economists’ reflection on the
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failure of Keynesian macroeconomic models in the 1970s (Lucas and Sargent, 1979). 
To put it quite generally, according to these economists, economics can acquire the 
theoretical information necessary for modelling the structure by adopting a bottom-up 
approach to the study of large-scale economic phenomena. This involves establishing 
a theory of microeconomic behaviour and transforming it into a theory of the 
economy using aggregation methods. The theoretical approach rests on two basic 
assumptions regarding human behaviour and the relation between the micro and 
macro levels in the economy.
The first assumption is that we have, or it is possible to establish, a satisfactory theory 
of individual behaviour. Early in the history of modem economics, economists 
thought that intuition, introspection, and interview were reliable means of 
understanding behaviour. Tjailing Koopmans held that through these means it would 
be possible to establish the motives of consumers, firms and investors, and hence 
understand how they make decisions. The information, he added, could eventually be 
turned into a theory of economic behaviour as precise as the laws of motion of 
material bodies known to Kepler (Koopmans, 1947b: 166).24 In recent years, more 
emphasis has been placed on experimentation. It has been suggested that neither the 
ethical prohibitions nor the unbearable costs involved in experimenting with the 
economy are encountered in studying individual behaviour. Therefore, even if current 
theories of behaviour are imprecise, with adequate research it should be possible to 
establish an adequate theory of behaviour (Lucas; 1980:288-90).
The second assumption is that the laws of the society are the same as the laws of the 
individual, and hence a theory of the economy as a whole can be inferred from a 
theory of individual behaviour. In this regard, theoretical economists follow John 
Stuart Mill, who wrote:
“Human beings in the society have no properties but those which derived from,
and may be resolved into the laws of the nature of the individual man. In social
24 A similar view regarding the obviousness of the laws of economic behaviour is explicit in Mill’s 
Principles of Political Economy, where he writes “Happily, there is nothing in the laws of Value which 
remains for the present writer or any future writer to clear up; the theory of the subject is complete” 
(1848 [ 1990]:420).
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phenomena the Composition of Causes is the universal law”(John Stuart Mill 
(1974 [1874]): 879)
There are at least two interpretations of this doctrine in the literature. In the early days 
of economics, Jevons (1965 [1871]: 16) and Hicks (1939:245) held that the general 
form of the laws of economics is the same in the case of a single decision maker and 
a nation, and thus the laws of the economic system can be derived from the laws of a 
single decision making unit, be it a household or a firm. Another interpretation of the 
doctrine, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of competition. It says what 
characterizes an economy is competition over scarce resources, and to understand the 
laws of the economy it is vital to understand how individuals compete against each 
other. The interpretation, therefore, identifies the laws of the economy with the laws 
of a group of competitive agents, not with the laws of a single individual (Lucas, 
1981:289).
The implications of these assumptions for modelling the economy are clear. By 
observation and experimentation, the economist can establish a theory of individual 
behaviour, replace the variables in the micro theory with their corresponding 
aggregate variables to obtain a qualitative model of the economy, and use aggregate 
data to estimate the model, hence transforming it into a quantitative model. Since the 
model is derived from the laws governing the basic decision making units of the 
economy, it correctly represents the structure. Accordingly, the main methodological 
objective of modem theoretical economics, at least as understood by the new 
classicals, has been to incorporate aggregative problems into the framework of 
microeconomics, eliminate the distinction between microeconomic and 
macroeconomic theory, and speak of economic theory in general. Robert Lucas 
vividly states and defends this claim in the following passage:
"The most interesting developments in macroeconomic theory seem to me 
describable as the reincorporation of aggregative problems such as inflation 
and the business cycle within the general framework of 'microeconomic' 
theory. If these developments succeed, the term 'macroeconomic' will simply 
disappear from use and the modifier 'micro' will be superfluous. We will 
simply speak, as did Smith, Ricardo, Marshall and Walras, of economic 
theory." (Lucas 1987:107-8)
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The project of inferring the patterns emerging at the economy level from a theory of 
individual or group behaviour is known as the microfoundations project. The project 
is claimed to enable the economist to establish a reliable theory of the economy 
without having to subject it to costly and prohibitive experiments:
Suppose that we have some ability to predict how individual behaviour will 
respond to specified changes. How, if at all, can such knowledge be translated 
into knowledge of the way an entire society is likely to react to changes in its 
environment? ... We clearly need to know something about the way a group of 
monkeys interacts, in addition to their individual preferences, in order to have 
any hope of progress on this complicated question.... The ingredient omitted so 
far is, of course, competition... Notice that, having specified the rules by which 
interaction occurs in detail, and in a way that introduces no free parameters, the 
ability to predict individual behaviour is nonexperimentally transformed into 
the ability to predict group behaviour. ... This is exactly why we care about the 
"microeconomic foundations" of aggregate theories (Lucas, 1981:289-91).25
The derived theory is believed to specify variables relevant for describing the 
economy, draw a line between endogenous and exogenous variables, determine the 
sign of relevant regression coefficients, and impose constraints on the form of the 
functions relating the aggregates. This information will be adequate for modelling the 
structure, and all the conventional goals of macroeconomics are thus claimed to be 
attainable. Most importantly, the microfoundations project is said to make it possible 
to predict the outcomes of policies that could shift the structure. One begins by 
analysing how a proposed policy might affect the way in which basic decision­
making units of the economy interact with each other and make decisions. Knowing 
this, one will be able to infer through aggregation the impact of the policy on the 
economy as a whole, and derive the new structure that will prevail after the policy 
change. Since the same can be carried out for any policy, one will be able to help the 
state officials to select an optimal policy (Lucas and Sargent, 1979). Theoretical 
economics confines the role of statistical methods to estimating and testing of 
economic theories, and leaves no role for the regression method in causal inference. If 
a theoretical model fails to accord with the data, the road to progress is held to lie in 
searching for better theories, not in sophistication of statistical procedures or in 
collection of more aggregate data.
25 Italics are added. Also see the same article, footnote 11.
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The call for microfoundations is characteristic of all schools of theoretical economics. 
It is, nevertheless, in the new classical school that the search for microfoundations has 
most systematically been pursued. In this school, one definition of microeconomic 
theory takes the basic unit of economic analysis to be a single decision maker, either 
a consumer (household) or a producer (firm). The consumer is modelled as an 
expected utility maximizer whereas the firm as an expected profit maximizer. 
Moreover, when there is uncertainty, the individual is assumed to act according to the 
true probabilistic model of the economy. From this perspective, a call for 
microfoundations is a call for a model of the economy in which the starting point is 
an expected utility or profit maximisation problem. To model the relation between 
aggregate variables of interest, such as aggregate income and consumption, a utility 
maximization problem for a single consumer is set up and solved subject to his 
budget constraint. The solution defines the relation between the relevant micro 
variables, say, individual income and consumption. The same relation is hypothesized 
to be true at the aggregate level, and the corresponding aggregate variables are 
inserted into the model to derive a model of the economy. Aggregate data are then 
used to estimate the model. This approach usually goes by the name of the 
“representative agent” or “per capita” modelling approach.
Another definition of microeconomics in the new .classical school stresses 
competition. In a competitive environment, the outcomes of an agent’s decision 
depends on the actions of others in the economy, which means agents must form 
expectations about the actions of others and, indeed, expectations about the 
expectations of others, and so forth. This feature of the economy is believed to be best 
captured by assuming equilibrium (Chari, 1999:3). Therefore, new classical 
economists have mainly equated microeconomic theory with the theory of Walrasian 
general equilibrium, or its successor the Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium 
theory, supplemented with the rational expectations hypothesis. In light of this 
interpretation, the laws of the economy are identified with the laws derived from the 
general equilibrium theory joined with the rational expectations hypothesis (Howitt, 
1986:273). A model is called structural if it is built on an appropriate microeconomic
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theory. Models that lack microeconomic foundations are viewed as non-structural 
(Sims, 1991:923, footnote; 1982:115-6).
5 Atheoretical Macroeconomics
The view of theoretical economics given above characterises one extreme side of the 
spectrum of competing views on the nature and scope of macroeconomics. The view 
stands on two types of assumptions. Metaphysically, it assumes that the micro- 
economic structure leads to a unique set of stable relations among economic 
aggregates, suitable for a causal account. And methodologically, it assumes that an 
accurate theory of individual behaviour can be established and no substantial 
difficulties arise in transforming it into a theory of the economy. We now present an
alternative view that stands on the other extreme side of the spectrum of opinions
*)(\about macroeconomics. The approach is due to Christopher Sims, who, in one way 
or another, challenges all the assumptions underlying theoretical economics. 
Following Cooley and LeRoy (1985), we refer to this approach as atheoretical 
macroeconomics.
Sims’ atheoretical approach also emerged in response to a general discontent with the 
performance of macroeconomic models during the 1970s and 1980s. Most 
economists of the time, including Sims, blamed the failure on the identifying 
restrictions underpinning the models, which were supposedly derived from economic 
theory. Sims termed the restrictions as ‘incredible’ (Sims, 1980:1; 1982a: 108). 
However, contrary to the theoretical economists, he did not think that the key to 
improving the state of macroeconomics was to search for better theories. In his view, 
the problem with macroeconomics was more profound. Consequently, he called for a 
far-reaching revision of the field and its objectives. Sims’ revision is open to more 
than one interpretation. Two possible interpretations will be discussed here, one 
methodological and the other metaphysical.
26 For a history of atheoretical macroeconomics see Simkins (1999).
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Our accounts of atheoretical macroeconomics differ from a dominant interpretation of 
the approach criticised in a well-known paper by Cooley and LeRoy (1985). 
According to these authors, Sims altogether dispenses with the role of economic 
theory or in general domain specific information, and seeks to achieve the traditional 
objectives of macroeconomics by means of statistical analysis of aggregate data 
alone.27 A reason put forward for this reading is the use of Granger’s test of causality 
by Sims and his followers, which is nothing but a statistical procedure for 
determining whether a variable helps predict another variable. Another reason is the 
claim by Sims that atheoretical models are useful for policy analysis. Since a model 
must be structural to be useful for policy evaluation, any claim for usefulness of 
atheoretical models for policy analysis presumes a structural interpretation of the 
models. Both reasons can be challenged. To begin with, Sims rejects that the Granger 
test of causality alone can ever establish causality (1977:29 and 42; 1986:3). In his 
view, it is always necessary to rely on non-sample information to conclude that a 
relation that passes the test is actually structural. Moreover, according to Sims, 
atheoretical models, as long as they remain uninterrupted, are of no use in policy 
analysis (1986:3); Sims simply challenges the claim that the interpretation derives 
from a well-founded economic theory (1982a: 138). I shall rely on Sims’ own writings 
as well as Cooley and LeRoy’s paper (1985), Learner (1985), Pagan (1987), and 
Swanson and Granger (1997) to give a brief review of formal aspects of Sims' 
modelling approach.
5.1 Methodological Interpretation
On this interpretation, Sims agrees with the theoretical economists that the relations 
discemable at the economy level are in principle suitable for a structural account but 
challenges the existence of a reliable method for discovering the structure. Sims 
argues that economic theories- are bound to remain imprecise due to the lack of 
controlled experiments and the fact that the economic structure is non-stationary. The 
structure continuously shifts through natural, social and political changes, and 
critically through accumulation of experience by people. As people learn about the
27 Cartwright (1989), Epstein (1989) and Learner (1985) suggest a similar interpretation.
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economy and discover the outcome of their actions, they modify their behaviour, and 
this shifts the structure. As a consequence, a theory approximately true of a situation 
might no longer be true of a new situation, making it difficult to tell whether the 
failure of economic theories is due to changes in the structure or to mistakes in 
theorising about the structure:
... dynamic economic theories must inherently be incomplete, imprecise, and 
therefore subject to variation over time. One reason for this is that economic 
cause-effect relations involve a "recognition delay" about which theory has 
little to say and may be expected to be variable.... It is wrong, then, to expect 
economic theories to be complete, mechanical, and divorced from reference to 
specific historical circumstances (Sims, 1981:579).28
Sims argues that this inherent imprecision renders economic theory personal and 
subjective (2004:282). And, as a consequence, uninterpreted statistical models of 
aggregate data are the only yardsticks of objectivity in macroeconomics, forming a 
basis around which economists may come to narrow down their differences (Sims, 
1987:53). These models are not, however, suitable for policy analysis, which requires 
classifying the variables into exogenous and endogenous categories, and deciding 
whether a variable can be influenced by a policy. In making such decisions, the 
analyst must inevitably rely on his personal view of the economy. Two economists, 
with different views of the economy, can arrive at conflicting interpretations of a 
single model of the data, and there is no objective ground to decisively resolve the 
disagreement.
Sims discerns three general stages in modelling aggregate data. The first stage is to 
build a model that best fits the data, which gives one possible characterisation of the 
economic structure. The second stage is to search for alternative models equally 
fitting the data, which provide different views of the structure that might have 
generated the data. In the final step, the analyst relies on his personal view of the 
economy to select one of the models that, in his view, is most likely to approximate 
the structure. An appropriate modelling approach, Sims says, must distinguish 
between those aspects of a model that are based on the analysis of data, and those 
based on subjective judgements about the economic structure (1982b:317; 1987:51).
28 Similar remarks are found in Sims (1996:113).
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Such a distinction, he argues, saves economics from the Lucas critique (1976) and 
that of Freedman (1981), as these critiques are directed at the subjective features of 
large-scale economic models (Sims, 1982b:317).
5.1.1 Vector Autoregression
Sims therefore abandons the framework laid down in the Cowles Commission that 
requires a theory to specify relevant variables, divide them into exogenous and 
endogenous variables, and determine the variables entering in each equation in the 
model. As an alternative, he puts forward a framework in which there is initially no 
division of the variables into exogenous and endogenous categories and every 
variable enters into the equation of every other variable (Hendry, 1993:128).29 The 
modeller relies on his view of the economy to select relevant variables and then uses 
the data as well as subjective and pragmatic considerations to select a model. To 
describe Sims’s formal approach, we adopt a study from Swanson and Granger 
(1997), which models the behaviour of four aggregate variables consisting of money 
M t , consumption C,, investment / , ,  and gross domestic product Yt . Let Yf be the
vector of current variables (Mn C,,I,,Yt) and Y,_,. the vector of lagged variables 
(M ^.C ,^.,/,^.,}^). Theoretically, the point of departure in Sims’s approach is a 
structural model of the following form:
where B and r f's are 4x4  matrices whose terms are polynomial in the lag operator,
p  is the lag length, and et is a column vector of stochastic error processes with
elements eit. The matrices have no zero element and all the variables are of identical
lags. Also, the model contains only current and lagged endogenous variables. This 
contrasts with a structural model of theoretical economics in which the theory dictates
29 Before Sims, T.C. Liu (1960) had argued that in a macroeconomic setting no variable could be regarded 
as exogenous.
(5.1)
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variables to be either endogenous or exogenous, and sets some elements of the 
coefficient matrices to zero.
In practice, Sims works with a vector autoregression (VAR) representation of (5.1), in 
which each current variable is regressed on its own past values and past values of 
other variables under study. The transformation into a VAR model leads to a model 
of the form
where the At ’s are 4x4  matrices, w, is a 4x1 column vector of stochastic error
processes, 2 is the contemporaneous covariance matrix, and E(.) is the expectation 
operator. Every current variable in (5.2) is a function of two components: its best 
linear predictor based on past values of all the variables considered and its 
unpredictable error un which is also called ‘innovation’ (Darnell, 1990:120). The 
innovation terms satisfy the orthogonality condition, and the least squares method can 
be used to estimate the parameters At .30
A VAR model can effectively captures patterns existing in the data and, so long as 
the mechanism generating the data remains the same, is useful for ex ante and ex post 
prediction. A VAR model, however, sweeps all the (exogenous) variables that can 
affect the contemporaneous variables under the blanket of the disturbance 
(innovation) terms aind is only driven by random shocks. As a result, it is not suitable 
for policy analysis in the traditional sense which involves tracing out the effects on 
the endogenous variables of changes in the exogenous variables or the rules 
governing them. Sims and his followers inevitably redefine a policy as a random 
shock to a variable in the system, and interpret policy analysis as the task of tracing 
out the reaction of the system to that shock. But even in this narrow sense, a VAR 
model cannot be used for policy analysis. In general, the contemporaneous covariance
30 This follows from the assumption that the present does not influence the past and the fact that all the 
variables on the right hand side of (5.2) are lagged except for ut.
(5.2)
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matrix £  is not diagonal. The non-zero off-diagonal elements entail that one variable, 
say Yt , cannot be shocked through its corresponding error term, uit, without having
to simultaneously deliver correlated influence on other variables (Demiralp, et al., 
2003:746). Without independence, it will not be possible to use the model to trace out 
the evolution of the system caused by a shock to a single variable. Sims and other 
VAR modellers advocate orthogonalizing the shocks using a Choleski decomposition 
to diagonalize the error covariance matrix £  by pre-multiplying (5.2) with the unique 
triangular matrix T. This generates a Wold causal chain among the current elements 
of Y, vector:31
orthogonalized innovations (Sims, 1987:52-3). A problem with this exercise is that
there is a unique triangular matrix which orthogonalizes the covariance matrix of the 
errors. Generally speaking, if we have k endogenous variables in the model, we can 
order them in k\ ways, resulting in k\ different causal chain models equally fitting the 
data. These models describe alternative causal relations among the variables, and if 
no way can be found to select an ordering, any policy analysis based on a model like
(5.3) will be arbitrary. A crucial matter facing the VAR methodology is how to 
transform a VAR model into a causal chain model in a non-arbitrary way.
In principle, Sims thinks “There is no unique way to do this” (1980:21). However, he 
suggests that some confidence in an ordering can be gained by checking the 
performance of the model against the data. In this line, if, for instance, we partition 
the data containing a shock to a variable into two parts, fit the model to one part, and 
the model closely approximates the impact of the shock in the other part, we gain
31 A Wold causal chain is a system of equations in which the shock to Yi contemporaneously affect Y2, 
Y2,...,Y„ while the shock to Y2 contemporaneously affect Y3, Y4, Y n but into Y\ with a lag, and so on.
(5.3)
where rjt -  Tut and D = TLT , a diagonal matrix. The errors rjt are termed as the
the causal ordering is arbitrary, since for any ordering of the variables in model (5.2)
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some confidence in the model. If a model is fitted to all the data, and there is no other 
data to check the performance of the model outside the sample period, the reliability 
of the model remains in doubt.
5.1.3 Selecting a Causal Chain Model
Since Sims’ paper (1980), there have been several attempts to reduce the subjectivity 
involved in transforming a VAR model into a causal chain model. A proposal, which 
is in line with Sims’ view, is found in Swanson and Granger (1997), who aim to 
devise a data-driven method for causally ordering the error terms.32 These authors 
begin by estimating the VAR model (5.2) and using it to compute the residuals 
associated with the observations on the variables. The residuals form the data in their 
study of the causal relations among the errors. An assumption underlying Swanson 
and Granger’s method is that the causal relations among the errors are recursive such 
that the error in the first equation in the appropriate model is exogenous and only 
affects the errors in the following equations (although generalisation to non-recursive 
models is possible in principle). Having said this, a possible ordering of the errors 
associated with model (5.2) is the following:
m t  =  V Mt
i. = con, + vi t
c, = yt, + Ora, + vc, 
yt = + 0 it + 0 mt + vYt
(5.4)
where the lower case letters stand for the error terms; for instance, m, stands for the 
error term in the equation for money M t and so forth.33 Swanson and Granger 
assume that the errors vit in (5.4) have zero expectation, are contemporaneously 
uncorrelated, and have a non-singular covariance matrix. Given these conditions, they
32 Swanson and Granger’s work has been recently pursued and extended by Demiralp and Hoover 
(2003).
33 In (5.4), each error, except for mt, is a linear function of the innovation terms appearing earlier in the 
model and a stochastic component.
58
prove that a recursive model like (5.4) entails certain zero partial correlations 
(vanishing partials). In particular, if in the true recursive model mt causes ct and ct
causes it , the partial correlation of mt and it given c, is zero. If the partial
correlation p(mt,it /c t ) is found to be zero or close to zero in the data, then the
variable ct in the appropriate causal ordering lies between mt and it . Swanson and
Granger exploit this and similar results to specify an ordering of the errors that is 
compatible with the data. Their method involves using the estimates of the residuals 
to compute the correlation matrix of the error terms, which is used to compute all 
possible partial correlations among the errors. The method then searches for a model 
that is compatible with the vanishing partials discerned in the data.
There are twelve partial correlations among the error terms associated with the 
variables under study here. In the data considered by Swanson and Granger 
/ c t ),  p(y,,m t / it), and p(it,mt /c t) are lowest in absolute value, and thus 
the most appropriate candidates for zero partial correlations. The first vanishing 
partial p ( y t ,mt / c () » 0 suggests that in the appropriate causal ordering c, lies
between yt and mf, the second p(yt ,m, /i ,)~  0 suggests that it lies between yt and
mt , and the third p(it ,mt /cf) «  0 implies that c, lies between it and m,. Altogether,
these vanishing partials suggest that a causal ordering as in the model below is 
compatible with the data:
m , =  V Mt
c, = con. + vr,
' (5.5)
=?cf +0m,+v„
y, = Mt + Oc, + 0 mt + vYt
The zero partial correlations are not, however, compatible with the ordering 
expressed by model (5.4).
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Swanson and Granger’s method shares with other statistical approaches to causal 
inference a number of assumptions about the connection between probability and 
causation, which will be studied in chapter 5. Here, the relevant point to make is that 
the method fails to entirely eliminate the arbitrariness involved in transforming a 
VAR model into a causal chain model. As recognised by the authors, partial 
correlation is invariant to the reversal of causal directionality in the sense that it does 
not matter whether mt causes ct and ct causes i, or it causes ct and ct causes m,.
In either case, the partial correlation p(it,mt fc t ) is zero. Thus, besides model (5.5), a
recursive model in which the causal influences proceed from yt through it and c, to
mt is also compatible with the vanishing partials in the data. In consequence, there is
usually more than one causal ordering compatible with any set of vanishing partials 
found in the data, and one must draw on other considerations to select an ordering. In 
the present example, Swanson and Granger eventually favour the ordering in model 
(5.5) on the grounds of a conjecture that money, consumption, or investment is a 
leading indicator of GDP (1997:363).
Also, a correlation between two variables can be due to latent common causes. If the 
correlation between mt and ct given any possible combination of other variables 
under study is different from zero, it cannot still be concluded that either variable 
causes the other. The possibility of latent common causes enormously widens the 
class of models compatible with the vanishing partials, making it impossible for the 
present approach to distinguish between cases of causal and spurious relations. If no 
outside knowledge is available, the choice of a particular causal ordering of the 
innovation terms and hence the choice of a VAR model remains arbitrary. Empirical 
evidence alone is inadequate for specifying the privileged transformation that 
corresponds to the data generating structure.
5.1.4 Revising the Objectives
According to Sims, economists are never in a position to eliminate the need for 
personal judgement in selecting a model as a representation of the structure. Owing to 
the unreliability of personal judgments, Sims argues for revising the conventional
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objectives of macroeconomics (Sims, 1982:39-40). In particular, he urges economists 
to be sceptical about the analysis of policies that have no historical precedent. If a 
policy had a precedent in the data, and enough data were available, it would be 
possible to fit a model to part of the data, and use it to investigate how it performs in 
predicting the course of the economy in the rest of the data. If the model performed 
well in mimicking the effect of the policy, assuming that the structure of the economy 
was still the same, it would also most likely predict the outcomes of the policy in the 
new situation (Sims, 1982:122). However, if a policy had no historical precedent, the 
choice of a model for evaluating it would be entirely subjective. In that case, there 
would be no guarantee that the model would correctly predict the policy outcomes. 
The more a policy differs from those that have precedents in the data, the less reliable 
will be the analysis. Sims therefore questions the objective of evaluating novel 
policies, which he claims to fall outside the reliable domain of macroeconomics 
(Sims, 1982:119). For him, economists are observers of the economy, not engineers 
of reform (Lucas, 1987:8).
Equally, Sims is sceptical of the reliability of explanations in macroeconomics. In his 
opinion, “economists must accept that a single view of the causal structure of the 
record they examine will never emerge (Sims, 1977:30; 1981:583). Explanations of 
large-scale economic phenomena are consequently “stories” that the modellers can 
envision about what is going on inside their models (Sims, 2004:282). The choice of 
a story is based bn personal considerations, and must be viewed with scepticism 
(Sims, 1981:583). Economists can be helpful in ex ante and ex post predictions over a 
short period of time. Analysis of radical polices and explanation of macroeconomic 
events, however, falls beyond the boundaries of their field (Sims, 1987:50).
Finally, Sims argues that the lack of controlled experiments and the inadequacy of 
statistical inference are not the only sources of the uncertainty of economic models. 
Aggregate economic data are also inherently inaccurate, and this fundamentally adds 
to the uncertainty of the models. This uncertainty casts doubt even on the choice of a 
model for ex ante or ex post prediction. And so, he advocates avoiding the choice of a
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single model and instead working with a group of models best fitting the data. If the 
task at hand is just ex ante or ex post prediction, it will be more reliable to average the 
predictions of all the models and act accordingly. In general, it is more reasonable 
both in prediction and policy analysis to compare the predictions of a number of 
plausible models and take a decision that is close to the predictions of all the models 
(Sims, 2004:282). Sims’ view is consistent with a Bayesian approach to model 
selection in which the analyst expresses his uncertainty regarding the models in form 
of a probability distribution over the models, thereby avoiding acceptance of any of 
the models as the true model.34
5.2 Metaphysical Interpretation
The interpretation above of atheoretical macroeconomics assumes that it makes sense 
to speak of the causal structure of the economy, i.e., a web of structural relationships 
true of economic aggregates. Sims’ early writings often suggest a more radical view 
that challenges the very existence of causal relations at the economy level. He time 
and again argues that economic variables can be aggregated in many different ways, 
and, all different levels of aggregation are theoretically arbitrary, and hence 
acceptable:
Almost every kind of data used in economics... is an aggregate or index 
number of some sort. We deal with accounting data. Household budget 
studies divide expenditure into a finite number of categories with somewhat 
arbitrary bounds. Studies of firms use the firm's own books to construct 
measures of input, output, and prices. This is not just a matter of aggregation 
of fine-grained truth in which arbitrary accounting conventions would not be 
necessary. ... The degree of arbitrariness in classifying production into two- 
digit industries is not convincingly greater than that in classifying it into four­
digit industries (Sims, 1987:50).
Sims, in addition, argues that, as the level of aggregation is varied, quite different and 
conflicting models of the system are achieved. And since there is no non-arbitrary or 
natural level of aggregation, it is wrong to attribute any causal interpretation to
34 For a Bayesian perspective on inference from aggregate data see Learner (1991).
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aggregate models. In his view, there is no truth about price indices, national income 
accounts, or the money stock in the way there is truth about falling objects, electrical 
currents or the stars:
The contribution of econometric probability models may be to make the 
process of economic data cheaper* more explicit, and more easily responsible. 
In doing so, it might also succeed in improving decision-making. But 
econometricians will not find truth the way physicists do. There is no truth 
about price indexes, national income accounts, expenditure of household j  on 
meat, or the money stock the way there is truth about falling objects, electrical 
currents, or the stars (Sims, 1987:51).
The search for truth in macroeconomics is, therefore, misguided. An implication of 
this rejection of a causal structure at the economy level is that the tools of structural 
modelling are irrelevant to macroeconomic modelling. Large-scale economic models 
become black boxes useful for summarising data, and making short run ex ante and 
ex post predictions. They are not, however, suitable for the kind of policy analysis 
economists have traditionally been after. The emergence of a pattern at the aggregate 
level may have an explanation but the explanation is not causal. The pattern is 
explained by showing how it emerges from an attempt to summarise the data. On this 
alternative reading, Sims deprives macroeconomics of its traditional subject matter. 
Macroeconomics is atheoretical because there are no truths at the economy level for a 
theory to represent. To him, economists are closer to accountants than natural 
scientists (Sims, 1987).
This view of macroeconomics has precedents in the history of economics. Hayek 
(1979) argued that the ‘wholes’ studied in the social sciences are constructs of our 
mind; they do not represent any thing in the external world, and are not therefore 
subject to scientific laws (1979:96).35 Also, recently, some new Keynesian 
economists have emphasized the vital importance of individual heterogeneity and 
direct interactions among market participants in explaining economic phenomena. 
Individual heterogeneity and direct interaction enormously complicate the relation 
between the micro and macro levels, making it impossible to attribute any theoretical 
interpretation to the relations emerging at the economy level. This has led these
35 See Hoover (2001, ch. 5) for an appraisal of Hayek’s position.
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economists to favour an atheoretical view of macroeconomics, similar to Sims’ 
approach (Colander, 1996:66).
6. Conclusion
This chapter began by defining the subject matter and objectives of macroeconomics, 
and outlined three arguments on the limitations of a purely statistical approach to 
macroeconomics. The arguments showed the necessity of domain specific 
information for modelling the structure and achieving macroeconomics’ objectives. 
Hence, the most fundamental question in modelling the economy is concerned with 
the feasibility of obtaining such information in economics. In response to this 
question, we reconstructed two general approaches to macroeconomics. The 
theoretical approach suggests that the necessary information can be obtained by 
incorporating aggregative phenomena into the framework of microeconomic theory. 
In contrast, the atheoretical approach rejects the credibility of domain-specific 
knowledge in macroeconomics and, as an alternative, uses certain general principles 
concerning the connection between probability and causation to narrow down the 
number of admissible models compatible with the data. It, therefore, calls for revising 
macroeconomics’ objectives. The contrast between these two competing views 
reveals that the issues regarding theories of economic behaviour and those about the 
link between the micro and macro levels are the most basic topics in 
macroeconomics. Of equal importance is the conjecture that one can sensibly talk of 
structural relations at the economy level.
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Chapter 2
Rational Behaviour and Economic Theory
1 Introduction
Unfortunately, the general hypothesis that economic agents are Bayesian 
decision makers has, in many applications, little empirical content: 
without some way of inferring what an agent’s subjective view of the 
future is, this hypothesis is of no help in understanding his behaviour. ... 
To practice economics, we need some way (...) of understanding which 
decision problem agents are solving. (Lucas, 1981:223)
The difficulties in atheoretical study of aggregate data have led economists to 
propose a bottom-up approach to the study of macroeconomic phenomena that 
involves establishing a theory of individual behaviour and transforming it into a 
theory of the economy using aggregation methods. Thus, even though 
macroeconomics is primarily concerned with aggregate phenomena such as the 
unemployment level or general price movements, issues of individual behaviour 
have come to occupy a central place in theoretical economic analysis. The chief 
conjecture about homo economicus is that he behaves rationally. This conjecture 
is believed to be an ‘engine of truth’, serving to establish the laws of economic 
behaviour. Market forces are said to eliminate irrational behaviour, justifying 
focusing exclusively on the study of rational behaviour. This chapter studies the 
contribution of various rationality hypotheses to theoretical economics.
Although the literature provides a host of definitions of rational behaviour, the 
leading definition is based on the theory of subjective expected utility, best 
developed in Savage’s book (1954 [1972]), The Foundations o f Statistics. 
Savage’s theory provides a general framework for studying possible contributions 
of the behavioural rationality hypotheses to economic analysis. We build our 
analysis around this theory and then explain how it applies to other rational choice 
theories. Savage’s theory identifies rationality of behaviour with subjective 
expected utility (SEU) maximisation. Since its inception, the theory has been 
criticised on several grounds. It has been argued that the postulates of the theory 
are empirically wrong, its computational requirements exceed those of human 
beings, and people are not simply after their own utility (Camerer 1955; Sen, 
1987; and Suppes, 1961). Nevertheless, these criticisms have not yet seriously 
shaken the central status of the theory in modem theoretical economic analysis.
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This chapter argues that the rational choice theories on offer are inadequate for 
explaining and predicting behaviour, regardless of whether they are true or not. 
The theories give no explanation of how the agent models his choice situation, 
and defines his decision problem. They only state how, given a fully specified 
choice situation, the agent makes a choice that maximises his expected utility with 
respect to the situation. In using the theories to model behaviour, a host of 
substantive assumptions are needed to specify the agent’s view of his choice 
situation and the problem he is trying to solve. These assumptions concern the 
agent’s view of the causal structure of the environment, his values, beliefs, needs, 
and goals. It is only then that the theories become relevant and can predict how 
the agent solves the decision problem.
However, a theory of economic behaviour cannot take as given the structure of the 
choice situation and how the agent defines his decision problem, since the 
resolution of economic controversies critically hinges on how he models his 
choice situation and defines his decision problem than on the specific method by 
which he solves the problem. The expected utility maximization hypotheses are 
consistent with all sides of any substantive controversy in economics, and are 
therefore of a minor contribution to economic analysis. Substantial results, 
attributed to these hypotheses, are in fact the implications of the substantive 
assumptions made about how people specify their choice situation and how they 
re-specify it when faced with changes in the economy. The minor contribution of 
the hypotheses also explains why economists have not been very worried about 
their failure in individual choice experiments. In practice, because of the silence 
of the expected utility theories, economists have turned to econometric analysis to 
settle economic controversies. But, for several reasons, the success of the 
econometric method is very limited.
As an attempt to specify how the agent views the environment and defines his 
choice situation, new classical economists have set forth the rational expectations 
hypothesis. The hypothesis identifies the agent’s view of the economic 
environment with the true model of the economy, suggesting that he maximises 
his expected utility with respect to the true model. Accordingly, as soon as the 
economist knows the structure of the economy, he also knows what the agent
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thinks of the economy. He then only needs to discover the agent’s preferences to 
specify the decision problem he is trying to solve, and predict his behaviour. We 
will briefly review the rational expectations hypothesis to further our 
understanding of the current state of microeconomic theory. The chapter ends 
with a characterisation of the sort of theory of behaviour that is needed for 
thinking about the economy.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 outlines Savage’s theory of 
subjective expected utility. Section 3 restates some key questions concerning the 
theory’s role in economic analysis. Section 4 discusses the postulates 
underpinning the theory by looking at some empirical counterexamples. Section 5 
examines the adequacy of Savage’s theory for predicting and explaining economic 
behaviour, and considers whether econometric methods can settle behavioural 
issues left unresolved by the theory. Section 6 takes up the rational expectations 
hypothesis. Section 7 concludes the chapter by arguing for the necessity of a 
learning-based theory of behaviour in economics.
2 Rational Choice
A rational choice theory of behaviour consists of a characterisation of rationality 
and a claim that a rational individual only chooses acts that satisfy the description. 
The oldest characterisation of economic rationality defines rational behaviour in 
terms of pursuit of self-interest -  rational behaviour is self-interested behaviour.1 
Economists flesh out the idea of pursuit of self-interest by stating that a producer 
prefers more profit to less profit or a consumer prefers more money to less money. 
Another notion identifies behavioural rationality with the requirement that choices 
from different subsets of the universal set of available options be maximising 
solutions from the respective subsets according to some binary relation R. A  
person is then rational if his choice from any subset of the set of options available 
to him is the /^-maximal element of the subset (Sen, 1987: 69). These definitions 
do not take into account the fact that full knowledge of the states of the world is 
never available, and one therefore always has to make decisions whose outcomes
1 See Sen (1987) for an analysis of these rationality notions, and historical references.
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are uncertain. A theory of rational behaviour should take this ubiquitous feature of 
real life decision-making seriously, and characterise rational behaviour under 
uncertainty.
Attempt at establishing a theory of rational choice under uncertainty demands a 
formal characterisation of uncertainty and a description of how the uncertainty 
thus characterised is taken into account in making decisions over alternative 
courses of actions (Sen, 1987:72). The theory used in this context is the expected 
utility theory, which weighs the value of each of the outcomes of an action by the 
respective probabilities of the different outcomes of the action. According to this 
theory, behaviour is rational if it is the outcome of expected utility maximisation. 
Depending on one’s interpretation of probability, two general classes of expected 
utility theories can be defined. An interpretation, known as the objective 
interpretation, takes probability to be a measure of relative frequency. This 
interpretation underpins the Von Neumann-Morgenstem theory of expected utility. 
Another interpretation, called the subjective interpretation, takes probability to be 
a measure of the degree of belief that a person has in the occurrence of an event. 
This interpretation lies behind Savage’s subjective expected utility theory, which 
will be the focus of analysis in what follows.
2.1 Savage’s Theory of Subjective Expected Utility
As in any axiomatic system, there are three parts to Savage’s theory. The first 
concerns definition of primitive and constructive notions. The second involves 
introduction of the axioms, and the third involves establishing the main result of 
the postulates. We describe the first two parts of Savage’s theory in some detail, 
as they play a critical part in our understanding of the role of the rationality 
hypotheses in economic theorising.
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2.1.1 Small Worlds
Savage starts with defining the primitives of his theory, including a choice set and a 
formal description of what the decision-maker is uncertain about.2 To this end, 
Savage has a colourful example. Imagine you have just broken five good eggs into a 
bowl to make an omelette. A sixth egg, which for some reason you must either use 
for the omelette or throw it away, lies unbroken besides the bowl. You are about to 
decide what to do with this unbroken egg, which you do not know is good or rotten. 
Savage calls the sixth egg, the object about which you are concerned, the World. A 
description of the world, leaving no relevant aspect un-described, is called a state (of 
the world), herein good or rotten. Of these two states one does in fact obtain. It is 
called the true state. A set of states is called an event. The event that has every state 
of the world as its element is called the universal event, and denoted by S. There are 
at least three actions available to you: you may break the egg into the bowl 
containing the other five good eggs, you may break it into a saucer for inspection, 
and you may throw it away without inspection. Depending on the state of the egg, 
each of these acts will have some consequences, say, wasting five good eggs or 
making a clean saucer dirty. Let Z denote the set of all the consequences about 
which you are concerned. In deciding on an act, you must take into account possible 
states of the world and also the consequences that may follow from each act under 
each state of the world. Accordingly, an act is formally defined as a function that 
attaches a consequence to each state of the world, i.e., a mapping from S to Z. Let F 
denote the set of available acts. The set F  is the choice set. In making a decision you 
prefer one act to others. A binary relation -< expresses your (strict) preferences over 
set F\ thus for two acts/and g in F, f  < g means g is (strictly) preferred to/. The 
term ‘world’ is also used to refer to the pair (S, Z). Table 1 below gives a schematic 
representation of a world, corresponding to Savage’s example (Savage, 1954 
[1972]: 14).
Although this example illustrates the basic notions of Savage’s theory, it does not 
describe a typical situation to which the theory is intended to apply. To be precise, 
Savage develops his theory around an ideal agent whose guide in life is the
2 For discussions o f Savage's theory see Fishbum (1970, ch 14) and (1981).
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proverb “Look before you leap” as opposed to “You can cross the bridge when 
you come to it” (Savage, 1954 [1972]:16). That is, in making a decision, he not 
only considers the consequences of his immediate acts but also those of the acts 
that he might need to take given the consequences of the immediate acts, and so 
forth. The objects about which he contemplates are not then simple acts but 
sequences of acts (Savage, 1954 [1972]: 15). Savage carries the maxim “Look 
before you leap” to the extreme, assuming that the agent behaves as though he has 
only one decision to make in his entire life. “He must, [...], decide how to live, 
and this he might in principle do once for all” (Savage, 1954 [1972]:83). 
Consequently, the world (S, Z) that he considers to represent his choice situation 
has an extremely large (potentially infinite) number of states and an ultimately 
refined description of the consequences of the acts under each state. Savage refers 
to an ultimately refined pair of states and consequences (S*,Z*) as the grand 
world.
Table 2.1 
Savage’s world
Act
State
Good Rotten
Break into bowl
Break into saucer
Throw away
Six-egg omelette
Six-egg omelette and 
a saucer to wash 
Five-egg omelette and 
one good egg destroyed
No omelette and five 
good eggs destroyed 
Five-egg omelette and 
A saucer to wash 
Five-egg omelette
In reality, no matter how refined a world (S, Z) is, it still does not include every 
conceivable state or consequence. Even if a person is currently considering a 
lifetime decision, he may not bother with the price of oil on 25th June 3500. Thus, 
the world (S,Z) he actually considers to represent his choice situation is, in 
Savage’s terms, a small world in the sense that each element in S can still be 
partitioned into smaller states and Z can still be replaced with an even more 
refined description of the consequences.
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2.1.2 The Postulates
Savage’s theory is based on seven postulates regarding the preference relation on 
F. The postulates can be stated in several equivalent ways. The statement below 
follows Fishbum (1971:191). Savage’s first postulate asserts that the strict 
preference relation -< on F  is a weak order. That is to say that -< is asymmetric and 
negatively transitive. The preference relation -< is asymmetric just in case, for every 
act /  and g in F, if /  is preferred to g, g is not preferred to /. And it is negatively 
transitive just in case, for every act/, g, and h in F, i f / i s  not preferred to g, and g is 
not preferred to h, then/is not preferred to h:
Postulate 1: For every/ g and h e F
a) if /  -< g then not g -< f  ;
b), if not f  -< g and not g <h  then not /  -<h.
Let denote indifference, which is defined as absence of strict preference. That 
is, for every/and g in F,
f ~ g if and only if neither f  < g nor g •< f  .
It follows from Postulate 1 that the relation -< is transitive, ~ is reflexive, 
symmetric, and transitive, and the preference relation on F  is complete in the sense 
that, for every pair of acts /  and g in F, exactly one of /  -< g , g ^  /  , or f ~ g 
holds (Fishbum, 1970, Theorem 2.1).
The second postulate says that states with similar consequences do not affect 
preferences. If acts/and g have different consequences over event A but agree over 
the complementary event Ac, they are ranked only on the basis of their differences on 
A. Similarly, if act /*  agrees with/and act g* agrees with g on A, and further/* and 
g* agree on Ac, f*  and g* are ranked in the same way that/and  g are ranked. Let
f ( s ) be the consequence that /assigns to state s in S. The postulate can then be
stated as follows:
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Postulate 2: Suppose acts fig , f * , and g* are such that:
a) f ( s )  = g(s),  f \ s )  = g \ s ) for all s e Ac
b) /(* ) = /*(*?), g(s) = g*(s) for all s g  A 
then /  x g iff /*  -< g V
The third postulate states that the relative value of consequences is invariant across 
the states. To make this idea precise, two further notions are needed: null event 
and constant act. An event E is considered as null by a person if he is indifferent to
acts that only differ on E. And an act is said to be constant if it yields the same
consequence over every state of the world. Savage uses the notion of constant act
to identify a consequence x with an act that leads to x  over all the non-null states of
the world. The third postulate then says that if a person prefers y to x  given non­
null event A, he prefers y to x  in general and if he prefers y to x in general, he 
prefers y to x  given A:
Postulate 3: If event A is not null, and
f ( s ) = x , g (j)  = y for all s g  A , f ( s ) = g(.s) for all s g  A°,
then f  < g iff x -< y .
So, for Savage, the set F  not only does include the concrete acts but also, for every z 
in Z, contains a constant act/that produces z in every state of the world, where by 
concrete acts we refer to acts that lead to different consequences over different states 
of the world. In this way, the postulate extends the preference relation -< from acts 
to consequences Z.
The fourth postulate supposes that the consequences following from an act under 
a state do not affect belief about the state. Suppose a person prefers consequence y 
to x  and y* to x* . Then, if he prefers y to x when event A obtains rather than 
when event B obtains, he also prefers y* to x* when A obtains rather than when B 
obtains. Formally,
3 “i f f ’ stands for if  and only if.
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Postulate 4: Suppose A, B c  S ; x, y, x *, y* e  Z ; / ,  g, f  *, g * g  F are such that
a) x  -< y and x* •< y*
b) f ( s )  = y for all s g  A f ( s ) = x for all s g Ac
g(,s) = y for all s g  B g(s) = x for all s g  Bc
c) f*( s )  = y* for all s g  A f * ( s ) = x * for all s g  Ac
g*(s) = y*for all s g  B g*(s) = x * for all s g  Bc
then /  -< g iff /*  -< g*
This postulate paves the way for defining a qualitative likelihood relation -< * over 
S. Suppose y is preferred to x. Further, suppose acts/and g are such that/is equal to 
y on A and equal to x  on Ac, and g is equal to y on B and equal to x  on Bc> If g is 
preferred to/, then the only explanation for the ordering is that B is considered to be 
more probable than A\ that is:
A ■< *B if and only if /  -< g . (2.1)
Thus, the preference ordering over F  induces a likelihood ordering over S. These four 
postulates capture all the behavioural content of Savage’s theory. Savage’s 
remaining three axioms are technical postulates to ensure the existence of a 
mathematical representation of preferences and likelihood judgements (Kreps, 
1988:128). We mention two of these postulates here. The first is the non-triviality 
postulate, which says:
Postulate 5: There is at least one pair of acts/and g such that f  < g .
The other postulate states that, for every two non-indifferent acts in F, and for every 
consequence x in Z, the set S can be partitioned into arbitrarily small events so that 
altering either act to equal x on just one of these events does not reverse the 
preference ordering of the acts:
Postulate 6: For all /, g g  F such that g -< f, and for all x e  Z, there is a finite 
partition of S  such that for every event A in the partition
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a) if f * ( s ) = x  for s e  A,  f \ s ) = f ( s ) for s e  Acthen g < f*
b) if g*(.y) = x for s e  A,  g*(s) = g(s) for s e  A c then g* -< f .
This postulate excludes infinitely desirable consequences. It also implies that if event 
B is less likely than event C, there is always a partition of S such that the union of 
each element of the partition with B is still less likely than C. Thus, S can endlessly 
be partitioned into smaller events. The postulate ensures that the preference relation 
-< has a property corresponding to the Archimedean property of natural numbers 
(and hence called the continuity postulate).
2.1.3 The Representation Theorem
These postulates lead to Savage’s representation theorem. Savage shows that when 
preferences among acts in F  satisfy the postulates, there exists, a unique finitely 
additive probability measure P on the set of all subsets of S such that
A< * B  if and only if P{A) < P{B) (2.2)
and, with P as given, there exists a real valued utility function u on Z such that for 
a finite Z,
f  < g  if and only if £  P{s)u{f{s)) < £  P(s)u(g(s)). (2.3)
According to (2.3), act g is preferred to a c t/ if  and only if the subjective expected 
utility of g exceeds the subjective expected utility of /. From this perspective, 
individual behaviour is rational if it is the outcome of subjective expected utility 
maximization.
3 Restating the Issues
Savage distinguishes between a normative and an empirical interpretation of his 
theory. The normative interpretation takes the postulates to be norms of rationality,
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providing a standard for actual people to follow. The empirical interpretation 
suggests that people’s actual preferences among acts by and large obey the 
postulates and hence agree with a ranking of subjective expected utility. Here, we 
are concerned solely with the empirical interpretation that is taken for granted in
To analyse Savage’s theory in its capacity as a descriptive theory of behaviour, it 
is vital to have, at least, an intuitive view of various phases of human decision­
making. To this end, we rely on the common sense view implicit in Savage’s 
discussion of human decision-making, which is also found elsewhere (Simon 
1960). Reading the Foundations, one gets the impression that, according to 
Savage, there are two general phases in human decision-making. In the first phase, 
the decision maker draws on his view of the causal structure of the world to 
specify a small world, or more generally, the acts available to him, the states 
affecting the outcomes of the acts, and the consequences following from each act 
under each state. After that, he evaluates the likelihood of each state of the world 
and assesses the desirability of the consequences. We refer to a small world, the 
likelihood ranking of the states of the world, and the preference ranking of the 
consequences of the world as a choice situation:
The choice situation defines the decision problem that the agent is trying to solve. 
In the second phase, the decision maker solves the problem by comparing the acts 
in the light of the likelihood of the states of the world and the desirability of their 
consequences to identify an act that is mostly likely to yield that which is desired 
the most.
This general characterisation of human decision-making is certainly imprecise. It, 
nevertheless, helps us to make a distinction between two types of theories of
4 Savage favours the normative interpretation (1954:20).
positive economics.4
Choice situation
Small world
Likelihood judgements over the states of the 
small world
Preferences over the consequences in the small 
world
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behaviour. One possible class of theories of behaviour is those theories that are 
concerned with both phases of decision-making: They explain both how a person 
models his choice situation and defines his decision problem, as well as how he 
solves the problem. In contrast, a second possible class of theories of behaviour 
consists of those theories that take the structure of the choice situation and the 
definition of the decision problem as given and exclusively focus on how a person 
solves an already well-structured decision problem. We call the former group of 
theories learning-based theories of behaviour and the latter group choice-based 
theories of behaviour.5
A highly important point regarding Savage’s theory is that it is a choice-based 
theory of behaviour. The reason for this classification can be explained by 
considering the restrictions that the postulates impose on the various stages of 
decision-making. According to the view just outlined, the process of decision­
making starts with construction of a small world. The postulates impose two 
restrictions on the admissibility of a small world. Postulate 6 requires the set of 
the states of the world to be such that they can be partitioned indefinitely into 
smaller elements. On the other hand, the second, third, and fourth postulates 
necessitate the description of the consequences to be such that preferences among 
them can be stated without regard to beliefs about the states and that likelihood 
judgements about the states can be expressed without regard to the preference 
ranking of the consequences. These restrictions are surely nontrivial but leave the 
specific structure of the small world undetermined. Formation of a small world 
lies outside the theory:
“I believe ... that decision situations can be usefully structured in terms of 
consequences, states, and acts in such a way that the postulates of F. of S. 
[The Foundations of Statistics] are satisfied. Just how to do that seems to 
be an art for which I can give no prescription and for which it is perhaps 
unreasonable to expect one -  as we know from other postulate systems for 
application” (Savage, 1971:79).
Now, consider beliefs and preferences. As our description of the theory reveals, 
Savage’s postulates only require a certain correspondence between different parts
5 A similar classification is found in Lane et al. (1996).
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of a preference (choice) function. They make no reference to anything outside 
preference (choice) such as information, experience, goals, needs, and motivations. 
Nor do they presuppose any specific hypothesis about how values and beliefs are 
formed (Sen, 1993:495). The theory permits any internally consistent preference 
and likelihood ranking, thus taking the content of beliefs and values as exogenous. 
In Suppes’ terms, both a cognitive and a moral idiot can be rational in the sense 
prescribed by Savage’s theory:
[Savage’s theory] can be satisfied by cognitive and moral idiots. Put 
another way, the consistency of computations required by the expected 
utility model does not guarantee the exercise of judgement and wisdom in 
the traditional sense’ (Suppes, 1984:207-8).
Moreover, since Savage’s theory is silent about how a rational person models his 
small world and forms beliefs and values, it also is silent about how he defines his 
decision problem. The contribution of the theory to analysis of behaviour comes 
very late in positing how a person solves an already well-structured choice 
problem. The same point applies to other rational choice theories on offer, 
including the Von Neumann-Morgenstem theory; they too concentrate on the final 
phase of decision-making, and fall into the category of choice-based theories of 
behaviour.6
With these preliminaries, it is now possible to distinguish between two entirely 
different questions about Savage’s theory in its capacity as a descriptive theory of 
economic behaviour: The first is whether it closely describes the process of 
human choice. And the other more critical question is whether a choice-based 
theory of behaviour is ever adequate for predicting and explaining economic 
behaviour, regardless of being true or false.
4 A Discussion of the Postulates
The first question, which has to do with the realism of the postulates, has been 
mostly investigated in experimental psychology. The second question, which
6 For a review of major rational choice theories see Kreps (1988).
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concerns the adequacy of choice-based theories of behaviour, has mostly been 
taken up in economics. Both approaches from psychology and economics are 
complementary. This section looks at some well-known findings from 
experimental psychology (Kahneman, 2003). The objective of examining them 
here is not simply to reiterate that the postulates fail. It is rather to explain why 
they fail, state a view of the nature of preferences that emerges from the findings, 
highlight the implications of the view for economic analysis, and set the stage for 
defining the kind of theory of behaviour needed in economics.
4.1 The Constructive Nature of Preferences
The first postulate implies that the decision maker has a complete preference 
ordering among acts in F. To spell out what this implication really means, we 
need to note a distinction between ‘indifference’ and ‘indecision.’ Indifference 
refers to a case when the decision maker neither prefers f  to g nor g to f  but is 
ready to replace one of the options with the other in his preference ordering. 
Indecision, however, refers to a case when the decision maker neither prefers/to 
g, g to /, nor is ready to substitute one for the other in his preference ordering. 
Completeness, therefore, means that there are no cases of indecision. Thus 
understood, the weak order postulate is most.consistent with the view that people 
have definite and ready-made preferences and as soon as they need to reveal them 
they can do so instantaneously and simultaneously (Thrall, 1954:183).
This view of preferences is incompatible with a large body of empirical evidence. 
In an early study, Frederich Mosteller and Philip Nogee (1951) observed that 
subjects on repeated elicitation of preferences would not always give the same 
answers. Similarly, Simonson and Tversky (1992) observed that varying the 
choice set could produce different patterns of preferences. In a set of experiments, 
they presented two groups of subjects with descriptions and pictures of 
microwave ovens taken from a catalogue. They invited one group of 60 
individuals to choose between an Emerson microwave priced at $110 and a 
Panasonic priced at $180. The subjects were told that both items were on sale, one 
third off the regular price. Of these individuals, 57% chose the Emerson oven and
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43% the Panasonic. In contrast, they presented the second group of 60 individuals 
with the same items together with a $200 Panasonic at a 10% discount. Only 13% 
of the people in the second group chose the more expensive Panasonic oven but 
its presence among the alternatives increased the percentage of the subjects who 
selected the less expensive from 43% to 60%. A similar pattern of preference 
variation has been found in a host of other experiments reported in Tversky and 
Shafir (1992).
If the subjects had definite and ready-made preferences or if they simply read 
preferences off “some master list” (Slovic, 1995:569), the introduction of the new 
expensive oven would not alter the percentage of people preferring the Emerson 
oven to the cheaper Panasonic one, and the subjects would exhibit an almost 
similar pattern of preferences in both experiments. Thus, the observed variation is 
most consistent with the view that people do not have ready-made preferences. 
Rather, when they need to choose among options, particularly among complex 
alternatives, they start in a sense from a state of indecision. They identify the 
features of the options relevant to the decision task at hand, compare the options 
in accordance with the attributes, and construct pro and con arguments for each 
option. The pro and con arguments are then used to construct a preference ranking 
of the options. From this perspective, since varying the choice set can make 
different attributes appear relevant or provide new information about the attributes 
already noted, a change in the choice set can give rise to construction of new pro 
and con arguments, and hence a different preference ranking. In the above 
example, the introduction of the more expensive microwave probably brought 
with it new useful clues that were not available before. When choosing among the 
ovens, the subjects most likely looked at the quality and the price of each brand. 
Since, in the first scenario, the quality difference between Emerson and Panasonic 
ovens appeared less dominant than the price difference, most subjects opted for 
Emerson. However, when the more expensive Panasonic was introduced because 
of a maintained correlation between price and quality, the subjects were led to 
think that the $180 Panasonic oven was of a much higher quality than previously 
thought. This additional clue rendered the quality difference more dominant than 
the price difference, driving more subjects to choose the $180 Panasonic oven, 
thinking that it was a bargain (McFadden, 1999:86).
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If people do not have ready-made preferences but construct them from pro and 
con arguments, it is natural to expect that they sometimes fail to establish 
arguments necessary for transforming all cases of indecision into a definite 
preference ranking. There may not be enough information available about the 
options. The options may be complex, multi-dimensional, newly invented, and so 
forth. Or gathering information may be costly. There is thus every reason to 
expect that completeness can fail in practice.
The emphasis on the constructive nature of preferences is the hallmark of 
psychologists’ view of preferences. There is, however, more to the claim in the 
psychological literature that preferences are constructed than revealed. To further 
our understanding of the constructive view of preferences, we look at another 
body of evidence termed preference reversals. The discovery of the preference 
reversal phenomenon goes back to a study by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968), 
where they noticed that selling prices of gambles were more highly correlated 
with payoffs than with probabilities of winning but choices among lotteries were 
more highly correlated with probabilities of wining than with the payoffs. The 
observation led the researchers to the conjecture that if subjects were offered two 
gambles with the same expected returns, one featuring a high probability of 
winning a modest sum of money (called H  for high chance of wining) and the 
other featuring a low probability of wining a relatively large amount of money 
(called L for low chance of winning), the subjects would most likely choose the 
high probability bet H  but price higher the low probability bet L. Lichtenstein and 
Slovic (1971) tested this conjecture by confronting a group of subjects with pairs 
of gambles like the one depicted in Table 4.2:
Table 2.2
Preference Reversal Phenomenon
H-bet L-bet
99 percent of winning $4 33 percent of winning $16
1 percent of loosing $1 67 percent of loosing $2
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The subjects were asked to state the cash equivalent of the H  bet, (i.e., the 
minimum price at which they would be willing to sell the bet if they owned it), the 
cash equivalent of the L bet, and make a choice between the two bets. Most 
subjects, as conjectured, chose the H  bet but assigned a higher selling price to the 
L bet. In an experiment, 127 out of 173 subjects (or 73.4%) assigned a higher 
selling price to the L bet in every pair in which they chose the H  bet, even though 
the expected value of both bets were the same.
As with any empirical finding, the preference reversal phenomenon is subject to 
competing explanations, arising from various assumptions that one is ready to 
make about preferences. There are several assumptions in the economic and 
rational choice literature that are relevant to the explanation of preference 
reversals. One assumption, which we have been discussing, is that people possess 
well-defined and stable preferences (Stigler and Becker, 1977). A second 
assumption is description invariance that says preferences among options do not 
depend on the manner in which they are represented or displayed. A third 
assumption is procedure invariance that says strategically equivalent methods of 
elicitation give rise to the same preference order; specifically, it does not matter 
whether choice questions or evaluation inquiries are used to elicit information 
about preferences.7 Let CH and CL denote, respectively, the cash equivalent of H 
and L. Procedure invariance implies that the decision maker prefers H  to a cash 
amount X  if and only if his cash equivalent for H  exceeds X, and that he is 
indifferent between H  and X  if and only if CH = X  . Finally, a fourth assumption 
is monetary consistency, which says people prefer more money to less. If X  and Y 
are sure cash amounts, then X  > Y implies X >■ Y , where > refers to the 
ordering of the cash amounts. Given these assumptions, preference reversal 
implies violation of transitivity, as shown below:
7 A principle o f economic thinking is that opportunity costs and out of pocket costs should be 
treated alike. This implies that preferences should depend only on relevant differences between 
options, not on how these differences are represented.
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1 , H > L  ,
2 CL > CH I Preference Reversal
3 .Ch ~ H  ,
, ^  T I Procedure Invariance4 ,Cl ~ L  ’
5. CL s- C„ Monetary consistency
L y C H (4 and 5)
H y C H (1,4 and 5)
which contradicts CH ~ H  (hence, intransitivity). Economists initially interpreted 
the reversals as violations of transitivity, and called for establishing a theory of 
expected utility that could account for intransitive choices (Machina, 1987). In 
contrast, psychologists saw more in the phenomenon than intransitivity, and began 
investigating whether it could have arisen from the failure of any of the other 
assumptions, in particular procedure invariance. This led to the definition of two 
rival hypotheses concerning the causes of preference reversals -  the intransitivity 
and non-invariance hypotheses.
To investigate these hypotheses, Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990) extended 
Lichtenstein and Slovic’s initial experimental setting by including an option of 
receiving a pre-specified sure cash amount X. In this setting, they asked the 
subjects to state their preferences between each of the pairs in the triple {H,  L, X } 
and also announce their cash equivalent for bets L and H. The researchers then 
focused on the preference reversal cases in which X  fell between the cash 
equivalents CL and CH announced by the subjects; that is, the cases in which the 
reversals had the pattern:
H >■ L and CL > X > CH. (PR)
The hypotheses of intransitivity and non-invariance give rise to different testable 
implications for preference orderings of those subjects whose preferences satisfy 
the PR pattern. To spell out some of these implications, note that procedure 
invariance can fail either because of overpricing of L, underpricing of H, or both 
overpricing of L and underpricing of H. Overpricing of L is said to occur if a
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person offers cash equivalent CL for L that is greater than X  but in a direct choice 
between CL and L he prefers CL > (i>0 -, CL y  L).  Underpricing of H  is said to 
occur if a person announces cash equivalent CH for H  that is less than X  but in a 
direct choice between the H  and CH he prefers H  to CH (i.e., H y  CH). Thus, 
there are at least four potential explanations of the preference reversals. Below we 
derive the implications of the explanations based on the failure of transitivity, 
overpricing of L , and underpricing of f/:8
Hypothesis I: 
Intransitivity
1. H y  L
2. CL > X > CH
3. CL y  X y  CH
4. Cl ~ L
5. C„ ~ H
L y X  
X y H
Hypothesis n: 
Overpricing of L
1. H y  L
2. CL > X > CH
3. CL y  X y  CH
4. CL y  L
5. Ch ~ H
X y H
X y L
Hypothesis IH: 
Underpricing of H
1 . H y L
2. CL > X > CH
3. CL y  X y  CH
4. Cl ~ L  
5 . H y C „
L y X  
H y  X
Tversky et al. (1990) looked at the relative frequencies of these implied preference 
patterns among the preference orderings announced by the subjects. Their 
findings were astounding. In the study, 40% to 50% of the participants showed 
preference reversals consistent with the PR pattern. Of these subjects, only 10% 
had preferences consistent with the intransitivity hypothesis while the remaining 
90% had preferences consistent with the non-invariance hypotheses. In particular, 
nearly two-thirds of the reversals were consistent with overpricing of the L bet. 
The researchers, therefore, concluded that the failure of procedure invariance 
(overpricing of the L bet) was the major cause of the preference reversals.
Several hypotheses have been proposed to explain the procedure invariance 
failure, including the scale compatibility hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that 
an attribute of an object is given more weight when it is compatible with the
8 The case where procedure invariance fails because of both overpricing and underpricing is 
similar.
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response mode than it is not. Since the cash equivalence of a bet is stated in, say, 
dollars, compatibility implies that payoffs, which are also stated in the same units, 
are weighted more heavily in pricing than in choice. As a result, the L bet is 
overpriced relative to the H  bet, leading to the observed preference reversals 
(Tversky, 1996:189-190).
The conclusion that preference reversals are to a large extent due to the failure of 
procedure invariance fits particularly well with another significant body of 
evidence, called ‘framing effect’, which points to the systematic failure of 
description invariance (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). These findings altogether 
lend strong support to the viewpoint that there are no ready-made, well-defined 
and stable preferences; preferences are constructed on demand and, more 
importantly, are endogenous to the decision process. Moreover, the findings 
indicate that formation of preferences is sensitive to the manner in which options 
are framed and questions are posed (Fisher, et al., 1999:1074). Owing to this 
sensitivity, behaviour is likely to vary across situations considered as identical by 
the rational choice theory (Tversky and Thaler, 1990:210).
4.2 The Entanglement of Values and Beliefs
Savage’s remaining behavioural postulates require a small world where 
preferences among the consequences and beliefs about the states are completely 
disentangled. Consider the third postulate, which says consequence x is preferred 
to y given a non-null event A  if and only if x  is preferred to y in general. 
Specialising A to a single state, it says that the relative value of x  is invariant 
across the states. If beliefs about the states of the world affected the desirability of 
x, the relative value of x  could vary across the states. In that case, the postulate 
would no longer apply. For the postulate to hold there must be a small world 
refined enough to permit expressing preferences among the consequences without 
regard to beliefs about the states and expressing likelihood judgements about the 
states without regard to preferences among the consequences (Shafer, 1986:743). 
The second and fourth postulates are also predicated on the existence of a small 
world where beliefs and values are entirely disentangled.
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In reality, the value of the consequences that a person includes in his small world 
may depend on his beliefs about the likelihood of the states of the world, and as 
his beliefs about the states change so does his preference ordering of the 
consequences. Savage was aware of this fact. Considering a person who is about 
to decide whether to buy a bathing suit or a tennis racket, he acknowledged that 
whether the preson prefers ‘possessing a bathing suit’ to ‘possessing a tennis 
racket’ might depend on whether he expects to go on a picnic at a beach or in a 
park (1954:25). Nevertheless, he took such dependence as an indication of the 
inadequacy of the person’s description of his choice situation. Possessing a 
bathing suit and a tennis racket, he argued, should be regarded as acts, not 
consequences. Appropriate consequences in this case would be things like ‘having 
a refreshing swim with friends at a beach in a sunny day’ and ‘sitting on a 
shadeless beach twiddling a brand new tennis racket while one’s friends swim.’ 
Evaluation of these consequences does not depend on which of the two states 
“picnic at the beach” or “picnic in the park” occurs. In general, he conjectured that 
it would be possible to completely disentangle values from beliefs by carrying the 
refinement of the consequences to “its limits’’ (Savage, 1954: 25). In an 
adequately (ultimately) refined world, Savage suggested, there would be no link 
between one’s values and beliefs.
The difficulty with this proposal is that an attempt at refining the consequences in 
Z can force a refinement of the states in S. This is because the states S must be 
detailed enough to determine which element of Z will be achieved by each act in 
F  (Shafer, 1986:474). Savage’s suggestion to take “refreshing swim with friends” 
as the appropriate consequence, rather than “possession of a bathing suit”, 
requires refining S to contain states such as whether friends come, whether the 
temperature is warm enough for a refreshing swim, whether the beach is clean, 
and so forth. These additional states can render one’s evaluation of the elements in 
the refined Z dependent on ones’ beliefs about which element in the refined S is 
true. Perhaps you would prefer twiddling a brand new tennis racket while your 
friends swim if you knew that your friends would bring along someone whom you 
don’t like. There is a priori no reason to think that, for any set of acts, there is 
always an ultimately refined world in which preferences among the consequences 
can be completely disentangled from beliefs about the states. Even if such a world
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existed, it would not be anything similar to a description that a typical individual 
would have of his choice situation. Later in his life, Savage acknowledged that an 
“ultimate” analysis might not after all exist and if it existed it might be quite 
“cumbersome”:
“A nickel is itself a lottery ticket, and one objection to getting miserably 
drenched is that it seems conducive to illness. If the problem were 
concerned with illness or the possibility of accidentally buying poisoned 
food, then of course the notion of consequences would have to be further 
analysed. An ultimate analysis might seem desirable, but probably it does 
not exist and certainly threatens to be cumbersome” (Savage, 1971:79; 
Italic added)
The conclusion is that in the small worlds we normally construct to represent our 
choice situations, our evaluation of the consequences of the world depends on our 
beliefs about the states of the world. This dependence of preferences on beliefs 
defines another aspect of the constructive view of preferences. Finally, it is 
equally important to emphasise the constructive nature of small worlds; they are 
also the outcome of our beliefs and models about the world, and evolve with the 
evolution of our beliefs and models. Small worlds, beliefs and preferences are not 
‘there like the Rocky Mountains’, to use Stigler and Becker’s phrase (1977:76); 
they are all constructed.9
These remarks, though self-evident may seem, have a profound implication for 
modelling behaviour. Since different constructions of beliefs, small worlds and 
preferences can give rise to systematically different choices, no theory can 
accurately predict or explain (dynamic) behaviour without carefully taking into 
account the factors affecting formation of beliefs, small worlds and preferences 
(Bowles, 1998:75). Therefore, a satisfactory theory of behaviour should explain 
how beliefs, small worlds and preferences are formed; it cannot take them as 
exogenous. To illustrate the point, let us return to the preference reversal 
phenomenon. The phenomenon shows that payoffs and probabilities of wining 
have quite different effect in pricing gambles and choosing among them. Payoffs 
are weighted more heavily in pricing gambles whereas probabilities of winning
9 We did not discuss the constructive nature of beliefs, as it is indisputable in economics (Aumann, 
1987:13).
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are weighted more heavily in choosing among gambles. This means a theory of 
behaviour cannot correctly predict or explain pricing and choice behaviour in such 
cases without taking into consideration the dominance of payoffs in pricing and 
probabilities in choice. A theory that pays no attention to the different roles of 
these factors is surely bound to yield wrong predictions. In light of this analysis, 
the real difficulty with Savage’s theory is not simply that it gives a wrong 
description of human choice. Rather, the real difficulty is that the theory takes 
things as exogenous that cannot be taken as exogenous by a theory of behaviour. 
In general, because of the constructive nature of beliefs, small worlds and 
preferences, no choice-based theory of behaviour can ever adequately explain or 
accurately predict behaviour.
5 The Limited Role of Rational Choice Theories
In economics, critics of the rational choice theories have until recently paid less 
attention to the realism of the postulates. Instead, they have mainly disputed the 
contribution that Savage’s theory, or similar rational choice theories, can make to 
economic theorising, whether they are true or not. This section draws on the 
works of economists such as Kenneth Arrow (1986), Arthur Goldberger (1989), 
Robert Lucas (1976), Herbert Simon (1984, 1986), and the philosopher Patrick 
Suppes (1961) to argue why choice-based theories of behaviour are in principle 
inadequate for dealing with substantive economic controversies. The analysis 
complements the lessons of the investigations in behavioural psychology. We 
continue working within the framework of Savage’s theory but the relevance of 
the analysis to other choice-based theories will be evident.
5.1 Choice-based Theories and Economic Controversies
Savage’s theory takes the structure of the small world as well as the content of 
beliefs and preferences as given, and only says how an agent solves a well- 
structured decision problem. This means, in modelling behaviour using the theory, 
a host of exogenous assumptions are needed to specify the agent’s choice situation 
and decision problem. These assumptions are made through specification of a
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utility function, the variables entering the function, the physical or socio­
economic laws determining the variables, their joint probability distribution, and 
so forth. Without such assumptions, the theory makes no concrete prediction 
about observed behaviour. 10
Now, one way to reconstruct the critique in the economic literature of Savage’s 
theory is that these assumptions are not like the auxiliary assumptions necessary 
for making a general theory speak about the world. Quite the opposite, they 
essentially assume the solutions to the very same questions that a theory of 
behaviour is expected to answer. The reason is that, by varying the exogenous 
assumptions, every conceivable side of any substantive economic controversy can 
be rationalised or, in other words, derived as the outcome of subjective expected 
utility maximisation. The key to settling an economic controversy, therefore, lies 
in correctly specifying the exogenous assumptions. However, correct specification 
of the assumptions necessary for making Savage’s theory to have any implication 
about a substantive controversy requires nothing less than knowing the correct 
side of the controversy. As a result, when the necessary exogenous assumptions in 
a given situation are fully specified, nothing essential remains for the theory to 
predict; the predictions are already in the assumptions. Savage’s theory simply 
repackages them in terms of subjective expected utility maximisation. But a 
theory of behaviour cannot take for granted the answer to the very same questions 
that is expected to address. Consequently, regardless of whether it is true or not, 
the theory cannot function as a theory of economic behaviour.
We defend these points by examining a rational choice-based model of economic 
behaviour to demonstrate how by varying the exogenous assumptions in the 
model any side of an economic controversy can be rationalised. We will then 
explain why the analysis generally holds.
10 This is not to deny the conditional restrictions that Savage’s postulates impose on observed 
behaviour, such as those tested in the Allais’s paradox (Allais, 1953, 1997).
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5.1.1 The Effect of Compensatory Educational Programs
We borrow our model from a paper by Arthur Goldberger (1989), who scrutinizes 
Gary Becker’s claim about the effectiveness of public compensatory educational 
programs. The effectiveness of these programs is still a matter of controversy.11 
On one hand, there is the view that such programs positively contribute to the well 
being of the children participating in them and improve their future earnings. On 
the other, there is the view that the programs are ineffective, since parents whose 
children participate in them reallocate the portion of their income that they would 
have otherwise spent on their children. This is known as the offsetting effect. A 
satisfactory theory of behaviour is expected to have some implication for the truth 
of the offsetting effect.
Becker (1981) seems to suggest that, by extending expected utility analysis to 
parents’ expenditure decision-making, he has been able to establish the offsetting 
effect. Goldberger is critical of this claim. He argues that the offsetting effect 
implied by Becker’s theoretical model is not the result of the expected utility 
maximisation assumption but depends on the exogenous assumptions introduced 
to specify, in our terms, the decision problem being solved by the parent. If the 
choice situation were defined slightly differently, a different conclusion would be 
derived. The hypothesis of expected utility maximisation, Goldberger shows, is 
consistent with both opposing views on the effect of compensatory educational 
programs. We review Goldberger’s analysis in some detail as it explains how 
formal economic modelling proceeds in practice. 12
A key to resolving the controversy surrounding the effectiveness of public 
education programs is to know how parents would respond to a change in the 
income of their children. To address this query, Becker assumes a representative 
parent; that is, he supposes that all parents whose children participate in the 
programs have the same utility function, live in the same environment, and 
receive the same information. He speaks of ‘the parent’ rather than parents.
11 Simon (1986) and Conslik (1996) also mention this example. Another example, relating to 
Becker’s work on marriage market, is found in Lam (1988).
12 The account given here of Becker’s work is based on Goldberger (1989).
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Having done so, he introduces several assumptions about the representative 
parent. The first is that she has an interdependent (i.e., non-egoistic) utility 
function that allows a concern with the consumption patterns of others (Poliak, 
2002:10). In particular, it is assumed that her utility derives from her own 
consumption C and her child’s income Y. Becker’s second assumption is that she 
has a Cobb-Douglas utility function U:
The parameter a , which lies between 0 and 1, reflects relative preference for 
child income as against own consumption. According to the function, the parent’s 
relative preference for her child’s income as against her own consumption is 
independent of Y and C. The parent receives income X  which is divided between 
consumption C and investment in child /:
Becker’s third assumption relates to the mechanism generating the child’s overall 
income. The child’s overall income is supposed to be an additive function of the 
parent’s investment I  and another general component E, called “Luck”, which 
represents natural endowments, social status, government support, luck in the 
market, and so forth. The rate of return on investment I  is r. Let m = 1 + r . The 
child’s income Y is thus given by
Since the time unit is a generation, Y and X  are technically wealth or permanent 
income. Consequently, the return factor m = 1 + r can be taken to be larger than 
unity, say, 1.5 or even more. As a final assumption, the parent is assumed to have 
full knowledge of her child’s luck. She decides at her own consumption and 
investment in her child by maximising (5.1) subject to (5.2) and (5.3), which 
yields the optimal level of investment and consumption as:
U = a lo g F  + (l-a ) lo g C . (5.1)
X  = C + 7. (5.2)
Y = ml + E . (5.3)
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/  = dX -  (1 -  a) E/m ,
C = ( l - a ) X + ( l - a ) E /m .
(5.4)
(5.5)
Substituting (5.4) back into (5.3) gives the income transmission rule,
Y = bX +aE, b = am. (5.6)
where the parameter b is the “propensity to invest in the child” and a  is the 
“fraction of family income spent on the child” (Goldberger, 1989:506).
The income transition rule (5.6) describes how the parent responds to an increase 
in her child’s luck. Suppose there is a dollar increase in E. According to (5.6), the 
child income increases only by the fraction of a ; the parent partially offsets the 
increase in E by increasing her own consumption (see (5.4)). Becker takes this 
implication to argue that “public education and other programs to aid the young 
may not significantly better them because of compensating decreases in parental 
expenditures” (Becker, 1981:153).
This conclusion, as shown by Goldberger, is not an inevitable implication of the 
expected utility maximisation principle. The offsetting result is based, among 
other things, on the assumption that the child’s income is an additive function of 
parental investment and child’s luck. If the child’s income were, for instance, a 
multiplicative function of parental investment and luck, the offsetting result would 
no longer follow. To illustrate this, Goldberger replaces the additive function (5.3) 
with the multiplicative function,
In this case, the parent divides her income between her own consumption and 
investment in her child according to
Y = m IE . (5.7)
I = a X ,
C = ( i - a ) X .
(5.8)
(5.9)
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Evidently, neither optimal investment nor optimal consumption any longer 
depends on E. And the income transmission rule becomes,
Y = bXE . (5.10)
An increase in E by the government no longer affects parental investment decision. 
If Y followed hypothesis (5.7) rather than (5.3), public education programs could 
have strong effects (Goldberger, 1989:507). It is thus wrong to suggest that the 
expected utility maximisation assumption implies the offsetting effect or its 
negation. Becker’s result is critically based on the specific hypothesis (5.3) about 
the structure of the environment.
Becker’s offsetting result is also based on the choice of a homothetic utility 
function. 13 Goldberger does not consider this but the choice of a non-homothetic 
utility function undermines the result too. Consider the simple non-homothetic 
utility function,
while retaining the assumption that the child’s income is an additive function of 
parental investment and the child’s luck. The optimal level of consumption and 
investment is given by
U = Y + \n C , (5.11)
(5.12)
(5.13)
The new income transmission rule will be
Y = mX —l + E . (5.14)
13 For definition of homotheticity see Appendix A.
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As evident from (5.12) and (5.13), the parent’s optimal consumption and 
investment are independent of the child’s luck. And so, the model does not entail 
the offsetting effect.
The subjective expected utility maximisation assumption is, therefore, consistent 
with both opposing views on the effectiveness of public education programs. It is 
the exogenous assumptions about the shape of the parent’s utility function, the 
variables entering it, and the mechanisms generating the variables that make a 
model entail the offsetting result or its negation (Pollack, 2002:9). To predict the 
effect of the programs using Savage’s theory, one ought to know, among other 
things, whether the parent cares about her child, how she cares, whether her 
relative preference for her own consumption and investment in her child vary with 
changes in her child’s income, what she thinks of the mechanism generating her 
child income, how she predicts the effect of her investment on the future wealth of 
her child, and so forth. But if we knew the answers to these queries, we would 
already know how she would behave in response to a change in her child’s 
income; the answer to the question concerning the effect of the educational 
programs are implicit in the answers to these questions. In the end, we might need 
to introduce an optimisation principle to infer how she actually solves her decision 
problem but the principle would not need to be the subjective expected utility 
maximisation principle; satisficing would equally do (Arrow, 1984).14 Nor is the 
principle an ‘engine of truth’ standing above all the other assumptions; it is an 
assumption like other substantive assumptions entering a model of parent 
behaviour.
5.2 How Economic Controversies Are Settled
Resolution of economic controversies depends critically on the choice of 
exogenous assumptions than on the expected utility maximisation principle. In 
practice, economists have turned to econometric analysis of aggregate data to 
select a rational choice model. The analysis involves trying various combinations 
of plausible assumptions to establish a rational choice model that well fits
14 See Appendix B for a definition of satisficing.
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aggregate data, and using the model to address behavioural questions of interest. 
A basic question is whether the econometric approach can fill the theoretical 
vacuum left by the rational choice theories, and dispense the need for an 
alternative theory of behaviour. To address this query, we first consider a typical 
application of the econometric method from the history of economics to bring to 
the fore some of the assumptions underlying the method. And, on that basis, we 
will explain why it fails.
5.2.1 The Effect of Economic Events on Votes
An issue of interest in economics concerns the effects of economic events on 
votes. The literature contains conflicting views on the matter. Kramer (1971), for 
example, studied data on U.S. voting behaviour, concluding that economic 
fluctuations have a significant effect on congressional elections, whereas Stigler 
(1973) concluded that they do not. Against this background, Fair (1978) set 
himself the task of presenting a theoretical model of voting that is general enough 
to allow one to define the disagreements in the literature and test them. So, he set 
up a rational choice model of voting behaviour. Fair considers a two-party 
political system such as the US, referred to as Democrat and Republican, and 
focuses on presidential, rather than congressional, elections. Let us define the 
following notations:
E(Uft ): voter i ’s expected utility if the Democratic candidate is elected at 
time t.
E(U rit) : voter Vs expected utility if the Republican candidate is elected at 
time t.
These expected values are based on the information available up to time t. Let Vit
be a variable that is equal to one if voter i votes for the Democratic candidate at 
time t and zero if he votes for the Republican candidate at time t. The expected 
utility theory implies that:15
15 For simplicity the case when the voter is indifferent is not considered here.
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(5.15)
Voter i votes for the candidate (party) that gives the higher expected utility. 
Further, let
be the voter f  s utility function, with Z it being the variables affecting the voter’s
utility. The expected utility theory has no implication for Z it or function/. In light
of this, Fair interprets the differences in the literature in terms of whether Z it
includes economic factors and, if so, how they affect votes. Fair’s assumption is 
that if economic factors influenced votes, the voter’s expected future utility if a 
party were in power would depend on his forecast of the performance of the 
economy under the party. He thus embarks on testing whether the voter’s 
expected future utility under a party depends on his forecast of the performance of 
the economy under the party. This raises several issues about how the voter 
measures the state of the economy and how he forecasts the performance of the 
economy under a party.
Fair first considers modelling the procedure used by the voter to forecast the 
performance of the economy under a party. He makes two assumptions about the 
method (1978:161):
Ai: The forecast reflects accumulated past experience.
A2: The forecast attaches more weight to recent than to remote periods.
This means the voter bases his forecast of the economic performance of a party on 
the performance of the economy when the party was recently in power. As a result, 
if economic factors affected voting decisions, the voter’s expected future utility 
under a party would be a function of how well the economy performed when the 
party was recently in power. Let
u» = n z„) (5.16)
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tj\ : last election from t back that party j  was in power,
tj2: second-to-last election from t back that party j  was in power,
: a vector of variables specific to voter i , assumed to be independent of
the variables used to measure the performance of the economy.
Mh’ some measure of economic performance of the party in power during 
the four years prior to election h.
j  takes two values d for the Democratic party and r for the Republican party. If 
party j  was in power at time t, then tjl is equal to t. 16 One way to formulate 
postulates Ai and A2 is the following:
(5.17)
t - t r  2 (5.18)
where parameters , J32, /?3, and are unknown coefficients and p  is an
unknown discount rate. Equations (5.17) and (5.18) state that voter i*s expected 
future utility under a party is a function of a vector of individual specific variables 
and the party’s performance during the last two times that it was in power. The 
performance measure is discounted from time t back at rate p . For p  greater 
than zero, more weight is attached to recent than to remote periods. If desired, the 
equations can be expanded to include more than just the last two periods each 
party was in power. Also, Mh can be a function of several variables representing 
the state of the economy.
In this setting, Fair attempts to settle the disagreement about the effect of 
economic events on votes by fitting to aggregate voting data various possible 
models arising from substituting alternative performance measures for Mh in 
equations (5.17) and (5.18), and determining if any of the models adequately 
account for the data. To justify the use of aggregate data for estimating the
161 is a time trend that takes, for instance, a value 8 in 1916, 9 in 1920, and so on.
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individual parameters in (5.17) and (5.18), Fair introduces four extra assumptions 
about the voters and the economy. Let
and (5.19)
(5.20)
It follows from equations (5.15), (5.17) and (5.18) that voter i votes for the 
Democratic candidate if q, > y/i and votes for the Republican candidate if
aggregate levels are as follows.
A3: All voters use the same measure of performance;
A4: The coefficients /?,, /? 2 > J33, and p  in (5.17) and (5.18) are 
the same for all voters;
A5: y/i in (5.19) is evenly distributed across voters in each election
between some numbers a + St and b + St , where a < 0  and b > 0 .
A6: There are an infinite number of voters in each election.
Now, let Vt stand for the percentage of the two-party vote that goes to the
Democratic candidate in election t. It follows from (5.15), (5.17), (5.18) and 
assumptions A3 through A6 that:
restrictions on the error term v2, equation (5.21) can be estimated from aggregate
“voter f s  expected utility difference between the Republican and Democratic parties before any 
consideration is given to their past performances.
18 The key assumption is here that this difference differs across voters in a uniform way (Fair,
qt < y/i} 1 Having said this, the four assumptions to link the individual and the
a and b are constant but St can vary across elections;18
(5.21)
which makes no reference to the variables and (Appendix C). Given certain
17 is voter’s “expected utility bias” in favour of the Republican candidate. It is, in other words,
1987:162).
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data. Fair replaces several measures of performance for A//, to investigate if any of 
the resulting equations accounts for the U.S presidential election data. The 
measures include “the growth rate of real per capita GDP over some specified 
period prior to the election” and “the absolute value of the inflation rate over some 
specified prior to the election”. In the fitted equation, the coefficient estimates for 
the growth rate and the inflation rate in the year prior to the election appear 
significant, and of the expected sign. Economic factors as measured by these 
variables, Fair concludes, do actually enter the voter’s utility function.
This study is a typical illustration of how substantive controversies -  such as what 
variables affect votes and how -  are settled in economics. In practice, substantive 
controversies are resolved by searching for a model that best fits aggregate data. 
Therefore, the answers to substantive economic queries do not come from formal 
economic theory, which is another name for a rational-choice based model of 
behaviour. Quite the opposite, one needs the answers to the questions to select an 
appropriate rational choice model. Rational choice models assume the answers to 
substantive economic questions rather than addressing them (Fisher, 1989:118; 
Conslik, 1996:685).
5.3 Why the Econometric Method Fails
For several reasons the econometric approach fails to fill the theoretical vacuum 
left by the rational choice theory. To begin with, the method requires making the 
assumption that the laws of the individual and the economy coincide; without this 
assumption aggregate data cannot be employed to select a rational choice model. 
Fair takes this coincidence for granted by assuming that all voters have the same 
.utility function, use the same performance measure, share the same rules for 
forecasting the performance of the economy, and individual characteristics are 
uniformly distributed in the population. Such assumptions, which are necessary 
for the laws of the individual to coincide with the laws of the economy, are 
incredibly strong. Even so, they are not adequate to ensure the coincidence. A full 
justification of this point demands a proper understanding of the conditions under 
which the laws of the individual and the economy are the same, which is given in
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Chapter 6 . Here, it suffices to note that economic variables change status when 
one moves from the micro level to the aggregate level. The individual takes 
prices, the rate of economic growth, inflation, and the unemployment level as 
given but the economy cannot take them as given; it determines them. It is thus 
wrong to assume that models true of the aggregates are also true of the individuals 
or vice versa. The fate of rational choice models cannot be settled by analysis of 
aggregate data. A different type of data is needed.
Another reason for the failure of the econometric method relates to the nature of 
the exogenous assumptions entering a rational choice model. The assumptions 
convey information about the agent’s small world, beliefs, and preferences. As we 
learnt from our review of the empirical investigations into human decision­
making, small worlds, beliefs and preferences are not invariants of human 
behaviour. Rather, they are constructed on the basis of past experiences, goals, 
needs, and the socio-economic structure of the society. As a result, they vary with 
accumulation of experiences, arrival of new information, and changes in the 
economy. This means even if the aggregation difficulties arising from the lack of 
correspondence between the micro and macro levels did not exist, the method 
could at best establish the model that was true of the individual during the period 
from which the data were collected. It could not, logically speaking, establish the 
model that would be true of the individuals if they received different information, 
if a different policy regime were in place, or if the institutional structure of the 
economy were different. Thus, the econometric method is unsuitable for 
establishing models useful for predicting the effects on individual behaviour of 
changes in the economy or policy regimes. And so, it fails to fill the theoretical 
vacuum left by the rational choice theories. 19
All in all, the marriage of the rational choice theory with econometrics fails to 
furnish models suitable for predicting the effects of change on behaviour. The key 
to this objective is the ability to address counterfactual queries such as those 
stated above. Addressing such queries demands a theory of behaviour that 
endogenises small worlds, beliefs, and preferences. In other words, it necessitates
19 The reasoning here is an adaptation of Lucas’ critique of econometric policy evaluation (1976).
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a theory that explains how a person forms views about the causal structure of the 
economy, updates his views in light of new information, adapts preferences on the 
basis of past experiences, and accordingly defines his decision problem. If such a 
theory is established, there remains no essential role for the subjective expected 
utility theory in predicting and explaining behaviour. The theory, to use Suppes’ 
words, becomes in one sense otiose:
The psychologist resists accepting them [subjective probability and utility] 
as basic or primitive concepts of behaviour. Ideally, what he desires is a 
dynamic theory of the inherent or environmental factors determining the 
acquisition of a particular set of beliefs or values. If these factors can be 
identified and their theory developed, the concepts of probability and 
utility become otiose in one sense (1961:614).
It is appropriate to close this section by making two remarks. One concerns the 
generality of the analysis. Our argument for the inadequacy of Savage’s theory 
draws on the fact that it gives no explanation of how the agent models his choice 
situation and defines his decision problem. In this respect, other rational choice 
theories are the same. They are also concerned with the final stage of decision, 
choice, and hence fail to serve as a theory of behaviour. The other remark relates 
to an implication of the analysis. Economists have long argued for the necessity of 
economic theory to specify explanatory variables in econometric models, the 
algebraic form of the model, the sign of the model parameters, and even the joint 
probability distribution of the variables being studied (Fair, 1987:270). And by 
economic theory, they mainly mean a theory of rational choice or a model based 
on it (Becker, 1976:5). The preceding analysis makes it evident that the rational 
choice theories do not provide any information useful for specification of 
econometric models; they just take them for granted. The so-called theoretical 
information in economics is simply disparate assumptions that are not derived 
from any systematic theory, certainly not from the rational choice theories 
(Peltzman, 1991:206). They are accepted because they intuitively sound plausible 
(Sims, 2004:282) or are part of a model that fits aggregate data.
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6 Expectations
To understand the dynamics of behaviour it is essential to model both the process 
of preference and expectations (beliefs) formation. Notwithstanding this, 
economists have treated expectations and preferences differently. Stigler and 
Becker (1977) famously suggested that economics should not only take 
preferences as exogenous but also as homogenous across individuals, arguing that 
differences in actions are best explained in terms of differences in perceived 
opportunities (Vriend, 1996:279). Ever since, there have been some attempts to 
study preference formation but Stigler and Becker’s view still dominates 
economics. In sharp contrast, a central position in economics has always been that 
economic theory cannot take expectations as exogenous (Harsanyi, 1965:450), 
and a variety of proposals have been set forth to model expectations. An 
influential proposal is the rational expectations hypothesis. We study some 
aspects of this hypothesis to further our understanding of the current state of 
economic theory.
6.1 Adaptive Expectations
The rational expectations (RE) hypothesis emerged as a result of reflection on the 
shortcomings of the so-called adaptive expectations (AE) hypothesis. According to 
this hypothesis, the agent considers only the recent values of a variable to form 
expectations of its future values, and, when the truth of his forecasts transpires, he 
uses his forecasting error to revise his future forecasts of the variable (Cagan, 1956). 
The AE hypothesis restricts relevant information on a variable to its recent history. 
As a consequence, it implies that people do not take note of changes in the economy 
until the effects of the changes are fed into their forecasting errors and, therefore, 
make systematic mistakes in perceiving the course of the economy (Bicchieri, 
1987:506). Moreover, according to the hypothesis, the effect of interventions on 
behaviour begins to bear only after previous expectations badly go wrong. And, 
because of this strictly backward looking feature, the hypothesis logically rules out 
any immediate effect of policies on expectations and hence behaviour. These 
implications go against a well-entrenched conviction in economics that people
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optimally use all available information in making decisions. They realise, it is 
claimed, the interrelations among economic variables and utilise the information on 
their movements to form expectations. The AE hypothesis has thus been viewed as 
an inadequate conjecture about people.
6.2 Rational Expectations
The RE hypothesis is an extreme response to the backward looking feature of the 
AE hypothesis. In its strong form, it posits that economic agents know the true 
structural model of the economy and their subjective expectations of the variables 
representing the economy are the same as the objective expectations entailed by the 
true model (Pesaran, 1987:165):
Expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are 
essentially the same as the predictions of relevant economic theory. At the 
risk of confusing this purely descriptive theory... with a pronouncement as 
to what firms ought to do, we call such expectations ‘rational’. (Muth, 
1961:316)
The RE hypothesis stands on several assumptions. An assumption is that the 
vector of exogenous and endogenous variables of the economy follows a jointly 
stationary stochastic process. Another assumption is that the variables have an 
objective joint probability distribution in the sense understood in the frequency 
interpretation of probability. In characterising this assumption, following Knight 
(1921), new classical economists divide uncertainty into ‘reducible’ and 
‘irreducible’ components. Reducible uncertainty is defined as risk, which is the 
uncertainty that is analysable according to the laws of mathematical probability. 
Irreducible uncertainty is taken to be the ‘true’ uncertainty, which falls outside the 
bounds of numerical probability. The RE hypothesis is, by definition, restricted to 
risky situations (McCann, 1994:63). However, nothing is said about how it can be 
known whether a given situation is risky or truly uncertain, and so in practice the 
hypothesis is applied generally. A further assumption is that the agents correctly 
know the objective probability distribution of the variables describing the
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9fteconomy. Finally, the agents are also assumed to know the true values of all the 
exogenous and endogenous variables through to the end of the present period.
These assumptions have strong implications for modelling of the economy. Since 
the agents know the true economic model, their forecasts are always confirmed by 
the course of events and their views are always consistent with each other. They 
therefore never have an incentive to revise their view of the economic structure. 
Moreover, since they maximise their expected utility with respect to the true 
model, they also never have an incentive to revise their actions. Their actions are 
always optimal with respect to the environment and with respect to the actions of 
other fellow agents in the economy. The economy is, therefore, permanently in 
equilibrium. Disequilibrium, by definition, becomes a vacuous notion, and all 
supposed disequilibrium phenomena are a priori defined out of existence. This 
last point plays a critical role in solving rational expectations models. These 
models are solved by requiring the collective outcomes of individual decisions to 
be an equilibrium state.
In order to better understand the hypothesis it is useful to look closely at how a 
rational expectations model is built and solved. To this end, we use a perfect 
foresight version of the quantity theory about the relation between money supply and
9 1prices. Versions of this model are found in Blanchard and Watson (1982), Sargent 
(1993), and MacCallum (1983). The account here is based on Sargent (1993), who 
uses it to discuss the problem of multiple equilibria arising in rational expectations 
models. This is done in three steps:
Step 1. The economy runs in discrete time, and each individual lives for two periods. 
The same number of individuals, normalised to one, is bom every period. An
20The RE hypothesis and subjective expected utility are reconciled through de Finetti’s (1937) 
exchangeability result. Suppose there are repeated trials of some random process; and that 
individuals are indifferent between receiving a dollar conditional on some sequence of outcomes 
and receiving a dollar conditional on any other sequence of outcomes of each type; if  there exist 
limiting frequencies of different types of outcomes, and individuals put strictly positive probability 
on the truth, then each individual’s conditional beliefs converge to these limiting relative 
frequencies (Morris, 1995:232-233).
21 Agents in a multi-agent economy is said to have perfect foresight if  the following two conditions 
hold: (a) people’s beliefs are correct and (b) there are no exogenous shock terms impinging on the 
economy, so that all expectations are correct without error, i.e., ( Et (Vl+Jt > =  Vl+ft).
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individual bom at time t is young at time t and old at time t + 1. Each individual 
receives an endowment of 2e{ when young and le 2 when old. The endowment is 
non-storable and the only way to save it is to hold money. Let p, be the price level 
at time t and E (pt+l) the value of p t+l expected as of period t. The decision faced 
by the individual is to choose his level of nominal balances mt to carry from time t 
to time t + 1 so as to maximise the utility function:
The utility function describes how the agent is ready to forfeit mt / p t units of goods 
this period against mt / E(p t+]) units that he expects his real money balances will 
offer next period. The agent maximises the utility function (6.1) to decide on his 
nominal balances mt , subject to the current price level p t and his expectation of
the next period price level, E(p l+l). This yields the money demand function
Step 2. The laws of the variables entering the model are specified -  here the 
money supply and price level. Suppose the government is supplying money in 
accordance to the rule
It remains to specify the price function that is essential for estimating the expected 
future price level E(pt+l). A trouble is that the expected future price level is
among the factors affecting the price level and thus E (p t+]) enters the true price
function as an argument. The RE hypothesis suggests that the true price function 
is a function that ensures equilibrium. A method for finding such a function is to 
conjecture a price function, and check if it leads to equilibrium, which here means
ln(2e, -  m, / p t) + ln(2e2 + m, /E(p t+l)). (6 .1)
(6 .2)
M t+l = oM t . (6.3)
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if it makes the demand for money mt equal to its supply M { . 22 A possible 
conjecture for the present economy is the following: v
(6.4)
Since the agent, by assumption, knows the economic structure, he knows laws 
(6.3) and (6.4), including the parameters. He uses these laws to forecast the price 
level next period. It follows that
Step 3. Finally, (6.4) and (6.5) are substituted into (6.2) and the demand for 
money m, is set equal to the money supply M t . This yields the equilibrium price 
as,
The agent holds money if m, / E(pt+]) is greater than mt / p t , and stops giving up 
his endowment 2ex if the two ratios are equal.
The RE hypothesis significantly reduces the complexity of predicting behaviour. 
According to the hypothesis, a person’s maximisation behaviour is solely a 
function of his environment, preferences, and budget constraint. That is, given his 
preferences and budget constraint, he behaves in exactly the way that is 
objectively optimal with respect to the environment. As a result, for predicting 
behaviour, the economist has no need to study the person’s beliefs about the 
economy or how he has arrived at those beliefs. He only needs to know the 
person’s preferences, budget constraint, and the structure of the economy (Simon, 
1990:6). And, issues of human learning and adaptation can be left to psychologists 
(Sargent, 1993:21). Furthermore, since in economics preferences are assumed to 
be homogenous across individuals, the RE hypothesis naturally leads to the
22 This method is known as the method of undetermined coefficients. See Pesaran (1987:80-81) 
for alternative methods.
E(pt+0  = (Xj3Mt (6.5)
p, = (e, - a e 2) XM,. (6.6)
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representative agent modelling approach, which, if suitable, enormously 
simplifies the study of macroeconomic phenomena.
6.3 Problems with the RE Hypothesis
The RE hypothesis has been one of the most influential proposals in modem 
economics, and influenced the views of economists on many aspects of policy 
analysis and inference from aggregate data. At the same time, like any bold 
conjecture, it has been the subject of bitter controversies. A full analysis of these 
controversies is beyond the scope of this chapter. Here, we only look at some of 
the theoretical debates that are directly related to the role of the hypothesis as a 
means for specifying people’s view of the economy, a role Lucas assigned to the 
hypothesis (1981:223).
6.3.1 The True Model
A problem with the RE hypothesis concerns the notion of the ‘true model’. There 
are certain situations where it clearly makes sense to speak of a true model. In 
computer simulations designed to investigate an estimation procedure, the 
modeller writes down a model, uses it to generate data, and studies whether the 
procedure can uncover the model from the data if the sample size is allowed to 
grow arbitrarily large. However, outside such situations, it is not clear what a true 
model means, particularly in macroeconomics where model construction heavily 
involves aggregation, idealisation, and simplification. As will be shown in the 
final chapter, aggregation over interactive heterogeneous units generates relations 
that are absent at the individual level, and more importantly as one varies the 
aggregation level, one encounters quite different models. What guides a modeller 
to decide at a specific level of aggregation are mainly pragmatic considerations, 
not correspondence between the model and reality, and this casts doubt on the 
notion of a true macroeconomic model. Moreover, even if the notion of a ‘true 
model’ were unproblematic, in macroeconomics the true model would be so 
complex that would be of no use for prediction or explanation of economic 
phenomena. These quandaries in making sense of a ‘true’ macroeconomic model
107
and the difficulties in establishing it reduce the RE hypothesis to the idea that the 
agent’s model of the economy coincides with whatever model the economist 
accepts to describe the economy (Bullard, 1994). The question then arises as to 
whose model really reflects the people’s view of the economy. A possible 
response is to search for a model that best fits aggregate data. This, however, 
takes us back to where we started the search for microfoundations. Many models 
can fit the data equally well, and the greatest challenge is to determine which 
model best approximates the economy.
6.3.2 Multiple Equilibria
A step in building a rational expectations model is to conjecture the mechanisms 
or laws governing the variables representing the economy, such as money supply 
in the above example. These conjectures are necessary for specifying people’s 
beliefs about the economy. To explain a difficulty with this, it is crucial to bring 
to the fore a distinction between two types of variables entering a model. First, 
there are variables whose values do not depend on their own expected value. One 
such variable is weather that often enters into agricultural models such as wheat 
production models. The state of weather over the next few years does not depend 
on people’s expectations about future weather. As opposed to such variables, the 
model may contain variables whose values depend on people’s expectations of the 
future values of the variables. The price of a commodity at time t can depend on 
people’s expectations of prices at time t+1. This means the way people form 
expectations about prices is part of the mechanism determining prices. In these 
cases, the RE hypothesis requires people’s expectations to be consistent with each 
other so that the economy is in equilibrium. In the present example, this means 
that people’s expectations of future prices are such that they make the demand and 
supply of money equal (the market clears). However, this consistency requirement 
is not enough to ensure a unique solution for rational expectation models with 
expected endogenous variables. Many expectations formation rules yield 
consistent expectations, raising the question of which rule is true of the economy. 
An alternative mechanism for the price level in the above economy is (Sargent, 
1993:11):
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Pt = P M , + X c (6.7)
Like the forecasting rule (6.3), this rule also clears the market. In fact, for every 
c> 0 , there is an equilibrium price. 23 Due to this multiplicity, a complete 
description of the fundamentals of the economy (i.e., tastes, technology, and 
initial resources endowments) and the condition of belief consistency across 
individuals are not sufficient for predicting the equilibrium price. It is also 
essential to know how people converge on a particular expectation formation rule. 
Contrary to Lucas’s initial expectation, the RE hypothesis falls short of specifying 
people’s beliefs about the future of the economy.24
6.3.3 A Paradox
The problem of multiple equilibria is well known in the economic literature. It has 
also been a major research problem in game theory. In addition to this problem, 
there are other issues with the RE hypothesis that are less known. Recall the 
hypothesis implies that the vector of exogenous and endogenous variables of the 
economy follow a jointly stationary stochastic process. It also implies that 
people’s subjective expectations of the variables coincide with the expectations 
implied by the joint objective probability distribution of the variables. Altogether, 
these assumptions exclude the possibility of discretionary policy interventions. 
This follows from the fact that if there were some free parameters that could be 
controlled by public officials there would be, according to the hypothesis, an 
objective probability distribution for the parameters that were known to the people. 
In that case, people would already know the likelihood of any variation in the 
parameters. As a result, they would have taken the information into account when 
making their future decisions. And so, the likelihood of any change by a policy 
maker would have already been known to the people and would have already been 
fed into their behaviour. This means there can be no discretionary policy
23 The equilibrium price is now determined by p t =  (el -  ae2) 1M  t + (ex / e2 ) ' c .
24 Economists have introduced extra principles to select a unique equilibrium. A proposal is due to 
MacCallum (1983:144) which seeks to block introduction of ‘extraneous’ terms such as c into 
forecasting rules. Such suggestions have turned out to be inadequate. They also lack a behavioural 
justification (Lucas, 1986).
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intervention under the RE hypothesis (Bicchieri, 1987:510; Vercelli, 1991:150). 
To allow for policy interventions, the assumption that the economy is permanently 
in a stationary state must be relinquished. This requires abandoning the RE 
hypothesis.25
6.3.4 The Peril of Redundancy
There is another related paradoxical implication of the RE hypothesis that is worth 
noting. The hypothesis, as just said, implies that the economic environment is 
stationary and so excludes the possibility of policy interventions. Granting the 
hypothesis, then, the only practical objective of macroeconomics that remains 
possible is ex ante and ex post predictions. Such predictions do not require a 
structural model built on the optimal rules of individual behaviour. A regression 
model closely representing the relations among relevant aggregate variables is 
enough. Therefore, with the impossibility of policy interventions, there is no 
practical necessity to model expectations and, for that reason, there remains no 
direct role for the hypothesis in economic modelling. The RE hypothesis implies 
its own practical redundancy. Sims notes this quandary at the heart of Lucas’ 
program (1982:115-16). He seems to argue that, having assumed stationarity, 
Muth should have excluded expected variables from the realm of large-scale 
economic modelling altogether rather than requiring macroeconomic models to be 
built on an expectation formation mechanism. In a stationary environment, a 
vector autoregression model tracking the past movements of relevant aggregate 
variables suffices for the purpose of economic analysis (Sims, 1982:115-16). In an 
interesting comparison of Lucas and Sims’ approaches to macroeconomic 
modelling, Sargent also acknowledges that the RE hypothesis, taken seriously, 
can be equally used to “to support Sims’ style of more or less uninterpreted vector 
autoregressive empirical work” (Sargent, 1984:408).
25 Some new classical economists have acknowledged that the RE hypothesis, literally understood, 
contradicts with the possibility of policy interventions. Aware of this contradiction, Sargent writes: 
“In formal work, this contradiction is evaded by regarding analyses of policy interventions as 
descriptions of different economies, defined on different probability spaces. The mental 
comparison is among economies identical with respect to private agents’ preferences and 
technologies, but differing in government policy regime” (1984:413). This move raises more 
questions than solves. Basically, it is not clear how the agents in the economy governed by the 
existing policy regime come to know the joint distribution of the variables characterising the 
economy governed by the new regime.
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6.3.5 The No-Trade Theorems
The RE hypothesis has also contributed to the emergence of a class of no-trade 
theorems that are in sharp conflict with observed data (Milgrom et al., 1982). In 
economics, preferences are taken to be homogenous across individuals. This 
assumption, joined with the hypothesis, implies a view of the economy as a 
society of identical individuals. Such an economy provides no place for security 
markets. Security markets exist because people have diverse information, think of 
the economy differently, and have heterogeneous preferences (Arrow, 1986:212). 
Even though rejecting homogenous preferences is enough for eliminating the 
theorems, it is equally plausible to reject the RE hypothesis to explain the 
emergence of security markets.
This ends our evaluation of the RE hypothesis. The hypothesis is a bold attempt to 
specify people’s view of their choice situation simply by studying the 
environment they live in. To achieve this objective, it is assumed that people have 
already learnt the structure of the economy, adapted their optimal rules of 
behaviour, and the economy is in equilibrium (Lucas, 1986). These suppositions 
are strong. Nevertheless, even when they are supplemented with complete 
knowledge of the fundamentals of the economy, they are still inadequate for 
prediction of economic outcomes, due to the multiple equilibria problem. The 
marriage of the subjective expected utility theory with the RE hypothesis fails to 
provide a predictive economic theory. Predicting whether as a result of an 
intervention the economy converges to equilibrium and the equilibrium at which it 
settles down calls for a theory of how people structure their choice situation, re­
define it as a result of a policy change, and adapt their behaviour as a result of 
subsequent experiences. Until an adequate theory explaining how people learn 
about the economy and adapt is found, macroeconomic theory cannot hope to 
produce the policy predictions that are its ultimate goal (Bicchieri, 1987:512).
I l l
7 Conclusion
New classical economists have proposed two hypotheses to derive generalisations 
of individual behaviour: the rational choice hypothesis and the rational 
expectations hypothesis. The claim is that these hypotheses furnish the basic 
elements of a theory that specifies the variables relevant to explaining economic 
phenomena, draws a distinction between exogenous and endogenous aggregate 
variables, specifies the algebraic form of the functions linking the aggregates, 
suggests their joint probability distribution, and more importantly characterizes 
the conditions under which an observed regularity at the aggregate level remains 
invariant.
This chapter studied the contributions of these rationality hypotheses to 
development of a theory of economic behaviour. Rational choice theories were 
examined using Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility and two types of 
issues were distinguished. One was whether the postulates of the theory were true. 
The other was whether the theory, regardless of the truth of its assumptions, was 
adequate for explaining and predicting behaviour, particularly in dynamic, 
evolving situations.
On the first issue, it was argued that Savage’s postulates were predicated on two 
more basic assumptions that preferences are fixed, and ready-made, and that there 
always exists a description of the world that allows complete disentanglement of 
values from beliefs. Drawing on the lessons of experimental psychology, we 
argued that, like beliefs and small worlds, preferences are not read off from a 
master list but constructed. As a result, since different constructions of beliefs, 
small worlds and preferences can systematically lead to different choices, 
prediction and explanation of behaviour in a dynamic situation demands a theory 
that explains the process of preference, belief, and small world formation. We 
also argued that a description of the world, allowing complete disentanglement of 
beliefs and values, was hard to find, and even if it existed, it would be so 
cumbersome to be of any use in guiding decisions.
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On the second issue, our central point was that these theories take the structure of 
the small world, likelihood judgements, and preferences as given, and only state 
how an ideal agent solves an already well-structured decision problem. As a result, 
in predicting behaviour, a very large list of substantive assumptions is needed to 
specify the agent’s view of his choice situation and the decision problem he is 
trying to solve. Yet, the nature of these assumptions is such that they involve the 
answer to the very same question a theory of behaviour is expected to answer. In 
fact, by varying the exogenous assumptions entering a rational choice model any 
side of any substantive controversy can be rationalized. For this reason, the 
rational choice models answer no substantive economic question; they only 
repackage what has already been stated in the assumptions. In practice, 
economists have tried to select a rational choice model based on econometric 
analysis of aggregate data. But the econometric approach is unsuitable for 
resolving questions of individual behaviour.
Moreover, for evaluating the outcomes of novel policy interventions, one needs to 
predict how the agents would react to the policy, and this requires predicting how 
in response to the policy they modify their view of their choice situation and 
redefine their decision problem. These queries entirely fall outside the scope of 
the rational choice theories, which take as given the structure of the choice 
situation. Contrary to common belief, the critical difficulty with the rational 
choice theories is not that they are false. It is that they in principle have very little 
to contribute to economic theorising.
Finally, the chapter studied the RE hypothesis, which is an attempt to specify 
people’s view of the economy without studying how they learn about it. 
Economic decisions usually involve expectations of endogenous variables, such as 
prices. In such cases, the hypothesis is reduced to the condition of belief 
consistency across individuals. However, there are always many ways in which 
people’s beliefs can be consistent with each other. The hypothesis falls short of 
specifying people’s view of the economy.
These remarks demonstrate that understanding economic behaviour requires a 
different type of theory of behaviour. It requires a theory that explains how people
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form preferences, learn about the economy, model their choice situation, define 
their decision problem, and redefine it as new information arrive. In a nutshell, 
economics needs a learning-based (adaptive) theory of behaviour, not a choice- 
based theory.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Homothetic Utility Function
A monotone preference relation > on a choice set X c R ^  is called homothetic just in
case x > y <=> ax. > ay for all a  > 0. Homothetic preferences can be represented by a 
monotonic transformation of a homogenous of degree 1 utility function. Informally, 
homothetic preferences mean that the agent always spends a fixed proportion of his or 
her income on each good.
Appendix B: Satisficing
Satisficing is a choice procedure. Following Rubinstein (1998:12), let A be some 
‘grand’ set of options (or the set of all possible options), O an ordering of the set A, 
and S c A  the set of satisfactory alternatives. For any choice problem C, satisficing 
involves sequentially examining the alternatives in A according to the ordering O, until 
an alternative is found that is a member of S.
Appendix C: Fair’s Voting Equation
As in the text, let Vu be a variable that is equal to one if voter i votes for the
Democratic candidate in period t and zero if he votes for the Republican candidate. 
Also, let
which means the voter votes for the Democratic candidate if \f/i < qt . Now, recall the 
aggregation assumptions (A5) and (A6 ), restated here as:
A5: y/i is evenly distributed across voters in each election between
some numbers a + 5t and b + St , where a < 0 and b> 0 . a and b are 
constant but St can vary across elections.
A6: There are an infinite number of voters in each election.
(Cl)
(C2)
The expected utility theory implies that:
1 if q ,> V,
0  if q, < w,
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These assumptions imply that if/ is uniformly distributed between a + S, and b + St , 
where the subscription is now dropped from y/i . The probability density function for 
if/, denoted by f t (if/) is
fora  + St <if/<b + St
(C3)
0  otherwise
and the cumulative distribution function for if/ , denoted as Ft (if/ ) , is
i / /<a + St
a+  St < y / < b  + St . (C4)
1 if/ > b + St
Because of S, , the probability density and distribution functions are different for each 
election. Let Vt denote the percentage of the vote that goes to the Democratic 
candidate in election t. Since a person votes for the Democrat candidate if if/i < qt , the 
probability that he votes for the Democrat candidate is p(if/ < qt). The proportion of 
voters voting for the Democrat candidate in election t is np(i// <qt)/n  = p(y/ <qt), 
which means V, is equal to the probability that if/ is less than or equal to qt . Since the 
probability density function of if/ is given by (C3), Vt is equal to Ft(qt) . Using (C4), 
V, can be stated as:
Substituting qt in (C5) yields
(C6 )
where
a 0 = - a / ( b -  a) ;
Pl  = Pi Kb —a) \ 
Pi = Pz l(b — a ) ;
P l = P 3/ ( b - a )■ 
p \ =  P J i b - a )  \ 
v, = -8 ,  l(b -  a ) .
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Chapter 3
Homo Economicus as an Intuitive Statistician (1)
Model Free Learning
1 Introduction
This is our key bounded rationality assumption: we back away 
from the rational expectations assumption, replacing it with the 
assumption that, in forecasting prices, firms act like 
econometricians (Evans et al., 2001:28).
The preceding chapter argued that the subjective expected utility theory is simply 
a method for solving an already well-structured decision problem. However, 
prediction of behaviour, particularly in dynamic situations, requires a theory that 
explains how the agent models his choice situation and defines his decision 
problem. Therefore, even if true, the subjective expected utility theory is 
inadequate as a theory of economic behaviour. New classical economics have set 
forth the rational expectations (RE) hypothesis as a way of specifying the agent’s 
view of his choice situation (or the economy in general). The hypothesis identifies 
the agent’s subjective expectations with the mathematical expectations implied by 
the true economic model, suggesting that he maximises his expected utility with 
respect to the true model. Accordingly, the new classical paradigm defines 
economics as the enterprise to derive observable economic phenomena from two 
basic hypotheses: (1 ) people are (subjective) expected utility maximisers and (2 ) 
they maximise their expected utility with respect to the true economic model.
Attempts to overcome the theoretical shortcomings of the RE hypothesis 
described in the last chapter have resulted in the re-emergence of the bounded 
rationality project, originally proposed by Herbert Simon (1955 and 1956). While 
there has been a burst of interest in the topic over the last two decades or more, 
there is no consensus yet on the definition of bounded rationality or what the 
critical questions of the project are (Rubinstein, 1998). The goal of the project is 
to replace the behavioural assumptions of economics with more realistic 
assumptions and investigate the implications of the changes for our understanding 
of the economy (Conslik, 1996). So, depending on what behavioural assumptions 
of economics are withdrawn and what assumptions are retained, various notions 
of bounded rationality can be defined. Most studies of bounded rationality in new 
classical economics retain the principle of subjective expected utility 
maximization but replace the RE hypothesis with the assumption that the agent
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constructs a model from the available economic data, which may not coincide 
with the true model. Thus, in new classical economics, the project of bounded 
rationality is a program to derive observable economic phenomena from the 
general principles that: (1 ) the agents are subjective expected utility maximisers 
and (2 ) they maximise their expected utility with respect to models constructed 
from the available economic data. 1
From this perspective, the primary issue of the bounded rationality program is to 
theorise how the agent learns about the economy and models his choice situation. 
There are several proposals on offer. The conjecture that has received most 
attention is that the homo economicus is an intuitive statistician; i.e., he intuitively 
models the economy like a statistician (Arthur, 1996:4). Thomas Sargent, a 
leading economist from the new classical camp, summarises this view of the 
bounded rationality program as follows:
I interpret a proposal to build models with ‘boundedly rational’ agents as a 
call to retreat from the second piece of rational expectations (mutual 
consistency of perceptions) by expelling rational agents from our model 
environments and replacing them with ‘artificially intelligent’ agents who 
behave like econometricians. These ‘econometricians’ theorise, estimate, 
and adapt in attempting to learn about probability distributions which, 
under rational expectations, they already know (Sargent, 1993:3).
This conjecture will be called the intuitive statistician (IS) hypothesis of bounded 
rationality. A pioneering work on this view of bounded rationality is Bray (1982), 
who considers an economy in which the agents know the correct model up to a 
small number of parameters and use the least squares method to estimate the 
unknown parameters. Letting the agents live indefinitely, she investigates if they 
ever learn the true parameters, which is essential for forming rational expectations. 
The significance of this question lies in the fact that the learning problem facing 
the agents in Bray’s model economy is not identical with ordinary parameter
1 There is a fundamental difference between the considerations that led Herbert Simon to propose 
his bounded rationality program and those that led new classical economists to study it. Herbert 
Simon initiated his project as an alternative to neoclassical economics. Whereas new classical 
economists have began studying bounded rationality to provide adequate foundations for the 
rational expectations hypothesis, and to extend the new classical tools and notions to phenomena 
traditionally unaccountable within the paradigm. Besides the differences in motivations, Simon 
rejects both elements of the new classical economics.
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estimation. As the agents learn about the economy, they modify their expectations 
and behaviour, which in turn alter the relations being learnt. It is not then possible 
to use the textbook convergence theorems on the long-run behaviour of the least 
squares estimator to argue that the agents will asymptotically learn the truth. The 
question addressed by Bray is different. Her objective is to examine the conditions 
under which her model economy converges to rational expectations equilibrium, 
even though feedback from learning can change the relations being learnt. Since 
Bray’s publication, a sizeable number of similar studies have emerged. Bray 
(1983), Honkapohja (1995), Marrimon (1997), Williamson (1997), Salmon and 
Kirman (1995), Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Sargent (1993), and Sobel (2000) 
contain original contributions as well as surveys of the literature on learning in 
economics.2
The relevance of these theoretical studies is unclear for several reasons. These 
studies usually assume that the agents already know the correct unestimated 
model of the economy, without any explanation of how the model was learnt in 
the first place (Sargent, 1993:166; Sobel, 2000:256).3 The assumption that the 
agents know the correct model is crucial, since starting with a wrong model can 
make learning of rational expectations impossible (Nyarko, 1991). Therefore, the 
convergence results established are contingent on the model economies being 
studied; they do not generally hold. Furthermore, the results are invariably of an 
asymptotic nature. But what is needed for evaluating policies are short run 
predictions of how agents would revise their view of the economy in response to a 
policy change, redefine their choice situation, and modify their behaviour. As 
Keynes put it, in the long run we are all dead. Finally, the dynamics of the 
economy in these studies come exclusively from people’s adjustments of their 
behaviour. However, the economic structure can change for reasons other than 
feedback from learning, entirely altering the inference problem facing the agent.
2 The proposal that human mind acts like an intuitive statistician has a long history in cognitive 
psychology. An interesting discussion of the proposal is found in Cheng and Holyoak (1995), who 
focus on how people, like statisticians, learn about the causal structure of their environment. The 
hypothesis also occupies a central place in Shanks (1995)’s monograph on the psychology of 
learning.
3 In Bray (1982), agents are assumed to know the supply curve and must only form price 
expectations to plug into it.
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The possibility of convergence to rational expectations equilibrium is not directly 
a concern of this thesis. The concern is to investigate if the IS hypothesis helps us 
understand and predict how the agent models his choice situation and defines his 
decision problem. A positive response to this query presumes that there is a ‘tight 
enough’ theory of statistical (scientific) inference, describing how statisticians 
learn about the world, turn economic data into a model of the economy, and revise 
the model in the face of new information (Sargent, 1993:23).4 Otherwise, the IS 
hypothesis would not be of much help in predicting how the statistician (and thus 
the agent) models his choice situation. And a fortiori, no general conclusion could 
be derived from the hypothesis about the conditions under which an economy 
converges to equilibrium.
Therefore, a major concern of this thesis is whether there is a ‘tight enough’ 
theory of statistical inference. To clarify the query, it is useful to start with a 
preliminary conjecture about how a statistician models a choice situation. In 
statistics, the environment is perceived through a collection of measurable 
quantities (features), which are conceived as realizations of some random 
variables with an unknown joint probability distribution. The statistician first uses 
the data on these quantities to estimate their joint probability distribution. He next 
uses the estimate of the joint distribution to uncover the causal relations among 
the variables. If the resulting model is inadequate, the initial set of variables is 
modified, and the two phases of inference repeated.
This description of the processes of statistical inference is imprecise. Nevertheless, 
it helps us in separating issues relating to inference about probabilities from issues 
relating to inference about causes, and provides a framework for defining certain 
important questions about the possibility of establishing a precise theory of 
statistical learning. This chapter and the one to follow examine some basic issues 
relating to learning of the joint probability distribution of a set of variables 
describing a choice situation. The fifth chapter investigates if there can be a theory 
that tells us how to move form the joint probability distribution of a set of 
variables to the causal structure linking the variables.
4 Sargent (1993) raises this question, hoping that it has a positive answer.
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Several approaches to statistical inference are on offer. The diversity arises partly 
from philosophical disagreements about the nature of probability and partly from 
alternative methodologies that, given an interpretation of probability, can be 
adopted to solve inference issues. The debates about the nature of probability are 
not crucially related to the issue of whether there exists a ‘tight enough’ theory of 
statistical inference, and will not be taken up here. Instead, two general 
methodological approaches to statistical modelling are studied, based on the 
frequency and subjective interpretations of probability respectively. An analysis 
of these approaches provides an adequate ground for judging if there can be a 
‘tight enough’ theory of statistical inference, which is essential for assessing the 
bounded rationality program as defined here.
The current chapter investigates the possibility of a ‘tight enough’ theory of 
statistical learning by looking at nonparametric statistics, which is a branch of 
statistics that avoids restrictive non-sample, probabilistic, assumptions, and seeks 
to leave model discovery to the data.5 We use this framework to investigate two 
queries. The first query is whether it is possible with a reasonably sized sample to 
obtain a good approximation of the joint probability distribution of several 
variables using nonparametric estimators, or whether substantial non-sample 
information is required to achieve this. The second query is whether there exist 
inferential procedures that receive observations on a set of variables and yield the 
best estimate of the underlying joint probability distribution, which is possible 
given the data. If not, statistical model discovery cannot be left entirely to the data, 
which raises the question of where statistical models come from. Both issues are 
clearly important for the bounded rationality program.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 defines the notion of a 
statistical model, model specification, and some key problems in statistical 
inference. Section 3 describes the basic idea of nonparametric inference. Section 4 
states the IS hypothesis within the framework of nonparametric statistics, relating
5 The terms parametric and nonparametric, as will be explained shortly, are used to distinguish 
those inference problems in which the regression or density function is known up to a finite 
number of parameters from those in which the algebraic form of the function is unknown, and thus 
the inference problem involves more than ordinary parameter estimation (Manski, 1991:34).
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the statement to the literature in economics. Section 5 studies whether it is 
possible with a reasonably sized sample to obtain a good approximation of the 
joint probability distribution of several variables using nonparametric estimators. 
Section 6  examines whether there exist inferential procedures that receive 
observations on a set of variables and yield the best estimate of the underlying 
joint probability distribution, which is possible given the data. Section 7 
concludes the chapter by stating some of the implications of the analysis for the 
bounded rationality project.
2 Statistical Model Specification
As said earlier, in statistics, the environment (choice situation) is perceived in 
terms of a collection of measurable quantities, some of which are known and 
some of which are not known. The quantities are considered as realizations of 
random variables with some unknown joint probability distribution. The goal of 
statistical inference is to determine the values of the unknown quantities from the 
known quantities, which in theory requires modelling the joint distribution of the 
random variables. So, an appropriate point of departure for our study is to 
disentangle problems that arise in modelling the joint distribution of a set of 
variables, give a precise definition of a statistical model, and highlight the basic 
issues that a theory of statistical learning has to explain.6
A problem in model building, which in a sense precedes any statistical inference, 
concerns the choice of variables that characterise the environment. Two forms of 
variable selection should be separated. Sometimes the objective in building a 
model is to generate accurate ex ante and ex post predictions of a response 
variable Y. In that case, variable selection requires specifying some variables that 
are systematically related to Y, and there is no need for them to be the causes of Y. 
Alternatively, if the goal is to use the model to analyse the effect of changes in the 
environment on Y, variable selection requires finding the causes of Y. In either 
case, variable selection poses difficult questions that must, at least tentatively, be
6 The discussion in this section builds on the works of Granger (1990; 1999), Lindley (1982), and 
Spanos (1986, 1999, and 2001). The definition of a statistical model to follow is adapted from 
Spanos.
123
solved before being able to construct a useful model. The problems in mind 
concern defining the appropriate form of the variables, finding the right method of 
measurement, deciding on the correct level of aggregation, and so fourth. The 
emphasis in this thesis is on the variable selection problem in the second sense. A 
solution to this problem calls for a theory of causal inference, which is taken up in 
the fifth chapter. For now, we assume that the relevant variables are known, and 
concentrate on issues relating to learning probabilities.7 We proceed by defining 
various issues that arise in modelling the joint distribution of a set of variables.
Let us start with the simplest case where there is only one variable of interest. 
Specifically, let Z, denote the variable of interest and D = {zx,z 2,—,z r_{} be the
past values of Z t . The aim is to predict the future values of Z, from the known 
values in Z). This requires estimating the joint probability distribution of 
Z = { Z j,Z 2, . . . ,Z r }, which we denote it by p(Zx,Z 2,...,ZT,&) or simply p{Z ,0 ), 
where © is a parameter space defining the distribution. However, the problem of 
inferring p{Z, 0 ) from the data alone is ill-posed, since it has no unique solution 
regardless of the size of the sample Z>.8 To show this, note that using sequential 
conditioning, the joint distribution p(Z,0 ) can be decomposed into a product of 
univariate marginal and conditional distributions:
p (Z ,0 ) = p{Zx /0 ,)]"Jp (Z , / zM , . . . ,Z i ,©, ) , for all z e  /?J . (2.1)
t= 2
For each sample size T, the conditional distribution p(ZT /z r_,,...,z1,©7-) 
involves T-1 conditioning variables. Therefore, with each increase in the sample 
size, the conditional distribution for Z T changes, making it impossible to infer 
p (Z ,0 ) from the data no matter how large the sample grows. Spanos terms this 
phenomenon the increasing conditioning set problem (1999:266).
7 Granger (1999, chapter 1) touches on some of the difficulties arising at this stage o f specification 
analysis.
8 The philosophical point to be made in this section may be well known but the aim is to precisely 
define a statistical model, which is essential for the analysis to follow.
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Furthermore, the notion of conditional density is defined only for specific values 
of the conditioning variables. Thus, for each z e R J , estimating p (Z, 0 ) involves 
estimating one marginal and T-l different conditional distributions. This is 
impossible since the number of distributions (or in other words, parameters) to be 
estimated always exceeds the sample size. Spanos calls this phenomenon the 
stochastic conditioning or heterogeneity problem (1999:267).9 It is therefore 
necessary to introduce certain simplifying assumptions to make any inference 
about the target distribution p(Z, 0 ).
To explain the kind of assumptions necessary for inference from data, note that 
the increasing conditioning set problem arises because Z, is allowed to depend on 
the whole past history of the stochastic process. This suggests that the problem 
can be circumvented by restricting the dependence of Z, on its past. To illustrate,
one possibility is to assume that Z { is completely independent of its past. 
Complete independence reduces the joint distribution p (Z ,0 ) into a product of 
univariate distributions:
p (Z ,0 ) = f j p ( Z , / 0 , ) ,  for all z e R l .  (2.2)
t =1
Another possibility is to assume that Z, conditional on its immediate past ZM is
independent of the rest of the history of the process. This independence 
assumption, called the first order Markov condition, simplifies (2.1) into,
p(Z /0 )  = p(Z, / 0 , ) f i P(Z, / z,_,,0 ,) ,  for all z e  (2.3)
1=2
In any case, inference about p(Z ,0) requires some independence assumption 
(restriction) to sever the tie between the conditional distribution 
p{Zt / z,_y Zi, 0 ,)  and the sample size.
9 For a concrete example see Spanos (1999:263-267).
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The stochastic conditioning problem arises because the conditional densities 
p(Z t / z,_,,..., zx, 0 ,)  are allowed to vary for each possible {zt_,,..., zt} e RT~l . The 
only way to deal with the problem is to impose some homogeneity restriction 
across the conditional densities / ? ( Z , / z , z , , 0 f) defined over all possible
values z e . The strongest form of homogeneity is complete homogeneity, 
which takes the conditional densities p(Zt / zf_ , zx, 0 ,)  defined over all z e R% 
to be the same. Complete homogeneity renders the indices in 0 , , which 
distinguish different densities p(Zt /z ,.,,...,* ,,© ,), redundant, simplifying (2.2) 
to:
T
p(Z, 0 ) = p(Z t /0 ) , for all z e R% . (2.4)
t= i
A set of random variables {Z1,Z2,...,ZT}, which is completely independent and 
homogeneous, is called a random sample, or an independently and identically 
distributed (IID) sample. An alternative concept of homogeneity, which will be 
used later in the thesis, is strict stationarity. The stochastic process {Z t, t e  T) is 
said to be strictly stationary if
P(Zti ,Z ,2 ,...,Z,b\8) = p(Zf+r,Z,2+r,...,Zf+r;0 ) , forany z ,  (ti +z )e  T (2.5)
i.e., the joint distribution remains unchanged when each point 1,2,..., T is shifted 
by a constant z . When n is equal 1, strict stationarity is reduced to complete 
homogeneity.
These two types of assumptions, although necessary, are still insufficient to 
transform the problem of inferring p(Z, 0 ) from data into a well-posed problem, 
i.e., a problem with a unique solution given the data. With a finite sample, it is 
also necessary to restrict a priori the class of density functions to which p(Z t , 0 )
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may belong to a class F smaller than the class of all possible density functions. 10 
The proposed distribution family must be small enough to warrant a unique 
solution. The distributional hypothesis allows restating (2.4) as,
(2.6)
t=i
The independence, homogeneity and distributional assumptions reduce the 
problem of inferring p{Z ,0 ) from data into finding a distribution /(Z , 16) from
the restricted distribution family F that best fits the data. If the non-sample 
assumptions are appropriate, and if the sample size is adequately large, then 
/(Z , Id) can be reliably estimated form the data.
In light of this analysis, we may define a statistical model as a set of three 
assumptions drawn from the three categories of independence (I), homogeneity 
(H), and distribution (D) (Spanos, 2000:239). A more precise of definition calls 
for some further remarks about these assumptions:
A key remark is that these assumptions are basic. That is, once we decide on the 
form of the assumptions for a vector of observables Z, no additional assumption is 
needed to specify the marginal and conditional distributions of the variables in Z, 
the algebraic form of the regression function of any of the variables on the others, 
or the distribution of the error terms. All these are determined by the three 
assumptions made about Z. As a simple illustration, consider a bivariate random 
variable Z, ={Xt ,Yt),  with data being D = {(*,,y ,)}*,. Further, suppose Z, is 
randomly distributed and has a bivariate normal distribution, giving the model:
Bivariate Normal Model
A3: Homogeneity: (Z1, Z 2,...,ZAf) is C-Homogeneous.
10 The reason is that even estimating a univariate distribution from a random sample involves 
estimating infinitely many parameters, which is impossible with a finite sample.
A2: Independence:
Aj: Data Distribution:
^Mx A & xy
Z N) is C-Independent
'// V  ~2 -  Y\
M y  & x y
,7 _  _ 2
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The model fully defines the marginal distribution of X , the conditional distribution 
of X  given Y, the marginal distribution of Y, and the conditional distribution of Y 
given X. It also determines the algebraic form of the regression function of Y on X, 
and X  on Y. If Y is the response variable, the model implies (Spanos, 1986, ch.22):
X ~ N ( jux , ct2x )
( Y / X  =x ) ~  N ({i\(T 2)
fi = E(Y IX  = x) = J30 + /?,*
fio =My ~ PtMx \ f i  =<*„ *. ~
A second key remark is that these assumptions cannot be combined arbitrarily. An 
assumption from one of these categories can restrict possible choices from the 
other categories. For example, the choice of a first order Markov condition for 
Z = (X ,, Yt ) and a bivariate normal distribution assumption are not compatible.
The assumption necessitates a multivariate distribution. A final remark is that all 
these assumptions are of a probabilistic nature; all have to do with the distribution 
of the observables.
A statistical model can thus be redefined as a set of internally consistent 
probabilistic hypotheses drawn from the three categories of independence, 
homogeneity and distribution (Spanos, 2001). From this perspective, statistical 
model specification' involves positing a priori appropriate independence, 
homogeneity and distribution assumptions to make inference about the target 
model (distribution) possible.
To recapitulate the points so far, any inference from data necessarily calls for 
three types of assumptions -  a model. In theory, once these assumptions are 
introduced, the inference problem is reduced to parameter estimation, for which 
there are usually routine procedures. So, the most fundamental and challenging 
aspect of inference (learning) from data consists in model specification. And, as a 
result, the most immediate task facing a theory of statistical inference (learning) is 
to explain where the models come from, and how to go about selecting the three 
basic assumptions in any inference problem.
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3 Nonparametric Statistical Inference
Two possible responses to these queries are found in the statistical literature. This 
chapter analyses a response found in nonparametric statistics. The concern in this 
branch of statistics has mostly been with estimating a density (regression) 
function from a random sample, and less attention has been paid to inference from 
non-random samples, which requires deciding on an appropriate independence 
and homogeneity assumption. We begin by assuming a random sample to spell 
out the core idea of nonparametric inference, and then explain how the idea can be 
extended to inference from non- random samples. Having done so, we define the 
IS hypothesis within the framework of nonparametric statistics, linking the 
definition to the economic literature on learning.
3.1 The Basic Idea
To explain the basic idea of nonparametric inference, it is convenient to start with 
a simple univariate case. Suppose D = {xJ}Jl1 is a random sample from an 
unknown distribution with density function f ( x ) and that the concern is to use 
the data to estimate f ( x ) . This requires restricting a priori the class of density 
functions to which f ( x )  belongs to a class smaller than the class of all possible 
density functions. In ordinary (parametric) statistics, inference begins by 
assuming that f ( x )  belongs to a particular distribution family defined by a small 
number of parameters, say, the exponential family. Nonparametric inference 
avoids starting with such a restrictive distribution assumption. Instead, it only 
assumes that f ( x )  belongs to the general class of smooth functions. Smoothness
basically means that, for each x  in a ‘small’ neighbourhood of point x0, f ( x )  is 
almost the same as f ( x 0) and, therefore, a small shift away from x0 to x does not 
greatly alter f ( x 0) .11 The restriction of / ( x) to the family of smooth functions 
allows us to estimate / ( .)  at each point jc0 by averaging over the observations
11 Although the above intuitive notion of smoothness is adequate for the purpose of this chapter, 
there is not yet a complete understanding of the abstract idea of “smoothness”, which is usually 
defined in terms of “the number of derivatives”. For a critical discussion see Marron, 1996.
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falling in a ‘small’ neighbourhood around it. The degree (strength) of smoothing 
is determined by the size of the neighbourhood over which averaging takes place. 
A larger neighbourhood size implies a greater degree of smoothing, and hence a 
smaller class of functions to which f ( x ) is a priori thought to belong.
In addition, nonparametric inference ties the strength of smoothing, or 
equivalently the neighbourhood size over which something takes place, to the size 
N  of the sample. As the sample size grows, the size of the neighbourhood is 
correspondingly reduced so as to enable the data to reveal the details of f ( x ). In 
the limit, when the sample size approaches infinity, the neighbourhood size is 
forced to zero so that the shape of the density function is fully determined by the 
data alone. In this way, nonparametric inference aims to do away with the need 
for pre-specifying the functional form of the density function, and bases that 
decision on the data alone. If successful, nonparametric inference turns model 
building (here, finding the right distribution assumption) into an integral part of 
the process of inference from data, and evades mis-specification. 12
The reason for naming this approach ‘nonparametric’ should now be clear. It is 
called nonparametric because it avoids beginning with the assumption that f ( x )  
belongs to a distribution family defined by a finite number of parameters. Since 
the approach leaves the determination of the functional form of f ( x )  to the data, 
nonparametric procedures have also been called ‘model free’ or ‘distribution-free’ 
procedures. The terms ‘nonparametric’, ‘model-free’, and ‘distribution-free’ are 
used interchangeably in what follows.
3.2 The Naive Estimator
The nonparametric literature has flourished over the last three decades, producing 
a remarkable list of procedures for implementing model-free inference. Here, to 
set the stage for our discussion and to give a brief glimpse of the field, we review 
a well-known group of procedures for local averaging that has evolved from
12 Yatchew, (1998) offers a readable review of nonparametric inference, directed at economists.
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attempts to improve on an estimation method called the simple or naive estimator 
(Silverman, 1986:12).
It follows from the definition of a probability density that if variable X  has density 
f i x ) , then (Bishop, 1995:51-2):
/ ( * 0) = lim P(x0 -  h < X  <x0 +h) 
2h
(3.1)
Suppose we are given N  real observations {xi from an unknown density
13f ( x ) . For any given h, the naive estimator estimates the density function /( .)  
at point x0 by replacing the probability P(jc0 —h < X  <x0 +h)  with the 
proportion of the observations falling in the interval (x0 -  h,xQ + h ). That is:
- , ' Z l [H X , e ( x ll- h , x 0 +h)]
o) = ----=---------^ . (3.2) 2 Nh
where /(.) is the indicator function and parameter h controls the neighbourhood 
size for averaging. When the support of f i x )  is densely populated with data and 
h is sufficiently small, estimator (3.2) is likely to generate a reliable estimate of 
the density function.
The naive estimator has several drawbacks. To begin with, it assigns equal 
weights to all the observations in the interval (jc0 - h , x 0+ h) and so allows them
to contribute equally to the estimate f i x 0).  However, it is more plausible to 
assume that f i x )  is more similar to / ( x 0) for points which are closer to x0 than 
those further away. A more accurate estimate of f i x )  at point x0 should thus be 
obtained by giving greater weight to data points closer to x0 . Moreover, the 
estimator takes the width of the interval ix0- h , x Q+h)  to be fixed across the
13 The exposition of nonparametric estimators in this section draws on Hardle (1990), Hardle 
(1993), most notably Silverman (1986), and Scott (1992).
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entire sample space. Consequently, it has the tendency to miss the details of the 
density function in the main part of the distribution where the data are plentiful 
and create noise in the tail area where the data are sparse. This suggests that the 
estimator can be improved by a procedure that adjusts the width of the smoothing 
interval to match the local density of the data.
3.3 Kernel-based Estimators
These considerations have led to development of numerous nonparametric 
estimators that outperform the naive estimator. Let’s restate the naive estimator 
employing a weight function w :
(3.3) makes it explicit that the naive estimator assigns equal weight to every point 
in (x0 —h,x0 +h) . One way to improve on (3.3) is to replace w(z) with a
function that assigns weights to points in (xQ —h,x0 + h) so that points closer to
jc0 receive higher weights while those farther receive lower weights. A
convenient class of such functions, termed kernel functions, is the family of 
unimodal functions centred at zero that decline in either direction at a rate 
controlled by a scale parameter. A common kernel function is the normal density 
function K(z)  = (2;r) ~ 1/2 exp(2 _1 z), where zg [-1/2,1/2]. In general, let ^Tbe a 
bounded function that integrates to one and is symmetric around zero. Substituting 
K(z)  for w(z) in (3.3) yields the general class of kernel estimators, defined by
(3.3)
w(z) = Vi if Izl < 1  and 0 otherwise.
(3.4)
where the scale parameter h is called the bandwidth, smoothing parameter, or 
window width. A large h places a greater weight on observations far apart from x0
whereas a small h allows only observations very close to x0 to influence the
estimate. If the kernel K  is a probability density function, the estimate f {x )  is 
also a probability density function. Estimator (3.4) improves on estimator (3.3) 
but still uses a fixed bandwidth across the jc-region. The so-called adaptive kernel 
estimator improves on (3.4) by varying h in accordance with the local density of 
the data. To decide on the window width at each data point, “an initial (fixed 
bandwidth) density estimate is computed to get an idea of the density at the data 
points.” This pilot estimate is then used to adjust “the size of the bandwidth over 
the data points when computing a new kernel estimate” (Silverman, 1986:100-
The definition of the univariate kernel density estimator (3.4) is easily generalised 
to multivariate cases. Let Z be a vector of variables with p elements. The p-variate 
kernel estimator with kernel K  and bandwidth h is defined by
K  can be any radially symmetric unimodal p-variate probability density function 
such as the standard p-variate normal density function. A common method of 
performing multivariate nonparametric density estimation is the product kernel 
method that replaces p-dimensional kernel K  in (3.5) with a product of one­
dimensional kernels. In the bivariate case, where Z = (X, T) ,  the bivariate 
product kernel estimator is given by
An important aspect of a multivariate probability distribution is the regression 
function of each of the variables under study on the remaining variables. This 
describes how the mean value of the variable in question, conditioned on the
14 See Silverman (1986: 100-10) for a formal description of the adaptive estimator.
15 It is important to note that although the expression (3.6) uses kernel independence, this does not 
imply the independence of the variables (See Appendix A).
(3.5)
(3.6)
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values of the rest of the variables, varies. The theoretical regression function of Y 
on X  is given by
(3.7)
Substituting the density estimate (3.6) into (3.7) yields the kernel regression 
estimator (Scott, 1992:220):
Since (3.8) is linear in the observations {y,}, it can simply be written as (Scott, 
1992:220):
where W(/i) is known as the smoother matrix and y is the vector of observed
response values. W (h) is an n x n  matrix whose elements wtj denote the weight
assigned to point x . in estimating the target function at point x i . As is evident
from (3.7), the issues arising in estimation of a density or regression function are 
theoretically the same.
Nonparametric estimator (3.5) (or, 3.8) has been shown to be consistent: under 
very general conditions, as the sample size approaches infinity, the estimator 
approximates the target density function arbitrarily closely regardless of the form 
of the function. A simple proof for the consistency of estimator (3.8) is found in 
Yatchew (1998). The nonparametric approach then theoretically provides a way of 
learning a density (regression) function from random data, without having to posit 
a priori a parametric distribution family.
(3.8)
/(*,.) = W(/i)y, (3.9)
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In practice, data is not usually known to be random, making the choice of 
independence and homogeneity assumptions as crucial as the choice of a 
distribution assumption. An issue for nonparametric inference is how to generalise 
the methods of model-free inference to non-random samples. Unlike learning the 
distribution of a random sample, there is no algorithmic procedure for learning of 
independence and homogeneity assumptions. The only way to extend 
nonparametric inference to the choice of these assumptions is to follow a 
hypothetic-deductive method. To be precise, one has to begin with an 
independence or homogeneity conjecture, deduce its implications, and 
nonparametrically test them against the data. Consider, for instance, the first order 
Markov condition which implies that p(Z, /z M,z,_2) = p(Z, /z,_,) . One can
proceed by hypothetically assuming that the vectors (Zf, ZM, Z,_2) and (Z,, Z,_,) 
are randomly distributed to nonparametrically estimate the probabilities 
p{Zt / z,_,,z,_2) and p{Zt /z ,_ ,). The estimates can then be used to check if the
equality holds. In theory, this proposal extends the nonparametric approach to 
non-sample data. But the manoeuvre, as will be seen, encounters insurmountable 
practical problems.
4 The Homo Economics as a Nonparametric Statistician
Although the flourishing of nonparametric statistics is relatively recent compared 
to ordinary (parametric) statistics, there have been a good number of attempts by 
economists to model the homo economicus as a nonparametric statistician. 
Historically, Bray’s work (1982) can be viewed as an early proposal to view the 
agent as a nonparametric statistician. She studies an economy in which the agents 
know the true (supply) curve p, = a + bE(pt+l) + ut but must form expectations
E(p[+l) to plug into it. She conjectures that they form expectations E(pl+l) by
taking the average of past prices, which is equivalent to learning with the naive 
estimator. Commenting on Bray’s pioneering work, Lucas suggests that ‘learning 
by averaging’ seems to be a plausible conjecture about human learning 
(1986:236). Thomas Sargent also considers using histogram and kernel estimators 
for modelling learning behaviour (1993:106-107).
135
More recently, Chen and White (1998) have criticised early works on learning in 
economics such as Bray and Savin (1986), which assume that the agents already 
know the correct unestimated model of the economy without any explanation as to 
how the model was learnt in the first place. To eliminate this shortcoming, Chen 
and White propose that agents are nonparametric statisticians who utilise an on­
line version of the kernel regression estimator (3.8) to learn about the economy. 
To explain what this means, note that the estimators described earlier, including 
estimator (3.8), are all defined from the whole data, meaning that the estimate 
must be recomputed from the whole sample for every newly arriving observation. 
In learning situations of interest in economics, data arrives as an ongoing 
sequence {(*,, yj),(x2 ,y 2),...}. It is thus more plausible that the agent works with 
an estimator that at any time t can be represented as a function of the estimator at 
time t — 1 and the new pair of observations (xt , y t ) . Interestingly, estimator (3.8) 
can be reformulated to achieve this (Hardle, 1990:66):
f N+1 (*0 ) = h  (*o) + (w 1 K N+Ul (x -  xN+] )(yN+] -  f N (x0)), (4.1)
which dispenses with the need for re-computing the estimate from the whole 
sample each time. With this proposal, the person uses the data available at time t
A
to obtain f N (jc) and uses the estimate to make predictions necessary for his future
decisions. As new data comes in, he uses rule (3.10) to update the estimate. 16 
Chen and White establish the necessary and sufficient conditions under which 
regression estimator (3.10) asymptotically converges to the true regression 
function in spite of the fact that feedback from learning may alter the relation 
being learnt. 17
16 N  stands for the sample size at time t.
17 In addition to these proposals, a sizeable number of studies of learning in economics and game 
theory utilise neural network inference procedures (e.g., Salmon, 1995). Neural network initially 
viewed as an independent field aiming to tackle complex learning tasks not usually considered in 
statistics. Yet it soon emerged that the procedures are essentially nothing but variants of 
nonparametric inference procedures and are subject to similar strengths and limits (Friedman, 
1994; Cheng, et al., 1994; Ripley, 1993). They cannot solve any learning problem that 
theoretically falls beyond the reach of nonparametric inference.
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This chapter follows these economists in viewing the economy as a society of 
nonparametric statisticians, and investigates if the conjecture helps shed light on 
some critical issues in theoretical economics. Specifically, we investigate if agents 
in such a society can learn the probabilistic features of their environment from 
ordinarily available data samples, whether it is possible to predict what the agents 
think given the data generated by the economy, and finally whether the conjecture 
helps us understand how the agents revise their view of the economy in the face of 
a new policy.
5 Intrinsic Limitations of Model Free Inference
Nonparametric estimators, as stated, can be shown to be asymptotically consistent, 
in that they uncover the target function as the number of observations approaches 
infinity. The asymptotic results teach us how learning is in principle possible and 
provide some general insights into the working of nonparametric estimators and 
what must be done as the sample size increases to ensure an accurate estimate 
(White, 1992:121). In reality, however, we only have access to a finite and usually 
small number of observations, and because the economy also changes over time, 
remote past data is often uninformative. For economics, the relevant question is 
not thus whether there are model-free estimators that can asymptotically discover 
the truth or whether the opinions in a society of nonparametric statisticians 
asymptotically converge to truth. The relevant question is whether it is possible 
with a ‘reasonably-sized’ sample to learn a ‘good’ approximation of a relatively 
complex target function using nonparametric methods. This section argues that 
accurate approximation of ‘complex’ functions using nonparametric techniques is 
practically impossible. Even a ‘crude’ model-free approximation of a function 
relating several variables requires a gigantically large sample that is rarely 
available in practice. The argument is inspired by a critique of the claims 
surrounding the theory of neural networks given in Geman et al. (1992).
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5.1 The Bias-variance Decomposition
Essential for investigating the limitations of nonparametric methods with 
‘reasonably sized’ samples is a precise definition of what is meant by a ‘good’ or 
‘accurate’ estimate. This can be achieved by considering nonparametric 
estimation of a simple regression function. Suppose we are given a random data 
set {(jcf., and are interested in estimating the regression function f i x )  in
y = f ( x )  + £ , (5.1)
where £ has mean zero and is independent of X. An objective in searching for an 
estimate of f i x )  is to predict the value of Y when only x  is known. A possible 
way to define the accuracy of an estimate is then in terms of the accuracy of its 
predictions. A popular measure of predictive accuracy is the mean squared 
prediction error (MPE):
MPE = E [ y - f ( x ) ] \  (5.2)
which provides a measure of the accuracy of the estimate / ( x) when X takes 
value x and Y takes value y. The expectation E(.) is taken with respect to the joint 
probability distribution of Y and X. The error (5.2) can be decomposed into two 
distinct elements (White, 1992:97-98):
MPE = E[(y -  f (x)]2 + E[ f (x ) -  f i x ) ]2. (5.3)
The first term on the right hand side is the variance of Y at point x, which is 
independent of the estimate and hence plays no role in evaluating accuracy. The 
second term is the mean squared distance between the estimate and the regression 
function at point x, and provides a natural measure of approximation accuracy. 
The term is known as the mean squared estimation (MSE) error:
MSE = E [ f ( x ) - f ( x ) ] \  (5.4)
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where the expectation is taken with respect to p(x). From this viewpoint, a ‘good’ 
approximation refers to an estimate that yields a ‘negligible’ MSE error. Since the 
estimate f i x )  depends on the data, it can be viewed as a realisation of a random 
variable defined over all samples D of fixed size N  that can possibly be drawn 
from the system. This means we can define the mean and variance of the estimate.
Letting E[f(x)] be the mean of / ( x) taken over all hypothetical samples D of 
fixed size N, the MSE error can then be decomposed into two distinct components 
(Gemanetal. 1992:10):
£ [ ( / ( * ) - / ( * ) ) 2 ]
= E{ [(/(*) -  £ [/(*)]) + (£ [/(* )] -  /(x ))]2} 
= £ [(/(* ) -  £ [/(x )])2] + E[(E[f(x)] ~ f i x ) ) 2]
+ 2E[(f(x) ~ E[ f (x )]) x (E [/(x )] -  /(x))]
= E[(f(x) -  E[ f  (x)])2] + (£ [/(x )] -  f i x ) ) 2 
+ 2[E[fix)] -  E[ f  (x)])] x [E[f  (x)] -  /(x )]
= E[if ix)  -  E[f ix)])2] + iE[fix)] -  f i x ) ) 2 (5.5)
The first term on the right hand side is the variance of the estimate at point x, 
measuring the dispersion of f i x )  around its mean. The second term is the 
squared bias of the estimate at point x, giving the squared distance between the
A
mean estimate value E[f{x)] and the regression function at point x. Since the 
variance and bias components contribute to the MSE error, both must approach to 
zero for a good approximation or, in other words, accurate learning to occur. 
Therefore, the question posed earlier is in fact whether it is possible to make both 
bias and variance ‘small’, with ‘reasonably’ sized samples in ‘interesting’ 
inference problems, using nonparametric procedures such as kernel regression 
estimators (Geman et al., 1992:44).
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5.2 The Bias-Variance Tradeoff
The estimate (estimator) f ( x ) depends on three factors: (a) the estimator family 
(say, the kernel family), (b) the smoothing parameter (or parameters), and (c) the 
data. By altering any of these elements it is possible to vary the estimate, and 
hence control the MSE error. Enough for the current purpose is to consider the 
effect of varying the smoothing level and the data (sample size). We begin by 
investigating the effect of varying the level of smoothing on the squared bias and 
variance components of the MSE error.
Increasing smoothing reduces the variance part of the error. In the extreme case, if 
each neighbourhood (bandwidth) is chosen to cover the whole x-region, the kernel 
estimate becomes equivalent to the average of the response values everywhere. In 
that case, the variance part of the MSE error is at its lowest possible value, namely 
zero. However, when each bandwidth is so chosen to cover the whole x-region, 
the estimator always yields a straight line, which is most likely quite different 
from the target function. In that case, the response value y corresponding to each x 
will be significantly different from the estimate, leading to a substantial bias 
(Hastie, et al., 1990:17). In general, an attempt at eliminating variance by 
increasing smoothing can cause an increase in the bias component that may be 
greater than the reduction in MSE error obtained by reducing the variance. 
Consequently, decreasing variance by increasing smoothing does not necessarily 
reduce the overall error; it may in fact increase it.
Conversely, decreasing smoothing reduces the squared bias component of the 
MSE error. In the extreme case, if each neighbourhood (bandwidth) is chosen to 
contain only one observation, the kernel estimator interpolates the data. In that 
case, the squared bias term achieves its lowest possible value at the data points 
and, if the target function is smooth, is also small in the close neighbourhoods of 
the points. But the reduction in the bias term can sharply increase the variance of 
the estimator, since the estimate at each point x  would most likely be quite 
different from its average value (Bishop, 1996:336; Hastie, et al., 1990:17). As a 
general rule, then, for a fixed sample, an attempt at reducing the squared bias part
140
by decreasing smoothing could increase the variance part of the error, thus 
increasing the overall value of the error.
These considerations about the effect of varying smoothing, which can be made 
formally precise in the case of each family of nonparametric estimators, point to a 
trade-off between the squared bias and variance components of the MSE error. For 
a fixed sample, the squared bias component can be reduced at the expense of 
increasing the variance factor and the variance factor can be reduced at the 
expense of increasing the bias component (Silverman, 1986:35). Geman el al. 
(1992) term this tradeoff the bias-variance dilemma.
Since this dilemma plays a central role in the analysis to follow, it is worth 
illustrating it with a simple example, which we adopt from Wahba and Wold 
(1975). Suppose x e  [0,3] and y is related to x  by
y = f ( x )  + e,  (5.6)
where /(x )  = 4.26(e_JC-4e~2*+3e_3jc) and £ is distributed as W(0,0.2). We 
generate 100 data points from the model to investigate the effect of varying 
smoothing on the performance of a kernel regressor. If the bandwidth is so chosen 
to cover the whole x-region (e.g., if it is set at 6) as in Figure 5.1, the resulting 
estimate is a straight line, significantly different from the target function. 
Alternatively, if the bandwidth is reduced to 0.01 as in Figure 5.2, the estimator 
interpolates the data, and again the estimate drastically differs from the true 
function. However, when the bandwidth is set to an intermediate value of 0.7 as in 
Figure 5.3, both the variance and bias of the estimate are reduced, and the 
estimator closely approximates the target function.
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The purple line shows the (true) regression function whereas the 
blue line shows the estimate.
An immediate implication of the bias and variance dilemma is that, given a data 
set, smoothing cannot be reduced arbitrarily. Quite the opposite, for a fixed 
sample size, there is a unique (set of) smoothing parameter value (values) that 
ensures an optimal tradeoff between the squared bias and variance in the sense of 
minimising MSE error (Friedman, 1994:32). This optimal value fixes the class of 
functions that the estimator can approximate given the data, and hence fixes the 
minimum bias possible. If the optimal neighbourhood size (bandwidth) relative to 
the data is, for instance, the whole x-region, the estimator will only be able to 
approximate straight lines. In that case, if the target function is considerably 
different from a straight line, the estimator will produce a highly biased estimate 
of the function. With a finite sample, there is in a sense no difference between
142
parametric and nonparametric estimators (White, 1992:117); they both search 
through a proper subset of the class of all possible functions.
The bias-variance dilemma can only be resolved by increasing the sample size. As 
the sample size increases, and the input variable space (jc-region) is increasingly 
densely populated with data everywhere, smoothing can be reduced without 
increasing variance. And, as smoothing is reduced, the estimator becomes able to 
search over an increasingly larger class of functions, thus reducing the chance of 
bias. To illustrate the point, let us return to the above example. This time, we hold 
the level of smoothing fixed but vary the sample size. If we simulate a sample of 
100 observations from the model, and fit a model using a kernel regressor with 
bandwidth 0.03, the result is a highly variable curve significantly different from 
the target function (Figure 5.4). If the sample size is 1,000, the same level of 
smoothing yields a much smoother curve, with lower bias and variance (Figure, 
5.5). When the sample size is 10,000, we get an estimate that closely matches the 
regression function (Figure 5.6). By increasing the sample size, it is possible to 
reduce bias and variance simultaneously.
Kernel regression estimate, h=0.03, n=101 Kernel regression estimate, h=0.03, n=100l
>. O
1.5 2.50.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 3.0
Figure 5.4 Figure 5.5
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Kernel regression estimate, h=0.03, n=10001
o
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Figure 5.6
The blue line shows the (true) regression function whereas the
black line shows the estimate.
Therefore, the key to driving both the bias and variance components of the MSE 
error towards zero using local averaging (fitting) estimators is to densely populate 
the x-region (input variable space) with data. If this turns out to be impossible in 
interesting inference situations, because of the bias-variance tradeoff, local 
averaging (fitting) estimators can only search through a proper and most likely 
small subset of the class of all possible functions. In that case, they may not be 
able to produce an accurate approximation of the target function.
5.3 The Curse of Dimensionality
Although it may be possible to densely populate low dimensional input variable 
spaces (i.e., one or two predictors) with ordinarily available samples, this is 
practically impossible in high dimensional spaces due to the curse o f 
dimensionality problem (Bellman, 1961). Recall that the basic idea of local 
averaging (or fitting) is to divide the input variable space (jc-region) into a number 
of cells and take the average of the responses in each cell as the estimate of the 
regression (or density) function in that cell. The curse of dimensionality refers to 
the fact that the number of cells increases exponentially with the dimension of the 
input variable space (i.e., the number of regressors). In general, if d indicates the 
dimension of X, ( x e R d ), and each regressor co-ordinate is divided into M
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divisions, the total number of cells will be M d . Since each cell must contain 
some data points to make any inference, the number of data points required for 
local averaging also grows exponentially with the dimension of the input variable 
space. For example, if M  is taken to be 10, and ten observations are required for 
densely populating each cell, a sample of lOxlO2 observations will be needed to 
densely populate a two dimensional input variable space (two regressors). On the 
same ground, a sample of lOxlO10 observations will be required to equally 
populate a ten dimensional input variable space (ten regressors). The curse of 
dimensionality thus makes it impossible to adequately densely populate high 
dimensional input variable spaces with ordinarily available samples.
To provide more insight into the problem, suppose we have 10,000 data points 
uniformly distributed over the ten-dimensional unit cube [0,1]10. A bandwidth of
diameter 0.2 in each regressor co-ordinate results in a volume of 0.210 * 1.02 x 10~7 
for each cell, and the expected number of observations in each cell is approximately 
1 xlO-3. Obviously, no local averaging is possible with this number of data points. 
Alternatively, if we increase the neighborhood size to include at least ten 
observations, the bandwidth must cover at least 0.5 of each co-ordinate. In that case, 
averaging is carried out over at least half of the range along each co-ordinate and is 
no longer local. The general lesson is that in high dimensional spaces, if the 
neighborhood is ‘local’ (i.e., small), it is almost surely empty. If the neighborhood 
is not empty, it is not ‘local’ ,18
What is more, to drive both elements of the MSE error of a local averaging (fitting) 
estimator towards zero, which is necessary for the estimator to arbitrarily closely 
approximate the target function, it is necessary to increasingly divide the input 
variable space into smaller and smaller cells, and, in parallel, the number of data 
points in each cell must increasingly grow larger and larger. In the limit, the number 
of cells M  and the number of data points in each cell must approach infinity to 
ensure a good approximation. As a consequence, densely populating of an even low
18 The example in this paragraph is adapted from Hardle (1990:258). For further discussion of the 
implications of the curse of dimensionality see Bellman (1961:94); Friedman (1991), (1994), 
Friedman et al. (1981:817), Scott (1995), Bishop (1995), Hardle (1990), Silverman, 1986:129.
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dimensional input variable space (say, with four or five regressors) demands an 
astronomically large sample that is impossible to achieve in practice, or at least in 
situations of interest in economics.
Taken together, the bias-variance tradeoff and the curse of dimensionality imply 
that an astronomically large sample, which is impossible to achieve in practice, is 
required to arbitrarily closely approximate the target function even for moderate 
numbers of regressors (say, 4 or 5). Ordinarily available samples in situations of 
economic interest do not even allow for a crude approximation of a high 
dimensional function using local averaging techniques. This intrinsic limitation of 
model-free inference reveals that even with an unusually large sample the agent is 
not able to accurately learn the probabilistic relations characterizing his choice 
situation from data alone. Learning the probabilistic relations of a choice situation 
calls for substantive probabilistic non-sample information.
5.4 Defeating the Curse of Dimensionality
The impossibility of local averaging (or fitting) in high dimensional input spaces 
have prompted search for nonparametric inference methods that build an 
approximation of a high dimensional function that takes the form of expansions in 
low dimensional (univariate) functions. If it were possible to approximate a 
complex high dimensional function with a sum or product of low dimensional 
(univariate) functions, nonparametric inference would theoretically only involve 
estimation of low dimensional functions. In that case, the curse of dimensionality 
would raise no intrinsic issue for a data-driven method of inference. And the 
argument for the impossibility of model-free learning of high dimensional 
functions would break down at a closer scrutiny. To explain that this is not really 
the case, and to draw some further important methodological conclusions about 
the boundaries of model-free learning, we look at the method of project pursuit 
regression developed by Friedman et al. (1981). The method is directly aimed at 
extending the idea of nonparametric inference to high dimensional data.19
19 Friedman (1994) and Hastie et al. (1994) review some of nonparametric multivariate 
approximation methods.
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In multivariate regression analysis the objective is to model the conditional 
expectation of response variable Y given predictor variables X = { X x, . . .Xp} on
the basis of a sample {yitxut...tx j }* . The data are assumed to have come from a 
system described by
y = f ( x l ,...,xp) + £ (5.7)
The projection pursuit regression (PPR) estimator models the conditional 
expectation of Y given X, / (x )  , as a sum of general functions of linear 
combinations of the predictors, i.e.,
/(x )  =  ar0 +  2 " , gm(zm), z„ =  2 ' , “ »»*, • (5 .8)
where the univariate variable zm denotes a projection of the vector X  onto a one­
dimensional space, and gm is a univariate smooth function, called basis function. 
The PPR estimator constructs an approximation /(x )  in an iterative manner. It 
begins by setting a 0 equal to y , the average of the observed responses, and 
computes the residuals ru = y, —y . Next, it assigns some initial values to
projection parameters a u to define a univariate variable zx = ocuxi and 
regresses ru on zu using some univariate nonparametric estimator. It updates the 
parameters a u by minimising the squared residuals sum A = ^  (ru -  g(zu))2 
over all possible choices of a u , inserts the optimal values of a u into 
Z[ = X,Ciariixi ’ re-estimates . Again, it uses the new estimate to
update a u and repeats the process until no further reduction of the sum of
residuals can be achieved. It then adds the final estimate g ,(z,) to y and 
computes the new residuals r2i = [y ; — (y H-gjCzj)]. These steps are repeated to 
obtain a second basis function g 2{z2), and the process of constructing new basis 
functions is continued until no further reduction can be achieved in the residuals.
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It has been shown that if the number of basis functions M  in (5.8) is let to grow to 
infinity, the function can approximate arbitrarily closely any continuous function 
(Diaconis et al., 1984). This means that as long as the target function is 
continuous and the number of basis functions M  is let to grow arbitrarily large, the 
PPR estimator can approximate it arbitrarily closely.20
This consistency result is theoretically reassuring but is of not much help in 
practice. The number of basis functions M  in a projection pursuit regression 
approximation plays the same role as the smoothing parameter in the kernel 
estimators. If M  is taken to be small, the estimator can only search through a small 
subset of continuous functions, which may neither include the target function nor 
a good approximation thereof, and will therefore be biased. If M  is taken to be 
large, the estimate interpolates the data and will be highly variable. Again, the 
bias-variance tradeoff restricts the number of basis functions that can be included 
in a projection pursuit estimate given a data set, thus limiting the class of 
functions that the estimator can approximate in practice. Consequently, the sample 
size must be adequately large to include an adequately large number of basis 
functions so as to ensure a good approximation.
Moreover, as pointed out by Huber (1985), there are relatively simple functions 
that cannot be approximated by a sum of a finite number of additive basis 
functions. An example is f ( x ],x2) = ex'Xi (Huber, 1985). An assumption behind 
the use of the projection pursuit method is that a good approximation of the target 
function can be obtained by an estimate containing only a small number of basis 
functions. There is no reason to think that this assumption is valid if nothing is 
known about the target function;
5.5 The Loss of Interpretability
There is another aspect of the attempt to extend nonparametric inference to high­
dimensional data that is worth noting. In practice, as explained, any extension of 
nonparametric inference to high dimensional input spaces takes the form of
20 See Ripley (1996) for a statement of the proof.
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expansions in low dimensional functions (Barron et al., 1991:80). And, a good 
estimate may require a large number of basis functions. In that case, the estimate 
is a model like (5.8) with a large number of univariate functions g ln. Such a
model gives no clear description of how each regressor X { separately relates to
the response variable Y\ each regressor X t relates to Y in a very complex way
(Hastie, et al., 1994:67). As a result, even if it were known that X ,,...,Xp are
causes of Y and have no latent common causes with Y, it would still be impossible 
to use the model to trace the distinct effect of each X t on Y. The model is only
useful for ex ante and ex post predictions; it is not suited for analysis of actions 
and policies or understanding of the system. A similar remark is true of the 
outcome of other nonparametric multivariate approximation methods, including 
the neural network approach (Warner, 1996). The price to pay for extending 
nonparametric inference to high dimensional data is the loss of interpretability 
(Friedman, 1994:9).
A general lesson learnt from this consideration is that establishing an interpretable 
model suitable for evaluating actions and policies calls for substantive 
probabilistic information. One has to begin with a parametric model to ensure 
interpretability. If no substantive probabilistic assumption is made at the outset, 
the outcome is a black box model that lacks interpretability and is only suitable 
for ex ante and ex post predictions. There is therefore a tradeoff between the 
interpretability of a model and the amount of probabilistic information used to 
obtain it.
We have so far explained some of the limitations of nonparametric inference from 
random data. It is appropriate to close it by looking at the possibility of 
generalising nonparametric inference to any sample regardless of whether it is 
random or not. Any such attempt, as stated earlier, requires hypothetically 
assuming that the data are random, and nonparametrically estimating the joint 
distributions of various subsets of the variables to assess alternative independence 
and homogeneity assumptions. However, since accurate estimation of the joint 
distribution of several variables with ordinary samples is not practically possible,
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successful nonparametric evaluation of these assumptions is not practically 
possible either. Alternative methods are needed for selecting independence and 
homogeneity assumptions.
6 Model Selection
The analysis of the bias-variance tradeoff demonstrates that, for any data set, there 
is an optimal smoothing parameter value that minimises the MSE error. The 
optimal value fixes the class of functions over which the estimator can search, and 
hence determines the best approximation of the target function possible given the 
data. A crucial issue in nonparametric inference, therefore, concerns the choice of 
the smoothing parameter value that is optimal given the data in hand. We refer to 
this issue as the smoothing parameter or nonparametric model selection problem. 
In nonparametric statistics, the assumption is that nothing is known about the 
target function apart from smoothness. This implies that one has to look at the 
data or, more precisely, assess the predictive accuracy (error) of possible models 
to select a model. This is indeed the approach pursued in nonparametric statistics. 
Broadly speaking, a number of models with different smoothing parameters are 
fitted to the data, the predictive error of each model is estimated, and the model 
with minimum prediction error is chosen (Moody, 1994:149). The remainder of 
this chapter first describes the rich variety of methods for estimating prediction 
error in order to explain the possibility of defining alternative predictive model 
selectors. It then shows how different model selectors often choose different 
models in practice. Having done this, it investigates if there are any adequate 
grounds for choosing a model selector as optimal. It finally spells out some 
intrinsic limitations in estimating prediction error. And the implications of the 
discussion for nonparametric inference are spelled out.
6.1 Alternative Model Selectors
A model selector is consisted of a discrepancy (distance) function and an 
estimation strategy. The discrepancy function is to measure the distance between 
the predicted value of the response variable and its actual value or, in short, to
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define prediction error. The estimation strategy is to estimate the accuracy of the 
model with respect to the population. To explain some of the approaches to
prediction error estimation, we continue working with the squared Euclidean
* A 2 * distance [y, -  f h (xi)] , where f h (x,) is the response value predicted by the
model for a new observation at x{, and y* is the actual response value. For the
purpose of this section, we propose to measure the prediction error rate of a model 
using the average mean squared prediction error (APE):
APE{h) = N - ' Y ME(y i - f h(xi) f  6.1)
The error, as made it explicit, depends on the smoothing parameter h. A problem 
is that future data are not known, and except for the strategy of “wait and see” any 
attempt at estimating error (6.1) involves exploiting exiting data. However, the 
same data cannot be used for both obtaining a model and estimating its predictive 
accuracy. An attempt to do so amounts to estimating APE using the average 
squared residuals (ASR):
ASR(h) = IV-1 - / , ( * .  )}2. (6.2)
Following a technique explained in Eubank (1988), the expected value of ASR can 
be decomposed into (see Appendix B):
E(ASR(h)) = S 2+ / (* ) '( /  -  W (h))2f ( x )  + N ' ' S 2tr[W(h)2] -  2N~'S2tr[W(h)]
(6.3)
W (h) is the smoother matrix with bandwidth h, f(x) is the regression function, 
S 2 is the variance of Y (given x), and fr[W(/i)] is the trace of the smoother 
matrix.21 However, applying the same technique to the average mean squared 
prediction error yields
21 The prime in /  (X ) stands for transpose.
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APE(h)  = S 2 + f ( x ) \ I  -  W (h))2 f ( x ) + AT1 S 2tr[W(h) 2] . (6.4)
A comparison of (6.3) and (6.4) shows that ASR on average underestimates the 
mean prediction error APE by factor 2N~l cr2tr[W(h)] . For this reason, 
statisticians call this estimate of the prediction error the apparent rate of error or 
the substitution error (Efron, 1983). In fact, substitution error (6.2) can arbitrarily 
be reduced by selecting a sufficiently small smoothing parameter value so that the 
model interpolates the data. However, this would not necessarily lead to a model 
that minimises the MSE error, which is essential for minimising prediction error. 
The literature provides three avenues for obtaining an unbiased estimation of 
prediction error.
A strategy is to split the data in two sets, a training set and a test set. The training 
set is used to obtain a model and the test set is used to evaluate its performance. 
By using different data for model construction and evaluation, the data splitting 
strategy evades the problem with the apparent rate of error. It, nevertheless, has 
several drawbacks. First, by leaving part of the data aside as a test set, the strategy 
fails to make optimal use of the data in estimating a model. In the nonparametric 
setting, a smaller sample necessitates a greater degree of smoothing, which 
reduces the class of functions over which an estimator can possibly search. 
Consequently, the procedure is likely to lead to the choice of a highly biased 
model. To be precise, the strategy estimates the predicting error of a model built 
from (say) half of the data but the primary concern is to estimate the predictive 
accuracy of a model that can be constructed from the whole data (Zucchini, 
2000:19). Secondly, when the sample size is small, as is usually in practice, 
splitting the data leads to a small test set, which may also be inadequate for 
achieving a reliable estimate of the model prediction error (Faraway, 1998:335). 
Finally, the strategy involves an arbitrary decision in dividing the data into a 
training set and a test set, which could affect estimation of the prediction error and 
hence model selection (Glymour, et al., 1995:37).
Another strategy attempts to overcome the inefficiency of the simple data splitting 
method by utilising resampling techniques to create a test set. Cross validation is
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the oldest resampling technique used for estimating prediction error, attributed to 
Stone (1974). The method, in its most common form, involves leaving a data 
point (x t , yf) aside at a time as a test set, fitting a model to the remaining N-l  data
points, and using the model to predict the omitted observation. The process is 
repeated for all the N  observations, and the average of the errors is taken as the
estimate of the model prediction error. Let /*"' (.) be the model estimated from 
sample D  excluding data point (jc, , y,), and f ^ ‘ (xt) the response value predicted 
by (.) at point xt . The cross-validation estimate of prediction error is given by
This technique is called “leave-one-out” cross validation, since each time only one 
data point is left out. Alternative cross-validation methods can be defined by 
holding out a different number of observations (say, 5) each time. A cross 
validation based model selector chooses a smoothing parameter h that minimises 
error estimate (6.5) or a similar one.
This re-sampling strategy yields an unbiased estimate of the mean prediction 
error. The reason for the unbiasedness of an estimator such as (6.5) can intuitively 
be understood by noting that
(6.5)
Ely, ~ fn )12 = <72 + E l f i x , ) -  / f  (x,. )]2, (6.6)
and
Ely] -  f h ixt )]2 = <72 + E[f (x t) -  f h (x, )]2. (6.7)
As the sample size increases, the estimate f h '(*,.) is expected to become closer to
the estimate f h(xf) , which is based on the full data, i.e., f h(x,) * f ^ ' ( x t). And, 
as a result, the mean value of CV(h) becomes increasingly close to the mean
prediction error, i.e., E(CV(h)) * APE(h) . This means that CV(h) is an 
approximately unbiased estimator of the mean prediction error (Hastie, et al., 
1990:43). Hall (1983) establishes that a sequence of smoothing parameters 
produced by the cross validation procedure (6.5) leads to consistent density 
estimation. A sequence of smoothing parameters minimising CV(h) is therefore 
expected to minimise the mean prediction error.
Although the description of cross validation techniques gives a glimpse of 
resampling approach, for the discussion to follow, we also need to mention an 
alternative resampling procedure, called bootstrapping, which exploits a different 
strategy for constructing a test set. In its simplest form, the bootstrap method takes 
the original data set in place of the unknown distribution, considers each 
observation in the data set as equally probable, and draws N  new observations 
from the set with replacement. The new sample is called the bootstrap sample. It 
fits the model to the bootstrap sample and estimates its prediction error by 
applying it to the original data set. The technique generates B bootstrap samples, 
estimates the model on each, and applies each fitted model to the original data to 
obtain B estimates of the model’s prediction error. The average of these estimates 
is taken as the model’s prediction error. A bootstrap model selector suggests 
choosing the smoothing parameter that minimises the average prediction error 
(Efron et al., 1993:247-254). Appendix C formally defines some bootstrap error 
estimators which will be mentioned in the text.
Statisticians have also pursued a third avenue to obtain an unbiased estimate of 
mean prediction error. As said earlier, the mean average squared residuals E(ASR) 
differs from the average mean prediction error APE by factor 2n~]S 2tr[W(h)]. If 
this term could somehow be estimated, it would be possible to transform ASR into 
an unbiased estimate of APE by adding an estimate of the term to ASR. In that 
case, the expected value of the augmented ASR would be the same as APE, and 
there would remain no need for computationally intensive resampling procedures. 
One would be able to estimate APE by correcting ASR with a term that cancels the 
bias term out. This possibility is the drive behind an ongoing search for estimates 
of prediction error that take the form
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E(ASR(h)) + 2N~lS 2tr[W(h) ] . (6.8)
To further illustrate the variety of ways of estimating prediction error, it is worth 
looking at one of the model selectors that proceed by minimising an estimate of 
(6.8). Note that the cross validation criterion can also be written as:
CVw  = T7Z (y. -  fk (*I) y' = 77S { y‘ j"' {'h 1} (6-9)l - w fi J
where wu are the diagonal elements of the smoother matrix W  (Eubank, 1988:30). 
Thus, the leave-one-out cross validation estimator corrects the bias of ASR by 
multiplying it with function (1-w^.)"2. Craven and Whaba (1979) suggests an 
approximation to (6.9) by replacing the diagonal elements wH with their average, 
namely t r ( W ) / N , calling it generalised cross validation (GCV). That is, they 
replace (6.9) with
tr (W(h)) /N\
GCV(h) = — Y \ ■ \ (6.10)
Z mJ  I J  / i I T / i  w  I i  r  I v /
as an estimate of the mean prediction error. While CV corrects the bias of ASR by 
multiplying it with function (1 -  wl7)2, GCV corrects it by {1 — tr(W(h))/ N}~2. If 
we take a first order Taylor expansion of this (correcting) function and ignore its 
reminder, we obtain \ + 2N~ltr(\V(h) . Using this approximation, GCV can be 
restated as
GCV(h) « ASR(h) + 2N~itr[W(h)]ASR(h) (6.11)
As shown in Hardle (1990:155), the expected value of the second term in (6.11) is 
approximately the same as the second term in (6.8) and asymptotically cancels out 
the bias term in ASR. Following a different route, Eubank (1988:35-6) sketches an
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alternative proof for the consistency of GCV as an estimator of APE. Now, an 
important point is that there is nothing unique about the correcting function 
{(N — tr(W))/ N}~2. Any function, with the same first-order Taylor expansion as 
1 + 2N~ltr(W(h) , can equally correct the bias term in ASR. This possibility opens 
the way for producing alternative unbiased model selectors and is behind most 
known selectors such as Akaike’s information criterion (Akaike, 1972), finite 
prediction error (Akaike, 1974), Shibata’s model selector (1981) and Rice’s 
bandwidth selector (1984). All these selectors are based on an estimate of 
prediction error that corrects ASR by a function whose first order Taylor 
expansion is l + 2N~ltr(W(h) (Hardle, 1990:167).22
This section has described some of the general strategies for error estimation, 
stressing how by varying the estimation strategies alternative model selectors can 
be invented. It is also important to bear in mind that the estimation strategies can 
be combined with other discrepancy functions than the squared Euclidean 
function to generate alternative model selectors. One can use, for instance, the 
Kullback-Leibler discrepancy. In general, alternative model selection techniques 
can be invented by slightly varying the discrepancy function or the estimation 
strategy (Amemiya, 1980:325).
6.2 Which Model Selector Should Be Used?
The existence of alternative model selectors raises the question of which selector 
to choose in practice. If these methods picked up the same model (smoothing 
parameter value), one could arbitrarily select any of the methods. But since they 
use different estimation strategies, when applied to ordinarily available samples, 
they often suggest different models. Consider the dataset plotted in the figures 
below, which consists of 100 observations simulated from the model used earlier 
to illustrate the bias-variance tradeoff. Two selection criteria have been applied to 
the data to find the optimal bandwidth in kernel regression of Y on X  -  the leave- 
one-out cross validation and generalised cross validation method. The former
22 For a discussion of these selectors see Hardle (1990), chapter 5
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suggests the optimal bandwidth to be 0.25, producing the model in Figure 6.1 
while the latter suggests it to be 0.07, producing the model in Figure 6.2. These 
models are evidently different.
Figure 6.1 Figure 6.2
Kernel Regression 
Leave-one-out Cross Validation
Kernel Regression 
Generalized Cross Validation
Similar findings have been observed in numerous extensive studies of the small 
sample behaviour of the selectors. So, in small samples the selectors can lead to 
conflicting models, which raises the question of which selector to choose in 
practice. Of the two elements defining a selector, the error estimator is more 
critical than the discrepancy function. An error estimator is required to be 
consistent, unbiased, and efficient. Consistency is to ensure that the estimator is 
asymptotically able to correctly estimate the error; unbiasedness is to ensure that 
the estimates, on average, coincide with the object of inference; and efficiency 
(i.e., minimum variance) is to ensure that there is no other, unbiased consistent 
estimator yielding a more precise estimate. One thus has to search for a selector 
that is based on a consistent, unbiased, and efficient error estimator.
Most error estimators described above have been shown to be consistent and 
asymptotically equivalent (Efron, 1983:328). This means consistency alone 
cannot help select an optimal error estimator. It is also necessary to consider the 
finite properties of the estimators, i.e., unbiasedness and efficiency. The problem 
is that there is no theoretical result as to which type of error estimator is both 
unbiased and most efficient. Consequently, statisticians have turned to simulation
23 See Breiman (1992), Breiman et al (1992), Efron (1983), Efron (1986), Efron et al (1993), Efron 
et a l(  1997), and Hardle et al (1988).
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experiments to study the finite-sample behaviour of the estimators. However, the 
studies have revealed that the estimators are either unbiased but highly variable or 
biased and less variable.
In a series of simulation experiments, Efron (1983) investigated the finite sample 
behaviour of the leave-one-out cross validation method, several variants of the 
bootstrap method, and some other error rate estimators not mentioned here. The 
studies revealed that the leave-one-out cross validation estimator was of low bias 
but suffered from a high degree of variability across different samples of fixed 
size. Other estimators in the study showed either high bias and less variability or 
high variability and low bias. Comparing the bias and variance of the estimators, 
Efron observed that a bootstrap estimator, called the 0.632 estimator, though 
biased, was comparatively less variable.24 He recommended it for model selection. 
Likewise, Breiman et al. (1992) compared the finite sample properties of leave- 
one-out cross validation, fc-fold cross validation, and a variant of the bootstrap 
method in a number of subset (variable) selection experiments. The simulations 
showed that the leave-one-out cross validation had low bias but suffered from 
high variability while five-fold cross validation method suffered from a large bias 
and less variability. Comparing the results, the authors suggested using the ten­
fold cross validation method. Finally, Efron et al. (1997) report a number of 
simulation studies that support a bootstrap estimator different than the 0.632 
estimator. If a lesson can be learnt from these studies it is that no error estimator 
outperforms others in all respects. Either they are unbiased but highly variable or 
they are biased and less variable. A judgement is needed about the relative 
importance of unbiasedness and efficiency to pick out an estimator.
Beside this, the real problem with the use of simulation studies is that their results 
cannot be generalised automatically. The fact that an estimator outperforms others 
in a series of simulations does not imply that it always outperforms others. In 
experiment with different models a different estimator may outperform the rivals. 
To give a historically interesting example, as said earlier, in a series of studies 
Efron (1983) found that the 0.632 bootstrap estimator outperformed several other
24 For a definition of this error estimator see Appendix C.
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methods, and so recommended it for estimating prediction error. Not long after, 
Breiman et al. (1984) noted that the estimator badly fails in predicting the error 
rate of highly overfit models, such as a one nearest neighbour classifier 
(estimator), where the apparent rate of error is zero.25 For example, if Y takes 
either 0 or 1 with probability Vi, independently of (useless) predictor vector X , 
then, the true error rate for any classifier equals 0.50. Yet, the 0.632 estimator 
predicts the expected error rate of a one nearest neighbour classifier to be 
0.632x0.5 = 0.316. In this case, both the leave-one-out cross validation estimator 
and the simple bootstrap estimator correctly predict the error rate of Vi. Similar 
counterexamples have been found for hold-out error rate estimators. For example, 
in a no-information dataset, where the assignment of cases to each class is 
completely random (e.g., Fisher’s iris data set), the best an estimator can predict is 
to predict majority. But if the number of cases for each class in the dataset 
happened to be equal, the leave-one-out cross validation method would wrongly 
predict 0% predictive accuracy for a majority prediction rule (Kohavi, 1995). The 
hold-out methods including the cross validation techniques work only if leaving 
part of the data aside as a test set does not destroy the structure of the data. The 
validity of simulation results is then confined to the type of models (and data) 
considered and cannot be generalised automatically (White, 1992:110). All in all, 
the question of which selector to choose in practice currently has no theoretical 
answer. In the end, the choice of a selector is to some extent left to the modeller’s 
judgement (Learner, 1982:217):
In this paper I have compared several simple criteria on the basis of which 
we can select one regression equation among many other candidates. ... 
the general picture that has emerged from this paper is that all of the 
criteria considered are based on a somewhat arbitrary assumption which 
cannot be fully justified, and that by slightly varying the loss function and 
the decision strategy one can indefinitely go on inventing new criteria. 
This is what one would expect, for there is no simple solution to a 
complex problem (Amemiya, 1980:352).
25 A ^-nearest neighbour classifier considers K  nearest neighbours and assigns the class by 
majority vote.
26 Fisher’s iris dataset, a well-known database in the pattern recognition literature, contains 3 
classes of 50 instances each, where each class refers to a type of iris plant (Fisher, 1936).
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In conclusion, the predictive model selectors do not provide an entirely objective 
(data-driven) solution to the model selection problem. They only provide an 
automatic solution in the sense that, given the choice of a discrepancy function 
and an error rate estimator, the method fixes the model that minimises the error, as 
measured by the estimator (Green et al., 1994:24). The idea of designing an 
inference procedure that receives data and yields the model that given the data 
best approximates the true model has no satisfactory foundation. Any 
nonparametric inference is founded at a deep level on a decision about the optimal 
level of smoothing that cannot be fully justified by the data:
The absence of theoretical guidance on setting the bandwidth, and more 
generally on defining nearness, leaves the empirical researchers with 
enormous discretion. This discretion gives applied nonparametric 
regression analysis a subjective flavor (Manski, 1991:44).
6.3 Extrapolation Error
The difficulty in choosing an optimal selector is not the only factor that limits the 
power of the model selection strategy available in nonparametric statistics. Even if 
it were possible to locate an optimal selector, there would still be no satisfactory, 
and entirely data-driven, solution to nonparametric model selection. An 
explanation of this point calls for making a distinction between two notions of 
prediction error: in-sample and extra-sample prediction error. In sample 
prediction error (accuracy) refers to the predictive performance of a model at the 
locations in the input variable space from which the data have been drawn. We 
refer to these locations in the input variable space as the sample region. On the 
other hand, extra-sample prediction error refers to the predictive performance of a 
model over the locations in the input variable space for which no data are 
available. Given this distinction, an important point to note is that in-sample 
predictive accuracy is not necessarily the evidence for extra-sample predictive 
accuracy. The reason is that two models can be exactly alike over the sample 
region but behave considerably differently outside the region. In that case, if the 
data produced by one of the models belonged to the points in the input variable 
space where the models are alike, the other model would equally predict the data
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despite the fact that it yields quite wrong predictions elsewhere.27 Consider the 
following two models:
(I) y - f ( x )  + e,, f ( x )  = l/2  + l/2 tan h (* -2 ), ex ~ A(0,0.2)
(II) y = g(x) + e2, g(x) = 0.05 -  0.2x + 0.3x2 -  0.002*4, e2 ~ N (0,0.2)
where X  takes values in interval [0,6.5]. As shown in Figure 6.3, these models 
are alike over interval [0,4] but fall apart over interval [4,6.5]. Suppose model (I) 
was true. If the data happened to fall in the first interval, where both models are 
alike, model (II) would equally predict the data well. But the predictive 
performance of the model over this interval would give a wrong indication of how 
it would perform over the second interval. Therefore, an estimate of in-sample 
prediction error (accuracy) cannot be taken as an estimate of extra-sample 
prediction error (accuracy). On the same ground, the fact that a model minimises 
in-sample prediction error is not a guarantee that it also performs well outside the 
sample region. To decide how to extrapolate beyond the data, it is essential to 
have an estimate of the extra-sample accuracy of the models considered. An 
estimate of in-sample accuracy is neither necessary nor sufficient.
E xtrapolation
Y
-3 .
o 1 2 3 4 5 6
X
Figure 6.3
27 This is another way of stating Goodman’s riddle o f induction (Goodman, 1955). See Howson 
(2000) for an exposition o f the riddle.
28 This model has been constructed based on a similar example found in Forster, 2000.
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Now, any prediction error estimator is an estimator of in-sample prediction error. 
Consider cross validation or bootstrap estimators. These estimators essentially 
work by correcting the optimism of the apparent rate of error (Efron and 
Tibshirani, 1993:249), which is a measure of how a model predicts the same data 
used to obtain it.29 The correction is to remove the effect of noise in the data so as 
to enable the error estimator to correctly estimate the prediction error of future 
observations drawn at the same locations in the input space from which the data 
have been drawn. The resulting selectors, therefore, are only able to locate a 
model that minimises in-sample prediction error. In other words, they can only tell 
what sort of model will yield accurate prediction if we draw a ‘similar’ sample, 
where by similarity we mean a sample drawn at the same points in the input space 
from which the original sample was drawn. The selectors are silent about the 
model that is true of the population, and consequently give no guidance as to how 
to generalise beyond the sample region (Browne, 2000:8).
This conclusion has an important implication for nonparametric inference. In 
general, if it were possible to densely populate the input region everywhere with 
data, every prediction would involve only in-sample prediction and, as a result, a 
cross validation estimate of a model’s error, for instance, would provide an 
estimate of the predictive accuracy of the model with respect to the population. In 
that case, the distinction between in-sample and extra-sample prediction error 
would be irrelevant. However, the discussion of the curse of dimensionality 
makes it clear that in ‘interesting’ inference situations, the input space is almost 
everywhere empty, which means nonparametric prediction in ‘interesting’ 
inference situations almost always involves extrapolation (extra-sample 
prediction). Since the model selection criteria are silent about the predictive 
performance of a model outside the sample region, nonparametric extrapolation is 
almost always arbitrary (Geman et al, 1992:44). As a consequence, in interesting 
inference situations such as modelling a choice situation that involve a relatively 
large number of variables, reliable prediction with ordinarily sample sizes 
necessarily calls for substantive prior background information. That is to say, one
29 This point is evident from the reformulation of the leave-one-out cross validation given in (6.9).
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needs to posit a priori a parametric model and be sure that the model is correctly 
specified:
One can usually be confident that the regression of interest is continuous. 
Hence one can usually trust nonparametric estimates to be consistent. On 
the other hand, these estimates are often imprecise in practice. Moreover, 
they cannot be extrapolated off the support of x. Parametric modelling 
permits more precise estimation and makes extrapolation possible. The 
problem, of course, is that an assumed parametric model may be 
misspecified (Manski, 1991:44).
Overall, the difficulty in locating the ‘best’ error rate estimator is not the only 
trouble with the predictive approach to model selection in nonparametric 
inference. The more serious problem is that in interesting nonparametric inference 
settings, such as modelling a complex choice situation, prediction almost always 
involves extrapolation about which data are absolutely silent. Nonparametric 
extrapolation in interesting cases is inevitably arbitrary. Nonparametric models 
are only reliable for in-sample prediction.
7 Conclusion
This chapter began with the remark that economics is in need of a theory that 
explains how the agent learns about the economy, defines his choice situation, and 
redefines it in response to policy interventions. A basic unifying hypothesis in 
new classical economics has been that he behaves like an econometrician (the IS 
hypothesis). Theoretical economists hope this conjecture helps them predict the 
model that the agent builds of his choice situation based on available economic 
data. The objective is to combine the information with information about the 
agent’s preferences and budget constraint to specify the decision problem he is 
trying to solve, which is essential for predicting his behaviour. The success of this 
hypothesis first and foremost depends on the existence of a ‘tight enough’ theory 
of statistical learning that describes how, given a data set, the statistician 
constructs a model of the mechanism generating the data.
To discuss some aspects of this issue, we began by showing that any statistical 
inference necessitates three types of assumptions, which define a model.
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Therefore, the central concern of a theory of statistical inference should be model 
specification. We then looked at nonparametric statistics, which suggests starting 
with a general and highly flexible model (distribution assumption) and leaving to 
the data to determine the precise form of the model. We first described how 
nonparametric statistics provides a way of learning a density or regression 
function from a random sample without having to posit a rigid model in advance. 
We then explained how the idea might be extended to non-random data. If 
nonparametric inference could be accomplished in practice, we would have, at 
least in the case of random samples, inference procedures that receive data and 
yield the best approximation of the underlying distribution given the data.
As seen, in order for a nonparametric estimator to deliver a good approximation of 
a function both the variance and squared bias component of the MSE error of the 
estimator must approach zero. Because of the bias-variance dilemma, this is only 
possible by densely populating the input variable space. But, due to the curse of 
dimensionality problem, it is practically impossible to densely populate input 
variable spaces in interesting inference situations, where the number of input 
variables considered exceeds three or four. In such situations, local averaging 
(fitting) inference demands an astronomically large sample that is usually 
impossible to achieve in practice. With a reasonably sized sample, a good 
approximation of the relations among several variables using local averaging- 
based techniques is impossible.
This impossibility also rules out the practical possibility of extending 
nonparametric inference to non-random data. The extension requires estimating 
the joint probability distributions of various subsets of the variables under study in 
order to assess the appropriateness of alternative independence and homogeneity 
assumptions. Since nonparametric density estimation of high dimensional data is 
practically impossible, the choice of appropriate independence and homogeneity 
assumptions cannot be left to nonparametric methods either. Modelling the 
probabilistic relations among a set of variables characterising a choice situation 
requires beginning with substantive probabilistic assumptions, which essentially 
means one has to work within the framework of parametric inference. In that case, 
learning will only be possible if the model is correctly specified.
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The bias-variance trade-off implies that, given a data set, there is an optimal value 
for the smoothing parameter of a nonparametric estimator that fixes the class of 
functions that it can approximate. The only avenue available to nonparametric 
statistics for specifying the optimal smoothing parameter value is to consider the 
predictive performance of various models arising from alternative smoothing 
parameters. We have seen that there are competing procedures for nonparametric 
model selection. Although asymptotically equivalent, the methods pick up 
different smoothing parameters in practice, leading to different models. There is, 
however, no general theoretical consideration that can help to choose a model 
selector. The performance of the methods depends on the target function. For 
some functions, cross validation-based techniques may, for instance, work better 
and, for some others, other methods may work better. As a consequence, in a 
purely nonparametric inference situation, there is an element of arbitrariness in the 
choice of a model selector and hence a model.
Even after choosing a model selector, the problem of smoothing parameter 
selection is not entirely resolved, as these selectors often have local minima. 
Moreover, the estimators underlying the selectors only measure in-sample 
prediction error. What they at best tell us is how to simplify the model so as to 
avoid overfitting. They do not tell us how to extrapolate beyond the sample. 
Taken together, these considerations rule out the possibility of inventing 
procedures that receive data and yield the best possible approximation of the 
underlying model given the data. Data only speak in the light of background 
information, and, as the information differs, they speak differently.
There are also numerous nonparametric estimators. Besides the family of kernel 
estimators, one may also mention nearest neighbours estimators, spline regression 
methods, neural network methods, local polynomials, and many others. When the 
concern is with arbitrarily large samples, this multiplicity may pose no problem, 
since all these methods are consistent. However, when the sample is small, they 
often produce different estimates, raising the question of which method to choose 
in practice (Breiman, 1992). Modelling learning also demands some decision 
about the agent’s choice of an estimator.
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Finally, due to the curse of dimensionality, in high dimensional input variable 
spaces, nonparametric models take the form of expansions in low dimensional 
functions. In such models, the relation between the dependent and independent 
variables are entirely blurred, which seriously limit their use in analysing how the 
dependent variable would vary if the independent variables were changed by 
intervention. Consequently, the models are not useful for analysis of actions and 
policies. Analysis of actions and policies requires an interpretable model, which 
necessitates working with a parametric model from the start.
These limitations of nonparametric inference define the boundaries of any theory 
of learning that fails to take seriously the role of non-sample information. It is a 
combination of background information and sample data that enables a person to 
come up with an intelligible model of a choice situation. A theory of learning 
ought to explain how non-sample information is obtained, how the information 
interacts with sample data, and how the interaction leads to a specific model. 
Some of these issues will be discussed in the next chapter that concentrates on the 
theory of Bayesian inference.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Product kernel independence
Notice that although the estimator
1 N 
f ( x , y )  = — t Y K
Nh &
x —xi
h
K y-yi
h
(Al)
uses kernel independence, this does not imply that the variables X  and Y are 
independently distributed. If the variables were assumed to be independent, the 
kernel estimator would have the form
/(* , y)  =
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Appendix B: Decomposition (Eubank, 1989)
This result is based on a lemma established in Searle (1971, Chapter 2) and 
mentioned in Eubank (1988: 402). Let Z be a n x l vector with mean m and 
variance-covariance matrix E . Suppose Wis a symmetric n x n  matrix. Then
E(Z'WZ) = m'Wm + tr(WE) (Bl)
where tr(WE) is the trace of WE.
Now let { ,  x,.),..., (yn ,*n)} be a vector of observations from 
y = /(x )  + £
where y is the vector of responses, /(x )  the vector of unknown means, and £ 
the vector of zero mean, uncorrelated random errors with common variance cr2.A_____________________________________
Further let f h(x) be a linear estimator of /(x )  . The mean average squared 
residuals for f h (x) is given by
E(ASR(h)) = E{y, -  f„ (x.)}2,
which can be rewritten as 
E(ASR(h)) = n ' E {  y -  W(h)y)2 
= n-'E[(y-W(h)y)(y-W(h)y)]
(B2)
(B3)
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= n~lE[y \ l - W ( h ) ) 2y] (B4)
where W(h) is the smoother matrix and ythe vector of responses. Let £  = <r2I, 
and note that W(h) is symmetric. Applying (Bl) to (B4) yields the result.
= n-7(x)'(I-W(A))2/W  + «"VV[(I-W(ft))2]
= n ~ ' f ( x ) ( l - W  (A))2 /(x )  + <72 +n''cr2tr[(W(h))2]-2n-'cT2trlW(h)] (B5)
Now consider applying the technique to average mean prediction error
APE(h) = n '  E(y. -  A (*, ))* (B6)
which can be restated as 
= <72+n~'Ydl E ( f ( x i) - f h(xi))2 
= <72 + n yE[f{x)  -  f h (*))’(/(* ) -  f k (x))]
= a 2 +n-lE [ f (x ) - W (h )y ) \ f ( x ) -W (h ) y ) ]
= a 2+ n ' E i f W - W m n x )  + £ ) ) \ f ( x )  -  W (/i)(/(x) + £)]
= a 2+ n - ' f ( x ) ( I - W m \ f ( x )  + n ' a 2trl{l-W{h))2} (B7)
which is the same as the equation (6.4) in the text.
Appendix C: Bootstrap Estimates of Prediction E rro r (Efron et al. 1993)
Without any loss of generality, let D = {(*., y ,)}^ be an IID sample from 
bivariate distribution n , /  be an estimate of the regression function/, and / ( x t ) , 
the predicted value of Y at point x t .
Let A = [y(, / ( x t.)] denote a measure of error between the response yt and 
prediction /(x ,)  . In regression, A = [y , , /^ . ) ]  is often chosen to be
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Let denote the prediction error for /  by
Perr(D,f)  = El{A[y ' , / ( / ) ] } ,  (Cl)
where the expectation is taken over a new observation (jc*,y*) from distribution 
7t. The apparent error rate is
A e r r ( D j )  = A[ y„ f ( x , )]. (C2)
N  1
Let D b =  { ( x bj , y bj ) } * f = l  be a bootstrap sample. The simplest bootstrap error
estimator generates B bootstrap samples, estimates the model on each, and then 
applies it to the original sample to give B estimates of prediction error:
e n ( D \ f )  = - |  (C3)
In this expression, f b( x t )  is the predicted outcome at x t based on the model f b
estimated from bootstrap data set Db. The overall prediction error estimate is the
average of these B estimates:
(C4)
D
Perrboot is not a good estimate, since the training and test samples overlap, 
causing an underestimation of prediction error Perr(D, / ) .
A second way to employ the bootstrap technique is to estimate the bias (or 
optimism) of the apparent error rate Aerr(D,f)  as an estimate of prediction error
Perr(D,f)  and obtain an estimate of the error by adding the bias term to
Aerr{D, f ) . Let denote the optimism by
co(f) = Perr(D, f )  -  Aerr(D, f )  (C5)
The bootstrap estimate of 0)(f) is given by
®(/}=^  t e l  zr  ^a ^ )i - k., it  >■*" • ^  )i} ■ (c6>
An alternative bootstrap estimate of the prediction error is the apparent error plus 
the downward bias in the apparent error given by
Perrlm, ( D , f )  = e r r ( D , f )  + d>(f ) .  (Cl)
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For each data point ( x { , y(.) the bootstrap samples can be divided into those that
contain ( x n y t )  and those that do not. The prediction error for the data point
(xi > y,-) will likely be smaller for a bootstrap sample containing the point. It can
be shown that the percentage of points belonging to both the original sample and 
the bootstrap sample is approximately 63.2%. A possible way to remedy this 
problem can be to take as test samples only those data point that do not belong to 
D b . That is,
-/(*,)] (cs)
N telt
where /, is the set of indices of the bootstrap sample D b that do not contain 
(x,, y ,) , and Bt is the number of such bootstrap samples. However, since the
samples used to obtain P e r r b o o t i  have no common elements with the test samples, 
they are likely to give rise to a pessimistic estimate of prediction error. On the 
other hand, 63.2% of the samples containing (x^y,) are, as said, likely to lead to 
an optimistic estimate of prediction error. The so-called bootstrap 0.632 estimator 
is defined by the weighted average of the apparent error estimate A e r r ( D , f )  and 
the error estimate P e r r b o o t 3:
Perr.632 = 0.368 x A e r r ( D , f )  + 0.632 x P e r r b o o t i (C9)
Chapter 4
Homo Economicus as an Intuitive Statistician (2)
Bayesian Diagnostic Learning
1 Introduction
Learning takes place through Bayesian updating of the individual prior 
beliefs. ... However, since the use of Bayesian updating is a consequence 
of expected utility maximisation, assumption (2) [Bayesian updating] is 
already a consequence of assumption (1) [subjective expected utility 
maximisation] (Kalai, et al., 1993:102).
“ ...hypothesis and model generation is far more important to problem 
solving that is hypothesis testing and that it is very much the statistician’s 
business to be involved with model generation and regeneration” (Box, 
1994:218).
The last chapter began the study of the bounded rationality program that viewed 
the economy as a society of intuitive statisticians -  the intuitive statistician 
hypothesis. A basic question for the program is whether there is a ‘tight enough’ 
theory of statistical inference. It has so far been argued that there can be no 
entirely data-driven procedure that receives a finite sample of data and yields the 
model that, given the data, best approximates the mechanism generating the data. 
To build an interpretable model of a choice situation, it is necessary to start with 
substantive probabilistic information or, more precisely, a parametric probability 
model. In order to advance our analysis, this chapter studies the intuitive 
statistician hypothesis within the framework of the Bayesian theory.
There is now a sizeable literature on learning in economics that models the agent 
as a Bayesian statistician. These studies consider economies of Bayesian 
statisticians, who know the true economic model except for a small number of 
parameters, and use Bayes’ theorem to learn the parameters from the data 
generated by the economy. The papers investigate the conditions under which the 
opinions of these intuitive statisticians converge on the true parameter values. As 
noted earlier, since feedback from learning can shift the structure, the issue in 
question is not ordinary parameter estimation but involves estimation of shifting 
parameters. Various convergence theorems of probability theory have been 
employed to demonstrate that if the agents do not entertain extreme priors 
excluding the true parameter values, they eventually learn the parameters with 
probability one. This result is often claimed to justify the use of the solution 
concepts of rational expectations equilibria in solving economic models and Nash
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equilibria in game theory. Good reviews of, and original contributions to, the 
literature on Bayesian learning are found in Blume and Easley (1995), Bray and 
Kreps (1986), Cyert and DeGroot (1974), Kiefer and Nyarko (1995), Nyarko 
(1997), Nyarko (2000).
As explained in the last chapter, the relevance of such studies to the study of the 
economy is unclear. The studies assume that the agents know the true model 
except for a finite number of parameters, providing no explanation of how the 
model has been learnt in the first place. This is a critical issue because starting 
with a mis-specified model can make learning of rational expectations impossible 
(Nyarko, 1991). Moreover, the results are invariably of an asymptotic nature, and 
thus do not bear on real inference situations where the samples are usually small. 
In fact, the economic structure can shift for reasons other than learning, rendering 
past data irrelevant. A theory of human learning should first and foremost explain 
how a person builds a model of his choice situation from ordinarily available 
samples. This chapter, therefore, departs from the dominant trend in the studies of 
Bayesian learning by exclusively focusing on the issue of parametric model 
formulation and problems arising in learning from small samples.
This chapter starts by arguing that the Bayesian theory is solely concerned with 
coherent (consistent) analysis Of uncertainty regarding a closed set of specified 
possibilities (events, hypotheses, models), which are assumed to be adequate as a 
description of the (inference) situation at hand. Coherent analysis constitutes only 
one phase out of several in the whole process of statistical learning. A vital 
activity preceding coherent analysis is the initial generation of models. Another 
critical activity following coherent analysis is appraising the empirical adequacy 
of the models (Smith, 1986:250). In practice, these phases of learning are iterated 
in a cyclical manner. New data cast doubt on the adequacy of the current models, 
calling for generation of new models. Construction of the new models necessitates 
forming a new coherent system of beliefs, which in turn raises the question 
whether the new models include a model that captures the salient features of the 
data. A satisfactory account of statistical learning should explain how models are 
built, how they are assessed, and how they are modified. This chapter aims to 
generalise the framework of Bayesian inference by introducing some additional
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proposals to shed light on those aspects of inference such as model formulation 
that are usually left unexplained in Bayesian statistics. Having done so, it spells 
out the implications of the broader theory of Bayesian inference for the bounded 
rationality project.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 touches on some issues in the 
foundations of the Bayesian theory. Section 3 explains how the idea of coherence 
is translated into a theory of statistical inference. Section 4 outlines various phases 
of the process of inference from data, and places coherent analysis within a wider 
view of inference. Section 5 begins spelling out an exploratory theory of model 
specification by explaining the process of initial model formulation. Section 6  
provides a framework for Bayesian empirical model assessment, and completes 
the exploratory theory of model specification. Section 7 takes up Bayesian model 
selection. Section 8 discusses some objections levelled against the theory of 
Bayesian model specification. Section 9 spells out the implications of the broad 
view of Bayesian learning for the bounded rationality project.
2 Foundational Issues
In economics, a choice situation (the environment) is viewed through the 
perspective of a collection of measurable quantities. These quantities are of two 
kinds: those whose numerical values are known and those that are not known. The 
general problem facing the modeller is to infer the unknown quantities from the 
known ones. Knowledge of the known quantities usually fails to determine 
uniquely that of the unknown quantities, and given the known quantities, there 
remains uncertainty about the values of the unknowns. The hallmark of the 
Bayesian position is that our uncertainty attitudes towards these unknowns should 
accord with the laws of probability. A foundational question is whether the 
Bayesian theory prescribes how these uncertainties should be updated as some of 
the unknowns become known. To address this query, it is first essential to 
understand the reasons why subjective uncertainties ought to accord with the laws 
of probability.
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The second chapter studied some aspects of the decision theoretic approach that 
took personal probability to be part of a theory of coherent preferences in the face 
of uncertainty. Since, in this chapter, the concern is not directly with decision­
making but with learning from data, it is convenient to consider another approach 
to establishing the probability axioms, which makes no formal reference to 
preference considerations. The approach is based on the so-called Dutch book 
(DB) theorem, which aims to justify the probability axioms as rationality 
constraints by showing that partial beliefs are ‘coherent’ if and only if they 
conform to the axioms. This section studies the assumptions underlying the 
theorem to explore if they impose any restriction on how learning from experience 
should take place. The exposition is mainly built on Skyrms (1986) and Howson’s 
various writings. 1 The theorem stands on three basic assumptions:
The first assumption consists of two related components: One is that you (the 
agent) have a degree of belief in any hypothesis H  you may ever consider. The 
other is that the strength of your belief in H  is reflected in the price that you are
•y
ready to pay in a bet on or against it. It is, therefore, considered as possible to 
measure your degree of belief in H  in terms of the price you are ready to pay in 
some appropriate bet on or against it. Several definitions are in order to elaborate 
on this point. A bet on a statement H is an arrangement between you (the bettor) 
and the bookie whereby you pay the bookie amount $d to receive amount $c if H 
is true and receive nothing if H  is false.3 The total amount involved, (d+c), is 
called the stake, the ratio dJc the odds, and the ratio d/d+c the betting quotient.4 
Finally, the price that you are ready to pay for a bet in which the stake and 
whether you bet on or against H  is decided by your opponent is considered to be 
fair in your eyes. Given these preliminaries, the first assumption identifies your 
degree of belief in H  with the betting quotient in a bet on or against H  whose price 
you consider as fair (Howson, 2000:126). Following de Finetti (1980), a bet is
1 Classic sources for the theorem are F.P. Ramsey, (1926 [1980]) and B. de Finetti, (1937 [1980]).
2 This assumption can be weakened. All that is needed is that if you have a degree of belief in H, it 
is reflected in the price you are ready to pay for a bet on or against H.
3 The dollar sign is omitted in what follows.
4 “[B]etting quotients are ... just odds normalized so that they lie within the half-open interval 
[0,1); this is extended to the closed-unit interval [0,1] by allowing the odds to take the ‘value’ °o ” 
(Howson, 2000:125).
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sometimes defined differently. Let s stand for the stake in the above bet and p  for 
the betting quotient. The bet can be restated as an arrangement in which you agree 
to pay ps in order to receive (l-p)s if H  turns out true and nothing otherwise. Your 
fair betting quotient p  then represents your degree of belief in H.
A corollary of the definition of a bet, which plays a vital role in the DB theorem, 
is that the sum of a collection of bets on some propositions, under certain 
conditions, determines a bet on another proposition. Note that a bet on a statement 
H  admits only two possibilities -  H  is true or H  is false -  and specifies a unique 
payoff in each case. The sum of a collection of bets then equals a new bet if it 
admits only two possibilities and specifies a unique payoff in each case. As a 
simple illustration, consider the case involving two mutually exclusive 
propositions P and Q. Let By be a bet on P with stake s and betting quotient p, 
and B2 be a bet on Q with stake r and betting quotient q. If the stakes s and r are 
equal, then, the sum of these bets is equivalent to a bet on PvQ with stake 
5 * = s = rand betting quotient p* = p + q (Skyrms, 1986:176). Table 4.1 shows 
this:
Table 4.1 
Equivalent Bets (1)
p Q
Bet 1
OnP
Bet II
On Q
Sum of Bet I and II Bet m
On PVQ
T F (l-p)s -qr (l-p)s-qr (l-p*)s*
F T -ps (l-q)r (l-q)r-ps (l-p*)s*
F F -ps -qr -(ps+qr) -p*s*
The second assumption underlying the DB theorem is that the value of the sum of 
a set of bets is the total value of the bets and, therefore, if a set of bets is regarded 
as individually fair, they are also considered as collectively fair. To give an 
example, if in the above situation the betting quotients p  and q are viewed as fair, 
the betting quotient p * for the third bet is also viewed as fair. Schick (1986) was 
the first to note the significance and independence of this assumption in 
establishing the DB theorem, calling it the value additivity assumption. The
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principle, he argues, presumes that the value that people assign to a bet is 
independent of whether other bets are in effect. But people are usually risk averse. 
If they have already committed themselves to a bet, the highest price that they 
would pay for a new bet is less than it otherwise would be (1986:114). In such 
cases, people are hedging against the possibility of losing both bets, and there is 
nothing irrational about this behaviour. The value additivity principle cannot, 
therefore, be taken for granted.
The literature provides several considerations in support of the value additivity 
assumption. Skyrms (1986:179) defines a fair bet as a bet with expected utility 
zero, and seeks to derive the assumption from this definition. This move seems to 
assume that your belief distribution obeys the probability calculus, which 
undermines the appeal of the DB theorem as an independent approach to 
establishing the probability axioms.5 Howson (2000) defends a view of the 
probability calculus as an extension of deductive logic to partial beliefs. In this 
setting, he envisages a parallel between the value additivity assumption and the 
closure principle applied in deductive logic. Just as the closure principle is taken 
for granted in deductive logic to define the truth-value of a compound sentence in 
terms of the truth-value of its components, it is equally ‘natural’, Howson 
suggests, to take value additivity for granted to determine the value of a 
compound bet from the value of its components (2000:129).6 This suggestion is 
plausible but applies only when the concern, as in deductive logic, is solely with 
bets that are simultaneously made. The proposal does not counter Schick’s worries 
in sequential betting scenarios. The validity of the principle, if valid at all, is 
confined to static betting scenarios.
An implication of the value additivity principle plays a crucial role in establishing 
the DB theorem. Note that a fair bet can informally be interpreted as a bet that
5 For a further discussion of this point see Howson (1995:4-5)
6 In a new manuscript, Colin Howson (2004) substantially reformulates the argument for the 
probability axioms as consistency constraints on partial beliefs, effectively rejecting the traditional 
formulation embodied in the DB theorem. In this new setting the value additivity assumption is 
introduced “as a constraint on the solution assignment of fair betting quotients” (2004:18). The 
new formulation more vividly supports the conclusions drawn in the text about the scope of the 
Bayesian theory.
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confers zero advantage to either side. Since any sum of zeros is zero, the net 
advantage of a collection of fair bets is also zero. Given the value additivity 
assumption, if you consider a collection of bets as individually fair but the net 
advantage of the bets is nonzero, then the only explanation is that you are 
evaluating a bet (or equivalent bets) at two different rates, regarding both as fair.7 
In that case, it is possible for a cunning bookie to invite you to accept a set of bets 
that all are individually fair in your eyes but, taken together, lead you to a sure 
loss. The trick for the bookie is simply to sell you the bet at your higher fair price 
and buy back an equivalent bet or an equivalent set of bets at your lower fair 
price. A collection of bets that guarantees a loss no mater what the outcome of the 
events upon which the wagers are made is called a Dutch book (Skyrms, 
1986:185).
The third assumption is a coherence (rationality) condition. Some statements of 
the DB theorem identify the condition with a simple behavioural criterion -  
essentially that a rational agent ought to avoid a combination of decisions that 
leads to a sure loss (Dawid, 2002:3). For several reasons, discussed in Christensen 
(1991), this criterion fails to support the laws of probability as rationality 
constraints on partial beliefs. In a nutshell, there are situations where a person 
accepts a combination of bets which leads to a sure loss but does not actually hold 
any beliefs violating the probability axioms. The person may recognise, for 
instance, that a collection of bets offered to him by a friend leads to a sure loss but 
accepts them to avoid harming her confidence. Such a decision is not usually 
considered as irrational. On the other hand, a person may have beliefs that breach 
the laws of probability or even logic but consciously refuses to participate in any 
decision which entails a sure loss. In such cases, even though he actually escapes 
a sure loss, there still seems to be something amiss about his beliefs. If the 
concern is to establish the probability axioms as rationality constraints on partial 
beliefs, the coherence condition must do more than pointing to some dire practical 
consequences; it must directly be concerned with relations among beliefs 
(Christensen, 1991:238).
7 It is here assumed that the sum of the bets is equivalent to an additional bet, which is not 
generally the case.
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Another notion of coherence appears in Ramsey’s brief allusion to the DB 
theorem in his seminal work “Truth and Probability” (1926 [1980]). There, he 
regards the theory of probability as “an extension to partial beliefs of formal logic, 
the logic of consistency” (1980:41).8 From this perspective, the underlying notion 
of coherence is logical consistency. Logical consistency directly deals with the 
internal structure of a belief system, and can well support a justification of the 
probability axioms as rationality constraints on partial beliefs. In what follows, we 
therefore build our analysis around this notion of coherence, which has also 
increasingly been adopted in the recent philosophical literature on the Bayesian 
theory.
These assumptions state all that is needed for proving the DB theorem. The proof 
starts by establishing that if your fair betting quotients for a collection of bets 
violate the probability axioms, a Dutch book can be made against you. In other 
words, there exists a finite series of bets that you consider as individually fair but 
collectively lead to a sure loss. The converse of this result is also shown to be true. 
If your fair betting quotients conform to the probability axioms, no Dutch book 
can be made against you. Given the value additivity assumption, the susceptibility 
to a Dutch book is the evidence that you are rating two equivalent bets at two 
different prices, considering both as fair. This means you believe in a pair of 
contradictory propositions that a bet is simultaneously fair and unfair. Since 
conformity with the probability calculus is both necessary and sufficient to avoid 
a Dutch book, the only way to avoid such a contradiction is to arrange your fan- 
betting quotients or, in other words, your partial beliefs, in accordance with the 
probability axioms. And since logical consistency is a rational desideratum, the 
laws of probability become rationality constraints on partial beliefs.9
8 As Howson (2004:5-6) points out, Ramsey set forth this view of the laws of probability within 
the theoretical framework of axiomatic utility, not the theory of logic. Recent defenders of 
epistemic probability have made every effort to entirely disentangle the proof of the probability 
axioms from formal utility considerations (See Howson, 2004).
9 Classic statements o f the DB theorem only establish finite additivity. Williamson (1999) has 
extended the theorem to countable additivity.
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The notion of conditional probability plays a key role in understanding whether 
the Bayesian theory furnishes a model of learning from experience. It is therefore 
useful to review the DB argument for the quotient rule
P{H / E) = P(H & E )t P(E) ,
which relates conditional probability to non-conditional probabilities. A key 
element in the argument is a definition of conditional bet, rooted in de Finetti’s 
writings. He defines a bet on H  conditional on £  as a bet on H  that proceeds if E 
turns out to be true and is called off if E is false (1980:69). Thus, the conditional 
probability P(H  /  E) is taken to stand for the price at which you will buy or sell a 
bet that pays $1 if H  is true, with the understanding that the purchase is called off 
if E turns out to be false. Another element is the fact that the sum of a bet on H&E 
and a bet against E, when the loss of the first bet is the wining of the second bet, is 
equivalent to a bet on H  conditional on E (Skyrms, 1986:189). To be precise, let q 
be your fair betting quotient for a bet on H&E with stake r, and r be your fair 
betting quotient for a bet against E with stake q. The sum of these bets is 
equivalent to a bet on H  conditional on E with fair betting quotient q/r and stake r, 
as shown in Table 4.2:
Table 4.2 
Equivalent Bets (2)
E H
Bet 1
On H&E -iE
Bet II
Against E
Sum of Bet I and II Bet HI
On H given E
T T (l-q)r^ F -(l-r)q r-q (l-q/r)r
T F -qr F -(l-r)q -(q/r)r
F T -qr T Qr 0 0
F F -qr T Qr 0 0
The ratio q/r corresponds to the ratio of the fair betting quotients for bet H&E over 
bet E. This suggests that if your fair betting quotient p  for the conditional bet 
differed from q/r, there could be a Dutch book made against you. Since the 
conditional bet is called off if E turns out false, the trick to construct such a 
collection of bets is to introduce an additional bet on E with a suitable stake. 
Specifically, consider a bet on H&E and a bet against E with betting quotients and
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stakes as given above. Further consider a bet against H  conditional on E  with 
betting quotient p and stake r, as well as a bet on E with stake q-pr. Taken 
together, these bets lead to a net loss (gain) of ripr-q) regardless of whether H  is 
true or false. Assuming that r is greater than zero, the net loss (gain) will be zero 
only if p  equals the ratio q/r. This happens only if the fair betting quotient for the 
conditional bet is equal to the ratio of the fair betting quotients of H&E over E. 
Like the basic probability axioms, the quotient rule also becomes a theorem of the 
probability calculus. 10
The quotient rule has a number of implications including Bayes’ theorem,
P( H/ E)ocP(E/H)P(H) .
This theorem is usually thought to express a fundamental model of learning from 
experience. Savage remarks that, by entailing Bayes’ theorem, the theory of 
coherent preferences gives a natural interpretation of (or at least one important 
sense) of the phrase ‘learning from experience’ (1967:596-7). The theorem, he 
says, “prescribes, presumably compellingly, exactly how a set of beliefs should 
change in the light of what is observed” (1967:602). A similar view is also 
commonly held in economics. Kiefer and Nyarko (1995:40) argue that economics 
needs no assumption beyond the subjective expected utility maximisation 
assumption to model learning behaviour, since, by implying Bayes’ theorem, the 
assumption yields a rational model of learning. Any additional assumption about 
how people learn about the economy is clamed to be ad hoc.
This interpretation of the role of the theorem is unwarranted, as Ian Hacking 
argued long ago (1967:315). The theorem is a consequence of the quotient rule, 
which only says how conditional probabilities ought to be related to non­
conditional probabilities where all the probabilities involved refer to the time 
before the conditioning event is learnt. So, like the quotient rule, the theorem is 
just a coherence constraint. In more detail, given P( E/ H) ,  the theorem 
constrains the compatible pairs of P(H) and P ( H I E ) ; given P(H),  it defines
10 This argument for the quotient rule is based on the argument given in Howson et al. (1993).
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the mapping from P(E/H)  to P ( H I E ) ; given P ( H / E) and P( E/H)  it fixes 
P ( H ) ; and given P(.IH)  and P(H) it defines the mapping from E  to P(HIE)  
(Smith, 1986:98). The theorem is silent about where one has to begin. Though it is 
common to begin with P(H)  and P(E/H)  and use the theorem to infer 
P{H / E ) , one can also start by fixing P{H / E) and use the theorem to search for 
a pair of P(H)  and P ( E / H ) that is compatible with it. As far as the justification 
behind the theorem is concerned, both routes are equally permissible (Lindley, 
1983:7). Consequently, the theorem is silent about how a set of beliefs should 
change in the light of what is observed.
Savage’s interpretation of Bayes’ theorem supposes an extra assumption that the 
probability of H  after having learnt E is the same as the probability of H  on the 
supposition that E were true (Hacking, 1967:317). This assumption is nowadays 
known as the Bayesian conditionalization rule (BCR). Precisely speaking, the rule 
states that if your degree of belief in H  conditional on E  is P{H / E ) , and you 
learn E  for sure and nothing else, your new degree of belief in H , denoted by 
Q(H), ought to be the same as P{H / E) ,
Q(H)  = P(H / E ) .
Due to the necessity of this assumption, the question posed at the outset becomes 
whether the rationality considerations behind the probability axioms lend any 
support to the BCR. A response is found in Teller (1973), who argues that if you 
violate the rule there will be a finite series of bets that you consider as 
individually fair but collectively result in a loss no matter the outcomes. This has 
been taken to support the BCR just as the DB arguments support the probability 
axioms. We analyse Teller’s argument to show why it fails and to hint at why 
there can be no justification for the rule anyway. To this end, we draw on a simple 
statement of the argument given in Howson (1997).
Suppose your updating strategy differs from the BCR. This means, upon learning 
E, you assign to H  either a probability less than P(H IE)  or a probability greater 
than P(H / E ) . Consider the first case where Q(H) < P(H / E ) . Further, suppose
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in your opinion P(H IE)  = x,  P(E) = y ,  and Q{H) = z . In this case, a bookie 
can ensure a net gain by adopting the following betting strategy. He first sells you 
a conditional bet on H  given E
Bi: [$1 if H, $0 otherwise], 
and a bet on E
B2: [$(x-z) if E, $0 otherwise]
at your fair prices. Later the truth of E becomes known. If E is false, the 
conditional bet is called off, and you end up losing (x — z)y.  If E is true, he buys 
from you a third bet on H
B3: [ $ 1  if H , $ 0  otherwise]
at your fair price. But then, regardless of whether H  is true or false, you will end 
up losing { x - z ) y . If your updating strategy were to assign a new probability to 
H  greater than P(H / E ) , i.e., Q{H) > P(H / E ) , the trick for the bookie would be 
to buy from you a bet on H  given E at your lower fair price and later sell you back 
a bet on H  at your higher fair price. In either scenario, your net loss would be zero 
if your new probability for H  were equal to its old probability conditional on E. A 
rational person, it is concluded, must update his probability function in 
accordance with the BCR. Since the bookie needs to be aware of your updating 
strategy at the outset to devise a collection of bets that guarantees a sure loss, the 
Teller type argument is referred to as the Dutch strategy (DS) argument.
Although Teller’s argument prima facie appears similar to the DB argument for 
the quotient rule, there are fundamental differences between them which are 
detrimental to the justificatory power of the DS argument. To begin with, in the 
argument for the quotient rule, assuming that you violate it, the bookie only has to 
know your current partial beliefs to make a Dutch book against you. The 
susceptibility to a Dutch book originates solely from the internal structure of your
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beliefs and, as a result, points to an undesirable feature of your belief system. In 
contrast, in devising a DS argument, the bookie needs to know not only your fair 
betting quotients (partial beliefs) but also the direction in which you intend to 
depart from the BCR. If you do not reveal in advance your updating strategy, he 
cannot make a Dutch strategy against you. The susceptibility to a Dutch strategy 
thus arises from a conjunction of your partial beliefs with a decision to pre­
announce your updating strategy. The susceptibility to the sure loss does not 
automatically indicate a defect in your belief system. You can avoid it simply by 
refusing to pre-announce your updating strategy. And there is nothing irrational 
about it.
Second, the success of the DB argument for the quotient rule depends on the 
validity of the value additivity principle. If the principle is not granted, 
susceptibility to a Dutch book will have other explanations including the failure of 
value additivity, and cannot be taken as an indication of belief inconsistency. The 
postulate, as we saw, is not a logical principle. The only support for it is that 
whenever a number of bets are made simultaneously, it seems plausible to require 
that the value of a bet equivalent to the sum of the bets be the sum of the values of 
the individual bets. Like the DB argument, the DS argument also requires the 
assumption of value additivity to interpret susceptibility to a sure loss as an 
indication of belief inconsistency. However, the concern in the DS argument is 
with decisions made over time. In a dynamic decision making scenario, there is no 
reason that an individual should not take note of his or her earlier commitments, 
and for this reason value additivity cannot be taken for granted. As a result, 
vulnerability to a Dutch strategy cannot be taken as an indication of belief 
inconsistency. The susceptibility can in fact arise from the failure of value 
additivity.
Third, the bets involved in the DB argument are made simultaneously, the 
underlying beliefs all belong to a single point in time, and the coherence 
requirement used is known to be a rational ideal. The possibility of devising a DS 
argument, in contrast, hinges on the bookie having the opportunity to sell to or 
buy from you bets that are fair in your eyes at different times. This means the 
beliefs underpinning a Dutch strategy belong to different moments of time. So,
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even if the validity of the value additivity assumption is not challenged, the most 
that the possibility of a Dutch strategy can reveal is temporal inconsistency. But 
temporal consistency is not a rationality requirement. If consistency over time 
were a rationality requirement, the very idea of rational belief updating would be 
self-contradictory. In consequence, the DS argument has no implication for how 
to shift from one belief system to another in the light of what is observed 
(Christensen, 1991:264).
These criticisms show why there can be no argument similar to the DB argument 
for the BCR. However, they do not establish that there can be no justification 
whatsoever for the rule. The Bayesian literature in fact offers several alternative 
attempts to justify the rule as well as a generalisation of it by Richard Jeffrey 
(1968)." An analysis of these endeavours is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Nevertheless, some general considerations indicate why they are also bound to 
fail. Note that the rule applies only when the probability of the conditioning event 
E shifts to unity. 12 In that case, the law of total probability implies that 
Q{H) = Q(H I f ) , 13 which means the rule holds if and only if
Q{H / E) = P(H / E ) .
This equality, termed the invariance condition, implies that in order for the rule to 
hold the new information must have no effect on the conditional probabilities in 
the domain of one’s probability function. That is, having learnt E, the old and new 
conditional probabilities must agree with each other (Diaconis, et al., 1985:36). 
Any attempt at establishing the BCR as a general updating rule requires showing 
that the invariance condition must hold under any circumstances. However, there 
are certain cases where new information not only shifts the probability of the 
conditioning event but also justifiably demands reassessing some of the 
conditional probabilities in the domain of one’s probability function. Howson 
(1997) provides a case in which by learning E one is logically forced to change
11 Williams (1980) derives the BCR from the minimum information principle.
12 This can be seen by applying the rule to E  itself.
13 Q( H)  = Q(E)Q (H  /  E ) + f i ( - i£ ) e ( H  / - iE ) .
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some of the conditional probabilities in the domain of one’s probability function. 
Another case, closer to statistical practice, occurs when new observations cast 
doubts on the adequacy of the set of models considered, calling for construction of 
new models. When a new model is added or the models in the present set are 
modified, one should inevitably revise the probability of each model given the 
conditioning event (proposition) E. Since such legitimate belief shifts, arising 
from introduction of new models, cannot be ruled out a priori, there can be no 
prospect for establishing the invariance condition as a general rationality 
requirement. And, therefore, there can never be an argument establishing the BCR 
as a general rationality constraint.
Justificatory issues aside, the BCR is subject to sever limitations that undermine 
its role as a general learning model. The rule only applies to situations where the 
new information shifts the probability of the conditioning event (proposition) to 
unity. In reality, new information is usually vague, imprecise, and fraught with 
errors, and rarely shifts the probability of an event to unity (Jeffrey, 1968:171). In 
most real cases, the rule does not then apply anyway. The rule also requires both 
p(E)  and p{H & E) to be specified prior to learning of E and hence does not 
apply to unanticipated information (Diaconis et al., 1985). Finally, the rule does 
not apply to situations where a zero probability event occurs. All in all, the 
circumstances in which the rule applies are extremely limited. 14
With these remarks, we end our brief study of some of the issues regarding the 
Bayesian theory, which have a direct bearing on the possibility of a theory of 
statistical learning. The main issue is whether the considerations behind the 
justification of the probability axioms impose any constraint on how to shift from 
a coherent system of beliefs to a new coherent system of beliefs in the fight of 
new information. It has been seen that the answer is in the negative. The only 
claim of the Bayesian theory left standing is that, for the sake of consistency, 
one’s likelihood judgements at each moment of time ought to accord with the 
laws of probability. This is a substantive requirement but does not prescribe how 
to shift from a coherent system of beliefs to a new coherent belief system. The
14 A lucid discussion of these issues is found in Diaconis et al. (1985).
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Bayesian theory, in itself, is not a theory of learning from experience. Contrary to 
some economists, the subjective expected utility maximisation assumption does 
not bring with it a rational theory of learning from experience.
3 The Orthodox View of Bayesian Inference
Coherent analysis has a place in a theory of statistical inference but there is much 
more to a theory of statistical inference than coherent analysis. As a step towards 
explaining the key issues that a theory of parametric inference must address and to 
define some necessary notions, we first give a brief account of the orthodox 
theory of Bayesian inference, which views inference from data solely in terms of 
prior to posterior analysis. Suppose we want to model the relation of random 
variable Y with X. According to the orthodox account, the modeller somehow 
knows the set of models W that can be true of the relation of Y with X:
W = {All possible models that could possibly be true of the observables X  and 7}.
The assumption that W is known reduces the problem of inference from data to 
that of inferring the member of W that is most likely given the data. The Bayesian 
approach requires the modeller to express his uncertainty about the models in 
terms of a probability distribution that captures the confidence he has in each 
model prior to seeing the data. Let D = {x,, yt denote the data on X  and 7, and 
let W contain only two models:
Inferring the model, which is most likely given the data, requires estimating the 
parameters in each model. The hallmark of the Bayesian approach is to regard the 
parameters as random quantities, requiring the modeller to express his uncertainty 
towards them in the form of a (joint) probability distribution. Thus, a Bayesian
M x : 7 ~ t f ( f lX ,t f 12),
M 2: Y ~ N( ax+fi2X , S 22), a x,f i2,S2 e 6 2
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model consists of at least two components, a data model f ( . / 0 )  and a (joint) 
prior density 7t{0) :
M , : Y ~N( f i , X , S , 2) 71(6,) P „ S 2e 6 ,
M 2: Y ~ N ( a l + p 2X , 8 2 ) 7t(0z) a l, p 2, S l & 0 2
7t{0i) is the prior probability distribution for the parameters in Af., representing 
the analyst’s belief regarding the parameters prior to seeing the data. 15 The 
parameters in the prior density 7l{0i) are called hyperparameters as opposed to
those in the data model / ( . / 0 (. ) . Bayes’ theorem combines the information in the 
prior density with the information in the data to derive the distribution of the 
parameters 0X of each model, namely
p(0i / D , M i)
= p i D i e ^ M ^ e ,  I M t) j  jp (D I0 n M t)7C(6t I M J d e , . (3.1)
In (3.1), p(0i / D , M i) stands for the posterior distribution of 0{ and 
p( D/ 0 i, M i) for the likelihood function under model M t . Assuming M, is true, 
the posterior distribution p(0t / D , M f) expresses all the information required for 
making inference about 0 .. A point estimate of 0{, for instance, is obtained by 
computing the posterior mean
6, = E(0, /D,M,)  = f a p W / D . M J d O , . (3.2)
Prediction is also obtained using posterior distribution /?(#,. / D ,M t) . Suppose 
yt+1 is a future observation, independently drawn from the same distribution that 
has generated the data. The predictive distribution of y,+1 is given by
15 Hierarchical models have further distributional assumptions relating to the distribution of 
hyperparameters.
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p (y t+1 / x , D , Mt)= jp (y t+] / 6i, M i)p{6i / D ,M i)dOi (3.3)
This distribution, termed the posterior predictive distribution, summarises the 
information concerning the likely value of a new observation given the 
information in the data model, the prior and the data. If the posterior distribution 
p{6t / D , M {) in (3.3) is replaced with the prior density p[0i / M t) , one obtains 
the prior predictive distribution
p ( y , +1 f x , M t ) =  \ p ( y t+1 l 0 t , M t ) p ( 0 ,  l M t ) d e , , (3 .4)
which summarises one’s information about an observation yl+l before having 
seen any data.
As in parameter estimation, the orthodox theory treats the problem of model 
selection within the framework of prior to posterior analysis. It uses Bayes’ 
theorem to derive the probability of each model given the data:
, D) = --------------------------------- , (3.5)
p(D  / M, )p(M ,) + p(D / Mi  )p(M2 )
where p{D/  M (.) is the marginal probability distribution of the data under model 
M t , obtained by integrating over the model parameter space
p (D /M , ) =  J/>(D/6r,M,)p(0, I M i)d0j (3.6)
with p(D / , M j ) being the likelihood of 6i under model M , . The theory then 
suggests choosing the model that scores the highest posterior probability. Also, 
the degree to which the data confirm A/, over M 2 is measured by the posterior 
odds for M ] against A/2, i.e., the ratio of their posterior probabilities. By 
equation (3.5), this is:
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p j M J D )  = p ( Ml) x p{ D l M t) 
p(M2/ D ) p ( M2) p ( D / M 2)'
(3.7)
The first ratio on the right-hand side of (3.7) is the prior odds ratio and the second 
is the Bayes factor. The numerator and the denominator of the Bayes factor are 
respectively the marginal likelihood of models M, and M 2. If the posterior odds 
ratio is above one, the data is said to support M, over M 2 and vice versa. If the 
posterior odds ratio equals unity, the data is said to give equal support to both 
models. 16 When the models are a priori considered equally likely, the posterior 
odds ratio is reduced to the Bayes factor.
To sum up, from the perspective of the orthodox theory, the agent knows the 
models possibly true of his choice situation or the economy in general. He uses 
data to estimate the models, and selects the model with the highest posterior 
probability. When new data come in, he re-estimates the models, computes their 
probabilities conditional on the data, and again searches for the model with the 
highest posterior probability.
4 Bayesian Statistical Inference: A Wider View
The orthodox Bayesian theory gives an incomplete description of the process of 
inference and of what a statistician does when confronting a real dataset. The 
starting point in, this theory is the presumption that the candidate models are 
known. So, the central task of inference is defined as that of finding the model 
that is most probable given the data. This assumption is both theoretically and 
empirically indefensible. Candidate models are not known in advance, and the 
most important aspect of inference from data consists of model specification 
(formulation).
A number of activities precede model formulation. They include initial 
examination of the data, choosing appropriate transformations of the data,
16 A review of Bayesian model selection is found in Kass and Raftery (1995).
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producing descriptive statistics, finding outliers (Box and Snell, 1981; Gilchrist, 
1984; Chatfield, 1995; and Learner 1978). There are, therefore, at least two 
important phases of inference before the orthodox Bayesian theory, which 
interprets inference in terms of prior to posterior analysis, becomes relevant. The 
first is initial examination of data and the other is formulation of an initial 
model. 17
The objective in initial model formulation is to specify a model that can serve as 
an informed basis to search for a model that can accurately account for the data. A 
Bayesian model is made of at least two components: a data model and a (joint) 
prior probability density for the model parameters. A data model, as stated in the 
last chapter, consists of a set of internally consistent hypotheses of independence, 
homogeneity, and distribution. The initial specification of a Bayesian model thus 
involves postulating appropriate assumptions of independence, homogeneity, and 
data distribution, as well as specifying a joint prior density for the data model 
parameters. Since initial specification of the basic assumptions concerns creating 
the objects (models) to which uncertainty applies, it is by definition a non- 
Bayesian matter. Any attempt at explaining initial model formulation necessitates 
stepping out of the framework of prior to posterior analysis (Hill, 1990:57). Once 
a model has been formulated, the next phase of inference is estimation (model 
fitting), where coherent analysis begins to become relevant.
Initial model formulation is a complex activity involving many decisions. There is 
no assurance a model generated in the early stage of research can account for the 
data and yield accurate predictions. An imperative question before making any 
use of the model is whether it is empirically adequate. In assessing the merits of 
candidate models M ,, Af2 ,...,MK, the orthodox theory requires specifying a prior 
distribution over the models and computing the posterior probability of each 
model using Bayes’ theorem:
17 Prior to these activities, a step in modelling consists of specifying the variables characterising 
the system. As in the previous chapter, for the time being, it is assumed that the variables are 
already known.
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This approach only allows the comparison of relative probabilities (Lindley, 
1982:81), which is not indicative of empirical adequacy. The high probability of a 
model can be the result of the choice of a particular prior for the parameters. As in 
Lindley’s paradox, it is possible by adopting flat priors to arbitrarily increase the 
posterior probability of a model, and this can happen even if the sample size is 
very large (Gelfand et al. 1992:151; See Appendix A for a statement of the 
paradox). Moreover, the posterior probability of a model is always conditional on 
the set of candidate models considered (Box, 1980:427). When the set of 
candidate models contains only a single model, by Bayes’ theorem the model 
automatically receives posterior probability one, and as the number of models in 
the set grows, the probability of the initial model can decrease and in fact 
approach zero (Box, 1983:73). The high probability of a model may thus be due to 
the analyst’s failure to include among the candidates the true model or a close 
approximate thereof, rather than the adequacy of the model. Only if the set of 
candidate models is known to be wide enough to contain an adequate model, a 
connection can be made between the high posterior probability of a model and its 
empirical adequacy. Any attempt at ensuring this, though, calls for investigating 
the compatibility of each model with the data (Anscombe, 1961:34). This cannot 
be done using Bayes’ theorem. Model assessment also necessitates a type of 
analysis different from prior to posterior analysis. It calls for a method that deals 
with the relation between a model and the data, not with apportioning of 
uncertainty across models (Barnard, 1962:42-3; Mallows, 1970:77).
The process of empirical adequacy assessment may reveal the failure of the initial 
model, calling for model re-specification. This involves varying the model 
assumptions one at a time, monitoring the effect of the variation, and continuing 
the process until an adequate model is obtained. Since in re-specification analysis 
the concern is with improving the adequacy of a single model, the analysis cannot 
be cast in terms of prior to posterior analysis. Re-specification analysis is also a 
non-Bayesian issue.
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The process of initial model formulation, empirical model assessment, and re­
specification analysis may produce several models fitting the data. For practical 
purposes, it may be needed to choose a model from among the candidates. It is 
here that coherent analysis can once again become relevant. Finally, the steps 
from initial examination of data to model selection are not a one-off process. New 
data may reveal the inadequacy of the final model. In real life, statistical inference 
is an iterative process. The statistician formulates a set of models, estimates them, 
assesses their adequacy, modifies them if necessary, chooses a model and derives 
the predictions' required for decisions. As new data arrive, he reassesses the 
adequacy of the models, expands or modifies the set of candidate models, and 
derives new predictions, waiting for future data to shed light on the adequacy of 
the models. It is thus plausible to think of parametric statistical inference as a 
process with the following key phases:
(a) Data description
(b) Initial model formulation (or specification)
(c) Model fitting (or estimation)
(d) Model assessment (or criticism)
(e) Model re-specification
(f) Model selection
(g) Iteration
The Bayesian theory is only relevant to model estimation and model selection. It 
leaves out other central aspects of inference, namely, initial model formulation, 
empirical model assessment, and re-specification analysis. If the theory is 
intended to be a satisfactory account of statistical inference, it must be broadened 
to cover these critical aspects of inference. The rest of this chapter joins together 
various pieces from the literature to define a broader view of Bayesian inference, 
which goes some way towards explaining those aspects of inference not covered 
by the orthodox Bayesian theory.
5 Initial Bayesian Model Formulation
Is there a theory of (initial) model specification? Fisher is said to be the first who 
raised the issue of model specification in his seminal paper (1922) “On the 
mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics.” In this paper, he divides the
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problems of statistics into three types: (i) problems of specification, (ii) problems 
Of estimation, and (iii) problems of distribution. Fisher’s discussion of 
specification problems in the paper is confined to a single paragraph, dominated 
by the first sentence: “As regards problems of specification, these are entirely a 
matter for the practical statistician ...” (1922: 314). The statement suggests “that 
in his view there can be no theory of modelling, no general modelling strategy, 
but that instead each problem must be considered entirely on its own merits” 
(Lehmann, 1990:160). Fisher’s view of model specification has continued to 
dominate the statistics community, and has been endorsed by most statisticians, 
including Savage (1971), Mallow (1970), Dawid (1982), and Poirier (1988). 
However, a look at the modem statistical literature suggests that the view of 
model specification as an art with no general strategies is unduly pessimistic. 
Modem statistics provides a great deal of teachings that are highly relevant to 
establishing an exploratory theory of statistical model formulation. This chapter 
pieces together various elements of an exploratory theory of Bayesian modelling 
that takes us some way towards understanding how a statistician proceeds to build 
a model. The theory addresses three aspects of the model building process: ‘initial 
model formulation’, ‘empirical model assessment’ and ‘re-specification analysis.’ 
The current section outlines a framework for initial model formulation by drawing 
on proposals found in D’Agostino (1986), Lehmann (1990), Rubin (1984), Spanos 
(1986,1999, and 2001).
5.1 Initial Data Model Specification
A theory of initial model formulation requires a clear definition of the problem 
and a method to solve it. To provide a satisfactory definition, we can divide the 
issue of Bayesian model formulation into specification of a data model and a prior 
distribution. We first consider the initial specification of a data model. As argued 
in the last chapter, when the concern is to establish an interpretable model of 
several variables, it is necessary to start with a parametric model, which raises the 
question of where the models come from. An interesting response to this question 
is found in Lehmann (1990): A line of research in mathematical statistics has been 
to define alternative notions of independence, homogeneity, and probability
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distribution families. The research has resulted in a rich variety of independence 
and homogeneity hypotheses, as well as a large list of univariate, bivariate, and 
multivariate probability distribution families. Consistent combination of these 
independence and homogeneity hypotheses with the distribution families produces 
a large collection of primitive data models, which can be used as building blocks 
to create numerous and in a sense countless mixture models. In this way, 
theoretical statistics provides a rich reservoir of models, to use Lehmann’s apt
term (1990:161). Figure 5.1 schematically shows the structure of the model
18reservoir.
So, in response to the question where the models come from, Lehmann suggests 
that they come from the reservoir of statistics. In light of this proposal, the issue 
of initial data model specification can be defined as the problem of selecting a set 
of internally consistent hypotheses from the three categories of known 
independence, homogeneity, and distributional assumptions to form a model that 
can account for the data (Spanos, 1999:756). Having said this, to provide a
18 See Spanos (1999) for definitions of the notions in the graph.
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satisfactory theory of initial model formulation, it remains to explain how the 
initial selection of these hypotheses can take place.
5.1.1 The Theoretical Approach to Data Model Specification
Theoretical statistics provides the ingredients for two complementary methods for 
initial selection of the basic hypotheses, one drawing on subject-matter 
information and the other on data. The first procedure, also cited in Lehmann 
(1990), emerges from a class of theorems known as characterization theorems. 
Roughly speaking, a characterization theorem defines a set of sufficient conditions 
that if they were true of a variable (or a set of variables), the distribution of the 
variable (or variables) would belong to a certain probability distribution family 
(Galambos, 1982). A well-known characterization theorem is the Poisson process 
theorem that describes the conditions under which a univariate distribution has a 
Poisson distribution. In one form, the theorem goes as follows:
Consider variable Yt and let t stand for time. For each t > 0, if
Ai: Yt is an integer-valued random variable,
A2: Y0 = 0,
A3: Yt and Yi+S -  Yt are independently distributed, s >0,
A4: Yt and Yt+S -  Yt are identically distributed,
As: limit->0 P(Y' =1) = 4 ,
t
A6; limit^ 0^ M  = 0,
t
then, Yt has a Poisson distribution (Feller, 1977). That is, for any positive integer 
n,
p(Y,=n)  = f(n) = e'x'(XlT(nWi
The theorem offers a way of deciding whether a variable Yt has a Poisson 
distribution by checking if the information about the distribution of Yt warrants 
assumptions Ai to A& If so, Yt has a Poisson distribution. In this way, the
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theorems provide a general procedure for using subject matter information to 
decide on the appropriateness of a distribution assumption, which leads to a 
narrowing of the set of appropriate data models. This approach underlies serious 
specification studies in econometrics, even though no reference is usually made to 
the theorems. To highlight the important role of the theorems in model 
formulation, we reconstruct a specification study from the econometric literature, 
and then state some of the limitations of the method in practice.
The study is adopted from Hausman et al. (1984) who examine the effect of 
research and development (R&D) on the technological innovation activity of a 
firm. The authors use patent applications as an indicator of inventive activity and 
seek to model its relationship with R&D. Let Yt represent the number of patents
applied for or received during period [0,0 and X, the expenditure on research 
and development during the period. To model the relation of Yt with X , , the 
authors proceed by listing a number of conceptual and simplifying assumptions 
that seem plausible about Yt . Specifically, they propose that
Ai: Yt is a discrete random variable taking a finite number of positive values;
A2: The value of Yt at time zero t = 0 is zero (innovation takes time);
A3: The numbers of patents received during nonoverlapping time intervals are
independent of each other (independence assumption);
A4: If Yt is the number of patents received during [0,/] and Z, the number of
patents received during [f,,f1+r], Yt and Z, have the same distribution
(homogeneity assumption);
A5: The probability of receiving two or more patents in a sufficiently small
interval is negligible; and 
A6: The probability of receiving n patents during [t, t + j] is proportional to the
length of [t,t + 5 ], barring extremely large intervals.
These hypotheses evidently match with the conditions of the Poisson process 
theorem. Thus, the authors conclude, as a first conjecture, that Yt has a Poisson
distribution, and model the dependence of Yt on X t using a Poisson regression
model (Hausman et al., 1984:911),
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p(Yt = n / x t) = e * (A,)"(n!) 1 
ln(>i,) = a +  J3xt
(5.1)
for any integer n. The authors then consider the effect of weakening the 
independence assumption, and investigate the possibility of adopting a more 
robust model such as the negative binomial regression model. A vast number of 
phenomena are similar to patent data, including the number of spells of sickness 
in a year, the number of records purchased per month, the number of cars owned, 
the number of jobs held during a year and so forth. Thus, in one stroke, the 
Poisson theorem provides a unified approach to creating an initial data model for a 
large number of economic phenomena. Many other specification studies in 
econometrics can easily be interpreted as an application of a characterisation 
theorem.19
This study illustrates how the theoretical approach to initial selection of a 
distribution assumption, which emerges from the characterisation theorems, 
enables one to draw on subject matter information to narrow down the class of 
data models that could possibly be true of a set of variables. The method is, 
nonetheless, subject to some limitations in practice. A trouble relates to the 
probabilistic conditions that enter the theorems. As explicit in the above example, 
the theorems assume that the data are identically and independently distributed. In 
the natural sciences, there may be reliable subject matter information to justify 
these assumptions a priori. But, in the social sciences, theories are imprecise, lack 
adequate empirical support, and the mechanisms generating the data undergo 
changes. And, therefore, the fate of these assumptions can rarely be decided on 
subject matter information alone. If there is any way of deciding on the 
appropriateness of the independence or homogeneity assumptions, which go into 
the theorems, it must be by looking at the data.
19 Another interesting use of the theorems is found in Kiefer (1988), which concerns modelling the 
duration of unemployment.
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Also, the information available about the distribution of a variable is usually 
imprecise and, as a result, consistent with more than one distribution family. In 
general, if the information is consistent with the assumptions defining a 
distribution family (say, exponential), it is also consistent with any distribution 
family that is robust with respect to it (say, Weibull). So, the approach does not 
usually lead to the choice of a single distribution hypothesis. These reservations 
aside, the theorems can effectively narrow down the class of appropriate models 
in the model reservoir. Even the information that the variable is continuous, finite, 
positive, or falls within the unit interval substantially reduces the space of 
appropriate data models within which an exploratory search must take place.
5.1.2 The Empirical Approach to Data Model Specification
The second method, which emerges from theoretical statistics, uses data for initial 
selection of the basic probabilistic assumptions. To explain the method, let us 
return to the definition of a data model as a set of internally consistent hypotheses 
drawn from the three categories of independence, homogeneity, and distribution. 
Each combination of these hypotheses, which forms a data model, implies a series 
of consequences that are true of the model under all its possible 
parameterisations. We term such consequences ex ante or pre-estimation 
implications, as they can be derived before estimating the model. Theoretical 
statistics has a rich literature on the ex ante consequences of alternative 
combinations of the basic assumptions defining the model reservoir. With this in 
mind, a plausible methodological principle is that a model worthy of further 
consideration must not have ex ante consequences that are grossly incompatible 
with the data. Granting this, the class of candidate data models, warranted by 
subject matter information, can be substantially narrowed down by investigating 
the pre-estimation consequences of the models. If the ex ante consequences of a 
model are compatible with the data, it is kept as a candidate model. Otherwise, it 
is excluded. Moreover, each ex ante implication of a data model can be traced to 
one of its assumptions. If an ex ante consequence of a model fails to appear in the 
data, then the failure can be traced to a particular assumption, and this information
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can be used to systematically search for a model capable of accounting for the 
data. The search for a first model need not then be entirely blind.
Essential to using data for initial model formulation is a judgment whether the ex 
ante consequences of the model are consistent with the data. In the frequentist 
setting, this judgment of consistency is made by computing p-values. An 
exploratory theory of Bayesian model formulation can also follow a similar route. 
But, since most ex ante consequences of a model are of a graphical nature or can 
be rephrased graphically, and since at this stage the objective is simply to make 
educated guesses about the nature of the statistical model that might be 
appropriate for the data, it suffices to work with an informal concept of 
incompatibility. It will be explained later how the frequentist idea of p-value can 
justifiably be assimilated within a broader view of Bayesian inference.
The following three subsections describe in some detail the process of data-driven 
initial model specification using a simple data set on the quarterly US 
unemployment rate over 25 years from 1948 to 1972, given in Fuller (1976), 
which is used later to illustrate Bayesian diagnostic learning. An objective behind 
the illustration is to emphasise the relevance of classical methods to an 
exploratory theory of Bayesian model formulation. Another objective is to bring 
to the fore the kind of heuristic principles that are necessary for using data in 
initial model specification. The exposition will also illustrate modes of inference 
that cannot be understood in terms of prior to posterior analysis but occupy a 
central place in a wider view of statistical inference.
5.1.2.1 The Independence Assumption
The choice of an independence and homogeneity assumption restricts the choice 
of a distribution family. This means the empirical search for an initial data model 
should begin with looking for an appropriate independence and homogeneity 
assumption. The starting point in this search is whether the data form a random 
sample or, in other words, whether the assumptions of C-independence (complete 
independence) and C-homogeneity (complete homogeneity) are appropriate. To
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focus on one assumption at a time, we first take C-homogeneity for granted. Let Y 
denote the unemployment rate, and N  the sample size. Given C-homogeneity, the 
task of ex ante assessment of C-independence involves assessing the implications 
of the following model:
Unrestricted Data Model
Ai Distribution: Unrestricted
Ai Independence: {Yx, Y2,..., YN) is C-Independent
Ai Homogeneity: {YX,Y2,..,,YN) is C-Homogeneous
This model has several consequences that underlie a number of classical tests of 
independence, usually named distribution-free tests of randomness. Some of these 
tests are discussed in Bradley (1968) and Lehmann (1975). Here, for illustration, 
we follow Bradley (1968:271-8). Let us arrange the N  observations in the order 
they were obtained. Suppose, for simplicity, none of the observations are identical 
so that they constitute N  distinct numbers. The N  numbers can be arranged in 
N\ distinguishable ways, creating a sample space S with AH elements. If the 
hypothesised model were true of Y, each element in S would a priori be as likely 
as the actual sequence. In other words, if one believed that the observations on Y 
were random, before seeing the data, one would have to consider each element in 
S as equally likely. An assumption to the contrary entails the failure of either C- 
independence or C-homogeneity (Bradley, 1968:277). The same conclusion is 
also true of any sample space formed from a sub-sequence of the N  observations. 
This consequence leads to several procedures for ex ante assessment of C- 
independence. To explain one possible method, consider the f-plot of the 
unemployment data given below:
20 For how to deal with identical observations see Bradley (1968:48-56).
201
U nem ploym ent D ata
20 40
Index
60 80 too
Figure 5.1
If an increase in the ordered sequence of observations is designated by “1” and a 
decrease by “0”, the first quarter of the sequence of the unemployment data 
plotted in Figure 5.1 can be shown as:
An unbroken sequence of increasing observations (ones) or decreasing 
observations (zeros) is called a run. There are a total of 10 runs in the above 
subsequence. Let R be the total number of runs of any size in the entire sequence, 
Ar n the total number of arrangements of N  that contains R runs, and R^m) the
number of runs of size m or greater. Given the equal probability of each element 
in S, Levene (1952) establishes that
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
P (R /N )  = —  
N\
E(R) = ( 2 N - \ ) / 3 , Var(R) = (16N  -  29) / 90
m < ( N -  2)
and that R is asymptotically normally distributed. These consequences are in the 
form of expected and probability values, and as such say nothing about a 
particular sample. Nonetheless, it is plausible to assume that if the assumptions
are appropriate, in an ‘adequately’ large sample the sample values come close to 
the theoretical values. In general, to bridge between the theoretical quantities and 
their sample analogues, the following heuristic principle, present in many areas of 
statistics, commands plausibility:
Heuristic Principle I: If the hypothesized model is appropriate, in an 
adequately large sample, the theoretical (expected) values implied by the 
model for variables defined from the sample and the sample values of the 
variables are expected to be ‘close’ to each other.
In light of this, the appropriateness of C-independence can be assessed by 
comparing, say, the actual values of R and R{^ m) with their expected values E(R)
and E(Rim). A sharp difference casts doubt on the assumption. The sample in
Figure 5.1 contains 100 observations, with E(R) and E(R^3) being 66.33 and
6.48 respectively. The actual values of R and are 32 and 14 respectively,
which are considerably different from the theoretical values. The significant 
difference strongly points to dependence in the data, suggesting the 
inappropriateness of C-independence.
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Figure 5.2
There is a wealth of techniques that can be used for pre-estimation assessment of 
alternative independence hypotheses. Notably, one may look at the sample partial 
autocorrelation function (SPACF) of various orders to tentatively select an
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independence assumption. Figure 5.2 (above) shows the plot of the SPACF of the 
unemployment data.
In general, if a /7-order Markov independence assumption were true of Y, the 
sample partial autocorrelation function would be expected to “cut o ff’ (i.e., be 
equal to zero) after p  lag (Box and Jenkins, 1976). The plot suggests selecting a 
second order Markov independence condition. However, for illustration purposes, 
in what follows, we will work with a first order Markov condition, which leads to 
a simpler data model.
5.1.2.2 The Homogeneity Assumption
The next phase in initial model formulation is to search for a homogeneity 
assumption. The starting point in this search is an assessment of C-homogeneity, 
which is the simplest of the homogeneity assumptions. Classical statistics 
provides a host of distribution-free tests useful for investigating the pre-estimation 
implications of C-homogeneity. A class of such procedures is developed in Cox et 
al. (1955). For illustration, we look at these authors’ test of trend in location, 
described in Bradley (1968:175). Suppose the sample consists of N  different 
observations, with N  being an even number. If N  is an odd number, the middle 
observation dividing the sequence into two parts is removed. Arrange the 
observations as an ordered sequence Yl,Y2,...Yi,...,Yn,Yn+l,...,Yn+i,...,Y2n with the 
subscripts indicating the order in which they were obtained. Now, for every i < n 
form the difference-score Z i = (Y{ -  Yn+.), and let S be the number of positive
difference-scores. Considering the signs of Z{, the difference-scores can be 
viewed as the outcomes of n Bernoulli trials. If the unrestricted model is true, Zf 
is as likely to be positive as to be negative, i.e., p(Y{ < Yn+i) = p(Yi > Yn+i) = .5. In
that case, S can be regarded as the number of successes in n Bernoulli trials, with 
probability p  = 0.5 of success on each trial. This results in the binomial data 
model:
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Binomial Data Model
Ai Distribution: Binomial, S ~ B i n ( n , 7 t ); P(S -  s )  =
A2 Independence: {Zl, Z2 Z n) is C-Independent
A3 Homogeneity: (Z,, Z2 ,...,Zn) is C-Homogeneous
with first and second moments
7 U S { \ - 7 C ) ’
\ S J
E(S) = n/  2, Var(S) = « /4 .
Cox et a/.’s test of trend in location is based on computing p- value of the observed 
value of S. As a less formal check, one may assess the appropriateness of C- 
homogeneity by comparing the expected values E(S) and Var(S) with their 
sample analogues. In an adequately large sample, a significant departure points to 
the failure of C-homogeneity. In particular, when S is considerably greater than 
E(S) , the data points to a negative trend in location, and when it is considerably 
less than E(S),  it points to a positive trend in location. Cox et al. (1955) also 
establish analogous procedures for testing trend in dispersion or cyclical trend.21
As for the unemployment data, the expected values E(S) and Var(S) are 25 and 
12.5 respectively, which are close to the sample values of 24 and 11.06. Similar 
results are obtained when the data are examined for trend in dispersion or cyclical 
trend. Thus, the data cast no doubt on C-homogeneity. The choice of the first 
order Markov condition, however, necessitates replacing C-homogeneity with 
strict stationarity, which is an extension of C-homogeneity to an independently 
distributed vector of random variables (chapter 3). With this choice, we obtain the 
following data model:
Unrestricted Data Model
Ai Distribution: Unrestricted
A2 Independence: (Yj, Y2,..., YT) is first order Markov independent
A3 Homogeneity: (Y1,Y2 ,...,Y7.) is strictly stationary
21 Kendall (1955) and Mann (1945) provide similar distribution-free tests of randomness, which 
can be used for ex ante assessment of C-homogeneity. See Bradley (1968:287-8) for an exposition.
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5.1.2.3 The Distribution Assumption
The outcome of a pre-estimation search among the independence and 
homogeneity hypotheses is a data model of the form stated above. Given such a 
model, the pre-estimation search for a distribution family involves inserting 
alternative distributions, suggested by subject matter information, into the model, 
and assessing the ex ante implications of the model relating to the distribution 
assumption. In the current case, since Yt is continuous, the first order Markov 
assumption restricts the class of plausible distribytion families for Yt to bivariate
continuous families. To illustrate, we consider the bivariate normal family. This 
gives rise to the following data model:
Bivariate Normal Data Model
Aj Distribution: X ~ N(/i ,E ), bivariate normal, X = (Yt ,Yt_x)
A2 Independence: (Y{, Y2,..., YT) is first order Markov independent
A3 Homogeneity: (Yl,Y2,...,YT) is strictly stationary
The ex ante consequences of a distribution family are mainly defined by the 
invariant features of the density curve, or the cumulative distribution function 
(cdf) of the family. These include symmetry and skewness. So, with a reasonably 
sized sample, the appropriateness of a distribution family can be assessed by 
comparing the density curve or the cdf of the family with their sample analogues. 
The justification for this practice arises from another typical exploratory principle, 
which can be stated as follows:
Heuristic Principle n : If the data come from a distribution family, when the 
sample is adequately large, an appropriate plot of the data should show, within 
sampling error, the invariant features of the density curve or cdf of the family such 
as symmetry, positive or negative skewness, kurtosis, and so forth.
This methodology works well for appraisal of univariate and bivariate distribution 
families. However, since graphical features are difficult to investigate in high 
dimensional data, it cannot directly be extended to multivariate families. 
Nevertheless, the multivariate families have other types of ex ante implications 
that pave the way for their assessment. We briefly refer to three categories of such 
implications:
206
A general feature of the exiting multivariate (bivariate) families is that if they are 
true of a set of variables, the marginal distributions of the variables also belong to 
the same distribution family. This means an initial assessment of a multivariate 
family can be achieved by checking the marginal distribution families of the 
variables. The converse of this result is not though true; if the univariate 
distributions of a set of variables belong to a distribution family, it does not follow 
that the joint distribution of the variables also belongs to the same family (Seber, 
1984:141).
In the current case, if the bivariate normal family is true of X = (Yl,Yl_l) , the
marginal distribution of Yt is also normal. The density curve of a normal
distribution is symmetric. This means that, with a large sample, a judgement about 
normality can be achieved by checking the symmetry of a histogram or stem and 
leaf plot of the data. A more informative graph for assessing symmetry is obtained 
by plotting the upper half of the ordered observations against the lower half. Let 
F(I),F(2),...,T(JV) represent the ordered observations. If the data arise from a
symmetric distribution, a plot of Y(N) versus y(1), T(Ar_i) versus T(2), and in
general K(Ar+,_f} versus Y(i) for i < N / 2  should create a straight line with a
negative unit slope (D’Agostino, 1986:13). Figure 5.2 plots T(N+)_I) versus F(i) for
the US unemployment data.
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Figure 5.3 Y stands for Y(N+l_0 and X  stands for Y(i).
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The data points are mostly scattered around a straight line with a negative slope 
close to one, suggesting that they could have come from a symmetric distribution 
family such as the normal family. To narrow down the class of symmetric families 
to the normal family, further assessment of the ex ante consequences of the 
normal family is needed, which can be done, say, by checking the normal 
probability plot of the data.
A second type of ex ante consequences of a multivariate distribution is the 
imposition of restrictions on the form of the regression function of each of the 
variables on the rest of the variables. The distribution family determines whether 
the functions are linear, nonlinear, or how they look like. In the present case, if the 
bivariate normal distribution is true of X, the regression function of Yt on Yt_x is 
given by the linear function
E(Y,/Yl_l =y , . l) = a  + flyl_l . (5.3)
Alternatively, if the variables (Yt , Yt_x) have, for instance, a bivariate exponential 
distribution, the regression of Yt on Yt_x is given by the nonlinear function 
(Mardia, 1970)
E(Y , /Y , l = y , l ) = a  + 0 + 0y’- ') . (5.4)
' M (1 + fy ,.l )2
One can assess the linearity of the regression of Yt on Yt_x by using a 
nonparametric regressor to obtain a curve of the dependence of Yt on Yt_x and 
checking if it can be approximated by a linear function. Figure 5.4 represents the 
kernel regression curve of Yt on Yt_x.
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Figure 5.4. Kernel regression of F,+1 on Yr  The optimal level of
smoothing was selected using the leave-one-out cross validation 
technique.
The curve comes close to a linear function, further confirming the consistency of 
the data with the normal family. In addition to nonparametric tools, a Bayesian 
statistician may also use the numerous classical means developed for checking 
linearity and curvature (Cox and Small, 1978; Abrevaya and Jiang, 2003).
Finally, a third type of ex ante consequences of a multivariate distribution family 
consists of the implications for new variables defined from the variables under 
study. To give an example, let X( be the ith point in a sample of data on X,  X the
vector of sample means, and S the sample covariance matrix. Further, define a 
new random variable:
d f = ( X i - X ) T S -'(X ,.-X ).
It has been shown that when X  has a multivariate normal distribution, for large 
samples, d f  -values are approximately distributed as Z 2(P)> where p  stands for
the dimension of X. In that case, a probability plot of the Z 2(P) percentiles 
against the ordered d f  -values will generate a straight line from the origin 
(Gnanadesikan, 1977:172-4), allowing direct assessment of joint normality.
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Figure 5.5 plots the %2{2) percentiles against the ordered d 2 -values for the 
unemployment data.
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Figure 5.5 X stands for d 2 -values and Y for ^ 2 (2) percentiles.
Though the data points are fairly closely scattered around a straight line, the fit is 
not perfect. The departure could be because the data have come from another 
symmetric distribution family, the first Markov condition is inappropriate, or there 
is noise in the data. All these possibilities can be investigated. Since the concern 
here is illustrative, we will not further the analysis and take the bivariate normal 
model as our initial model. In general, if the ex ante implications of a distribution 
family depart from the data, a similar approach can be pursued to assess the 
appropriateness of alternative distributions.
The unemployment data is very simple, and so is the above analysis. 
Nevertheless, the analysis gives a reasonable description of how a serious 
statistician formulates an initial model. Similar methods also guide dealing with 
complex datasets. An issue in dealing with complex datasets, for instance, is to 
decide whether to fit a mixture model and, if so, how complex the mixture model 
should be. Significant insight on this matter can be achieved by using probability 
plots. When the data come from different members of a distribution family, an 
appropriate probability plot generates several straight lines, each line representing 
a specific distribution (D’Agostino 1986:42-6). The complexity of the model can
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then be based on the number of inferred distributions. Initial data model 
specification is no longer without principles and procedures.
5.2 Prior Specification
A Bayesian model also requires a (joint) probability distribution for the model 
parameters. Although the Bayesian literature offers very little on data model 
specification, there is a substantive body of literature on prior modelling. O’Hagan 
(1994), to give an example, devotes a full long chapter on prior modelling but 
says nothing about specification of other model assumptions. This exclusive 
emphasis on prior modelling is unbalanced. The prior assumption is like any other 
assumption entering a model, if not the least critical one. If the data model is mis- 
specified, it is hard to make sense of a good prior. And, if it is correctly specified, 
when the sample is adequately large, the choice of a particular prior is not often 
critical. In any case, the central issue in prior modelling is whether there is a 
method to find a prior density for the parameters of the data model that enables it 
to best account for the data. Our response to this question will come in a later 
section. Here, to pave the way, we briefly look at various conventional approaches 
to prior modelling, explain the merits and shortcomings of each approach, and 
show why the focus of attention in these approaches are mistaken.22
5.2.1 The Summary-Based Method
The aim of prior modelling is traditionally defined as specifying a joint density 
function that best represents the modeller’s opinion about the parameters before 
seeing the data. A prior density that represents substantive information is called an 
informative prior. The literature provides two methodologies for quantifying a 
person’s qualitative information in terms of a density function. One is the 
summary-based method. The idea behind this method is that a distribution can be 
characterised in terms of a number of summaries. A univariate distribution, for 
instance, can be summarised using location measures (mean, median, and mode),
22 Kadane et al. (1998) review the recent literature on prior elicitation.
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dispersion measures (variance, standard deviation, and range), skewness, and 
fractiles. The summary-based method reverses this summarisation process. It 
requires expressing certain summaries about the distribution of the parameters and 
searching for a probability distribution that best fits the summaries (O’Hagan, 
1994:143). This strategy underlies several apparently differing prior modelling 
techniques, whose only difference consists of the type of summaries they require 
and the way in which the summaries are used to select a density function.
As a simple illustration, following Berger (1980:66), consider the case of a 
univariate parameter d , say, the mean of a normal distribution with a known 
variance. Suppose it is thought the median of the distribution 7 t { 0 )  is close to 
zero and the first quartile (1/4 fractile) and the second quartile (3/4 fractile) of the 
distribution are respectively -1 and l.23 These summaries suggest that 7 t ( 0 )  is 
symmetric around its median. Therefore, it may be concluded that 7 t { 0 )  belongs 
to the family of normal distributions, which are symmetric about their median. 
Since the mean and median of a normal distribution is the same, it follows that 
7t(6) is a normal distribution with mean zero i.e., N (0 ,S2). At this point, the 
table of normal distribution can be used to conclude from the information on the 
quartiles that the variance 8 2 = 2.16.24
The summary-based method is fraught with difficulties. One problem is that it 
requires thinking directly about parameters, which is difficult. To appreciate this 
point, recall the parameter in the simple exponential regression model mentioned 
earlier. The parameter enters the model in various ways, making it difficult to 
think directly about its role and distribution. The difficulty is compounded as 
more complex nonlinear models are considered (Kadane, 1980:90). Second, the 
distribution summaries obtainable in practice are usually consistent with more 
than one distribution family. The above summaries about 6 are also consistent 
with the Cauchy distribution C(0,1). Telling these two distributions apart
23 An “a-fractile o f a continuous distribution is a point z(a) such that a random variable with this 
distribution has probability a o f being less than or equal to z(a)” (Berger, 1985:79).
24 When Zis a standard normal variable p (Z  < -1 /  V2.I6) = 1 /4.
25 The median is zero, and it can be checked that 1 / x([  1 + 0 2 ])d d  = 1 / 4 .
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requires accurate summaries that cannot be easily obtained. Third, according to a 
dominant reading of the Bayesian position rooted in de Finetti’s representation 
theorem, the parameters have no independent role but to simplify the relations 
among the observables (Lindley, 1982:77; Poirier, 1988:131).26 If so, there is no 
fact of the matter about parameters to guide formulating a prior density other than 
their instrumental role in generating an empirically adequate model. Finally, there 
is no guarantee that the priors resulting from a person’s distribution summaries 
lead to an empirically adequate model. It may be that the data model is correctly 
specified but, because of the choice of an inappropriate prior, the overall model is 
inadequate.
5.2.2 The Hypothetical Prediction-Based Method
The difficulties in thinking directly about parameters have given rise to an 
alternative approach to prior modelling that only demands distribution summaries 
about observables. Suppose the interest is to model the distribution of variable X, 
with data density f ( x / 0 ). Let 7t{0) stand for the (joint) prior density function of 
the parameters 0 . Further, let Y denote some statistic defined from (hypothetical) 
observations {jc, . The distribution of Y before seeing the data is given by
the prior predictive distribution
m(y)= j^ f (y /0 ) f t (0 )d0  0 g  0 ,  (5.16)
which does not depend on the parameters 0,  since they are integrated out. 
Equation (5.16) contains one known term, which is the data density of the statistic 
f ( y l 0 ) ,  and two unknown terms, which are the predictive distribution of the 
statistic m(y) and the prior distribution 7t{0) . Now, suppose it was possible to 
estimate the predictive distribution m(y) for some values of Y, or to state some
26 De Finetti’s representation theorem implies that coherent like-minded individuals who share 
symmetries (like exchangeability) in their beliefs are led to common likelihoods (data models). 
These data models are simplified in terms of mental constructs (unobservables) called parameters 
(Poirier, 1988:131). A readable introduction to the theorem is given in Heath et al. (1976). Also 
see Bernardo et al. (1994:172-80).
213
summaries of m(y) , such as mean, median, and fractiles, which were enough to 
infer the distribution. This would reduce the number of unknowns in equation 
(5.16) to one unknown, the prior density 7 t(& ) . The prior specification problem 
could then be solved by searching for a density function that renders the two sides 
of equation (5.16) equal. And, there would remain no need to think directly about 
the parameters to formulate a prior.
A problem with this strategy is that if the search for a prior is carried out in the 
class of all possible density functions, it will be difficult to solve the problem 
analytically. Specifically, it is not clear where to start the search and there can be 
many different densities equalising the two sides of (5.16). Any attempt at solving 
the inference problem requires restricting a priori the class of densities to which 
7 t(0 )  belongs. A common restriction is to assume that 7 t(0 )  is a member of the 
distribution family that is conjugate with respect to the data density f ( y f O ) .21 
This assumption reduces the search for a prior into the search for a set of 
hyperparameters of the conjugate family that renders the two sides of (5.16) equal 
(Winkler, 1980:99). So, an alternative approach to prior modelling is to state 
certain summaries of the prior predictive distribution of the observables to infer 
the distribution. The approach next involves a priori restricting the distribution 
family to which the priors belong to a class smaller than the class of all possible 
densities. One then uses the predictive assessments to infer a set of values for the 
hyperparameters that equalises the two sides of (5.16).
A simple example, adapted from Winkler (1980:99), illustrates the method. 
Suppose the data have arisen form a Bernoulli process so that each observation 
can be considered as either a success (x  = 1) or a failure (x = 0). Let Y stand for 
the number of successes in N  trials. And, suppose the observations are random. 
We can describe the process generating Y using a binomial data model, with a 
parameter 6 representing the probability of success on any given trial. The
27 Let F  denote the class of data density functions f ( x / 6 ) ,  defined by 6 . A class of P of prior 
distributions is said to be a conjugate family for F  if 7 t{d  I x) is also in the class P  for all f e  F  
and 7t e  P  (Berger, 1980:96).
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conjugate family for a binomial parameter is the beta family, which gives rise to a 
Beta-Binomial Bayesian model:
The Beta-Binomial Model
Ai Data Distribution: Binomial, p{y!6) = N }dy(l-0)n~y, Y = X,
\ y )
A2Independence: ( X l, X 2,...,XN) is C-independent
A3Homogeneity: (X l, X 2i.i. ,X N) is C-homogenous
A4 Prior Distribution: Beta, jc(0) = B(a, /?)"' 0a~1 (1 -  0)^-1,
where B is the beta function, 0 < 0 < 1, a >  0, and P > 0. The prior predictive 
distribution of Y is given by the ‘beta-binomial’ distribution (N,a,/3) ,
p(y) =
'N^rta+flna+yWiN + fi-y)
\S  / T(a)T(P) T(a  + fi + N)
for y = 0,1,..JV , where T is the gamma function. Let y{ be the number of 
successes in i trials. Thus, y2 = 1 represents one success in two trials. Given this 
notation and the properties of the gamma function, equation (5.17) entails the 
following simple equalities:
P(Yi = 1) = oc_ p (y2 = 0) = P(P + \) and p(y 2 =1) = l a p
l “ P (y i= l)  P ’ P(y2 = 2) cc(a+\)'  p (y 2 = l )  a ( a + 1)
These equalities can be used to infer a  and p  from some estimates of p(y t) . 
For instance, the estimates p(y^ =1) = .5, p(y2 =0) = .25 and p(y2 = 2 ) - . 2 5  
imply that a  and P  are equal to one. Over the last two decades or so, the 
predictive method has been extended to some common models such as the normal 
linear regression model (Kadane, et al., 1980; Kadane et al., 1998). For these 
models, it is now known what prior predictive assessments to obtain and how to 
use them to infer a prior fitting the assessments.
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The predictive approach to prior modelling conquers one serious problem with the 
summary-based method by relinquishing the need for directly thinking about 
parameters. But it has its own limitations. For one thing, the form of the prior 
predictive distribution is not known for most interesting models encountered. This 
limits the usefulness of the method in practice (Winkler, 1980:99). Moreover, as 
the complexity of the data model grows, a larger number of predictive estimates 
are needed for finding necessary priors, making the method impractical (Kadane, 
1980:91). Above all, the method requires pre-specifying a distribution family to 
which the priors belong. This raises the possibility that none of the members of 
the family can yield an empirically adequate model. On this score, the predictive 
approach offers no improvement on the summary-based method. Like the older 
approach, this method is also concerned with eliciting beliefs about parameters 
rather than with building an empirically adequate model.
5.2.3 Default Priors
The analysis of these two major approaches to prior modelling demonstrates the 
difficulties in specification of an informative prior. In addition to these methods, a 
line of research in JJayesian statistics has been to establish formal rules for 
specifying priors that contain no information and let the data rapidly dominate the 
posterior distribution. Historically, the origin of these rules is traced to the theory 
of objective Bayesianism, according to which, given any information set, there is 
only one probability distribution in relation to the information set (Jeffreys, 
1931:10). And, when there is no information about a parameter, there exists a 
unique prior density representing the state of initial knowledge (ignorance). Such 
priors go by the name of ‘noninformative’, ‘default’, ‘reference’ or ‘invariant’ 
priors.
The earliest formal rule for prior specification is the principle of insufficient 
reason that assigns equal probabilities to all possible outcomes when there is no 
information to the contrary. The rule is subject to a re-parameterisation 
(partitioning) paradox; applying it simultaneously to all the equivalent 
representations (coarsenings and refinings) of the parameter space yields
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inconsistent probability assignments (Kass, et al., 1996:1347). Consider a single 
parameter 0 and a one to one transformation of it such as <j) — 6{\ -  0)~l . If 
ignorance is claimed about 0 , the rule requires choosing a uniform distribution. 
The change of variable formula then entails the prior density for <j) to be
;r*(0) = (l + ^)~2, which is not uniform. But, if one is ignorant about 0,  one is 
also ignorant about <j), and in either case, according to the principle, one should 
select a uniform density. Since there is no such a thing as the ‘correct’ 
representation of the parameter space, the principle fails to identify a unique 
representation of the initial state of knowledge (Learner, 1978:61).
What is ideally required is a rule that chooses a prior that is parameterisation 
invariant. In the context of the above example, this means it should not matter 
whether the rule is first applied to 0 to obtain 7t{0) and Jt* (0) is derived by 
means of the change of variable formula or it is first applied to (f> to obtain 7t* {</>) 
and 7t(0) is derived by means of the change of variable formula. In either case, 
the priors should assign equal probabilities to the corresponding regions under 
both parameterisations.28 Recognising this minimal requirement, Harold Jeffreys 
(1946) pioneered an approach to non-informative prior modelling, which is 
nowadays referred to as the invariance approach.
The approach links the choice of a prior to the model chosen for the data. To be 
precise, it considers one-to-one differentiable transformations of the random 
variables or the model parameters that do not change the model, and accordingly 
defines certain invariance requirements. It next searches for a prior that satisfies 
the requirements (Seidenfeld, 1979:419). To explain the core of the approach, 
following (Dawid, 1983), denote a data model by the triple M  = (X ,0 ,P ) , where 
X  is a variable, 0  the parameter space, and P = { /(x ,0 ) ,0e  0} the distribution 
family to which p(x) belongs. Let T = g(X) be a one-to-one differentiable 
transformation of X  (e.g.,Y = X  + c) and d> = h(&) the parameter space induced 
by the transformation of X  (i.e., <I> = 0  + c). Although the change transforms
28 The priors must be related according to 7 T (0 )d 0  =  71 {(/>)d(p.
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M  = (X ,0 ,P ) into a new model M* = (y,<J>,P), the distribution families in both 
cases are still the same; if p(x) belongs to distribution family P (say, the normal 
family), so does p (y ). This means if M  is true of a situation, M  * is also true of 
that situation, and in this sense the models are equivalent. Moreover, in the state 
of ignorance it is as likely that d e  Ac. R as <pe A d  R.  It is therefore required
that the prior satisfies the invariance condition 7 t ( 0  e  A )  =  7t* ( $  e  A ) , which is 
known as the context invariance condition.
Jeffreys (1961:181) proposes a general rule that fulfils the context invariance 
condition and a few others. The rule is to take the prior density to be proportional 
to the square root of the expected Fisher information measure. In the univariate 
case, it is given by
jc(0) = (1(0)\1' \  (5.18)
where 1(0) — £ [ -3 2 lo g /( ;c /# ) /3 # 2] is the expected Fisher information for the 
parameter 0,  and the expectation is taken with respect to the probability 
distribution function for jc, f ( x / 0 ) . In the multi-parameter case, 1(0) is replaced 
with the determinant of the expected Fisher information matrix. This prior is 
invariant with respect to one-to-one transformations of the random variables or 
parameters appearing in the data model. That is,
*’(0  = [/(*)] 1 / 2 (Wd(f> (5.19)
Computing the Jeffreys prior for (f) directly produces the same prior as computing 
the prior for 0 and subsequently using the change of variable formula to obtain 
n(<j>).
There has been a great deal of controversy surrounding the use and status of 
invariant priors. Most of these arise from the fact that invariant priors are 
inevitably improper; that is, they do not integrate to one. As a consequence, the
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context invariance condition in the form stated above is not strictly valid (Dawid, 
1983). The most that can be assumed is that if in the state of initial knowledge it is 
as likely that 0 e  A c  R as <j>e A c  R,  then the priors 7i{0) and 7t* {$) must be 
proportionally related to one another, i.e., 7t(d) = h(c)n* (<j>). This weaker 
condition is, however, satisfied by many other priors than Jeffreys’ prior, which 
makes invariant priors non-unique. Having noted this multiplicity, Jeffreys 
proposed to select a prior on the basis of an international agreement (1955: 111)?9
This proposal overlooks the possibility that a prior, chosen on the basis of 
international agreement, may not give rise to an empirically adequate model. A 
more reasonable proposal for selecting from among invariant priors is to tie the 
acceptability of the priors to the overall adequacy of the model. There is no 
difference between the prior assumption and other assumptions entering a model, 
and just as the plausibility of other assumptions are to be judged by looking at the 
overall adequacy of the model, the appropriateness of a prior must also be judged 
in the light of the adequacy of the model. From this perspective, the insufficient 
reason principle, Jeffreys’ rule and other possible formal rules for formulating 
priors constitute valuable modelling tools. Since formulating informative priors is 
difficult, it is sensible to pick out first a prior using these rules and assess if it 
gives rise to an adequate model. If the model is adequate, the posterior distribution 
can be used as a prior in future inferences. If the model turns out to be inadequate, 
it is necessary to search for alternative priors. Thus, we regard invariant priors as 
default priors. This is not, however, to deny that invariant priors must be used 
with care, especially because they can lead to improper posteriors (O’Hagan 
1994:79).
5.3 Some Limitations
This section began by asking if there is a theory of initial model formulation. The 
dominant belief is that there is not. Against this background, the section noted that 
theoretical statistics provides a rich reservoir of models, characterises the 
conditions under which a model can be true, and offers valuable information on
29 Seidenfeld (1979) offers an appraisal of the invariance approach.
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the ex ante consequences of the models. The section next showed how these 
contributions could be used as building blocks for an exploratory theory of initial 
model formulation. According to the theory, initial model formulation begins by 
using qualitative assumptions about the distribution of the variables to narrow 
down the class of data models that can be appropriate. It then involves examining 
the ex ante consequences of the models to find a model that can account for the 
data. Essential for the theory is certain heuristic principles for linking theoretical 
concepts with their sample counterparts.
The possibility of a theory of model formulation hinges on the existence of a 
model reservoir, and the scope of the theory grows with advances in theoretical 
statistics. As the list of the independence and homogeneity assumptions grows, 
new distributions are characterised, and new ex ante consequences are derived, the 
scope of the theory expands. Even though there is a relatively large list of 
univariate and bivariate distribution families, to date only a few multivariate 
distribution families have emerged in statistics. Of the four volumes of the 
reference work by Johnson et al. (1994), only the last deals with multivariate 
distributions, and this is dominated by the multivariate normal distribution. In 
addition, all the known multivariate families are based on the restrictive 
assumption that the marginal and conditional distributions of the variables also 
belong to the same distribution family. This scarcity of multivariate families 
defines the boundary of parametric inference. It also constrains the scope of the 
specification approach outlined above, which starts with modelling the joint 
distribution of the observables, and using it to derive the marginal and conditional 
distributions, as well as the regression functions of interest. The scarcity also 
renders prior formulation further difficult, as none of the few multivariate families 
may actually fit one’s prior information.
Due to the scarcity of multivariate distribution families, it has inevitably become 
common in practice to consider the values of the independent variables as 
constant, and concentrate on the univariate distribution of the dependant variable 
conditional on the fixed values of the independent variables. The above 
exploratory methods assist in deciding on the univariate distribution but are not of 
much help in specifying the regression function beyond indicating whether it is
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linear, convex, or concave. Precise specification of the algebraic form of the 
function becomes a matter for trial and error.
Apart from the limitation arising from the scarcity of multivariate families, initial 
model formulation requires subjective judgements as to whether the sample size is 
large enough to permit comparison of theoretical and sample values, whether the 
discrepancies between the theoretical and actual values are large enough to call 
for searching an alternative model, and whether an incompatibility between the 
model’s ex ante consequences and the data is due to chance or inappropriateness 
of the model. Because of the necessity of such judgements, investigation of ex 
ante consequences should be used for finding a model capable of accounting for 
the data, not for rejecting a model as false.
A final word may be needed on the compatibility of the Bayesian theory with the 
exploratory methods outlined above. Strictly speaking, Bayesian theory is only 
applicable after having formulated a model or a set of models, and is silent about 
the steps preceding specification of a model. Since the theory and the exploratory 
methods operate at two different levels, there is no incompatibility between them. 
Savage’s last papers also reveal a high regard for ‘puttering about with the data’ 
(Savage, 1977:5), which can be construed as learning by means other than Bayes’ 
theorem (Draper et al., 1993:25).
6 Bayesian Empirical Model Assessment
The above analysis exposes the complexity of initial model formulation, the 
uncertain decisions involved in selecting basic hypotheses, the difficulties in prior 
formulation, and the inconclusiveness of data and subject matter information in 
locating a single model. There is every reason to expect that the initial model may 
fail to account for important features of the data, and yield poor predictions. An 
important aspect of data modelling is therefore to assess the empirical adequacy of 
the initial model or models. The concern in empirical model assessment is with 
assessing the relation between a single model and the data, which falls outside the 
scope of the orthodox Bayesian theory. This section reconstructs and defends a
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trend in the literature that seeks to broaden the Bayesian framework by enriching 
it with a Fisherian notion of empirical adequacy and a method for assessing 
adequacy. The trend began with proposals by Barnard (1962), Anscombe (1964), 
and Dempster (1971), and culminated in the works of Box (1980, 1983), Rubin 
(1984), and Gelman et al. (1996). Drawing on the works and ideas of these 
statisticians, this section defines the notion of empirical adequacy of a Bayesian 
model, and describes various ways to investigate a model’s adequacy. The section 
then shows how the ideas lead to a general procedure for Bayesian specification 
searches.
6.1 A General Framework for Model Assessment
The key to a theory of Bayesian empirical adequacy is the notion of ex post 
consequences and a method for judging their conformity with the data. Let denote 
a Bayesian model by A/(Z, <£,#), with Z being the variable (or variables) under 
study, the parameter space, and ;rthe (joint) prior density. Further, let 
= {z°,—,z°N} be the actual sample, which, in statistics, is perceived as a 
realization of a vector of random variables Z = {Z, ,...,ZN}. The set of all possible 
realizations of variables Z^... ,ZN is called a sample space, denoted by S. The 
actual data {z° ,..-,z0N} is thus a point in the A-dimensional sample space S. Next, 
let 7](.) be a function that maps each point of S into the real line, and let 
T = {7] (.),...',Tk (.)} be the set of all such functions of interest. We refer to 7)(.) as 
a diagnostic or checking function. Each 7](.) takes the points in S into a new 
sample space Sn leading to a collection of sample spaces S* ={Si,...,Sk) , 
defined by the checking functions in T. Any fully specified model for Z implies a 
probability distribution for the points in S, and through 7](.) a distribution p(St)
over S i . By the ex post consequences of a model, we therefore mean the set of 
probability distributions C = {p(5(),...,p(5it)} that the model implies for the 
sample spaces inS*.
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In this setting, the issue of consistency of a model’s ex post consequences with the 
data boils down to the consistency of the induced probability distribution p(S,)
with the actual value 7] (D°), for every checking function Ti (.) of interest. Now 
the core of the Fisherian theory of goodness of fit test is that the consistency in 
question has to do with the location of T f D 0) in the distribution /?(£, ), which is 
termed as the reference distribution, following Box (1980). If T f D 0) falls in the 
central part of p{Si), the distribution is consistent with the data. If it falls in the 
(extreme) tail area of the distribution, it is inconsistent with the data, since in that 
case the actual value Tt (D°) receives a lower probability as compared to the most 
points in the sample space S, (Anscombe, 1963). Having said this, a model 
may be defined as empirically adequate if, for each relevant 
diagnostic function 7](.) in T, the reference distribution p(St) confers a ‘high’ 
probability on the realized value T f D 0) as compared to other possible points 
Tt (D) in the sample 5,.
In the Bayesian setting, the distribution of the observables under a model is given 
by the predictive distribution or, in other words, the marginal distribution of the 
data. In view of this, Guttman (1967), Dempster (1971), Box (1980) and Rubin 
(1984) have suggested taking the predictive distribution as the basis from which to 
derive the distributions of the statistics included in T. From this perspective, a 
Bayesian model is adequate if the predictive distribution p(St) for each
diagnostic function 7](.) of interest confers a high probability on the realized
value r.(D °) as compared with the other points 7J(D) in S,. The empirical
adequacy of a Bayesian model thus goes hand in hand with the predictive 
accuracy of the model; they are in fact the same thing.
In light of this account, the adequacy of a Bayesian model can be assessed by (i) 
selecting appropriate diagnostic functions 7] (.) to capture relevant features of the
data; (ii) deriving the predictive (reference) distributions of the functions piTf.))
under the model; (iii) computing the realised values of the functions, i.e., Tt (D°),
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and (iv) determining the location of T,(D°) in the distribution p(T)(.)). This may 
be done in more than one way. It may be done by computing the probability 
Pr{/?(7](Z))) > p(7] (Z)0))} or p(Ti(D)>Ti(D0)) . If these probabilities are not
extreme, the model is consistent with the data in respect of the statistic in question 
(Anscombe, 1963:84).
The justification of this approach to Bayesian model assessment lies, on the one 
hand, in the fact that for assessing the adequacy of a single model one necessarily 
needs to look at the consistency of the model’s consequences with data. And on 
the other, it lies in the fact that statistical models have no deductive consequences; 
a statistical model is logically consistent with any observed data (Dawid, 2002). 
Therefore, either the idea of assessing the empirical adequacy of a single model is 
abandoned, in which case the process of model formulation remains a mystery, or 
it is admitted and one is naturally led to the Fisherian idea (Spanos, 2001). After 
all, the only way to decide on the consistency of a statistical model with data is by 
looking at the location of the data in the distribution of the observables under the 
model.
6.1.1 The Variety of Predictive Distributions
Two types of predictive distributions were defined earlier, prior and posterior 
predictive distributions. The former describes the distribution of the observables 
given the information in the data model and prior density but takes no account of 
the data. The latter distribution, in contrast, describes the distribution of future 
data given the information in the data model, data and the prior density. There are 
thus two types of predictive distributions from which to derive the ex post 
implications of a Bayesian model, each of which gives rise to a somewhat 
different approach to model assessment.
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6.1.2 Prior Predictive Checks
Suppose our assumptions A regarding the process generating data D lead us to the 
density function p(D I0 ,A ) and prior p{0 / A ) . The joint distribution of D and 6 
is given by
p(D,0 /A)  = p (D /0 ,A )p (0 /A ) ,
and the prior predictive distribution of D by
p(D /A )=  $p(D/0 ,A)p(0 /A)d0,  (6.1)
which gives the distribution of the totality of all possible samples D that could 
occur if the assumptions A were true. The belief in the appropriateness of the 
assumptions A implies that the outcome of contemplated data acquisition would 
be calibrated with adequate approximation by a simulation involving appropriate 
random sampling from the distributions p(D/0 ,A)  and p{0IA)  (Box, 1983:59). 
This means if A were true, the actual data D would fall well within the support of 
the predictive distribution p(DIA) .  In light of this, Box (1980) suggests 
assessing the adequacy of the model by investigating the location of actual data 
D° in the prior predictive distribution p(D/ A) or by checking the location of 
some relevant diagnostic function T(D°) in p(T(D)l A ) . The following two 
examples, adapted from Box (1983) and (1980), illustrate the prior predictive 
approach to adequacy assessment.
The first example concerns the modelling of the number of successes in a 
sequence of random Bernoulli trials X {, X 2,...,XN, with X { being either 0
(failure) or 1 (success). The distribution of the number of successes Y in a 
sequence of random Bernoulli trials is given by the Binomial distribution, with 
parameter 0 representing the probability of success on each trial. Suppose a 
member of the beta distribution family with E{6) = .0.2, and Var(&) = 0.01 
represents our belief about 0. As seen earlier, with a beta prior, the prior 
predictive distribution of Y in N  Bernoulli trials is given by the ‘beta-binomial’ 
distribution (n,a,j3)
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p ( y ! A )  =
' N \  r ( a + P) Hor + y)r(N + P - y )  . . . .
(6.2)
T{a)T{P) F ( a + P  + N)
where A stands for the model assumptions.30 Using the formula for the mean and 
variance of a beta distribution, it can be shown that the prior belief about the 
distribution of G implies that a - 3  and p  = 12. The prior predictive approach to 
model assessment involves assessing the model adequacy by locating the 
probability of the observed data p(y° I A) in the distribution (6.2) by computing 
the probability
Pr (p(y / A) < p(y° I A)). (6.3)
Consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, the experiment is carried out 10 
times and 3 successes are observed. The prior predictive probability p{3! A) is 
0.16, which is not unusually small. In fact
Pr(p(y M ) < p(3M )) = 0.33.
The data provides no reason to doubt the model. In the second scenario, suppose 
there are 8 successes. The prior predictive probability p(&/ A) is 0.0018, and
FT(p(y/A)<p(S/A)) = 0.0021,
which is quite small. The data casts doubt on the model, calling for a revision of 
the assumptions A.
As a different illustration, consider modelling the distribution of a continuous 
random variable X  for which we have the data set D° = (34, 32, 38, 35, 39). 
Suppose a normal distribution with variance <72 = 1 is thought to fit the data.
30 Note that the Beta function can be stated in terms of the Gamma as 
B[a, 0] = r[o]r[B] / r[a + 0].
226
Suppose a normal prior with mean 0Q = 30 and variance r 2 = 3 captures our
prior belief about the location parameter 6 of the data density. These assumptions 
lead to the following model:
Simple Bayesian Normal Model
Ai Distribution: Normal, X  ~ N(0,cr2), c 2 =1
A2 Independence: (X {, X 2,...,Xn) is C-independent
A3 Homogeneity: (X l, X 2,...,Xn) is C-homogenous
A4 Prior Distribution: Normal, 0 ~ N(0O, T2), 0Q = 30, T2 = 3.
The posterior distribution of 0 is given by
Let s 2 = (jc, -  x )2 . The prior predictive distribution of X  is given by (Berger, 
1980:93-94):
A possible checking function for the model is the quantity in the bracket; namely,
The empirical adequacy of the model may then be assessed by computing the 
prior predictive probability
0 ~ N((p,0), <j) = (T~2 +nS~2)~\ <p = 0(0oT~2 + 8  2X * ,)  
0 ~ TV(36,0.19).
p(x /A)  = (2x) n,2a  n(cr2T2/ a 2 + n r 2) ,/2exp{— [—  + ]}. (6.4)
Pr (p (T (X) /A)<p(T (x° ) /A ) ) . (6.5)
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Given the model assumptions, the quantity T ( X ) has distribution,31 and 
since T ( X ) is inversely related to p(x /  A), for computing (6.5) it is sufficient to 
calculate
p = P { x l > T ( x 0))
However, the test statistic
5X 6^ + (31 6-30)1 = 43 
1 3.2
and
p ( x l  >43) <0.001.
This low predictive probability reveals that the occurrence of the data under the 
model is quite unlikely, which calls for a revision of the model A(36,0.19) .The 
entire predictive approach to adequacy assessment rests upon the ability to derive 
desired predictive distributions and to locate the position of the actual values of 
the statistics of interest in the distributions. Analytic evaluation of the integrals in 
the predictive distributions is generally hopeless. One needs to turn to sampling 
based methods to derive the predictive distributions of interest (Gelfand et al., 
1992:148).
A common criticism against the prior predictive approach relates to the similarity 
between prior predictive p-values and the classical goodness of fit tests. Since the 
same criticism has been levelled against other types of Bayesian predictive p- 
values, we postpone an assessment of this criticism until we thoroughly explain 
the role of predictive checks in the Bayesian setting. This aside, a limitation of the 
prior predictive approach is that it only applies to models with proper priors. 
When the prior is improper, the prior predictive distribution is also improper and, 
as a result, prior predictive p -values are not defined (Bayarri et al. 1999). More 
importantly, prior predictive checks are sensitive to the choice of priors. A choice 
of inappropriate priors can lead the analyst to wrongly question a well-specified 
data model. Thus, the approach is primarily suitable for exploring the effect of
31 If X l , X 2 ,...Xn are NED (standard Normal) Y = T . x f  ~ ^ 2(n).
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alternative priors within a model and should not be used to question the data 
model unless the appropriateness of the priors has somehow been ascertained 
(Hodges, 1988:264).32
6.1.3 Posterior Predictive Checks
The proposal to use posterior predictive distribution for adequacy assessment first 
appeared in Guttman (1967) and was later developed in Rubin (1984) and Gelman 
et al., (1996). To explain the posterior predictive approach, let D° be the 
observed data on random variable Y, and A the assumptions forming a candidate 
model, with parameter vector 0 . The posterior predictive distribution of Y under 
the model is given by
P(y f I A, D°) = \P ( y f  / A,6)x(01 D °)d8 , (6.6)
with y f  standing for a future observation. If the assumptions A were correctly
specified, we could think of the actual data D° as a random sample drawn from 
the distribution (6.6). This means if we could simulate random samples of size N  
(the size of D ° ) from the distribution, we would expect the samples to be on 
average ‘similar’ in ‘relevant ways’ to the actual sample D° (Rubin, 1984:116). 
So, information on the adequacy of the model may be achieved by simulating 
random samples of size N  from the distribution (6.6) and assessing the similarity 
of the hypothetical samples with the realized sample D ° . To elaborate on the 
process, consider checking if a normal model fits data D° = [x{ ,...,xn) . Suppose a
pair of conjugate priors is thought to capture the beliefs about the location and 
scale parameters of the data distribution. Assuming that the data form a random 
sample, the task involves assessing the adequacy of the normal / chi-squared 
model (Lee, 1997):
32 See Bayarri and Berger “Measures of Surprise in Bayesian Analysis” for a discussion of other 
objections to the prior predictive approach.
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Bayesian Normal/Chi-squared Model
Ai Distribution: Normal, X  ~ N(6,<j>)
A2 Independence: ( X l, X 2,...,XN) is C-independent
A3 Homogeneity: ( X ltX 2,...tX N) is C-homogenous
A4 Prior Distribution: Normal / Chi-squared distribution
The posterior distribution for <J) is given by the inverse chi-squared distribution 
and for 6  given (j> by the normal distribution 6 1 <j) ~ N(6x,<j)lN) , 
where S{, 6{, and v, are defined in Appendix B The posterior predictive 
distribution of X  is given by
P(x/A, D)=  JJjV(*/ A, 0, <f>)N(dx,^ / n)Sxz~* . (6.7)
The key part of Rubin’s posterior predictive approach is to compare the actual 
sample with the samples simulated from (6.7). To this end, a value <j>* is first 
drawn from the posterior distribution say by means of Markov chain
Monto Carlo simulation, and then given <jf a value 6* is drawn from 
I N ) . Next, using the simulated values, a sample D repi = {jc, } is 
drawn from X ~ N{6* ,<j)*). These steps are repeated to obtain k (say, 10,000) 
random samples and the value of the diagnostic statistic 7^ .(Z)rep') for each 
simulated sample is defined.33
A judgment of similarity is based on the number of cases in which the simulated 
value of the diagnostic function Ti(Drepi) differs from the realized value 7].(D°). 
More precisely, similarity is judged by computing the percentage of these k 
simulations for which the value of the function 7] (D rep') exceeds (or is less than)
the realized value 7].(D°). This is known as the posterior predictive p-value 
(Gelman et al. 1996):
33 Gilks, et al., (1996) contins a collection of articles on Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques.
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Posterior Predictivep-value = a  = (6.8)
where I  is the indicator function. If a  for the diagnostic functions of interest are 
close to 0 or 1, the model is considered to be suspect. Otherwise, it is considered 
as empirically adequate. The posterior predictive approach is consistent with the 
main trust of Bayesian reasoning, which is conditioning on the whole data (Rubin, 
1984:1166).
The posterior predictive approach gets around two difficulties of the prior 
predictive diagnostics. Since regardless of whether the priors are proper or not, 
posterior parameter distributions are usually proper, posterior predictive 
distributions are also usually proper. As a result, the use of posterior predictive 
diagnostics is not limited to models with proper priors. Second, in contrast to prior 
predictive checks, if the sample is adequately large, posterior predictive 
distributions are not sensitive to the choice of priors. Thus, posterior predictive 
diagnostics can be used for assessing data model assumptions. These successes, 
however, come at a price. As many critics have pointed out, posterior predictive 
checks use the data twice. They use the data once to derive the posterior predictive 
distribution of the observables under the model and once to assess the model. 
They are therefore prone to underestimating the inadequacy of the model 
(O’Hagan, 2001:7). Even so, it is true that if a model fails to generate data similar 
to the data used to obtain it, there is something amiss about it. So, posterior 
predictive checks of the type proposed by Rubin and others provide valuable 
exploratory tools for specification searches.
6.1.4 Cross-validated Posterior Predictive Checks
The prior predictive approach, which leaves the whole data out as a test set, and 
the posterior predictive approach, which takes the whole data as the training set, 
are two extremes of an spectrum in which the ex post consequences of a single 
Bayesian model can be defined. There are many alternatives in between, arising 
from various other ways in which the data can be divided into a training and test 
set. Of these middle-way procedures, re-sampling techniques, as stated in the last
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chapter, have received most attention. In the Bayesian setting, Gelfand et al. 
(1992) and Bernardo et al. (1994) suggest using cross validation for model 
selection but the method can equally be used for adequacy assessment. In its 
simplest form, the technique leaves out the ith observation y t as a test set and fits
the model to the remaining data set D~' to derive the posterior predictive 
distribution of the omitted observation yt
p (y l ID~‘)=  J / ( j , / t f ) * ( « /D 'l)(M for alii = 1 N  (6.9)
The procedure is repeated to derive N  posterior predictive distributions of the N  
observations in the sample. Adequacy is judged by drawing k (say, 10,000) 
hypothetical observations from the predictive distribution (6.9) for each 
observation to form k hypothetical samples, and using the samples to derive the 
posterior predictive distributions of the diagnostic statistics T{ (.) of interest. The
model is considered as adequate if the actual values of the statistics fall in the 
main part of their reference distributions.
The cross-validated distribution (6.9) can also be used to define other important 
types of ex post consequences of a Bayesian model. A number of these 
implications are listed in Gelfand et al. (1992), of which the following two are the 
simplest:
(i) Let eu = y. -  y(. measure the difference between the realized value y, and its 
predicted value y,- (i.e.,E(Yi /£>“')) , and erf be VartJ.J D ~‘) . Standardizing eu 
yields d u = eu / cri . If the errors eu are approximately normally distributed, du 
approximately has a standard normal distribution.34 In that case, 95% of the 
standardized errors du must fall within the interval -2  to +2. If this is not the 
case, the model fails to fully capture systematic information in the data. Also, the
34 A well-fitted model will produce residuals that are approximately independent random variables 
with zero mean, constant variance, and, possibly, a normal distribution (Gilchrist, 1984:138).
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rsquared sum of the standardized errors D2i = ^ d ^  can be taken as an overall 
index of adequacy.
(ii) Let e2i =1 if y t < y f, otherwise 0. The expectation d2i = E(e2i) is 
P(Yi < y(. / D~l) . Viewing yt as a random draw from the predictive distribution 
p(Xi ID~t) implies that d2i is uniformly distributed over the unit interval, i.e., 
d 2i ~ U(0,1). If the model is correctly specified, the average A(e2i) = ^ e 2i IN  is 
expected to be close to 0.5. Extreme values for A(e2i) , i.e., values close to 0 or 1, 
point to inadequacy.
In addition, the predictive errors eu can be used for graphical residual analysis to 
investigate different aspects of the model. By plotting the errors eu versus the 
predicted values y, it is possible to check the appropriateness of the variance 
homogeneity; by plotting the residuals versus time it is possible to assess the 
appropriateness of the independence assumption; or by plotting the residuals as a 
histogram it is possible to check if they are normally distributed (Gilchrist, 
1984:138-44).
The cross-validation method overcomes double using of the data but is not free of 
limitation either. Holding part of the data out as a test (adequacy) set can destroy 
crucial features of the data such as dependence, which can lead to a wrong 
estimate of the model accuracy (Chapter 3). Hold-out methods, such as cross- 
validation techniques, are only suited for unstructured data. The general view 
transpiring from the remarks about the weaknesses and strengths of each approach 
to adequacy assessment is that none of the methods outperforms others in all 
respect. Their applicability depends on the kind of data under study and the aspect 
of the model being considered.
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6.2 Bayesian Specification Searches
The notion of ex post consequences of a Bayesian model combined with the 
Fisherian approach to assessing the compatibility of the model consequences with 
the data leads to a powerful procedure for searching the space of data models 
suggested by the initial exploratory analysis. The procedure involves choosing a 
data model, adopting a (joint) prior distribution for the model parameters, and 
assessing the compatibility of its ex post consequences with the data. If the model 
is found empirically inadequate, one model assumption is varied at a time, the 
effect of the variation on the model adequacy is assessed, and the procedure is 
repeated until a model that successfully accounts for the data is found. In practice, 
when a data model assumption is varied, it is also often essential to modify other 
model assumptions to preserve consistency among the basic hypotheses. This 
learning procedure, which captures the way in which a serious (Bayesian) 
statistician builds a model, might be named Bayesian diagnostic model searching. 
This section illustrates the procedure by further analyzing the example discussed 
in Section V.
6.2.1 Exploring Prior Distributions
The traditional methods to informative prior modeling demand arbitrary choices 
regarding the distribution families to which the priors belong and distributional 
summaries and hypothetical predictions that are hard to obtain. This raises the 
possibility that the resulting priors may not enable the model to best account for 
the data, even though the basic probabilistic assumptions are correctly specified. 
As a result, when the candidate model is the outcome of a careful initial 
exploratory analysis, the first step in ex post assessment of the model should be to 
find a set of priors, which, given its other assumptions, enables it to best account 
for the data. It is only after this that it can be assessed whether the data model is 
able to account for the data. In view of the fact that the main objective of 
modelling is to specify a model capable of accounting for the data, it makes sense 
to link choice of priors to the adequacy of the model. As an alternative to the 
traditional methods, it is therefore appropriate to choose a prior by looking at the
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compatibility of the e x  p o s t  consequences of the model with the data. Specifically, 
following Box (1980), Hill (1990), and Geweke (1999), it seems plausible to 
propose a two-stage method for prior specification. First, subject matter 
considerations are brought in to t e n t a t i v e l y  limit the class of candidate priors; 
considerations such as the parameter takes real, positive values, falls in the unit 
interval, and so forth. Second, the effect of candidate priors on the adequacy of the 
model is investigated, while holding the data model fixed. A set of priors that 
enables the model to best account for the data is selected.
To illustrate the process, let us return to the US unemployment data. Initial 
examination of the data suggested that a bivariate normal data model might be 
appropriate. This implies that Yt follows a first order normal autoregression 
model (Spanos, 1986, Ch 22, Appendix):
Normal AR (1) Data Model
Y, I y,_! ~ N ( x , t t 2),
7 t  =  a  +  P y t _ x
which contains three parameters a , p  and <72. To illustrate the search for priors, 
it is necessary to start with some tentative decision about the distribution families 
to which the priors might belong. Since the purpose here is illustrative, it seems 
appropriate to consider conjugate priors. Suppose we start with the prior densities 
given below:
Bayesian Normal AR (1) Model I
Yt ly,_, ~ N(x ,ct2),
7 t  =  a  +  p y t _ x
a  ~ N ( 0 , 0.001), P  ~ N ( 0 , 0.001) , r  ~ G a m m a & 3 0 ) , t  ~ l/<72
Assessing empirical adequacy requires some statistics to characterise salient 
features of the data. In general, any summary statistics may be chosen, such as 
minimum sample value, maximum sample value, standard deviation, skewness, 
and so forth. However, when the concern is to check a specific assumption, it is
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vital to adopt statistics that capture those aspects of the data that relate to the 
assumption in question. The unemployment data shows strong positive 
dependence. A critical modelling concern is thus to select an appropriate 
independence hypothesis. This demands using statistics that capture the 
dependence feature of the data.35 To this end, we may include among our 
diagnostic statistics autocorrelation functions of different order. Table 4.3 defines 
the statistics used here:
Table 4.3
Definition of vector of interest
Preliminary statistics:
y T = E L  y<I T  s t  = E L ^ -  -  y r ? n
y ? = Z * * I T
Minimum sample value iVmin
t 2 ( .) Maximum sample value y  max
r3(.) Standard deviation ( s t ) U2
t 4 (.) Skewness
Z j y i - y )  m s r ? ' 1
t 5 ( .) Excess kurtosis ( Z L c v i - y / m ^ ) 2 ) - 3
T6 (.) 1st order autocorrelation
E L '(?> ~  -  j v v E L ^  ~  J t )
r 7 C) 2nd order autocorrelation
Z *  ( y . - y r )(y».2 - % ) > E L (y,  - > v )
r8(.) 3rd order autocorrelation
Z * ( y > - y r X y  i+3- y ^ ' Z S y ' - y ^
In principle, any of the predictive approaches can be used to search for priors. 
However, since in the current case the data shows strong dependence, cross 
validations techniques are not appropriate; they destroy the dependence feature of 
the data. For simplicity, we adopt Rubin’s approach both for prior modelling and 
data model assessment. To derive the posterior predictive distributions of the
35 See Rubin (1984:1168) on how a statistic may be defined to tell whether the data come from a 
normal or a Cauchy distribution. Also, Geweke (2001:5-6) contains a discussion on the choice of 
diagnostic statistics for assessing models of financial returns.
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statistics, 10,000 samples are simulated from the posterior predictive distribution 
of the observable under the model, (with 5000 burnt in), and the values of the 
statistics for each sample is calculated. The values are used to calculate the 
quantiles of the predictive distributions of the statistics. Table 4.4 gives the 
quantiles as well as the predictive p-values for the observed values of the 
statistics.36
Table 4.4
Posterior predictive distribution of vector of interest
Norm al AR (1) M odel I
D ata M edian (2.5% , 97.5% ) p-value
T{(.) Minimum value 2.57 1.557 (032,2.37) 0.9937
t 2 (.) Maximum value 7.37 8.189 (7.306,9.449) 0.0365
t 3 (.) Standard deviation 1.172 1.412 (1.197,1.648) 0.0152
T4 (.) Skewness 0.2068 0.077 (-0.292,0.441) 0.757
T5 ( .) Excess kurtosis -0.9009 -0.386 (-0.876,0.46) 0.0185
T6(.) 1st order autocorrelation 0.919 0.541 (0.358,0.680) 1
t7(.) 2nd order autocorrelation 0.743 0.4402 (0.2608,0.5746) 1
T M 3rd order autocorrelation 0.534 0.3192 (0.151,0.460) 0.9997
The observed value of the skewness and maximum value statistics are within the 
support of their distributions. However, the observed values of the rest of the 
statistics either fall outside the support of their distributions or lie in their extreme 
tail areas. Notably, none of the realised values of the autocorrelation functions 
falls within the interval (2.5%, 97.5%) of the predictive distributions; the 
simulated values of the functions are invariably smaller than their observed 
values. The model strikingly fails to account for most aspects of the data, and is 
empirically inadequate.
36 To perform the simulations discussed in this section I have used the Bugs software, freely 
available on http://www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/bugs. I am greatly indebted to the Bugs programs 
accompanied Congdon’s book (2001) as well as the programs found in the Bugs Manuals, 
available from the above website.
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Another way of assessing the compatibility of the model with the data, suggested 
in Gelman et al. (1996), is to plot the simulated values of each statistic in form of 
a histogram to obtain a nonparametric estimate of the distribution of the statistic. 
The consistency of the distribution with the data is determined by locating the 
observed value of the statistic in the histogram. The following histograms show 
the distributions of the minimum value and standard deviation statistics under the 
model.
Model AR(1) I
Standard DeviationMinimum Value
Figure 6.1 Posterior predictive distributions and the observed values 
for the sample minimum value and sample standard deviation 
statistics.
The lines indicate the position of the actual values of the statistics in their 
distributions, showing that the simulated samples D rep almost invariably differ 
from the actual sample D. The failure of the model demands searching for 
alternative priors.
Experiments with alternative hyperparameters suggest that the ability of the model 
to account for the data is not sensitive to the choice of hyperparameters for the 
prior densities of a  and f3 but is highly sensitive to those in the distribution of
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x . A relatively extensive experiment with alternative values for the 
hyperparameters suggests the priors given in the following model:
Normal AR (1) Model II
Yt \ y ^ ~ N f r , < r 2), 
x  = a  + py,_ i
a  -  N(0,0.001), p  ~ N (0,0.001), r -  Gamma(0.1.0.1) , r  ~ l/<r2
The posterior predictive distributions implied by these new priors are given in 
Table 4.5 below.
Table 4.5
Posterior predictive distribution of vector of interest 
N orm al AR (1) M odel II
Data Median (2.5%, 97.5%) p-value
Tx (.) Minimum value 2.57 2.343 (1.672,2.824) 0.799
t2(.) Maximum value 7.37 7.524 (6.973,8.245) 0.302
t 3 C) Standard deviation 1.172 1.176 (1.056,1.303) 0.4741
t 4 (.) Skewness 0.2068 0.149 (-0.083,0.377) 0.687
Ts (.) Excess kurtosis -0.9009 -0.685 (-1.02, -0.201) 0.122
T6(.) 1st order autocorrelation 0.919 0.785 (0.707,0.840) 1
t 7 (.) 2nd order autocorrelation 0.743 0.6391 (0.5572,0.701) 0.9993
r 8(.) 3rd order autocorrelation 0.534 0.4638 (0.3709, 0.520) 0.9581
As the quantiles in the Table show, the new priors enable the model to better 
account for the features of the data captured by the statistics. Unlike the previous 
model, the actual values of the statistics minimum sample value, standard 
deviation, excess kurtosis, and the 3rd order autocorrelation fall within the support 
of the distributions, i.e., the (2.5%, 97.5%) predictive interval. Nevertheless, the 
model still fails to account for the 1st order and 2nd order autocorrelation functions. 
Since experiments with alternative priors for x do not improve on the adequacy 
of the model, and the performance of the model is not sensitive to the choice of 
priors for a  and j3 , there is every reason to think that the data model is not 
correctly specified.
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In general, if experiment with a wide range of hyperparameters fails to produce 
good priors, other distribution families consistent with the subject matter 
information should be considered. If, after an adequate search among alternative 
distribution families, a model still fails to account for the data, a revision of the 
data model assumptions becomes necessary (Geweke, 2001:7). It should be clear 
from this analysis that the diagnostic approach to adequacy assessment presents a 
powerful alternative to the traditional prior modelling methods. The approach 
forgoes the need for qualitative distribution summaries or hypothetical 
predictions. And more importantly, it overcomes the risk of rejecting a correctly 
specified data model because of the choice of inappropriate priors. It ties the 
choice of priors to the model adequacy.
6.2.2 Exploring Data Model Assumptions
When a model fails to account for the data regardless of the choice of priors, the 
focus of investigation must be turned towards alternative data models. The 
investigation involves varying the data model assumptions one at a time, 
searching for a set of priors that best enables the model to account for the data, 
and checking the model adequacy. Although the failure of the above model may 
be due to any of the basic assumptions, because of its specific failure in 
accounting for the dependence feature of the data, it is more plausible to first 
investigate the effect of varying the first order Markov condition. We proceed by 
replacing it with the second order Markov condition. Modifying the distribution 
hypothesis appropriately, this hypothesis leads to a second order normal 
autoregression model:
Normal AR (2) Model
+ » , - 2
Experiments with alternative priors suggest that the following set of priors best 
enables the model to account for the data:
a  ~ A(0,0.01), P  ~ A(0,0.01), y ~ 7V(0,0.01),t ~ Gamma(l,3), T ~ M o 2
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Table 4.6 gives the (2.5%, 97.5%) predictive intervals of the posterior predictive 
distributions of the statistics resulting from these priors. The predictive intervals 
are computed from 10,000 samples simulated from the posterior predictive 
distribution of the observable under the model, (with 5000 burnt in).
Table 4.6
Predictive Distribution of Vector o f Interest
Norm al AR (2) M odel
Data Median (2.5%, 97.5%) p-value
Minimum value 2.57 2.21 (1.265,2.771) 0.876
T2(.) Maximum value 7.37 7.668 (7.081,8.442) 0.1836
t 3 (.) Standard deviation 1.172 1.172 (1.055,1.296) 0.5
T M Skewness 0.2068 0.1872 (-0.088,0.448) 0.558
T5Q Excess kurtosis -0.9009 -0.46 (-0.854,0.158) 0.0127
r« C ) 1st order autocorrelation 0.919 0.688 (0.573,0.768) 1
r 7 (.) 2nd order autocorrelation 0.743 0.576 (0.482,0.6503) 1
r .C ) 3rd order autocorrelation 0.534 0.376 (0.272,0.4666) 0.9999
These predictive quantiles are not improved by considering alternative values for 
the hyperparameters or alternative prior distribution families. The current 
parameterisation seems to enable the model to best fit the data. If so, the model 
does not improve on the second AR(1) model. In fact, contrary to the latter model, 
it accounts neither for the excess kurtosis nor for the 3rd autocorrelation statistic.
Replacing the first order Markov condition with higher order Markov conditions 
does not create an empirically more adequate model. Nor does the data show any 
heterogeneity to consider alternative homogeneity assumptions. Experiments with 
alternative distributions such as student f-distribution also fail to yield a better 
model. In all these cases, however, the residual ACF function has some large 
spikes at low lags, indicating that the errors are correlated. This suggests using an 
Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) model.37 To continue, consider an 
ARMA (1,1) model,
37 An ARMA model can theoretically be regarded as an efficient approximation to an 
Autoregression model o f some order p (Spanos, 1999:452).
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Normal ARMA(1,1) ModelY, iyM.y.-2 -  n (x ,<j 2), 
x = a + 0y,-,
Experiments with alternative priors soon lead to the following densities,
a  ~ AT(0,0.3), P  ~ Af(0.1,0.1), y ~ AT(0.1,0.1),r ~ Gamma(0.01,0.01) ,T ~ 1/tx2.
Table 4.7 gives the (2.5%, 97.5%) predictive intervals of the predictive 
distributions of the statistics that result from these priors. The intervals are 
computed from 10,000 samples simulated from the posterior predictive 
distributions, (with 5000 burnt in).
Table 4.7
Predictive Distribution of Vector of Interest
N orm al ARMA (1,1) M odel
Data Median (2.5%, 97.5%) p-value
7 , 0 Minimum value 2.57 2.538 (2.315,2.538) 0.624
t 2q Maximum value 7.37 7.399 (7.189,7.629) 0.398
T,C) Standard deviation 1.172 1.177 (1.149,1.204) 0.39
t4(.) Skewness 0.2068 0.1576 (0.085,0.229) 0.413
t5(.) Excess kurtosis -0.9009 -0.886 (-1, -0.755) 0.91
t 6 (.) 1st order autocorrelation 0.919 0.914 (0.906,0.921) 0.909
T7 (.) 2nd order autocorrelation 0.743 0.741 (0.724,0.757) 0.598
r .C ) 3rd order autocorrelation 0.534 0.5395 (0.514,0.564) 0.355
The Normal ARMA (1,1) model accounts for all the aspects of the data captured 
by the diagnostic functions. In particular, it accounts for the dependence features 
of the data. Moreover, the performance of the model is not sensitive to particular 
hyperparameters, as a very wide range of hyperparameters preserves the ability of 
the model to account for the data. We at last have a candidate model fitting the 
data.
The unemployment data set is a very simple one. The analysis, nevertheless, 
illustrates the essence of the Bayesian diagnostic approach to model specification, 
which offers a powerful tool for searching the space of candidate models to find a
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model capable of accounting for the data. The diagnostic approach to specification 
searches, combined with the procedures introduced for initial model formulation, 
furnishes the key elements of an exploratory theory of Bayesian model 
formulation.
7 Model Selection
Exploratory searches may generate several models equally fitting the data, raising 
the issue of how a model should be chosen from among the candidates. We earlier 
described the Bayesian solution to this problem, and now return to it to discuss 
some controversies surrounding it and highlight certain complexities in 
establishing a theory of statistical learning. At the start, following Bernardo et al. 
(1994), it i s . useful to make a distinction between two possible views 
(perspectives) that can be held with respect to a set of candidate models:
Closed view: the set of candidate models [M k) is complete in the 
sense that it includes the true model.
Open view: the set of candidate models {Mx,..., M k} is incomplete in the
sense that it excludes the true model, either because the model is not 
among the candidates or because there is no true model anyway.
The closed view stands on two assumptions: a metaphysical assumption that there 
exists a true model and an epistemological assumption that the true model is 
actually among the candidate models. The model selection problem is thus 
defined as that of finding the true model from among the candidates. The open 
view emerges from rejection of at least one of these assumptions and can be 
interpreted in two ways. One interpretation takes for granted the existence of a 
true model but acknowledges that it may not be among the candidates. In this 
case, the model selection issue involves selecting the model that best 
approximates the true model. The other interpretation rejects the reality of a true 
model outright, considering the candidate models simply as a set of models 
contending to account for the data. In this case, the model selection issue is simply 
to find a simple model that best fits the data and yields accurate predictions.
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The Bayesian theory of model selection takes the closed view for granted. It 
interprets the probability of a model as the probability that it is true (Hill, 
1990:61). And, it requires the probabilities over the candidate models to add up to 
one, meaning that the true model is among the candidates (Wasserman, 
2000:103). Consequently, it recommends selecting the model that scores the 
highest probability in the light of the data. Both assumptions underpinning the 
closed view are flawed.
The metaphysical assumption of a true model encounters problems of 
interpretation from the subjectivist viewpoint. From this perspective, probability 
is the product of thinking consistently about the universe, with no counterpart in 
the external world (Dawid, 2002:8), and there is no true probability model or data 
generating process involving parameters that attain an objective existence (Poirier, 
1988:122, Learner, 1990:188). Therefore, for a subjectivist, the truth of a model 
can only be defined in terms of features of the observables. To elaborate on this, 
suppose it was possible to observe endlessly a socio-economic or physical process 
generating data sets of size N. Suppose also it was possible to simulate endlessly 
samples of the same size from a candidate model purporting to describe the 
system. The model could be said to be true if the stylised features of the simulated 
samples (such as sample mean, median, minimum value, maximum value, 
covariance, and so forth) arbitrarily closely resembled those of the actual samples. 
This or something similar seems to be the only way to define a true model in the 
subjectivist framework. If so, the question arises about the rationale for supposing 
a unique model generating samples most closely resembling the actual samples. 
To define ‘arbitrarily closely’, it is necessary to introduce some distance function. 
There are, however, many possible distance functions, and depending on the 
choice of metric, different models may turn out to be true. There is no natural 
choice of a distance function. All in all, even in the abstract it is not clear how to 
defend the existence of a true Bayesian model.
The epistemological assumption that the true model is among the candidate 
models is also indefensible for several reasons. The number of models that can be 
considered in practice is restricted by the finiteness of the reservoir of known 
models. None of the models may approximate the ‘true’ model. Moreover, in
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empirical modelling, due to the possibility of overfitting, the complexity of the 
models considered must always be tied to the sample size. With small samples, 
only simple models can be considered, since highly parameterised models are 
prone to overfitting. This restriction arising from the smallness of actual samples 
constrains the set of models that can be considered in practice, giving rise to the 
possibility that the allowed set may neither include the true model nor even a good 
approximation thereof (Spiegelhalter, 1995:72). Constructing models is also 
costly, time consuming, and constrained by computational capabilities of the day. 
The cost of developing a complex model with a better chance of approximating 
the reality may outweigh the practical benefit that may ensue. Such real pragmatic 
considerations compel the analyst to consider only a handful of models that may 
be very different from the true model. Thus, even if the metaphysical quandaries 
surrounding the existence of a true model are ignored, there are still serious 
reasons to doubt that the model is among the candidates considered.
The advocates of the Bayesian approach have argued that these objections do not 
undermine the heuristic role that the closed view plays in the advancement of 
science. It has been claimed that scientists proceed by adopting the working 
hypothesis that one of the models under consideration is true in order to analyse 
the merits of the models and to conduct further research. This tentative 
assumption transforms the set of models into a closed set, allowing the scientists 
to assign to them probabilities that add up to one (Wasserman, 2000:103). But, the 
claim that the only way to consider the merits of alternative models is to think of 
them as an exhaustive set containing the true model is unfounded. Models can be 
compared in respect of their predictive accuracy, simplicity, broadness, 
computability, and so forth. It is by no means necessary to think that one model is 
true and the other false to contrast the performance of two models.
Another attempt to retain the closed view involves adding to the candidate models 
{M,,...,Mfc} a ‘catchall’ model M c to represent ‘all other models’. This
formally transforms the candidate models into an exhaustive set but raises two 
questions that are difficult to answer. First, it is not clear how to assess the 
probability of the model p (M c). What is the probability that the ‘true’ model is
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not among the candidate models (Winkler, 1994:109)? Second, Bayesian model 
selection requires specifying the probability of the data given the model, i.e., 
P (D /M C). How can the probability of the data conditional on a model or set of
models that is totally unknown be estimated (Anscombe, 1963)? The proposal 
makes no headway in addressing the problems facing the closed view.
A satisfactory account of model selection should take into account the fact that the 
candidate models might exclude the ‘true’ model. A departure from the closed 
view requires reinterpreting the probability of a model, redefining the goal of 
inference, specifying the features a model must have to be conducive to the goal, 
and describing methods for selecting a model with the requisite features. 
Interestingly, the Bayesian literature provides the elements of an alternative 
account of model selection that takes some steps in these directions. The account, 
defended by Geisser (1980), Lane (1986), and Bernardo et al. (1994), has its roots 
in de Finetti’s representation theorem. On this theorem, as said earlier, statistical 
inference is primarily concerned with observables, and parameters enter the model 
just to simplify the relations among the observables, and have no independent 
meaning (Lindley, 1982:77). Since the distribution of the observables under a 
Bayesian model is given by the predictive distribution, the probability assigned to 
a model is best understood as the confidence that one has in the model’s ability to 
yield accurate predictions. This permits comparing the relative probability of any 
set of models, regardless of whether the set is exhaustive or not (Lane, 1986:256). 
From this perspective, the primary objective of inference is to generate an 
accurate predictive distribution (Lane, 1986:254; Poirier, 1988:132), and a highly 
desirable feature of a Bayesian model is its ability to generate accurate 
predictions.
Epistemic considerations aside, constructing accurate models (and hence accurate 
predictive distributions) is costly, time consuming, and subject to computational 
and tractability constraints. A satisfactory account of model selection should also 
take these features of the real-life inference situations into account. Taken 
together, these considerations suggest redefining the issue of Bayesian model 
selection as the problem of selecting a model that is likely to produce the most
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accurate predictions subject to computational, time, cost, and other pragmatic 
constraints facing the analyst.
Transforming these remarks into a formal theory of model selection may require 
introducing a preference function weighting the competing goals of predictive 
accuracy, tractability, and affordability, and treating the whole model selection 
problem within the matrix of the expected utility theory. The call for establishing 
such a theory of model selection is by now old (Anscombe, 1963:89; Lindley, 
1968) and still being insisted on (Draper, 1996:763; Hodges, 1987:262). 
Nevertheless, no serious contender has yet emerged. This partly has to do with the 
fact that pragmatic considerations are terribly difficult to quantify (Poirier, 
1988:137). In the end, a fully formal theory of model selection may be as elusive 
as a ‘true model’ (Pesaran, et al., 1985).
8 Objections Revisited
The theory of diagnostic searches characterised in this chapter is founded on the 
core idea of the Fisherian concept of goodness of fit test, which has been criticised 
by Bayesian and non-Bayesian statisticians. To complete the discussion, we 
review some of the basic criticisms levelled against the use of p-values and data- 
driven model building in general.
The central objection to the use of p-values is that they imply an abrogation of the 
likelihood principle (LP) implied by two basic principles: the conditionality 
principle (CP) and the sufficiency principle (SP). Consider a parameter 6 
standing for the proportion of successes in a sequence of independent Bernoulli 
trials, say, the proportion of non-defective items produced by a machine. Further, 
consider two scenarios for collecting data to estimate 0 . In the first scenario, Ei , 
N  items are collected and the number of non-defectives k is counted, with N  being 
predetermined. In the second scenario, E2, sampling from the machine continues 
.until k non-defective items are obtained, where k > 0 is a pre-determined integer, 
and the sample size happens to be N. The first experiment leads to a binomial 
distribution and the second to a negative binomial.
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Within this context, the CP states that if we decide which of the experiments El 
and E2 to do by the flip of a coin, the finial inference must be the same as if the 
experiment had been chosen without flipping the coin (Cox, 1958). The SP, on the 
other hand, says when there exists a sufficient statistic for 0 , two samples that 
yield the same value for the statistic provide the same evidence for 9 . These 
principles, as shown by Brinbaum (1962), necessitate the LP, which for the 
current purpose, can be stated as:
The Likelihood Principle: Consider two experiments E] = {Y]f0 , f ](y] 19)} and 
E2 = [Y2, 0 , f 2(y2 16)} involving the same parameter 6.  Suppose that for 
particular realizations y, and y2 of the data, Ll(0 ,y l) = cL2(0,y2) for some 
constant c not depending on 6 . Then, Ev[El, y, ] = Ev[E2, y2 ], where Ev[E}, y . ] 
denotes the evidence about 6 arising from experiment Ej and realised data y j .
Informally, the principle “states that two experiments providing evidence about 
the same parameter 9 which give rise to data realisations yielding likelihoods 
which are proportional, must provide the same evidence regarding 9 ” (Poirier, 
1988:125). Since both the CP and SP seem plausible, the LP has become for many 
statisticians the yardstick against which to gauge the acceptability of a statistical 
procedure. Agreement with the LP is argued to be a minimal requirement that no 
statistical procedure can fail to fulfil.
Some simple examples reveal that conventional frequentist-based hypothesis 
testing procedures, based on assessments of p-values, abrogate the LP. A simple 
example, due to Lindley et al. (1976), is concerned with estimating 9 in 
experiments similar to those described above. Suppose in the first experiment 12 
items are collected and 9 non-defective items are found while in the second it has
38 A sufficient statistic for 0  is a function of the data which summarises all available sample
2
information concerning 0.  For example, if  an independent sample Xi,...,XN for N(fi ,  a  )
2 2 distribution is to be taken, it is known that T ( X , S  ) is a sufficient statistic for 0  = (//, <J  ) ,
where X  stands for the sample mean and S 2 = - X ) 2 / N - l  (Berger,1985:35). This
common definition, which underlies the sufficiency principle, assumes that the model is known to 
be ‘true’. Otherwise, a different definition of sufficiency is needed, and the sufficiency principle 
will no longer be valid (Hill, 1986:217).
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taken sampling 12 items to collect 9 non-defectives. The likelihoods for these 
experiments are given respectively by
These likelihoods are proportional to each other, i.e., Ll(0,k) = 4L2(0 ,k ) . 
Therefore, according to the LP, both experiments provide the same information 
about 6 , and must lead to the same inferences about the parameter. However, 
consider testing the null hypothesis:
The p- value p0=0 5 (Y > 9) is 0.075 under Ex and 0.0325 under E2. If the
significance level is set at 0.05, the first experiment suggests accepting the null 
hypothesis but the second suggests rejecting it. Thus, the frequentist-based 
hypothesis testing procedures, which require calculating p-values, violate the LP. 
To see the cause of the conflict, note that even though the observed data are the 
same in Ex and E2, the sample spaces are different. In Ex the sample space is 
given by {0,1,...,//} and in E2 by {m,m + l,...}(m denotes the number of 
defectives). Since in computing p-values the whole sample space is considered, 
not the realised data alone, the difference leads to conflicting inferences (Poirier, 
1988:126).
Based on this example, Lindley et al. (1976) and others have criticized the 
frequentist testing methods, arguing that inferences about statistical hypotheses 
must be conditioned only on the observed data, which requires abandoning p- 
values.39 And when Box (1980) proposed prior predictive p -values for adequacy
39 See Barnett (1999, pp.181-183).
and
L2{0,k) = — [ d \ l - 0 ) 3]=55[09( l - 0 ) 3].
H 0 = 0  = 1/2.
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assessment, Lindley repeated the criticism that it would lead to an abrogation of 
the LP (Lindley, 1980:423). This critique is misplaced. The LP conditions upon 
the choice of a model and is therefore only relevant to the estimation phase of 
inference, where the truth of the model is taken for granted. When the concern is 
to construct a model that fits the data and no decision has yet been made about 
whether the model is true or not, the principle has no regulative force at all (Box, 
1983:74). The conflict between the LP and p -values can be resolved by 
recognising that the former belongs to the estimation phase of inference while the 
latter to the model formulation phase (McCullagh, 1995:178). There is then no 
conflict between the LP and the use of p-values. As a final point, the LP also 
looses its regulative force if one takes the role of parameters to be solely 
instrumental (Lane, 1986:257).
A second objection against the use of p-values is that in large samples they lead to 
rejection of any model by locating minor deficiencies that are otherwise 
unimportant (Pratt, 1965). This is not really a deficiency at all. In practice, all 
models are imperfect, and it is therefore highly desirable to have exploratory 
methods that can reveal deficiencies in currently held models as the sample grows 
(Hodges, 1990:87-88). The deficiencies with a model might be ignored for various 
practical reasons but it is still useful to discover them with an eye to ultimately 
improving it (Gelman et al., 1996: 800).
Thirdly, it has been objected that there is no guidance to decide when a p-value is 
extreme enough to warrant rejecting a model. This criticism fails to appreciate that 
Bayesian p-values are not for testing or rejecting models. They are just to show 
whether a model fits the data and, if not, help searching for a model with a better 
goodness of fit (Dempster, 1983:124). The right question to ask is when a p-value 
is extreme enough to justify the search for an alternative model. There is, 
however, no purely epistemic response to such questions. The decision whether to 
take a discrepancy between a model and the data seriously and search for an 
alternative model is to a large extent driven by pragmatic considerations, which 
are by no means unique to the use of p-values (Anscombe, 1963:89); they are 
needed at every stage of modelling.
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Finally, a serious matter about any exploratory procedure concerns the borderline 
between model searching and data mining. It is always possible to find a model 
with a better goodness of fit by exploring increasingly more complex models but 
such a model may not necessarily perform better over future data. Why should 
then one search for a model that best fits the data? Several things can be done to 
meet this concern. First of all, predictive searches must be carried out within the 
class of models warranted by the existing subject matter information. Secondly, 
having found a model fitting the data, an essential aspect of modelling is to assess 
the sensitivity of the model to the underlying assumptions that are in doubt. In the 
end, the only way to gain serious confidence in a model is to try it over new and 
diverse data. There is never a substitute for new data. Model building is a complex 
problem and there is rarely a simple solution to a complex problem.
9 Conclusion
The last chapter began the study of the bounded rationality paradigm that seeks to 
explain economic phenomena by modelling the economy as a society of intuitive 
statisticians. The paradigm raises the question if there can be a ‘tight enough’ 
theory of model formulation. The chapter showed that constructing an 
interpretable model requires starting with a parametric model, and model 
formulation cannot be left to the data. This led us to consider if there can be a 
‘tight enough’ theory of parametric model formulation. To this end, the present 
chapter studied the theory of Bayesian inference, which, as traditionally 
understood, is a form of parametric inference, and is commonly believed to offer a 
model of learning from experience.
The chapter started by examining some foundational issues to provide a correct 
interpretation of the Bayesian theory. It argued that the theory was concerned 
solely with coherent analysis of uncertainty attitudes towards a closed set of 
specified models. And, it has no implication for dynamics of beliefs except that 
partial beliefs at any moment in time ought to accord with the laws of probability. 
Considering the limitations of the Bayesian theory, the chapter next outlined 
various phases of parametric inference including initial model formulation, model
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fitting (estimation), empirical model assessment, re-specification analysis, and 
model selection. Coherent analysis is relevant only to model fitting and model 
selection. Any attempt at explaining other central aspects of learning necessitates 
broadening the scope of the Bayesian theory.
As a step towards establishing a broader theory of inference within the Bayesian 
framework, the chapter decomposed a Bayesian model into a data model -  which 
consisted of a set of internally consistent hypotheses of independence, 
homogeneity, and distribution -  and a (joint) prior distribution. Using this 
decomposition, it outlined a theory of model formulation which dealt with major 
aspects of learning from data, notably initial model specification, empirical model 
assessment, and model re-specification.
Contrary to a dominant belief, the chapter pointed to three contributions form 
theoretical statistics that furnished the essential elements of a theory of initial 
model formulation. The first contribution was a large collection of independence 
and homogeneity hypotheses, as well as a large list of probability distribution 
families, which could be used as building blocks for constructing countless 
models. The existence of the model reservoir made it possible to define initial data 
model specification as the problem of selecting a set of internally consistent basic 
hypotheses from the three categories of known independence, homogeneity, and 
distributional assumptions to form a model, which can account for the data. The 
second contribution was the class of characterisation theorems while the third was 
a rich literature on ex ante consequences of alternative models. These 
contributions led to two general exploratory methods for initial selection of the 
assumptions entering a model.
Initial model specification involves a variety of subjective decisions at several 
levels, which necessitate assessing the empirical adequacy of the model before 
using it. To provide a framework for adequacy assessment, the chapter introduced 
the notion of ex post consequences of a Bayesian model, consisting of the 
predictive distributions the model implies for various functions of the data. The 
empirical adequacy of a Bayesian model was defined in terms of consistency of 
the predictive distributions with the actual values of the statistics. These ideas,
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joined with the Fisherian idea of goodness of fit testing, led to a powerful 
exploratory method for searching the space of candidate models warranted by pre­
estimation considerations. The method involved beginning with a candidate 
model, assessing its adequacy, and monitoring the effect of varying one 
assumption at a time until an empirically adequate model is found.
These concepts and methods provided the necessary elements for an exploratory 
theory of model construction, according to which the process of model 
specification starts with examining the ex ante consequences of known basic 
hypotheses to construct an initial model or a set of initial models capable of 
accounting for the data. The process next involved assessing the ex post 
consequences of the candidate models, which survived initial analysis, to locate a 
model or models that accurately accounted for the data.
It was also pointed out that there was a pragmatic side to statistical inference. 
Model construction is costly, time consuming, constrained by computational 
capabilities, and influenced by the purported use of the model. If the goal is to 
explain how a statistician approaches a data set and constructs a model, the entire 
modelling process ought to be thought of as a constrained optimisation problem. 
This account of the model formulation process has significant implications for 
establishing a theory of statistical learning and thus the bounded rationality 
project, some of which are stated below:
First, in the above theory of model formulation, background information enters 
inference in many forms: most notably, in the form of a reservoir of models 
(Arthur, 2000), knowledge of the conditions under which the models are 
appropriate, and knowledge of the ex ante implications of the models. An 
extremely significant point is that a theory of parametric learning takes such 
information as given, which means there can be no general theory of parametric 
inference that can also explain where the models or, more precisely, basic 
probabilistic hypotheses come from in the first place. Only after a reservoir of 
models is given, it is possible to speak of a theory of parametric learning. The 
necessity of a model reservoir, whose generation cannot be explained by a theory 
of parametric learning, might have been the principal reason for Fisher and other
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statisticians’ negative feeling concerning the possibility of a theory of model 
specification (Lehmann, 1990:161). The search for a theory of statistical learning, 
therefore, encounters a dilemma. If a nonparametric approach to learning is 
pursued, it would be impossible to build an interpretable model of several 
variables with ordinarily available samples. If, on the other hand, a parametric 
approach is taken, the question arises as to where the models come from in the 
first place.
Second, the scope of a theory of parametric learning is defined by the scope of the 
model reservoir. So far, only a few multivariate distribution families have 
emerged, and, because of this scarcity, any set of models considered in practice is 
likely to exclude the ‘true’ model or a good approximation thereof. It thus seems 
fair to question the relevance of the convergence results established in the learning 
literature; all these results are based on the presumption that the true model is 
among the candidate models.40 The relevance of the convergence results becomes 
even more suspect when we realise the necessity of subjective and pragmatic 
considerations in modelling data.
Third, since pragmatic considerations influence decisions about the adequacy of a 
model, the hypothesis that the agent behaves like a Bayesian statistician, even if 
true, would not be adequate for predicting his model. To predict the agent’s 
model, it is also necessary to know his goals, preferences, and constraints. This 
makes it even more difficult to establish a precise and informative theory of how 
he actually models the economy.
All in all, the claim that by modelling people as intuitive Bayesian statisticians we 
can predict the probabilistic models that they construct of the economy should be 
treated with scepticism. The most that can be predicted on the basis of this 
hypothesis, the history of the observables, and the expected utility maximisation 
principle, is that he takes an action that is optimal with respect to his utility 
function and view of the environment. The serious issue with the IS hypothesis is
40 When what is at issue is the structural specification of how known and unknown quantities are 
related one cannot count on “the data to swamp the priors” (Draper, 1995).
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not that people are not perfect statisticians but that, even if they were, the 
hypothesis would still fall short of producing informative predictions. More will 
be said on this in the next chapter.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Lindley’s Paradox
Lindley’s paradox shows a disagreement between sampling theory and Bayesian 
methods, first noted by Jeffreys (1939). The paradox illustrates that a “sharp null 
hypothesis may be strongly rejected by a standard sampling [...] theory test of 
significance and yet be awarded a high odds by a Bayesian analysis based on a 
small prior probability for the null hypothesis and a diffuse distribution of one’s 
remaining probability over the alternatives” (Shafer, 1998:2257). As an 
illustration, following Bernardo and Smith (1994:394), suppose for data 
D = {xl ,...,xn} the set of candidate models are Af, and Af2, corresponding to the
simple and composite hypotheses about 6 in N(xt 10, (j>) defined by 
Af,: p l (D) = f \ N ( x t 160,<p), dQ ,<j> known;41
i=l
M 2: p 2(D) = I 0,0)N(0  I (p,rj)dd, 0 , <p,Tj known.
i=l
Since x  = x,. under both models is a sufficient statistic, the Bayes factor
in favor of A/, against M 2 is given by
B N (x \0 o,n0)
12 \N (x \O yn<l>)N(d\<p,Ti)de
_ ( T] + n<f> Y/2 exp{2_1(7_1 + (/i^)-1)-1( x - ^ ) 2}
 ^ 1 J exp{2 ~ 'n ^ (x -0 o)2}
For any fixed sample D, Bl2 —><*> as the prior precision 7j in M 2 approaches 
zero. This in turn pushes the posterior probability p(M , I D) towards unity, 
regardless of the data. In many cases, however, the null hypothesis is rejected by 
the sampling significance tests (See Lee 1997:128 for an example).
The general, and in fact more important, lesson learnt from the paradox is that, in 
any Bayesian model comparison, the Bayes factor can depend on the prior 
distributions specified for the parameters of each model (Bernardo et al. 
1994:394), and the effect of the priors on the Bayes factor remains even when the 
sample size grows (Kass et al. 1993:555).
41 Here, (j) is taken to be precision, defined as 1 / <T2.
256
Appendix B: Bayesian Normal/Chi-squared Model42
Consider the case where we have a set of observations D = thought to
come from distribution N(6,0 ) , with 6 and 0 both unknown. So,
p ( x /0 , f )  = (27npy'n  exp { -( x ~ 6/ ).
2 ( f )
The likelihood function is given by
where S = - x ) 2 .
The conjugate prior distribution of <f> is (a multiple of) an inverse chi-squared on 
v0 degrees of freedom. (The term ‘degree of freedom’ is just a name for a 
parameter). That is,
The conjugate prior distribution of 6 conditional on (f) is normal with mean 0O 
and variance 0 /n Q. Then
The joint prior distribution is thus a normal /chi-squared distribution with density 
function
2(f)
.] = /jrnn exp[- {S + rt(x - # ) 2}.
y>
exp(-S0120).
p (0 /0 )  = (2jtfil nD)~'/2 exp
2(<f>/n0)
p ( 6 , 0 )  =  p ( 0 ) p ( d  1 0 )  o c ( f , r (v0+ l ) /2 - l exp [ - - { S o +no( 0 - 0 o)2}/0}
^ - ( v 0+ l ) /2 - l exp{-i{20(^)/^},
where Q0 (0) = no0 2-  2(no0o )0 + (no0 2 + S0).
42 Based on Lee, 1997:65-71
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The posterior is 
p{e ,t lD )cc  p(0tt )U 0 tf l D )
oc ^-<vo+,,+1>/2-i xeXp[~ ^{(50 + S) + wo(0 —#0)2 +n{d — x )2)t  0]
= (p-"’"'11-' xcM - \ { Q > ( 8 ) I </>).
where v, =vQ+n
and <2,(0) = (S0 + S) + nQ( 0 - 0 o)2 + n ( 0 - x ) 2 
= (n0 + ri)02 - 2 (no0o + rix)0 + (no0o2 + nx2 +S0 +S)
= Sx + (0 — )2
= nx0 2 — 2(nx0x)0 + (nx0x +SX) ,
where
nx = n0 + n ;
0, = (no0o + /ijc) / n ,; and
5, = S0 + S + no0Q + nx2 - nx0 2 
= S0 + 5 + (n0-, + n - ' r 1 (0O- * ) 2-
The posterior for (j) is
0  ~ 5 i^v“2
and that for 0 given <f> is 
0 ! <f) ~ N(0x,(j>!ri).
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Chapter 5
Homo Economicus as an Intuitive Statistician (3)
Data Driven Causal Inference
1 Introduction
I w ould rather discover a single causal relationship than be king o f  Persia
D em ocritus'
The last two chapters studied some aspects of the bounded rationality program that 
views the economy as a society of intuitive statisticians -  the intuitive statistician 
hypothesis. This hypothesis raises the question whether there is a ‘tight enough’ 
theory of statistical inference. To establish a general framework for addressing this 
issue, this thesis tentatively conjectured that the agent first seeks to learn the 
probability distribution of the variables representing his choice situation, and next 
uses the probabilistic information to learn about the causal structure of the situation. 
The last two chapters studied some of the issues surrounding learning the probability 
distribution of a set of variables. This chapter studies the second stage of learning that 
is concerned with inferring the causal structure of a set of variables from their joint 
distribution.
The first chapter studied the regression method of causal inference. According to this 
method, to infer whether X  causes Y, one has to include in the regression equation of 
Y on X  various combinations of potential confounders of X  and Y. If the coefficient of 
X  differs from zero regardless of what potential confounders are in the equation, X is 
said to cause Y (Cox, 1992). The method fails on several grounds. First, it cannot 
establish whether an association between X  and Y is because of a direct causal link or 
latent common causes. Second, conditioning on potential confounders can turn an 
otherwise consistent estimate of the effect of X  on Y into an inconsistent estimate. 
Also, controlling for the effects of the response variable Y can lead to wrong causal 
conclusions (Cox, 1958:48, Pearl, 2000:76). It has been argued that these problems 
can be overcome only by relying on subject matter information about the underlying 
system.
1 Quoted from Whittaker, 1990.
260
An approach pioneered by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (SGS, hereafter) and Judea 
Pearl and his co-researchers is claimed to evade the difficulties facing the traditional 
methods to causal inference. These authors have argued that the reason for the failure 
of the traditional methods lies in two things: the lack of'an efficient language for 
representing causal structures and the absence of a precise characterisation of the 
connection between probability and causation. Once an adequate language for 
representing causal structures is developed and the principles connecting causation 
and probability are defined, reliable causal conclusions can be derived from data 
alone. The claim for the necessity of theoretical knowledge in casual inference is 
exaggerated:
In the social sciences there is a great deal of talk about the importance of 
‘theory’ in constructing causal explanations ... In many of these cases the 
necessity of theory is badly exaggerated (Spirtes et al. 1993:133)
In the absence of very strong prior causal knowledge, multiple regression 
should not be used to select the variables that influence an outcome or 
criterion variable in data from uncontrolled studies. So far as we can tell, the 
popular automatic regression search procedures [like stepwise regression] 
should not be used at all in contexts where causal inferences are at stake. Such 
contexts require improved versions of algorithms like those described here to 
select those variables whose influence on an outcome can be reliably 
estimated by regression (Spirtes et al. 1993: 257).2
The approach proposed by these authors, which is termed the Graph Theoretical (GT) 
or Bayes net approach, has been the source of many advances. In particular, it has led 
to the development of an efficient language for representing causal structures, a 
precise formulation of the principles underpinning the traditional methods of causal 
inference, and to a variety of new algorithms for causal inference. It has also 
advanced our understanding of the important issue of statistical indistinguishability of 
causal models. This chapter uses this approach to study the boundaries of data-driven 
causal inference. By data-driven causal inference, we mean any effort to draw causal
2 Similar remarks are found in Pearl and Verma (1991).
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conclusions from probabilistic data using only general subject-matter-independent 
principles supposedly linking causation and probability. A claim for a data-driven 
approach to causal inference, therefore, raises two fundamental issues. The first is 
whether there are any universal principles correctly linking probabilistic and causal 
dependencies. And, the other is whether the principles are sufficient for inferring the 
causal structure of a set of variables from their joint probability distribution.
This chapter investigates both topics by focusing on the principles underlying the GT 
approach, which are the most general principles that can possibly be true of the 
connection between probability and causation. After a brief description of the GT 
approach, the chapter takes up the issue of model equivalence. It argues that for every 
causal model consistent with the data, there are simple rules that allow generating a 
class of statistically equivalent causal models that have very little or nothing in 
common. As a consequence, even if the validity of the GT principles is not 
challenged, one can learn very little from data alone. The chapter next investigates the 
general validity of the principles. It argues that none of the arguments put forward for 
the principles justifies their universal validity. In addition, it shows how the 
possibility of selection bias undermines the claim that the GT approach outperforms 
other causal inference methods by being able to establish whether a correlation is 
definitely due to latent common causes. Moreover, it shows why, because of the 
possibility of mistaking the concomitant of a cause for the cause, the GT approach 
cannot establish the existence or absence of a causal link either. In the end, by 
reflecting* on the limitations of the GT approach, the chapter sketches out an 
alternative account of causal inference from observational data, explains the role that 
the GT techniques play in the account, and spells out some implications of the 
analysis for the bounded rationality project.
The plan of the chapter is as follows: Section 2 defines some formal notions and 
introduces the axioms put forward by the GT approach for connecting causal and 
probabilistic dependencies. Section 3 explains the process of causal inference in the 
GT approach. Section 4 concentrates on the notion of statistical indistinguishability of
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causal models. Section 5 examines possible justifications for the axioms, and studies 
issues arising from aggregation, selection bias and concomitants. Section 6 concludes 
the chapter.
2 Preliminaries and Principles
The GT approach is built on formal notions that are new to the traditional literature 
on causal inference. This section begins by describing the notion of causation used 
here, and defines the concepts of ‘causal structure’ and ‘causal model’. It next 
describes the method of path analysis which will be used to introduce some key graph 
theoretic notions. The section then characterises the class of candidate causal models 
in the GT approach, the data used for causal inference, and the principles used to link 
the data with a causal model.
2.1 Causal Structure
Causation is perhaps the most philosophically controversial topic, and this makes it 
impossible to offer an account of rival views in a handful of pages. For brevity, we 
only explicate the view of causation adopted here. Our view of causation has affinity 
with the manipulative account of causation, defended in the writings of philosophers 
such as Collingwood ([1940], 1948), Gasking (1955), and von Wright (1971). 
According to this account, a causal relationship primarily obtains between single 
events. An event x causes an event y if it was in principle possible to alter y by 
wiggling sjc. Or in Collingwood’s terms, “that which is ‘caused’ is an event in nature, 
and its ‘cause’ is an event or state of things by producing or preventing which we can 
produce or prevent that whose cause it is said to be ([1940], 1948:285).” If it were not 
even hypothetically possible to alter y by wiggling x, x would not be a cause of y. 
This intuition, central to the manipulative account, is basic to analysis of actions in 
decision theory and evaluation of policies in economics.
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The causal relation ‘event x causes event y’ is transitive, irreflexive, and 
antisymmetric. Particular events can be classified into types of events and types of 
events can be coupled with their complementary type events to form variables. 
Consider the rise in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average last Monday. We may classify 
this event into event type of ‘rises in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average’; call it D. 
And, we may further put together this type event with its complementary type event 
‘declines in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average’ to define the random variable ‘the 
Dow-Jones Industrial Average’; call it X = (D,DC) , 3  Similarly, we may join together 
the type events ‘rises in the FTSE 100’ and ‘declines in the FTSE 100’ to define the 
random variable ‘the FTSE 100; call it Y = (C,CC). We say that variable X causes 
variable Y if and only if at least one member of types (D ,DC) causes at least one 
member of types (C,CC) (Sobel, 1995:8). Having said this, we hereafter suppress the 
talk of particular events to the background.
Let V = {Xj,..., X n} be the set of variables necessary for describing a choice situation 
or a certain aspect of the economy. A proper subset of V, X, is said to be a full cause 
of X m (X m £ X) with respect to V  if (i) there is a set of values x  for X  and a value xm
for X m such that were it possible to set X  at value x, X m would take on value xm 
regardless of the value of other variables in V and (ii), no proper subset of X  satisfies 
condition (i). In line with Spirtes et al. (1993:44), variable X t is said to be a direct 
cause of X„ relative to V if X, is a member of a full cause X of X m in V. By them i  m  j
same token, Xf is said to be an indirect cause of Xm relative to V  if there is an 
ordered sequence of variables in V starting with Xf and ending at X m such that each 
variable in the sequence is a direct cause of the next variable in the sequence, 
provided that m is greater than two. Also, X,. is said to be a common cause of Xm
and X„ in V if X,. is a direct or indirect cause of both X m and X„.n i m  ti
3 We may intuitively think of event x  as a value of (random) variable X.
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Following Spirtes et al. (1993:45), we define a causal structure over variables V  as an 
ordered pair (V ,E ), where E  is a set of ordered pairs of V  such that (X,Y)  is in E  if 
and only if X is a direct cause of Y with respect to V. The variables in V, which have 
no direct cause in V, are called exogenous, and the rest are called endogenous. A 
structure (V,E) is deterministic if the value of each endogenous variable in V  is 
uniquely determined by its direct causes in V. A structure that is not deterministic but 
forms part of a deterministic structure is called pseudo-deterministic. Each variable 
X t in a pseudo-deterministic structure (V,E) is a deterministic function of its direct
causes in V and a disturbance term e ., which represents the net effects of variables 
outside V on X r  A  particular causal structure, called a causally sufficient structure, 
plays a special role in the GT literature:
Causal Sufficiency: A set of variables V is called causally sufficient for a 
population if and only if in the population every common cause of any of two 
or more variables in V is in V, or has the same value for all units in the 
population (Spirtes et al. 1993:45).
An (extra) assumption in the GT literature is that the disturbance terms associated 
with the variables in a causally sufficient structure are independently distributed. For 
the time being, when we refer to a causally sufficient structure, we also assume the 
independence of the errors. Finally, in a pseudo-deterministic structure, as soon as the 
functions linking the endogenous variables to the exogenous variables are defined, 
specification of a joint probability distribution for the disturbance terms generates a 
unique probability distribution for V. With this remark, a causal model can be defined 
as:
Causal Model: Let S be a causal structure defined over variables V, F a 
distribution family over V, and 0  a parameter space compatible with S. The 
triple M =(S,F,&)  is said to be a causal model. Each particular 
parameterisation of M  forms a causal hypothesis.
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2.2 Path Models
The causal structure is unknown but the presumption is that if enough data become 
available, the joint probability distribution of the variables under study can be 
estimated. The issue of data-driven causal inference involves using the estimate to 
learn about the structure. To explain how this problem is solved by the GT approach, 
it is useful to begin with a description of the more familiar field of path analysis, 
which also addresses a similar inference issue. In a nutshell, path analysis starts with 
a conjecture about the causal structure of the variables under study, translates the 
structure into a system of equations, introduces certain causal principles to derive the 
implications of the model, and tests them against the data.4 As an illustration, 
consider variables V = {X,,..., X 5}. Model I describes a possible structure that can be 
true of these variables:
X 2 = a X ] +e2
X 3 = 0 X {+e3 Model I
X 4 = jX 2 + <j>X 3 +
X 5 = (pX4 + £s
where the term £. in each equation represents the effect of unrecorded variables on 
X t . According to this model, X x is a direct cause of X 2 and X 3 but an indirect 
cause of X 4 and X 5. X 2 and X 3 are direct causes of X 4, and X 4 is a direct cause 
of X 5. Since there is no reciprocal causal influence among the variables, the model is 
called a recursive model.
4 Path analysis was developed by Sewell Wright (1934) and advanced by others including Simon 
(1954) and Blalock (1972). Blalock (1964) gives an introduction to the field. Irzik (1987) contains a 
philosophically oriented discussion of path analysis.
266
To estimate the model, path analysis assumes that (i) the disturbance term et in each
equation is uncorrelated with the exogenous variables in the equation; (ii) the 
disturbance (error) terms across the equations are uncorrelated; (iii) the errors are 
normally distributed with mean zero; and (iv) the endogenous variable in each 
equation linearly depends on the exogenous variables in the equation. A recursive 
model satisfying these conditions is called a path model. In addition, path analysis 
assumes that (v) the existence of a direct causal connection between two variables 
appears as a non-zero coefficient and (vi) that the absence of a direct causal 
connection always appears as a zero coefficient (Goldberger, 1971:35). These 
assumptions lead to two principles that allow deriving the implications of a path 
model for the data (see Appendix A for a proof):
(i) The Screening off Principle: If in a path model X  cause Z only through 
the mediate of a set of variables Y, then X  and Z are statistically 
independent conditional on Y. In short, direct causes screen off their 
remote causes. Given the linearity assumption, this means that the partial 
correlation p xz Y is zero.
(ii) The Common Cause Principle: If in a path model Z is a common cause 
of X  and Y and neither X is a cause of Y nor Y is a cause of X, then
P x y .z  =  0 •
Assuming that Model I satisfies the conditions listed above, the model entails the 
following zero partial correlations:
Px2x2.xx = 0j  Px<xl.x1xi Px5x2.x4 = 0» Px5xyx4 = 0> Pxsx].xA = 0
The practice in path analysis is to derive these zero partial correlations and test them 
against the data. If the vanishing partials are approximately zero in the data, the data 
is said to confirm the model and if they are significantly different from zero, the 
model is considered as incompatible with the data. Path analysis solves the causal 
inference problem by finding a model whose vanishing partials are all consistent with 
the data. A limitation of this approach is that conflicting causal models can imply the
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same vanishing partials, which makes it is impossible to infer the true model by 
testing its zero restrictions. Path analysis can at best eliminate the models whose zero 
restrictions are not found in the data. But it cannot establish the model that has 
actually generated the data.
2.3 Graphical Representation
The GT approach builds on the tradition of path analysis and seeks to confront its 
limitation squarely. To this end, it replaces the language of equations with the 
language of graphs to represent causal structures. A graph consists of two parts - a set 
of variables (vertices or nodes) V and a set of edges (or links) E. Each edge in E  is 
between two distinct variables in V. There are two kinds of edges in E, directed edges 
X —> Y and bi-directed edges X Y . In either case, X and Y are called the endpoints 
of the edge and when there is an edge between X  and 7, X  and Y are said to be 
adjacent. If there is an edge between X  and Y and towards Y, X  is called a parent of Y 
and Y a child of X. A directed edge between X and Y (i.e., X —» Y ) in graph G stands 
for the claim that X is a direct cause of Y relative to G. Absence of an edge conveys 
the claim that neither X causes Y nor Y causes X. The error terms are not usually 
represented in a graph. Thus, the structure implied by Model I can be expressed as the 
following graph:
Graph 2.1
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This graphs depicts a directed acyclic graph (DAG). It is directed because the arrows 
lead from one variable into another and acyclic because one cannot return to any of 
the variables by following the arrows leading away from it. A sequence of 
consecutive edges in a directed graph G is called a path. A directed path P from X  to 
Y is a sequence of vertices starting with X  and ending with Y such that for every pair 
of variables A and B that are adjacent in the sequence in that order, the edge A —» B 
occurs in G, and no vertex occurs more than once in P. Likewise, an undirected path 
U from X  to Y is a sequence of variables starting with X  and ending with Y such that 
for every pair of variables A and B that are adjacent in the sequence, A and B are 
adjacent in G, and no vertex occurs more than once in U. Y is a collider on an 
undirected path U if and only if there exist edges X  -» Y and Z —>Y in U. And Y is 
an unshielded collider on U if and only if there exist edges X  —» Y and Z —> Y in U 
and, in addition, Z and X  are not adjacent in G. When there is a directed acyclic path 
from X  to Y or X = Y , then X  is said to be an ancestor of Y, and Y a descendant of X.
A  DAG is another way of representing a recursive causally sufficient structure. If the 
possibility of feedback is ruled out, the class of DAGs that can be built from a set of 
variables V constitutes the class of all causal models that can be true of V. For now, 
we restrict our analysis to recursive causal structures, and denote the class of DAGs 
that can be built from V by D .
2.4 Conditional Independence Data
The GT approach takes the independencies true in the joint distribution of variables 
V, i.e., P(V ), as the evidence for making inference about the causal structure true of 
V. Let X  and Y be two variables in V. X  and Y are said to be independent if the joint 
probability density P(x,y) is the product of the marginal density P(x) and the 
marginal density P(y) , for all values x and y such that P(y) is greater than zero. 
Following Dawid (1979), the independence of X  and Y is shown by XA.Y. That is,
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X±Y if and only if P(xly)  = P(x) whenever P(y) > 0.
Similarly, X  and Y are said to be independent conditional on Z if P(x/  y,z) equals 
the product of P(x! z) and P(y/  z), for all values x, y, and z such that P(y,z) is 
greater than zero. That is,
XA.Y/Z if and only if P(xly,  z) = P(xl z) whenever P(y, z) > 0.
These definitions are generalized to disjoint sets of variables.5 The conditional 
independence relation possesses several basic properties that allow deriving new 
independencies from an existing set of independencies. Some of these properties, 
studied by Dawid (1979), are listed in Appendix B. In what follows, the set of 
independencies true in the joint distribution P(V) over variables V  is denoted by 
Ind. p.
2.5 Assumptions Relating Probability to Causal Relations
The GT approach introduces two principles to link independence data to a causal 
structure (DAG). The first principle is the causal Markov Condition, which 
generalizes the principles underlying path analysis. Informally, the condition says 
that, in a recursive causal structure, every variable, conditional on its direct causes, is 
independent of all other variables in the structure except its effects. Formally, it says:
Markov Condition: A DAG G over a set of variables V and a probability distribution 
P(V) satisfy the Markov condition if and only if for every X  in V  and every set Z of 
variables in V  such that no member of Z is a descendent nor a parent of X, X  and Z 
are independent conditional on the parents of X  (SGS, 1993:35).6
5 See Pearl (1988:82-83).
6 Glymour (1997a:203-6) explains how traditional approaches to causal inference rely on variants of 
the Markov Condition. Hans Reichenbach (1956) was the first philosopher to discuss the Markov 
properties of causal systems, but variants of the principle have been discussed by Cartwright (1989), 
Salmon (1984), Skyrms (1980) and Suppes (1970).
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The Markov condition characterises how a DAG represents independence relations. It 
says a variable X  in DAG G, conditional on the state of its parents, is independent of 
all its non-descendants in G. Applying the condition to graph 2.1 yields the following 
independencies:
X 2l X 3/ X lt
x 4i x , / ( x 2, x 3) ,
x 5MXltx 2, x 3) / x 4.
These independencies entail additional independencies that are not immediately 
obtained by applying the Markov condition to graph 2.1. An example is 
X 5 _L X 3 / {X2, X 4} ? Pearl et al. (1988) have introduced a graph theoretic criterion,
called d-separation, which allows reading from a DAG the entire list of 
independencies entailed by applying the Markov condition to the DAG. The criterion 
reads as follows:
Definition: Let X  and Y be two variables among the vertices in graph G, and Z a 
subset of the vertices in G. A path p is said to be ^-separated (or blocked) by Z if and 
only if (i) it contains a chain X —> W —» Y or a fork X  <— W —> Y such that the 
middle variable W is in Z, or (ii) it contains an unshielded collider X  —» W <— Y such 
that neither the middle variable W nor any of its descendants in G are in Z. Z is then 
said to ^-separate X  from Y if and only if Z blocks every path from X to Y. (Pearl, 
1998:238).
Geiger et al. (1990) have shown that there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
the independence relations entailed by applying the Markov condition to a DAG G 
and the triples (X,Z,Y)  that satisfy the ^-separation criterion in G. In graph 2.1, X 2 
and X 3 are ^-separated by X ,. However, X 2 and X 3 are not ^-separated by X 4, 
since X 4 is an unshielded collider on the path X 2 —> X 4 <— X 3. Nor are X 2 and X 3
7 This follows by first applying the weak union and then decomposition properties of independence 
relations to X 5 _L (X j, X 2, X 3) / X 4 . See Appendix B.
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d-separated by {X15X5}, since X5 is a descendant of X 4, which is an unshielded 
collider. Applying the ^-separation criterion to every DAG G in Q yields all the 
independencies implied by G. We use IndG to denote the set of independencies
implied by DAG G over V to distinguish it from Indp that denotes the 
independencies true in P(V ).
Using the d-separation criterion, appendix C shows that the Markov condition applied 
to a DAG over variables V = {XM...,Xn} implies the following variant of the
common cause principle: If X, and X j are correlated, and neither X, is a cause of
Xj nor X j is a cause of Xf, there are common causes of X; and Xy. in V
conditional on which X, and Xj are independent. The Markov condition therefore
implies that every correlation among a recursive causally sufficient set of variables 
with independent errors has a causal explanation. The GT theorists generalises this 
implication to every correlation in the world by making a metaphysical assumption 
that can be called the completeness hypothesis:
The Completeness Hypothesis: For every set of recorded variable O, either the set 
forms a causally sufficient set with uncorrelated errors or it can be embedded in a 
larger set of variables V that is causally sufficient with uncorrelated errors (Scheines, 
1997:197; SGS, 1993:51)
Joined with this hypothesis, the Markov condition entails that every probabilistic 
dependency in the world reflects either a direct causal connection or the presence of 
latent common causes.8
8 To deal with feedback systems, the GT theorists have recently introduced the so-called Global 
Markov Condition, which reads as follows: for a directed (cyclic or acyclic) graph G over vertices V  
and a probability distribution P  over V, the distribution satisfies the global Markov condition if and 
only if for any three disjoint sets of X,  Y, and Z in V  if X  is d-separated from Y  given Z in G, then, X  is 
independent of Y  given Z in P (Koster, 1999). Joined with the completeness hypothesis, this implies 
that every correlation has a causal explanation.
272
The second principle in the GT approach about the connection between probability 
and causation is the so-called Faithfulness condition. The condition says that every 
conditional and unconditional independency true in the joint distribution of a set of 
observables represents absence of direct causal connection. Stated in graph-theoretic 
terms it says:
Faithfulness condition: Let G be a causal graph over variables V and P(V) a 
probability distribution generated by G. (G, P) satisfies the Faithfulness Condition if 
and only if every conditional independence relatioh true in P(V) is entailed by the 
Causal Markov Condition applied to G (SGS, 1993:56).
Faithfulness excludes all the independencies that are not implied by the topology of a 
DAG. For a possible case of such independencies, consider the graph below, which 
describes a conjecture about the relations among minimum wage, the economy, and 
individual income.
M inimum
W age
Individual
IncomeEconomy
c
Figure 2.2
Suppose the effect of minimum wage through the economy on individual income 
were such that it exactly cancelled out its direct effect on individual income, i.e., 
a = -(be) . In that case, the structure would generate an independency that does not 
follow from applying the Markov condition to it. If the world contained such 
structures, it would be wrong to infer absence of causation from independence data. 
In the current case, one would wrongly conclude that minimum wage does not affect
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income, even though it does. Faithfulness excludes such structures from the world. It 
implies that all independencies are structural independencies, following from the 
topology of the true graph. Appendix D shows how Faithfulness underlies other 
methods of causal inference.
3 Causal Inference
Causal inference in the GT approach proceeds by (i) estimating the joint probability 
distribution of the variables V, (ii) deriving the independencies true in P( \ ) , and (iii) 
constructing a graph (or graphs) that, given the Markov condition and Faithfulness, is 
(are) consistent with the independencies. The concern, here, is with the final stage, 
which has to do with the move from the independencies true in P(V) to a graph that 
could have generated the distribution. This section describes this stage of inference in 
some detail so as to prepare the ground for a critical appraisal of the GT approach in 
Section V.
3.1 Inference with Causal Sufficiency
We begin our exposition by assuming that the variables under study are causally 
sufficient, and then describe graph-theoretic causal inference in general. To be 
specific, we work with variables V = {X1V..,X5}, assuming that V  is causally 
sufficient. And, we hypothesise that
Indp ={ X2 ± X 3/ X },
X4_LX1/(X2,X 3),
X5 ± (X ,,X 2,X 3) /X 4}.
Causal sufficiency implies that the set of DAGs, Cl, that can possibly be true of 
variables V  is finite. Thus, the solution to the causal inference problem involves
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finding a DAG G from ft that is consistent with the independencies in Indp . To 
explain how such a DAG can be found, note that, given the Markov condition, if a 
DAG G generated the data, G would not imply any independency that is not in Indp. 
As a result, for any DAG G in f t , if IndG contains an independency that is not in 
Indp, the DAG does not satisfy the Markov condition. The Markov condition 
therefore excludes all those DAGs in ft that entail at least one independency that is 
not in Indp . On the other hand, according to the Faithfulness condition, the 
distribution P(V) is faithful to a DAG G in ft if every independency in 1ndp 
follows from the ^-separation criterion applied to G. This means that if a DAG G in 
ft fails to imply all the independencies in IndP, the DAG is not faithful to P(V). 
Faithfulness, therefore, excludes all those DAGs in ft that fail to imply all the 
independencies in Indp . These conditions altogether imply that a DAG G in ft with 
independencies IndG is consistent with the independencies in Indp if and only if 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the independencies in Indp and those 
in IndG. The inference problem can then be solved by deriving the set of 
independencies IndG implied by each DAG G in ft and investigating whether they 
have a one-to-one correspondence with the independencies in Indp.
When causal sufficiency is assumed, the above description gives all that there is in 
the GT approach to causal inference. Yet, the above implications of the Markov 
condition and Faithfulness lead to a basic theorem that simplifies the procedure for 
constructing a DAG consistent with the independencies in Indp. The theorem, 
proved by Verma and Pearl (1990), says:
Theorem: Distribution P(V) satisfies the Markov and Faithfulness conditions for 
DAG G if and only if (i) any two vertices X  and Y are adjacent in G if and only if they 
are statistically dependent conditional on every subset of vertices in G not containing 
them, (ii) X —>Y <— Z  is an unshielded collider in G, then X, Z  are not independent 
conditional on Y.
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The procedure begins with a complete skeleton', that is, a graph in which every 
variable is connected by an undirected edge to every other variable. It tests every pair 
of variables X and Y, and removes the edge between the variables if XA.Y is in Indp. 
Next, for every pair of variables X  and Y, it tests whether there is a subset Z of 
variables that does not contain X  and Y but renders X  and Y independent. If so, the 
edge between X  and Y is removed. The process creates an undirected graph from 
which some of the edges are removed. In our example, the process results in the 
graph in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1
In the second phase, the procedure considers every triple of vertices X, Y, and Z in V. 
If there is an edge between X  and Y, and an edge between Z and Y, but no edge 
between X  and Z, and X  and Z are not independent given Y, the edges are directed 
towards Y. In Figure 3.1, there is an edge between X 2 and X 4, an edge between X 3
and X 4, but no edge between X 2 and X 3. The edges are thus directed towards X 4.
Otherwise, the resulting DAG will not entail X4-LXj/(X 2,X 3) , which violates
Faithfulness. Similarly, the edge between X 4 and X 5 is directed towards X 5 to
avoid violating Faithfulness. The edges between X, and X 2, and X, and X3 cannot
both be directed towards X x, since such an orientation makes X2 and X3 dependent
conditional on X ,, which contradicts Faithfulness. The independencies Indp impose
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no further restrictions on the edges. The graph in Figure 2.1 is consistent with the 
independencies in Indp.
3.2 Inference without Causal Sufficiency
Causal sufficiency is hardly true, and even if true, it would not be known in advance. 
To claim any success, a data-driven method of causal inference should deal with the 
causal inference problem regardless of whether the recorded variables are causally 
sufficient or not. Without causal sufficiency, a correlation between measured 
variables X  and Y no longer implies that either X  causes Y or Y causes X. The 
correlation might be due to latent common causes. Thus, the general question will be 
to determine when and how by analysis of a set of measured variables containing X 
and Y it is possible to conclude that X  causes Y, or X  does not cause Y, or the 
correlation between X  and Y is due to latent common causes.
In the GT approach, the burden of generalising the solution to the inference problem 
under causal sufficiency to cases where the truth of the condition is not known is on 
the completeness hypothesis (Scheines, 1997:197). According to the hypothesis, for 
every set of measured variables O, which is not causally sufficient, there is in reality 
a DAG G(0,L) with independent errors that is responsible for the dependencies 
among the observed variables 0 , with L = V\0 standing for the latent common causes 
of O. Thus, the joint probability distribution of the recorded variables P(O) is
regarded as the marginal of an un-estimated distribution P*(V) that satisfies both the 
Markov condition and Faithfulness. From this perspective, the general problem of 
causal inference involves learning about the true DAG G(0,L) from the marginal 
distribution P(O).
With causal sufficiency, the object of inference is a DAG in which every adjacency 
between X  and Y is represented by an arrow, meaning that either X  causes Y or Y 
causes X. As causal sufficiency is withdrawn, one needs a different graphical object
277
to state that an adjacency is due to latent common causes. The literature provides 
several objects suitable for representing latent common causes. We use the so-called 
hybrid graph, which is a graph that, in addition to one-directional edges —>, contains 
bi-directional edges <-» to represent latent common causes.9 To illustrate the simplest 
hybrid graph, let X  <— Z —» Y be the DAG true of variables X, Y, and Z. When Z is 
unknown, the hybrid graph for this DAG is given by X  <-» Y ; the bi-directed link 
represents the latent common cause Z.
Learning about the true DAG G(0,L) from the independencies true in P(O) 
requires knowing what independencies, given the Markov condition, would occur 
among the recorded variables O if G(0,L) were the DAG generating the data. An 
answer to this question is given in Pearl and Verma (1991). To explicate the answer, 
we need to introduce a further graph-theoretic notion -  an inducing path. An 
undirected path U between X  and Y is an inducing path over O in G(0,L) if and only 
if (i) every member of O on U (except the endpoints) is a collider on U, and (ii) from 
every collider on U there is a directed path to X  or Y. Figure 3.2 shows an inducing 
path between X  and Y over O = {X,Z,Y}:
Figure 3.2
Pearl and Verma (1991) have shown that there is an inducing path between recorded 
variables X  and Y in G(0,L) over O if and only if X  and Y are not independent 
conditional on any subset of O \ {X,7}. This means that if there is a directed path in 
the hybrid graph between X  and Y that is into Y, then X  is a (possibly indirect) cause 
of Y. If the path is into X, then 7 is a (possibly indirect) cause of X. And, if the path is
9 The term ‘hybrid graph’ has been borrowed from Pearl and Verma (1991). They, however, define a 
hybrid graph slightly differently; they identify it with a graph in which links may be undirected, uni­
directed or bi-directed.
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both into X and into Y, then there is a common cause (or causes) in G(0,L) affecting 
both X  and Y. Thus, given the Markov and Faithfulness conditions, one can learn 
about the true structure G(0,L) by investigating the hybrid graph consistent with the 
independence data.
The intuitions behind these results can be explained by analysing some simple 
examples, which will be used later to assess the GT approach. As a first example, we 
withdraw the causal sufficiency assumption about the variables {X1V..,X5} studied 
earlier while retaining the same set of independence relations:
Indp =
{X2 _LX3/X „
X4 1 X 1/(X2,X 3),
X5 _L(X1,X 2,X 3) /X 4}.
Starting from a skeleton over O, these independencies lead to the same graph as the 
one in Figure 3.1. Faithfulness requires directing the edges between X2 and X4, and 
X3 and X4 towards X4, and the edge between X4 and X5 towards X5. No DAG 
G (0 ,L ), containing variables ^/-separating X4 and X5, can be true of the data. Any 
such DAG fails to entail X5IX 2/X 4, and is unfaithful to P(O). The true DAG 
G(0,L) thus contains an inducing path between X4 and X5 that is into X5, 
meaning that X4 causes X5. Moreover, since cycles have been ruled out, X5 is not a 
cause of X4. Also, no DAG that renders both dependencies between X, and X2 and 
X, and X3 spurious can be faithful to P(O). In any such DAG, X 1 is a collider 
incapable of d-separating X2 from X3. Finally, only one of the edges in 
X2 —> X4 <— X3 can be due to latent common causes. A DAG that renders both 
edges spurious fails to entail X5 _L X, /(X2,X 3) . Figure 3.3 shows two hybrid graphs 
consistent with the independencies:
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Graph (a) Figure 3.3 Graph (b)
This example shows how, given the Markov condition and Faithfulness, the GT 
theorists conclude whether a variable causes another variable. To set the stage for our 
discussion, we also describe an example from Glymour (1997:218) intended to 
illustrate a case where the conditions entail that an association is definitely due to 
latent common causes. Let O = {X,,...,X4} and
Indp =
{X , _LX2,X, ± X 3,X 2 1 X 4}'
Starting from a skeleton over O, these independencies lead to undirected graph (a) in 
Figure 3.4. Faithfulness requires directing the edges between X2 and X3 and
between X4 and X3 towards X3. It also requires orienting the edges between X,
and X4 and between X3 and X4 towards X4. These create a bi-directed edge
between X3 and X4, as shown in graph (b) bellow. The bi-directed edge reveals an
inducing path in the true G(0,L) that is into both X3 and X4, revealing the
existence of a common cause for the variables.
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This conclusion is based on the consideration that any DAG G(L,0) not containing 
some variables responsible for the correlation between X 2 and X 4 violates either the 
Markov condition or Faithfulness. Consider, for instance, a DAG G(L, O) in which 
X 3 causes X 4. Such a DAG does not entail X2_IJf4, which is in Indp, and hence 
violates Faithfulness. Since, by assumption, there is no feedback among the variables, 
the correlation between X 2 and X 4 must be due to latent common causes.
4 Intrinsic Limitations of Data-driven Causal Inference
Granting that a causal relation is not the same as a probabilistic relation, the Markov 
and Faithfulness conditions are the most general principles that can be true of the 
connection between causation and probability. This section continues to assume the 
universal validity of these principles to examine exactly what kind of conclusions 
they allow us to infer from data. This requires us studying the issue of statistical 
indistinguishability (equivalence) of causal models. An analysis of this issue is 
essential for understanding intrinsic limitations of data-driven causal inference. It will 
be seen that even if the generality of the principles is not challenged, extremely little 
can be inferred from data alone. This section proceeds by showing that, given any 
causal model fitting the data, there is usually a simple rule that can be used to 
generate a class of equivalent models. These models have very little or nothing in
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common, because the sign and significance of the coefficient estimates can vary from 
one model to another.
A notion of model equivalence is the so-called Markovian (or ^-separation) model 
equivalence that reads as follows:
Markovian Model Equivalence: Let St be a causal structure defined on variables V, 
Ft a multivariate distribution family over V, and ©,. a parameter space compatible 
with S(. Two models and M 2 ={S2,F2,©2) are Markovian
equivalent if and only if they imply the same Markovian independencies; i.e., if and 
only if lndpx — Indp2.
Another stronger concept of model equivalence is the so-called distributional model 
equivalence:
Distributional Model Equivalence: Two models A/, = (S ,,/7,,©,) and
A/ 2 = (1S2 , F2 , ®2 ) are distributionally equivalent if and only if for every 
parameterisation of A/, generating distribution /, there is a parameterisation of Af 2 
generating distribution f 2 such that /, and f 2 are the same.
These notions coincide in the case of causally sufficient recursive models (Pearl, 
2000:146). Outside this category, there are Markovian equivalent models that are not 
distributionally equivalent (Sprites, et al., 1996a; Raykov et al., 1999). Since the aim 
here is to assess the claims of the GT approach, the discussion will be confined to 
Markovian model equivalence.10 We first consider recursive causal models and then 
turn to non-recursive models.
4.1 Recursive Equivalent Models
Recursive causal models can be divided into causally sufficient and causally 
insufficient models. An original contribution to the study of statistical
10 Appendix G shows how in general it is possible to check if two models are distributionally 
equivalent.
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indistinguishability of causally sufficient recursive models (DAGs) is Stelzl (1986), 
who investigates statistical equivalence of path models. Other early contributions are 
Frydenberg (1990), Lee and Hershberger (1990), and Verma and Pearl (1990).11 In 
path analysis, data are characterised by sample covariance matrices and, as seen, the 
implications of a model is defined in terms of its zero partial correlations. A path 
model is compatible with the data if its vanishing partials are compatible with the 
sample covariance matrix. So, if path models M, and M 2 entail the same vanishing 
partials, and if M, is compatible with the data, then M 2 is also compatible with the 
data and vice versa. On the other hand, if either M x or M 2 entails a zero partial 
correlation that is not implied by the other, the models are not equivalent. This 
suggests the following definition of path model equivalence:
Path Model Equivalence: Two paths models M x and M 2 are equivalent if and only 
if they constrain the same set of partial correlations to zero.
(i) X ----—► z --- —► Y
(v) ^  “7(ii) X ■*——  z --- —► Y X ^  L w
(iii) X -4——  z •+—---- ' Y
(vi) x  — — ► z < —
*
(iv)
A W £-. ^  I
Figure 4.1
Stelzl (1986) noted that the zero partial correlations implied by a path model were 
invariant with respect to certain changes in the ordering of the variables in the model. 
He located several invariant properties of vanishing partials and used them to define 
four rules for transforming a path model into another statistically equivalent model. 
The invariant properties underpinning Stelzl’s rules can be reduced to two very
1J Further contributions include: Bollen (1989), Breckler (1990), Hershberger, (1994), Jorgeskog and 
Sorbom, (1993), Luijben (1991), MacCallum, Wegener, Uchino, Fabrigar, (1993), and Raykov, (1997, 
1999, 2001).
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simple properties. Consider a path model over variables {X , Y , Z }, with path diagram 
(i) in Figure 4.1.
Graph (i) implies p XY z = 0 but no other zero restriction. Inverting arrow X —> Z or
both arrows yields graph (ii) or (iii), which have the same zero restrictions as (i). 
However, inverting arrow Z —> Y in (i) or X Z in (iii) creates unshielded collider 
(iv), which does not imply p ^  z -  0; the only zero restriction it implies is p XY = 0.
Similarly, consider inverting one or both of the arrows in (iv). This yields one of the 
models (i) through (iii) that imply a zero restriction not implied by (iv) and does not 
entail the zero restriction implied by (iv). This suggests that any arrow inversion in a 
path diagram that creates or destroys an unshielded collider destroys or creates a zero 
restriction, yielding a statistically different path model.
Now, consider graph (v), which is a complete graph in the sense that there is a link 
between every two variables in it. A complete graph implies no zero partial 
correlation (Wermuth, 1980). So, any change in the graph that turns it into another 
(non-cyclic) complete graph yields an equivalent path model. Redirecting arrow 
Z —> Y , for instance, gives rise to graph (vi) which is equivalent to graph (v). 
Removing an arrow from these two models, however, yields a model with a zero 
restriction not implied by the original model.
Altogether, these analyses point to two types of changes in a path diagram that alter 
its zero restrictions: (i) deletion or creation of a new link and (ii) creation or 
destruction of an unshielded collider. In general, Verma and Pearl (1990) and 
Frydenberg (1990) show that:
Theorem 4.1: Two DAGs G and G* are Markovian (covariance) equivalent if and 
only if they (i) they have the same links and (ii) the same unshielded colliders.12
12 This theorem also follows from Proposition I in Raykov et al. (1999:206).
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In light of this, an edge X —> Y in a DAG G can be inverted to form an equivalent 
DAG G* as long as the inversion neither destroys nor creates an unshielded collider. 
This happens only when every parent of X  is a parent of Y and every parent of Y 
(except X) is a parent of X  (Chickering, 1995; and Meek, 1995). The result gives rise 
to the following rule for converting a DAG G into anpther equivalent DAG G* 
(Appendix E  outlines a proof):
The DAG Inversion Rule: An arrow X —>Y in a DAG G can be inverted to form an 
equivalent DAG G* only if every parent of X  is a parent of Y and every parent of Y 
(except X) is a parent of X.
Since equivalence relation is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive, by repeatedly 
applying the rule one can generate all possible models equivalent to a DAG. 
Applying the rule to the path model described in Section II yields two more 
equivalent models. The original model corresponds to graph (a) below, with the zero 
partial correlations:
Px 1xi.xi = 0;  Px4xl.x1xi = 0» Pxix1.x4 Pxsx3.x4 = 0;  p x5xl.x4 = 0*
( x , ;
X,) ( x 2
X4 y r
Cx0
Graph (c)Graph (a) Graph (b)
Figure 4.2
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Assuming causal sufficiency, no other arrow in DAG (a) can be inverted. Take arrow 
X 4 —» X 5. X 4 has two parents X 2 and X 3 which are not parents of X 5. Inverting 
this arrow creates new unshielded colliders, which destroy zero restrictions 
Px5x2.x4 Px5x3jr4 = 0,and p Xsxi.x4 = 0 -
The above analysis shows that once a DAG is fitted to the data, there is a simple rule 
to transform it into another statistically equivalent DAG. Even when the causal 
sufficiency assumption is taken for granted, the ‘true’ structure cannot then be 
discovered from the independence data alone. If causal sufficinency is not assumed, a 
graph (model) over measured variables O can be changed into another equivalent 
graph not only by inverting some of the directed edges but also by replacing them 
with bi-directed edges representing latent common causes. In discussing 
Morkovian equivalence of causally insufficient models, we continue to assume the 
completeness hypothese. The equivalence of two DAGs over observed variables O 
can then be defined as follows:
Markovian Equivalence Over O: Two DAGs G(0,L) and G*(0,L*) are 
Markovian equivalent over O if they imply the same set of d-seperation triples over 
O.13
Building on Stelzl’s (1986), Lee et al. (1990) establish a simple condition for 
replacing an arrow X  —> Y in the graph of a covariance structural model with a bi- 
directed edge X  <-> Y that suggests the correlation between the variables is due to 
correlated errors. By completeness, correlation among errors indicates latent common 
causes. Lee et al.’s condition can therefore be viewed as a condition for converting a 
hybrid graph into an equivalent hybrid graph. Theorem 4.2 restates Lee et al.’s result, 
and Appendix F provides a proof for it.
13 A necessary and sufficient criterion for testing the ^-separation equivalence of two semi-Markovian 
models is given in Spirtes and Verma (1992).
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Theorem 4.2: Let G(0,L) be a DAG, X and Y in 0 , and X —»Y hold in G (0 ,L ). 
Let G*(0,L*)be the same as G(0,L) except that X  -> Y is replaced with X  <-> Y . 
G (0,L) and G*(0,L*) are Markovian equivalent over O if for every variable Zin O 
that is a parent of X in G, Z is also a parent of Y. Also, if X <r->Y is in G (0 ,L ), the 
bi-directed edge can be replaced with X —»Y if every parent of X  is a parent of Y.
Pearl (2000:146) notes that, when the requirement of the DAG inversion rule holds of 
an arrow X —> Y in a hybrid graph, replacing it with a bi-directed edge neither 
generates nor destroys an unshielded collider, and yields an equivalent hybrid graph. 
The rule, he argues, can be used to transform a hybrid graph into another equivalent 
hybrid graph. However, unlike the condition in Theorem 4.2, the DAG inversion rule 
requires every parent of X  or Y (except X) to be a parent of both, which is 
unnecessarily strong. Consider graph (a) in Figure 4.3. Here, X  has a direct cause, W, 
which is not a cause of Z. But replacing the arrow Z —> X  with a bi-directed edge 
neither destroys nor creates an independence relation among the recorded variables. 
Both graph (a) and (b) imply the same independencies over O = {X,7,Z,W}.
As required by theorem 4.2, in order to replace an arrow X  —> Y with a bi-directed 
arrow X  <-» Y without destroying or creating an unshielded collider it is sufficient 
that every parent of X  is a parent of Y. The theorem, however, does not exhaustively 
characterise the class of DAGs that are Markovian equivalent with G(0,L) over O. 
This is because creation of a new unshielded collider in certain situations leaves the 
independencies implied by G(0,L) over O unchanged. An example is given by
Graph (a) Graph (b)
Figure (4.3)
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graph (a) in Figure 4.4.14 Theorem 4.2 permits replacing Z —»Y with a bi-directed 
edge to create equivalent graph (b) but does not allow replacing X —> Y in (b) with a 
bi-directed edge, since X  has a parent that is no longer a parent of Y. Nevertheless, 
such replacement neither destroys nor creates an independency. Even though graph 
(c) contains an extra un-shielded collider, all the three graphs are Markovian 
equivalent over O.
Graph (c)Graph (a) Graph (b)
Figure (4.4)
Due to such cases, establishing a rule that defines necessary and sufficient conditions 
for transforming a hybrid graph into another equivalent hybrid graph demands 
specifying the conditions under which creating a new unshielded collider does not 
alter the independencies. Pearl (2000:147) takes some steps towards this aim but 
acknowledges that his requirements are not sufficient. All the same, theorem 4.2 
gives way to the following rule for creation of a partial set of equivalent hybrid 
acyclic graphs:
The Bi-directed Edge Replacement Rule: An arrow X  —»Y in a hybrid graph 
G(0,L)can be replaced with a bi-directed edge X  <-» Y to form an equivalent
hybrid graph G*(0,L*) if the parents of Y in G(0,L) include the parents of X. 
Conversely, under the same condition, a bi-directed edge X  T can be replaced 
with a directed edge X Y .
Applying this rule to the example used throughout the chapter adds four more models 
to the catalogue of the equivalent models listed in Figure 4.2. The new models are
14 A different example is found in Pearl, (2000: 147)
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shown in Figure 4.5. Graph (b) is obtained by first applying the DAG inversion rule 
to arrow X x —> X 2 and then replacing it with a bi-directed edge. Similarly, graph (d) 
is obtained by first applying the DAG inversion rule to arrow X x —> X 3 and then 
replacing it with a bi-directed edge.
x2
Graph (b)Graph (a) Graph (c) Graph (d)
Figure (4.5)
The rule does not permit replacing arrow X 4 —> X 5 with a bi-directed edge, as X 4 
has parents which are not parents of X 5. Given the Markov and Faithfulness 
conditions, the only conclusion that can be inferred from the (hypothetical) 
independence data is that X 4 is a (possibly indirect) cause of X 5, and X 5 has no
causal influence over X 4.
4.2 Non-recursive Equivalent Models
Allowing feedback increases the complexity of causal modelling. Notably, the 
Markov condition, as defined earlier, does not hold of non-recursive (cyclic) models 
and must be replaced with a more general one.15 In addition, feedback adds to the 
complexity of the conditions under which two cyclic models are d-separation
15 Glymour (1997a: 208) describes a feedback model that does not satisfy the Markov condition.
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equivalent. This in turn makes it even more difficult to characterise the necessary and 
sufficient conditions under which a cyclic model can be transformed into another 
equivalent model. To keep the discussion short, instead of considering the 
equivalence of cyclic models in general, building on the works of Frydenberg (1990), 
Lee et al. (1990), and Raykov et al. (1999), we discuss a specific class of non­
recursive models, known as block recursive models, which has been of interest in 
econometrics (Kmenta, 1986). In graph theoretic terms, a block recursive equation 
system corresponds to a directed graph that can be partitioned into several subgraphs 
(blocks) such that there is no feedback across the blocks but the relations among the 
variables within each block can be either recursive or non-recursive. Graph (a) in 
Figure 4.6 represents a block recursive equation system. There is no feedback across 
the blocks separated by the line. If, in addition, the graph (equation system) contains 
an acyclic subgraph (block), the graph is said to be a limited block recursive graph 
(system) (Lee et al., 1990:317). Following Lee et al. (1990) we name an acyclic 
subgraph a focal subgraph. Theorem 4.3 captures the result available about the d- 
separation equivalence of limited block recursive models. Appendix G outlines a 
proof, based on a theorem due to Raykov et al. (1999):
Theorem 4.3: Let G*(0,L*) be the same limited block recursive graph as G(0,L) 
over O except that X  <-» Y is in G*(0,L*) instead of X —> Y . Then, G(0,L) and 
G*(0,L*)are ^-separation equivalent over O if for every variable Z in O that is a 
parent of X in G (0 ,L ), Z is also a parent of Y. Furthermore, if X  «-» Y is in 
G (0 ,L ), the edge can be replaced with X —>Y if every parent of X  is a parent of Y.
This theorem makes it possible to establish a rule similar to the bi-directed edge 
replacement rule that allows transforming a limited block recursive graph into another 
equivalent graph.16 Figure 4.6 depicts four equivalent models. The set {Xx, X 2} 
forms a focal block. Using the theorem, the arrow X x —» X 2 can be redirected to 
obtain graph (b) or replaced with a bi-directed edge to obtain graph (c).17 The set
16 Richardson (1996) provides the necessary and sufficient conditions under which two non-recursive
models, limited block-recursive or not, are 4-separation equivalent.
17 Graph (b) is obtained by first X ] —» X 2 with X x X 2 and then replacing it with X x <— X 2 .
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{X^Xg} also forms a focal block. The arrow X, —> X3 can be replaced with a bi- 
directed edge to obtain graph (d).
Graph (a) Graph (b)
Graph (c) Figure 4.6 Graph (d)
Although the discussion of non-recursive models has been confined to limited block 
recursive models, the scope of the result is not that limited. It is usually possible to 
locate a focal block in most non-recursive models. Theorem 4.3 thus applies to most 
cyclic models.
The above rules permit generating a class of equivalent models for a large class of 
structural models. As stressed by the founders of the GT approach, the outcome of the 
GT algorithms is not therefore the true graph but a class of equivalent graphs that 
could have generated the data. More precisely, the outcome of the algorithms is a 
pattern; that is a graphical object that represents the directed edges common to all the 
members of the equivalent class but leaves the direction of other edges unspecified. 
These common edges define what can be learnt from the data using the GT 
techniques.
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4.3 Causal Inference in Practice
A proposal to curb the multiplicity of equivalent models is to consider the temporal 
order of the variables. A cause is said to temporally precede the effect, which means 
if X  precedes Y, Y cannot be a cause of X. Though this suggestion may be of some 
help, it falls short of narrowing the class of equivalent models to a single model. The 
suggestion does not apply to feedback models, and it is often difficult to ascertain 
whether a variable precedes another. In addition, even if the temporal order of the 
variables were known and only recursive models were permitted, there would still be 
many models fitting the data. As a simple example, suppose that O = {X,Y,Z}  is the 
set of recorded variables, X temporally precedes Y, Y temporally precedes Z and that 
X L Z I Y  is true in F(O). The only conclusion that can be derived from this 
information is that Y causes Z. Both graph (a) and (b) in Figure (4.7) are consistent 
with the data. In fact, L stands for all the temporally precedent variables that can 
affect both X and Y. This means infinitely many models could have generated the 
independence data.
Hence, even with the imposition of temporal order, the class of equivalent models 
may be large. Now, a very important point, which often goes unnoticed, is that in 
practice the class of models (graphs) equivalent with a model fitting the data usually 
have little or even nothing in common. The reason is that the coefficient estimates do 
not remain invariant across various members of the equivalence class; they vary as 
we move from one member of the class to another. Consider the following covariance
Graph (a) Graph (b)
Figure 4.7
matrix:
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X
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1
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.30
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1
Figure 4.8 depicts three equivalent graphs consistent with this data.
.25 .30 .26
.34
.22 .21 .15 .26 .15
Graph (a) Graph (b) Graph (c)
Figure 4.8
As these graphs illustrate, the parameter estimate for a link between two variables 
does not remain invariant across the members of the equivalent class. In general, a 
coefficient estimate may be significant in some members of the class but not in 
others. Or it may be positive in some members of the class but negative in others. 
More importantly, the change in the sign and significance of the coefficient estimates 
is not confined to the coefficients of the edges varying across the equivalent models. 
The sign and significance of the coefficients of the common edges can also vary from 
one model to another (Williams et al., 1996:286). In some members of the equivalent 
class the coefficient estimate associated with a common edge may be significant but 
not in others. Or in some models it may be positive but in others negative. Appendix 
H  further demonstrates these points using two real examples from MacCallum, et al. 
(1993).
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Since probabilities are unknown and one has to rely on their estimates, and since the 
coefficient estimates vary across equivalent models, in practice the members of an 
equivalent class usually have little in common. As a result, even by granting the 
Markov and Faithfulness conditions, little can be learnt from data alone. The claim of 
the GT approach that one can infer substantive causal conclusions by inspecting the 
edges common among equivalent models is contingent on the invariance of the 
coefficient estimates, which is not always the case. Substantive conclusions from data 
demands subject matter information to narrow down the class of equivalent models 
fitting the data. One, in particular, needs information on the sign and significance .of 
the coefficients.
5 Assumptions Revisited
The claim that the GT approach can discover the class of equivalent causal models 
that could have generated the data depends on the universal validity of the Markov 
condition and Faithfulness. It is now time to investigate if these principles can be 
applied to any correlation or independency found in the data or, in short, if they are 
universally valid. This section takes on this issue by examining the positive 
justifications proposed for the principles, studying some of the objections raised 
against them, and putting forward some new criticisms. It argues against the universal 
validity of the conditions, and further demonstrates the necessity of subject matter 
information in causal inference.
5.1 The Causal Markov Condition
The advocates of the GT approach have set forth several justifications for the Markov 
condition. It has been argued that variants of the principle underlie other methods of 
causal inference, and in this respect the GT approach is the same as other causal 
inference methods (Glymour, 1997:203-5). This claim only means that the 
conclusions obtained using the GT techniques are as valid as those obtained using
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other methods. This in itself offers no justification for the condition. It has also 
sometimes been claimed that if one does not assume the universal validity of the 
Markov condition, some correlations remain unexplained. Implicit in this defence is 
that if a correlation has no causal explanation it has no explanation. But this is the 
very claim that one must defend for establishing the validity of the condition; one 
cannot simply take it for granted.
The central justification for the Markov condition, however, is said to derive from the 
fact that it is provably true of recursive, pseudo indeterministic, causally sufficient 
structures, with independently distributed disturbance terms (Kiiveri et al., 1982).18 
Koster (1999) and Spirtes (1996) have shown that a more general property, called the 
global Markov condition, is true of both recursive and non-recursive causally 
sufficient, homogenous and pseudo indeterministic linear structures, with 
independently distributed errors.19 In what follows, the focus of analysis will be on 
the Markov condition defined in Section II, even though the analysis is also relevant 
to the global Markov condition.
The proof of the Markov condition is a piece of mathematics. To relate it to the 
world, it is necessary to show that the underlying requirements are true of the world. 
Of these conditions, recursiveness is not a critical issue (at least in the case of linear 
models), since the global Markov condition is true of both recursive and non­
recursive (linear) structures, which satisfy the other conditions. The pseudo 
indeterminism requirement has come under attack by critics concerned with the 
outcomes of quantum mechanical experiments that seem to point to indeterminism. 
At the quantum level, the world is said to be genuinely indeterministic and the 
Markov condition does not apply. Since the universal validity of the condition can be 
challenged without taking sides on indeterminism, we take the pseudo-indeterminism 
condition for granted, and focus on the causal sufficiency and independence of the
18 Kiiveri et al. (1982) provided the first proof of the result. A simple proof of the result appears as an 
appendix in Cartwright (2002:451-452).
19 For definition of the Global Markov condition see footnote 8. The proofs by Koster (1999) and 
Spirtes (1996) assume linearity of the structural model.
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errors requirements. The founders of the GT approach acknowledge that these 
conditions may not be true of a set of measured variables. Yet, to universally apply 
the Markov condition, they introduce the completeness hypothesis:
The Completeness Assumption: For every set of recorded variables O, either the set 
forms a causally sufficient set with uncorrelated errors or it can be embedded in a 
larger set of variables V that is causally sufficient with uncorrelated errors (Scheines, 
1997:197).
On this basis, the Markov condition is generalised to every set of variables, at least at 
the level of description with which social scientists, economists, and biologist are 
concerned. In light of this, the universal validity of the Markov condition critically 
depends on the validity of the completeness hypothesis. We therefore concentrate our 
analysis on this hypothesis. Before proceeding, it should be stressed that exact 
independencies are not known in practice. One only has access to an estimate of the 
joint probability distribution of the variables under study, usually obtained from a 
small sample, and should take approximately zero correlations in place of exact 
independencies. To make any causal inference from data, the (Population) Markov 
Condition, which is defined for true probabilities, should be replaced with the so- 
called sample Markov condition:
The Sample Markov Condition: Let P(V) be a joint probability distribution 
estimated from a finite sample of observations on variables V. The pair (G, P) 
satisfies the sample Markov condition if and only if every variable X  in V, conditional 
on its parents, is almost independent of every variable Y in V  that is not a descendent 
ofX.
5.1.1 Aggregation over Heterogeneous Units
The literature points to several circumstances in which completeness can fail. An 
important case was pointed out by G. Udny Yule in his seminal paper (1903) on the 
theory of association of attributes in statistics, where he noted that mixing 
heterogeneous units could lead to creation of spurious correlations at the population
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level that did not exist at the level of sub-populations. An illustration of such a 
phenomenon is presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1
Aggregation over Heterogeneous Units
Male Population Female Population Mixed Population
Treated Untreated Treated Untreated Treated Untreated
Alive 4/99 16/99 20/99 10/99 24/99 26/99
Dead 8/99 32/99 6/99 3/99 14/99 35/99
In both female and male subpopulations treatment and recovery as well as non­
treatment and non-recovery are uncorrelated. When the two subpopulations are mixed 
together, however, recovery becomes statistically related to treatment and non­
recovery to non-treatment. Such examples show that mixing populations, which 
either have different causal structures or have the same causal structure but different 
probability distributions, can create associations that do not exist at the sub­
population level. Since such associations are by-products of mixing, the mixed 
population violates the Markov condition.
Spirtes et al. (1993:57) describe in some detail Yule’s example, which is similar to 
the above example, to explain why it presents no problem for the Markov condition. 
The authors argue that the variables in Yule’s example exclude a variable that is the 
cause of membership in a sub-population. Once the omitted variable is included, and 
the measured variables are conditioned on it, the spurious correlations disappear 
(1993:60). In the above example, the analyst has failed to include, for instance, 
gender. Once he includes gender and conditions treatment (non-treatment) and 
recovery (non-recovery) on it, the spurious correlations disappear, and the population 
satisfies the Markov condition.20
20 For further discussion of how correlations arising from mixing heterogeneous units are dealt with 
see Glymour (1997a:207) and Glymour and Meek (1995:1012).
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Although it may be possible in simple situations like the one above to locate 
classifying variables that can sensibly be considered as common causes, in more 
complex cases of aggregation over heterogeneous units, which are ubiquitous in the 
social sciences, there exists no small set of classifying variables capable of explaining 
away spurious correlations, which can at the same time be considered as common 
causes of the recorded variables. In social contexts, what is in fact required to explain 
away a spurious correlation at the aggregate level is a full description of the system at 
the micro level including the laws governing the behaviour of the individuals, their 
interactions with each other, and more importantly the socio-economic processes 
determining the variables affecting individual behaviour. However, a description of 
the system at the micro-level cannot be considered as a common cause of the 
variables at the aggregate level. To highlight this point, we borrow an example from 
the next chapter that studies in detail the complexities arising from aggregating over 
heterogeneous units. The example revolves around a simple economy studied in Lippi 
(1988:174), which has two consumers, each having a slightly different demand 
function. To be specific, the demand function for each individual follows the static 
routine:
Yit= n fX ,  f = lf2 ,  (5.1)
which has no stochastic term. Yit and X it are respectively consumption and income 
of the ith individual in period t, and the parameter IT,, for each individual is different. 
Moreover, each consumer operates in a slightly different environment in the sense 
that the independent micro variable X it for each individual follows a different 
autoregressive routine,
X it = atX l7_, + v„, 0 < a, < 1, (5.2)
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where the parameter a, for each individual is d i f f e r e n t ,  and the vl7 are orthogonal 
white-noise processes.21 As shown in Appendix E of the next chapter, in this 
economy the function relating aggregate consumption Yt -  Yu + Ylt to aggregate 
income X t = X U+ X lt is given by
Yt =aYt_i +f iXt +j Xt_,+ut , (5.3)
with m, being a white-noise process. Contrary to the individual consumption
functions, this function contains among its arguments lagged aggregate consumption 
and income. Moreover, as the number of consumers increases, the complexity of the 
function grows, including an increasingly larger number of lagged predictors. Now, 
the point is that the relation between Y, and Yt.} in (5.3) is not a causal relation, since 
the last period individual consumption Yit.j does not appear in the individual 
consumption function and, for that reason, setting Yt.j by intervention at certain 
value does not affect Yt. To explain away the spurious correlation, one needs a 
description of the economy at the micro level, including a description of the choice 
situation faced by each individual. In real-life situations, providing such a 
description is impossible. In addition, the description would involve a tremendously 
large number of classificatory variables (e.g., ‘being a farmer’, ‘being a banker’), 
which cannot be considered as the common causes of the aggregate variables, say, Yt 
and Yt.j. As this example shows, in social contexts, where decision makers are 
different, and operate in different choice situations, aggregation over heterogeneous 
units produces variables that neither stand in a causal relation with each other nor are 
part of a larger causally sufficient set of variables. In such situations, completeness 
and hence the Markov condition fail.
21 The stochastic process {Zt , t  = 1,2,...} is a white-noise process if E ( Z t ) = 0 and 
Cov(Zt , Z S) = S 1 if t=s and Cov(Zt , Z s ) = 0 if t  ^  S .
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5.1.2 Selection Bias
Aggregation over heterogeneous units is only one of the situations in which 
completeness fails. Another situation in which completeness fails is when there is 
“selection bias”; that is, when a population is defined by conditioning on some 
variable Z that is a common effect of two or more of the variables under study (or 
their causes) that have no mutual influence on each other (Glymour, 1997:208). There 
has recently been a growing interest in studying the implications of selection bias for 
causal inference.22 Here, we concentrate on a problem that selection bias creates for 
the completeness hypothesis, examine a proposal that some GT theorists have put 
forward to deal with it, and argue why, because of the possibility of selection bias, an 
important claim of the GT approach must be abandoned. We first consider an 
illustration of selection bias discussed in Spirtes, Meek, and Richardson (1996). 
Suppose a survey of college students is done to determine whether there is a link 
between Intelligence (I) and Sex drive (D). Let Student statues (S) be a binary 
variable that takes value 1 when one is studying in a college and zero otherwise. Also, 
as in graph (a) in Figure 5.1, suppose Age (A) causes sex drive, and age and 
intelligence cause student status (here, age is taken to be a proxy for a combination of 
biological and mental states associated with age).
Graph (a) Graph (b) Graph (c)
Figures 5.1
22 See Cooper (1995, 2000) and Spirtes, Meek and Richardson (1996).
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Since the sample is gathered from college students, the variables under study or their 
causes, i.e., I  and A, influence whether one is in the sample, and this can create a 
correlation among the recorded variables, i.e., I and D. If graph (a) is an accurate 
description of the causal relations among V = {A,D, I ,S}, the correlation between I 
and D is spurious, as there is no causal connection among them (graph (b)). 
Moreover, V  contains no common cause of I and D that can screen off the correlation. 
The Markov condition is not true of the recorded variables I  and D. Nor is there a 
larger DAG with the common causes of I  and D that satisfies the condition -  hence a 
serious failure of completeness.
A number of proposals have been set forth to counter the danger of selection bias, 
mainly calling for the use of domain-specific information and sensitivity analysis 
(Scharfstein et al., 2003). Against this approaches, following a proposal by Wermuth 
et al. (1994), Cooper (1995) argues that selecting a unit to include in the sample is a 
causal event. It can be represented by a variable and treated as a genuine part of the 
causal structure.23 So, he proposes to incorporate into the structure the process of unit 
(case) selection, adding an extra assumption to the arsenal of the assumptions 
underlying the GT approach:
Selection Bias Assumption: Case selection is a causal event that can be modelled 
within a causal directed graph that has a variable representing whether a case was 
selected or not (Cooper, 2000).
A similar supposition underlies an attempt by Spirtes, Meek, and Richardson (1996) 
to extend the GT techniques to data that might be affected by selection bias. On this 
proposal, the set {I,D} does not actually exhaust all the recorded variables in the 
current case. The recorded set is said to be {I,D,S},  where S' is a selection variable 
taking value 1 for the students in the sample and zero for non-students. The 
dependence —\{D _L /) appeared in the sample should then be interpreted as 
-n(Z) _1_ 7/(S =1)), which means graph (b) ought to be replaced with graph (c) in
23 In other words, it can be treated as a variable in a higher dimensional probability space.
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Figure 5.1 (where the small ovals indicate that each arrow can be replaced with a bi­
directed edge <-»). Now, there is many ways to embed graph (c) into a DAG to make 
it consistent with the Markov condition. Figure 5.2 depicts two possibilities:
Although there may be nothing theoretically wrong with this proposal, it comes with 
a price for the GT approach. Inclusion of selection variables adds to the complexity 
of the structure. This enlarges the class of models that, given the Markov and 
Faithfulness conditions, could have possibly generated the independence data. In that 
case, the models will have less in common and much less can be learnt about the 
structure from the data. Specifically, the increase in the class of graphs consistent 
with the independence data undermines the central claim that the GT techniques are 
able to establish whether or not a correlation is definitely due to latent common 
causes. Recall, when the orientation of an undirected graph leads to a bi-directed 
edge, the edge is taken as the evidence that the correlation is definitely due to a latent 
common cause. In the analysis of the second example in Section III, the Faithfulness 
condition required placing a bi-directed edge between X2 and X3 and, following the 
GT theorists, it was concluded that the correlation was due to latent common causes. 
However, when the possibility of selection bias is acknowledged, this inference is no 
longer warranted. This is because the bi-directed edge can simply be due to selection 
bias. An example of such an explanation is given in graph (b) below, which is also 
found in Spirtes et al. (1996).
Graph (a) Graph (b)
Figure 5.2
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Graph (b)Graph (a)
Figure 5.3
Graph (b) implies all the independencies over the recorded variables in graph (a). Yet, 
it contains no variable affecting both X2 and X3, If structures like graph (b) are 
permitted, it is no longer possible to take a bi-directed edge as the evidence for a 
latent common cause. Such an interpretation demands ensuring that the bi-directed 
edge is not the result of selection bias. The GT approach provides no formal guidance 
how to decide whether a data set is affected by selection bias or not. It too must rely 
on domain-specific information or sensitivity analysis to counter the threat of 
selection bias. Finally, allowing selection-variables in a causal structure demands 
revising the main theorem of the GT approach given in Glymour (1997:219). The 
theorem assumes that there is no selection bias.
5.1.3 Concomitants
The advocates of the GT approach may admit the inability of their methods to 
establish the existence of latent common causes but still argue that, regardless of 
selection bias, the GT techniques are able to establish in certain cases that a variable 
either directly or indirectly but definitely causes another variable. This claim is also 
unfounded. To explain this, it is important to recall the distinction between a cause 
and a concomitant of a cause (Sobel, 1995:29). The possibility of mistaking a cause 
with a concomitant of the cause creates another situation where completeness fails. In 
such cases, it is wrong to admit the outcome of the GT techniques that a variable
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causes another. As an illustration, suppose we are given data on four variables: 
Mother’s Genotype (G), Mother’s childhood nutrition (N), Mother’s occupation (O), 
and Children’s intelligence (I). It is plausible to assume that the following 
independencies are approximately true in the sample:
Given the Markov condition and Faithfulness, these independencies lead to graph (a) 
in Figure 5.4, where the ovals at the end of the arrows between G and O and N  and O 
indicate that each arrow can be replaced with a bi-directed edge .
Interpreting it causally, graph (a) reads that Mother’s occupation causes (possibly 
indirectly) child’s intelligence. Such a claim, though logically possible, is not taken 
seriously at present. The graph suggests a causal connection from O to I  that does not 
seem to exist. Assuming completeness, the strategy of the defenders of the Markov 
condition would be to try to embed the graph into a DAG G(0,L) with a common 
cause L that screens off the correlation between O and 7. But, if the assumptions of 
the GT approach are taken for granted, no such DAG can exist. Graph (b) in Figure 
5.4 shows a typical DAG capable of explaining away the correlation between O and /. 
Any such graph neither entails independence relation G All 10  nor N ±  I / O ,  and is 
not faithful to the distribution of the recorded variables. In the current example,
Indp = [ G ± N , G ± I / 0 , N  ± 1 / 0 }
Graph (a) Graph (b)
Figure 5.4
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completeness can be restored only at the expense of Faithfulness and Faithfulness can 
be retained only at the expense of completeness. In either case, the immediate 
conclusion is that, because of the possibility of mistaking a concomitant of a cause 
with the cause, it is not warranted to take the existence of an irremovable arrow, such 
as the one from O to 7, as the evidence of a definite causal connection. Like other 
approaches to causal inference, the GT method cannot also establish that a variable 
directly or indirectly but definitely causes another variable.
The way to deal with the problem created by concomitants is not to search for a larger 
set of variables that includes the original ones. It is to replace them with the right 
ones. Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993:63) come close to a similar conclusion 
when dealing with a counterexample put forward by Wesley Salmon to the common 
cause principle, calling it interactive forks . 24 They argue that the apparent 
counterexample arises because one has failed to pick up the right variables to 
describe the situation in hand. This simply means that the Markov condition 
generates sensible results only when applied to right variables. Moreover, one cannot 
rely on formal principles to decide on the right set of variables to describe a situation. 
One needs domain-specific information.25
The analysis has so far focused on one component of the completeness conjecture 
that says for every set of variables O that is not causally sufficient there is a causally 
sufficient set V  embedding O. It remains to investigate the other component that says 
the disturbance terms associated with the variables V  are independently distributed. 
Pearl seems to suggest that this condition is not an extra assumption. On his view, the 
independence assumption follows from the causal sufficiency assumption and the 
common cause principle, which he regards it as basic for linking probability with 
causation (2000:30). Other GT theorists have also taken a similar line (Richardson et
24 Consider variables X, Y, and Z. Suppose Z causes X  and Y but there is no causal link between X  and 
Y. Salmon calls such a situation an interactive fork if P(X/Z)<P(X/Z&Y). For some examples see 
Salmon (1984:168-174).
25 Another case where the completeness hypothesis may fail is raised in Sober (1987), discussed under 
the nomenclature of “Co-evolving Processes”. An interesting examination of Sober’s type of 
counterexamples is found in Hoover (2003).
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al., 1999). But it should not be difficult to gather from our earlier discussion why 
causal sufficiency and the common cause principle do not entail the independence of 
the errors. A disturbance term u associated with an exogenous variable X in V 
represents the aggregate effect of all the variables outside V that influence X. 
Aggregation can render dependent variables that are independently distributed at the 
micro level. Therefore, even if all the variables affecting those in V  are pairwise 
independent, when they are aggregated, they might become correlated (Cartwright, 
2001). The requirement of independent errors is an additional assumption that lacks a 
justification. Altogether, these analyses reveal why the completeness hypothesis 
cannot be taken for granted, and, as a result, why the Markov condition cannot be 
applied universally.
. 5.2 The Faithfulness Condition
Faithfulness rules out any structure that, when the Markov condition applied to it, 
does not entail all the independencies found in the data. The GT literature offers 
several considerations to support a priori exclusion of such structures. Glymour 
(1997:210) begins his defence of Faithfulness by showing that it underlies other 
approaches to causal inference. But this provides no justification for causal 
conclusions drawn using the GT techniques. Scheines (1997:194) defends the 
condition by arguing that it increases our inferential power, as without it nothing can 
be learnt from data about the direction of causal influence. Again, the increase in 
inferential power is in itself no evidence for the soundness of the conclusions, and as 
such provides no support for Faithfulness.
5.2.1 The Measure Theoretic Argument
The main justification of Faithfulness is of a Bayesian nature. It has been argued that 
for any linear structural model, the set of parameterisations of the model that lead to 
violations of Faithfulness is of Lebesgue measure zero. Hence, any Bayesian whose
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prior over the parameters is absolutely continuous with the Lebesgue measure assigns 
a zero prior probability to the violations of Faithfulness (SGS, 1993:68-9).26 A quick 
challenge to this argument, also noted by Scheines et al. (1998:82), is to ask why one 
has to have a prior that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue 
measure. Obviously, if one adopts a prior that lacks this feature, the measure theoretic 
argument has no force. Though this criticism is sufficient to challenge the argument, 
more can be learnt by analysing what is really involved in having a prior that assigns 
zero probability to violations of Faithfulness. To this end, we follow a line of analysis 
in Robins et al. (1999) and Robins (2003). Consider a normally distributed causally 
sufficient set of variables V = {X,Y,Z,U,V,W}, and let 0  = {X,y,Z} be the 
recorded variables. Suppose X  precedes Y, and Y precedes Z. Also, assume there is an 
extremely large sample of data on X, Y and Z so that estimation problems can be left 
aside. Finally, suppose the following dependencies and independencies are true in the 
data:27
Explanation (1): A possible explanation of these data is given by graph (a) in Figure 
5.5. The graph implies that X  causes Y, Y causes Z and that these variables have no 
common causes in V.
26 Lebesgue measure is the uniform distribution in Euclidean space, e.g., length, area, volume.
27 This example originates from Sewell Wright (1934) and is described in Irzik et al. (1987:508-9).
P xy ~  0 '^  > P yz ~  0-5 , Pxz ~  0-25 , P xz.y ~  0 •
graph (b)
Figure 5.5
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Another way of representing the same causal facts is given in graph (b), where the 
lower case letters denote path coefficients. Represented in this way, the explanation 
implies that uxu2 = 0, VjV2 = 0, wxw2 = 0, but, a * 0 and b * 0.
Explanation (2): A second possible explanation is offered by graph (a) below. 
According to this graph, neither X  causes Y nor Y causes Z. The dependencies and 
vanishing partial p XZY = 0 are due to particular residual correlations between X  and
Z, X  and Y, and Y and Z -  as shown by the numbers on the bi-directed edges linking 
the variables.
0.25
w  2
w.0.50.5
graph (a)
graph (b)
Figures 5.6
If we follow the GT theorists in explaining residual correlation in terms of latent 
common causes, graph (b) above provides an alternative representation of the causal 
facts in graph (a). On this graph, U, V, and W are confounders. This means uxu2 * 0, 
v,v2 ^ 0, w\w2 =£ 0, but, a = 0 and b = 0.
These explanations are both possible. The measure theoretic argument draws on the 
fact that the subset of coefficient values for {u,,u2,v,,v2,w,,vv2) that yields the 
vanishing partial p XZY = 0 , when uxu2 & 0 , VjV2 * 0, and wxw2 * 0, has Lebesgue
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measure zero in R6. If one has a prior over the parameter space that is absolutely 
continuous with the Lebesgue measure of the space, then one has to regard 
Explanation (2) as a prior unlikely and accept Explanation (1), which is faithful to 
the data. The difficulty with this argument is that the move from showing that 
Explanation (2) is a priori unlikely to acceptance of Explanation (1) is not warranted. 
As noted earlier, Explanation (1) implies that uiu2 = 0, v,v2 = 0 , and w,w2 =0. 
Now, the Lebesgue measure of each of these events is also zero in R2. And, if one has 
a prior over the parameters that is absolutely continuous with the Lebesgue measure, 
one also has to consider these events as a priori unlikely. As far as the measure 
theoretic considerations are concerned, both explanations are equally unlikely. The 
only way the balance can be tilted in favour of Explanation (1) is to rule out a priori 
any latent common cause for the recorded variables.28 If the existence of common 
causes is not a priori ruled out, both explanations are a priori equally likely, and no 
causal conclusion can be inferred from the data. This means, to believe that violations 
of Faithfulness are a priori unlikely, one must believe that X  and Y and Y and Z have 
no latent common causes.
In the above analysis, by assuming the existence of an extremely large sample, it was 
assumed that the true independencies were known. In practice, as said earlier, one 
only has access to a finite sample, and should take approximately zero dependencies 
in lieu of exact independencies. This requires substituting the population Faithfulness 
condition, which is defined for true independencies, with the so-called sample 
Faithfulness condition:
The Sample Faithfulness Assumption: In a large sample if X  and Y are almost 
independent conditional on Z, that is evidence that X  and Y are not directly causally 
connected except through Z (Glymour et al. 1999:345)
28 In other words, one has to assign a priori non-zero probabilities to events u,m2 =  0 , vtv2 = 0 and 
w, w2 =  0 .
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In light of this, what the GT theorists need to exclude a priori is the set of parameter 
values that nearly cancel each other out. Such a set always has a non-zero Lebesgue 
measure, and cannot be excluded on measure theoretic grounds. The Bayesian 
argument applies, if at all, only when the true independencies are known. It has no 
force in practice, where almost-zero partial correlations should be taken in place of 
exact independencies.
5.2.2 Stable Unfaithfulness
Another line of defence of Faithfulness has been pursued in Pearl’s writings. Pearl’s 
view of a causal model is influenced by the early views in econometrics. These views 
define a structural model as a system of equations each representing an autonomous 
causal mechanism that can be manipulated without affecting other equations in the 
model. Autonomy, the early economists argued, is an essential feature that a model 
must have to be useful for evaluating actions and policies. Influenced by this 
tradition, Pearl argues that the reason we search for causal models is the need for 
evaluating actions and policies, and a key feature that a model ought to have to be 
useful for analysis of actions and policies is the autonomy of the model equations. 
Since the equations in unfaithful models break down with a slight change in the 
conditions sustaining one of the equations, the models lack autonomy and are not 
useful for evaluating actions and policies. They should not, therefore, be taken 
seriously (2000: 63).29
A number of authors have rightly challenged this claim. Cartwright (1999:118) and 
Hoover (2001:170) have pointed out that one of the ways that we minimise damages 
in our social and medical regimes is by arranging the system so that conflicting causal 
forces counterbalance the effect of each other. Unfaithful structures can therefore be 
of significant interest in designing efficient social and medical regimes. Moreover,
29 ‘Autonomy’ or ‘invariance’ is defined with respect to a specific set o f changes. An elaboration of 
this point is beyond the scope of this chapter. See Woodward (1993).
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what is really at issue here is whether Faithfulness is a reliable guide to discovery of 
autonomous relations. Surely, a definition of autonomy and a recommendation to 
avoid using unstable relations in policy analysis cannot serve as a guide in searching 
for structural relations.
In another charitable reading, Pearl may be taken as arguing that, since unfaithful 
structures are unstable, they do not last enough to generate data for a reliable estimate 
of the underlying distribution. So, any independencies embedded in a distribution 
estimated from an adequately large homogenous sample arise from a faithful 
structure. It is thus a sound practice to rely on Faithfulness to infer causation from 
reliably estimated independencies. This line of reasoning assumes that there can be no 
‘stable’ unfaithful independencies. But, this is wrong. We earlier noted the difficulty 
that ‘concomitants’ could create for the Markov condition by generating 
dependencies that lack a causal explanation. Mistaking a concomitant of a genuine 
cause with the cause can also produce stable independencies that do not represent 
absence of causation. Consider the structure depicted in graph (a) in Figure 5.6 that 
represents a possible causal structure between Genotype (G), Family background (F), 
Heavy smoking (H), and Lung cancer (L).
Graph (c)Graph (b)Graph (a)
Figure 5.6
According to this structure, conditional on H, L is independent of G and F, which 
means there is no direct causal link from genotype and family background to lung 
cancer; they cause lung cancer through causing heavy smoking. Now suppose H  is
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replaced with one of the concomitants of heavy smoking like ‘Having yellowed teeth’ 
(P). Assuming that the conditional independence relation L _L {G,F}/H is true in the 
data, the conditional independency L ±{G, F}I  P will also most likely be true, and if 
one picks up variables {G,F,P,L} instead of {G,F,H,L}, one ends up with graph 
(b). The graph entails that, conditional on having yellowed teeth, lung cancer is 
independent of genotype and family background. However, based on our current state 
of knowledge, independence relations LJLG/P  and L ± F / P  do not genuinely 
represent absence of causal connections. Assuming graph (a) is true, when ‘heavy 
smoking’ is dropped from the graph, there will be causal links from G and F to L, as 
shown in graph (c). Moreover, the spurious independencies L L G  / P and LI .  F /  P 
are stable in the sense that they are true as long as the structure depicted by graph (a) 
is true. Such examples, which are by no means rare, illustrate cases of stable 
unfaithfulness that are neither generated by exact cancellation of parameter values nor 
by mixing of heterogeneous units (the Simpson Paradox). Pearl’s stability argument 
may be useful for excluding violations of Faithfulness that arise from exact 
cancellation of parameter values. It is of no force in ruling out stable unfaithful 
independencies that arise from mistaking concomitants with genuine causes. Like the 
Markov condition, Faithfulness cannot be applied universally either.
6 Conclusion
The strongest assumptions that can be made about the link between causation and 
probability are that “every probabilistic dependency has a causal explanation” and 
“every probabilistic independency reflects lack of a causal connection”. This chapter 
has argued that these hypotheses are not true. A correlation or non-correlation can 
arise for reasons other than causal reasons, and hence the class of possible 
explanations for a correlation or non-correlation is larger than the class of possible 
causal explanations. So, there can never be an entirely data driven causal inference
30 Simpson’s Paradox has been taken up by many authors in detail (Cartwright, 1997, and Hausman, 
1998). The philosophical problems arising from the paradox are similar to those discussed under the 
heading of mixing heterogeneous units.
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method. Causal inference must first proceed by eliminating non-causal explanations 
that a dependency or independency can have. This requires drawing on subject matter 
information available about the system. In the simple economy we described, it is 
essential to know the rules governing the behaviour of the individuals as well as the 
character of the environment in which they operate to decide whether the correlation 
between the aggregates reflect a causal connection or is an artefact of aggregation. 
The Markov and Faithfulness conditions become relevant only after non-causal 
candidate explanations are eliminated.
Even when non-sample explanations are ruled out, because of the existence of 
causally equivalent models, the Markov and Faithfulness conditions are not sufficient 
to pin down a single causal model. Given a causal model, there is always a simple 
rule to generate a class of equivalent models. Since the coefficient estimates of the 
common edges are not invariant across the models and their sign and significance 
vary from one model to another, very little or often, nothing can be learnt from data 
without further subject matter information. Specifically, extra subject matter 
information is needed to reduce the class of causally equivalent models by excluding 
unlikely but possible causal models.
The reliability of the GT algorithms, and indeed any data-driven method of causal 
inference, is contingent on the sample size and the joint distribution of the variables 
under study. The GT algorithms proceed by assuming that the data comes from a 
multivariate normal distribution. When the sample is large, this assumption may be 
justified, and one can reliably test independence hypotheses. But, in practice, where 
the samples are small, the normality assumption can lead to wrong conclusions. As a 
general rule, since the known multivariate distribution families are very limited, and 
all make the restrictive assumption that the marginal distributions of the variables 
belong to the same family, in practice test of independence hypotheses needs great 
care.
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Also, for analysis of policies and actions, one needs to know not only whether an 
equation in a model represents a causal relation but also the circumstances under 
which it remains invariant. Recall Haavelmo’s remarks about the relation between 
pressure on the throttle and acceleration of the car (Haavelmo, 1944). For forecasting 
the effect of taking a car to a territory not yet explored one needs to know not only 
whether putting pressure on throttle makes the car accelerate but also the 
circumstances under which the relation remains invariant. The methods studied here 
are at best suited for discovering a causal structure, understood as a complex of type- 
level causal connections (Cartwright, 1997:435). They are not suitable for 
understanding the circumstances under which the structure continues to operate. This 
needs knowledge of the experimental conditions or the chance set-up, to use 
Cartwright’s phrase (1997:357), which have given rise to and sustain the causal 
relations.
These analyses have major implications for modelling bounded rationality. They 
imply that to explain how people are able to make causal inferences from usually 
small samples one has to search for an approach, which emphasises the interaction 
between domain-specific causal knowledge and statistical learning (Griffiths, et al., 
2004). The causal knowledge is required to restrict plausible causal relationships, 
their functional form, and strength. This will limit the space of plausible models, 
making it possible to infer causal conclusions from small samples. But again, as in 
statistical model formulation, we are faced with the question of where the domain 
specific knowledge comes from. One thing is clear about this question. The 
information does not come from a statistical analysis of data. The IS hypothesis does 
not provide a full account of human causal learning.
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Appendices
Appendix A: The Path Analysis Principle
We state the proofs of the two principles for the case where there are only three 
variables X, Y and Z under investigation.31 Extension to more general cases is 
straightforward. Since for the current purpose there is no interest in the first moments, 
each variable is expressed as a deviation from its mean.
Proof of the fist principle:
Let
Assumption (i): ux,uz, and uy areuncorrelated, and 
Assumption (ii): uz and X, and uy and Z are uncorrelated.
Given these assumptions, the objective is to establish that p  = 0.
Multiply both sides of the equation for Z with X. Taking expectations of both sides of 
the equation gives
Also multiply both sides of the equation for Y with Z. Taking expectations of both 
sides of the equation yields
Multiplying both sides of the equation for Y with X  and taking expectations of both 
sides of the equation leads to
Z = a xzX + u z 
Y = a yzZ + uy.
(Al)
E{XZ) / E( X2) = p xz= a xz. (A2)
E(YZ)IE{Z2) = p yz = a yz. (A3)
E( YX) / E(X2) = p xy= a xza :xz  y z  ’ (A4)
Therefore,
P x y  P x z  P y z  •
31 This appendix is based on Irzik, 1987.
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Finally, recall the expression for partial correlation
= (/>, -  PnP„)/Q- - P i ) ' ' 2*)- P)z ) '"  • (A5)
Since the numerator is zero (because p  = p xzp yz), p ^  z -  0.
The proof for the second principle is quite similar. We replace (Al) with
(A6)
Y = a yzZ + uy
and compute p a , p yz, and p ^ .
Appendix B: The Conditional Independence Properties
Some of the properties of conditional independence, studied by Dawid (1979), 
include:
(1) Symmetry: (X  1  Y/ Z)  => (Y 1  X I Z ) ;
(2) Decomposition: (X  1 YWIZ)  => (X 1  Y / Z ) ;
(3) Weak union: (X ±YW/ Z)=> (X ± Y / Z W ) :
(4) Contraction: (X  ±  Y/ Z)  & (X 1 W/ ZY)  => (X 1  Y W/ Z ) ;
(5) Intersection: (X ± W  / ZY) &( X ±W Y I ZW)^> (X ±YW  I Z ) .
For a detailed discussion of these properties see Pearl (1988:82-83).
Appendix C: The Common Cause Principle
Consider a DAG G true of variables V = {X,,...,Xn}. Define X c as a common cause 
of X a and X b in Vjust in case there is a directed path from X c to X a and a directed 
path from X c t oXb. Let C denote the set of common causes of X a and X b in the
Claim: Suppose X a and X b are conditionalized on C. If X a is not a cause of 
X b and X b is not a cause of X a, then every path between X a and X b in G 
is ^-separated (inactive or blocked).
32 The proof to follow is based on a footnote in Amtzenius, (1999).
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For any path P between X a and X b, either (i) P departs from X a (i.e., is out ofXa) 
or (ii) it arrives at X a (i.e., is into X a).
Case (i): Suppose P is a path out ofXa. Since X a is not a cause o f Xb, the path 
cannot be a directed path, and therefore along the way to X b it must reach a 
colliderX d. Since neither X d nor any of its descendent is in C, X d blocks (d- 
separates) the path between X a and X b.
Case (ii): Suppose P is a path into X a . Since X b is not a cause of X a , the path cannot 
be a directed path, and therefore somewhere along the way it must change direction. 
Starting from X a and moving along the path towardsX b, there are two general 
possibilities:
(a): P changes direction at a variable X c from which there is a directed path 'mtoXb. 
In that case, X c is a common cause of X a and X b and in C, d-separating the path 
between X a andX b.
(b): Suppose the path from X c to X b is not a directed path. In that case, it must 
contain a collider X d, as in graph (a).
Graph (a)
To take up this possibility, it is enough to concentrate on path P* between X d 
andXb. As before, these paths can be of two types. Either they are into X d or they 
are out o f X d.
For any path P* that is intoXd, the whole path between X a and X b, created by 
joining the sub-paths between X a andXrf, and X d andXt , is inactive, as neither X d 
is in C nor a descendent of it.
For any path P* between X d and X b which is out of X d there is also two 
possibilities. Either it changes direction at some points between X d and X b or it 
forms a directed path towardsX b. If it forms a directed path and intersects with no
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node between X c and X a as shown in graph (b) below, node X c will be a common 
cause and is included in C. The whole path between X a and X b will be ^-separated.
Graph (b)
On the other hand, if the directed path has a common node X j with the path between 
X a and X c, there will be a directed path from Xy to X d. In that case, Xy will be a 
common cause of X a andXfc, as shown in graph (c).
Graph (c)
Since Xy is in C, the whole path between X a andXfc, formed by joining the (sub) 
path from X a to Xy with the path from Xy to X b, is ^-separated. This exhausts all 
the possibilities that matter and, therefore, the desired conclusion.
Appendix D: The Use of the Faithfulness Condition in the Traditional Methods
Variants of the Faithfulness condition underlie other data-driven approaches to causal 
inference. Suppes (1970) defines an event C,» to be a prima facie cause of an event
Et if and only if (i) t refers to a time point prior to t, (ii) the event C,* has positive 
probability, and (iii) and C,* is positively relevant to Et , that is, P(E ,/C t*) > P(Et). 
He then gives several conditions of spuriousness to distinguish genuine causes of Et 
from those events spuriously related to Et . On this account, the events that could 
possibly be causes of Et are those that are positively correlated with it; an event 
cannot be a cause of Et if it is statistically unrelated with Et . This is nothing but the 
Faithfulness condition.
As another example, consider Granger’s theory of causation (Granger, 1980). Let Q.t 
denote the complete history of the world up to and including discrete time t,
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excluding deterministic relations among the components of this history. Let X t stand 
for a random variable. Granger suggests that X t causes Y t+i if
P(Yl+l e A /£ lt)*P (Y t+l e AICI, - X t)
for some set A. He next operationalises this definition by replacing the set £1, with a 
limited information set /, that includes information on the history of the variables 
considered, i.e., I t = (X,,y(,Z ,,...), and relativizes his definition of causation with 
respect to / , .  Thus, he takes a confirmation of the statistical hypothesis of non­
causality
P(Yl+]E A /I t) = P(YtME A /I t - X , )
by the data as the evidence that X, does not causes Yt+l. The inference from the 
independence of Yt+i and X t conditional on the information set I, -  X t to the denial 
of a causal link from X , to Y t+] is a special case of the Faithfulness condition 
(Robins, 2003:89).
Appendix E: The DAG Inversion Rule
Let G be any DAG containing the edge X —> Y , and G* be a graph the same as G 
except that the edge X  —» Y is replaced with X <— Y . Then, G* is a DAG equivalent 
to G if and only if every parent of X  is a parent of Y and every parent of Y, except X, 
is a parent of 7.33
Part I (if part): Suppose G* is not a DAG (i.e., contains a cycle). Since the only 
difference between G and G*is that X Y is replaced with X  <— Y , and since G is 
a DAG, then there has to be a directed path from X  to a variable Z which is a parent of 
Y. This means Y has a parent in G which is not a parent of X, contrary to the 
assumption. So, G* is a DAG.
Now suppose G and G* are not equivalent. Then, by theorem 4.1 in the text, either G 
or G*contains an unshielded collider that is not present in the other. Since the only 
difference between G and G*is that X —>Y in G*is replaced with X <—Y , the 
unshielded collider ought to be formed from X  «- Y and X  «— Z , while Z is not a 
parent of Y. This implies that X  in G has a parent that is not a parent of Y, 
contradicting the assumption. The same argument applies if G contains an unshielded 
collider that is not in G*.
33 The proof here is based on Chickering, 1995.
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Part II (only if): Suppose X  has a parent in G that is not a parent of Y. Substituting 
X  —» Y with X  <— Y creates an unshielded collider in G*. Alternatively, suppose Y 
has a parent that is not a parent of X. Substituting X  —» Y with X <—Y destroys an 
unshielded collider which is in G. In either case, G and G* are not equivalent.
Appendix F: The Semi-Markovian Model Equivalence Theorem
Theorem 4.2: Let G(0,L)be a directed acyclic graph, X  and Y in O, and X  —> Y 
hold in G (0 ,L ). Let G*(0,L*) be the same as G(0,L) except that the directed edge 
X —» Y is replaced in G*(0,L*) with the bi-directed edge X  <-> Y . (i) G(0,L) and 
G*(0,L*) are Markovian equivalent over O if for every variable Z in O that is a 
parent of X in G, Z is also a parent of Y. (ii) Furthermore, if X  <-> Y is in G (0 ,L ), 
the bi-directed edge can be replaced with X —> Y just in case every parent of X in 
G*(0,L*) is also a parent of Y.
The proof of this theorem follows from a theorem established in Spirtes and Verma 
(1992). Several graph-theoretic notions are needed to introduce the theorem:
Inducing path relative to O: If G(0,L) is a DAG over variables V, O is a recorded 
subset of V  containing X  and Y, where X * Y , then an undirected path U between X 
and Y is an inducing path relative to O if and only if every member of O on U except 
the end points (i.e., X  and Y) is a collider on U, and every collider on U is an ancestor 
of either X  or Y.34
Inducing path graph over O: G* is an inducing path graph over O for DAG 
G(0,L) if and only if there is an edge between variables X  and Y with an arrow 
directed at Y if and only if X  and Y are in O and there is an iducing path in G(0, L) 
between X  and Y relative to O that is into Y.
Partially oriented inducing path graph over 0\ Recall, the process of GT inference 
without causal sufficiency starts by constructing a skeleton over O. For every pair X 
and Y in O, it is checked whether X and Y are independent. If so, the edge between 
them is removed. It is then searched if there is any subset Z of 0\{X ,T } such that 
conditional on Z, X  and Y are independent. If so, the edge between X  and Y is 
removed. The process is repeated for every pair of variables in O. The outcome at this 
stage is an incomplete undirected graph. Every end point between X — Y admits two 
possibilities, i.e., and '> '. To make these possibilities explicit, let us represent the 
undirected edge X — Y between every connected pair X  and Y by X o - o Y .
34 These definitions are adapted from Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993), Ch 6.
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In the next stage, we look at every triple (X, Y, Z). If there is an edge between X  and 
7, an edge between Y and Z, and no edge between X  and Z, we replace X o -o Y o -o Z  
with Xo —>Y <— o Z .
Then, for every -  o Yo - , it is checked if there can be a graph consistent with the data 
such that both ‘o’ are replaced with arrows, i.e., —>Y <—. If no such graph is 
consistent with the data, - 0 Y0 -  is replaced with -oY o - . The graphical object, thus 
constructed, represents all that can be learnt from the independence data about the 
underlying causal structure. The graph is referred to as a partially oriented inducing 
path graph over O.
With these preliminaries in hand, Spirtes and Verma establish the following:
Theorem (Spirtes and Verma, 1992): If G is a DAG over V, G* is a DAG over V*, O 
is a subset of V  and of V*, then G and G* have the same d-separation relations among 
the variablese in O if and if they have the same partially oriented inducing path graph 
over O 35
Given this theorem, the proof of theorem 4.2 is strightforward:
(i) Suppose G(0,L) and G*(0,L*) are defined as in the first part of Theorem 4.2 
but are not Markovian equivalent over O. By the above theorem, G*(0,L*) has a 
partially oriented inducing path graph over O different than that of G (0 ,L ). This can 
only happen if in G(0, L) X  has a parent Z in O that is not a parent of Y and Z and Y 
are independent (d-separated) conditional on X. In that case, G*(0,L*) includes the 
subgraph Z —> X <— L -* Y  that makes Z and Y dependent conditional on X. 
However, by assumption, every parent of X in O is a parent of Y in G (0 ,L ). So, both 
DAGs have the same partially oriented inducing path graph and are Markovian 
equivalent over O.
(ii) Suppose G(0,L) and G*(0,L*) are as defined in the second part of the theorem. 
That is, they just differ in that X Y is in G(0,L) but X  —> Y in G*(0,L*). If 
G(0,L) and G*(0,L*) are not Markovian equivalent, it follows that G(0,L) and 
G*(0,L*) produce different partially oriented inducing path graphs over O. Again, 
this can only happen if X  in G*(0,L*) has a parent Z in O that is not not a pamt of Y 
and Z  and Y conditional on X  are indepenent (d-separated). By assumption, every 
parent of X  in O is also a parent of Y in G*(0,L*). Both DAGs, therefore, generate 
the same partially orineted inducing path garph and are Markovian equivalent over O.
35 This theorem is restated, somewhat differently, as corollary 6.4.1 in Spirtes, Glymour, Scheines 
(1993:189).
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In either case, the condition given in the lemma is sufficient for the equivalence of 
G(0,L) and G*(0,L*).
Appendix G: The Limited Block Recursive Theorem
A proof for theorem 4.3 is found in Raykov et al. (1999:238-43). The proof is based 
on a proposition, established by these authors, which provides a general procedure for 
checking model equivalence. We outline the proof to explain how it can in general be 
checked whether two models are equivalent. To state the proposition, several 
technical notions are needed:
The first is the concept of parameter transformation. Let M , and Af 2 stand for two 
models, with parameter spaces 0  and 0  * respectively. Call g : 0  —> 0  * a 
parameter transformation (mapping) if for each 6 e 0  there is an 0*e 0 *  such that 
6 is mapped into 6 * by g; that is, 6* = g(0).
The mapping g : © —» © * is called surjective if for each 0* e 0  * there exists an 
0 e  0  such that 6 * is mapped into 6 by g. A surjective transformation is an “onto” 
mapping. And, A/, and M 2 are said to satisfy X-condition if, for all 6 e 0 ,  there is 
a g  such that
where ^  {6) is the covariance matrix implied by the parameter vector 6 for model 
Af, and J ] 2[g(0)] is the derived covariance matrix for model Af2.
Raykov et al.’s theorem (1999:206) can now be stated as follows:
General Model Equivalence Proposition: Two models Af, and M 2 are equivalent 
if and only if they fulfill the ^-condition with a surjective transformation 
g : 0  —» 0  * relating their parameters (Raykov, et al., 1999:206).
Informally, two models are equivalent if a transformation of the parameters of one of 
them can be found that preserves the implied covariance matrix, and covers the whole 
parameter space of the other.
The proof for theorem 4.3 then involves establishing that there is a transformation g 
such that (i) the model before applying the theorem, denoted by A/,, and the model 
obtained by applying the theorem, denoted by Af2, satisfy the ^-condition; and (ii) g  
is surjective. To state the proof, some further notations and preliminaries are needed:
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1. Notations:
M ,: the model before replacement of X  —» Y with bi-directed edge X  <-» Y ;
A/2: the model after replacement of I  f ) 7  for X —> Y ;
P = : the vector of common explanatory variables (parents) of X  and Y\
Q = (Ql,...,Qn)': the vector of additional explanatory variables (parents) of Y 
(m, n > 0).
Every limited block recursive model can in principle be decomposed into three 
blocks. They are the preceding block, focal block, and succeeding block. So, M, can 
be decomposed into a preceding block (PB) with variables Vp, a focal block (FB) 
with Vf (= (X ,Y)), and a succeeding block (SB) with Vf . Several assumptions are 
made about M ,:
(I) The relations across \ p, \ f  and \ s are recursive.
(II) The relations within the focal block \ f  are only recursive.
(HI) M , is identified
Thus, A/, can be stated as:
V =A  V +E„,
p  p p  p  p *
X  = a 'P  + «,
Y = b'P + c'Q + AX+v (FI) 
= (b'+zl.a' )P + c' Q + (Au + v), A * 0
Vs = A psV p +KVf +LVs +Es.
where
■ A pp is a p X p  matrix containing all regression coefficients in the PB;
■ a and b. are m xl vectors containing the partial regression coefficients of X 
and Y upon the common explanatory variables of X  and Y ;
■ c is an n x l  vector containing the partial regression coefficients of Y on its 
additional explanatory variables;
■ A ps is the coefficient matrix relating the SB-variables to the PB variables;
■ K contains two columns, representing the coefficients of X  and Y, relating the 
SB-variables to X  and Y;
■ L  is a coefficient matrix relating the SB-variables to each other; and
■ u and v are uncorrelated.
Model M 2 obtained by replacing X Y for X —> Y is defined as
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u and w are no longer assumed to be uncorrelated. Note that the replacement leaves 
all the equations expect the equation for Y unchanged, and in this equation nothing 
has changed regarding the variables in Q, which do not enter into the equation for X. 
Before showing that Af, and Af 2 are equivalent, it is useful to state some rules for 
calculating the required covariance matrices.
2. Simple rules of covariance algebra (Bollen, 1989):
(I) For any random variable X  with finite second-order moment,
Cov(X,X) = Var(X), and
(I) For any random variables X, Y, Z and U with finite second-order moments,
and any real numbers a, b, c, and d,
Cov(aX + bY, cZ + dU) =
acCov(X ,Z) + adCov(X ,U) + bcCov(Y,Z) + bdCov(Y,U).
To establish that Af, and M 2 are equivalent it must be shown that there is a 
surjective transformation vector function g , mapping every element of 0  onto © *, 
and satisfies the ^-condition. sjnce the replacement of X —» Y with X <-> Y leaves
all the elements of the parameter vector 6 for A/, unchanged except (b{ bm), X
and , where o vv is the variance of v, one only needs to find a surjective mapping 
g  for these parameters. For the rest of the elements in 6 , the required mappings are 
identity functions. To define the transformation g  for the parameters changed by the 
replacement, the parameters of Af, are held as fixed to define the corresponding 
parameters of Af 2 as
With g thus defined, it remains to show that M , and M 2 satisfy the ^-condition and 
that g is surjective. For model M {, let
^  : the covariance matrix of the preceding block; 
Z1 : the covariance matrix of the focal block;ff
^  : the covariance matrix of the succeeding block;
J ] 1 : the covariance matrix of the variables in preceding and focal block;
J ] 1 : the covariance matrix of the variables in preceding and succeeding block;
J !  : the covariance matrix of the variables in the focal and succeeding block.
The covariance matrix implied by the model for parameter vector 0 can be 
partitioned as:
Model 1
V, V,
V, I > )
V/ 5 > 5 >
V, z > x > ) I> >
Similarly, the covariance matrix implied by model M 2 for 6* = g(6) can be 
partitioned as,
Model 2
V, v,
V, ! > ( * > ]
V/ H jr i s m
V, Z > w i
To establish the ^-condition, it must be shown that:
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E’(*) = X - ’ (U = *./.P) (F4)
The transformation g : 0  —» 0 * , defined by equation (F3) leaves and
Xp5 unchanged. For these matrices, equation (F4) is trivially true. It remains to show 
that
( i ) Z ^ W  = Z j [ g W ] ;
<H> I  > ) = ! > ( * ) ] •
The process of establishing (i) and (ii) is similar. So, we describe the steps in 
establishing (ii). Let V . be any variable from the preceding block V . Since the
equation for X  in both models is the same, the covariance of X  with Vpi remains
unchanged by g. To establish (ii), it is therefore enough to show that the covariance of
Y with each V . in V„ satisfies the T-condition.Pi p
Let App{i) be the row of coefficients in the coefficient matrix A pp relating V . to its 
predictors. Using the covariance rules (I) and (II), for any Vpi in \ p in model M, we 
have
Cov(Y,Vpi) = A pp (0Cov(Vp,PW +Aa') + A pp (i)Cov(yp ,Q )c. (F5)
Applying transformation g , defined by (F3), to the right hand side of this equation 
yields
A pp (/)Cov(V,,P)B + A pp (i)Cbv(Vp,Q )c. (F6)
Applying the covariance rules (I) and (II) to model M 2 to compute the covariance of
Y with any variable Vpi in \ p yields
A pp (i)Cov(yp ,P)B +A pp (i)Cov(Vp, Q)c, (F7)
which is identical with (F6). So, condition (ii) holds. A similar reasoning can be used 
to establish (i). The two models satisfy the ^-condition. It remains to show that g  is 
surjective.
Recall in equation (F3), we hold the parameters of the original model M x fixed to
define the parameters of the transformed model M 2. To establish the surjectivity of
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g, the parameters of model M 2 is held fixed in order to define the parameters of 
model My, which yields
b, — B. — (a  la  )a,1 1 V uw  l  uu '  \
b~. = B, -  (<y /cr )a,2 2 ^ uw l  uu '  2
(F9)b =B - ( a  la  )am m  '  uw l  u u '  m
-  G ww ~  ( ° u J ° u u  ) 2 (7 uu
X = <j  l<Juw l uu
The surjectivity of g  is established by deriving the covariance Cov(Y,Vpi) of each 
variable V . in V^ , of model M 2 using rules (I) and (II), restating the result using 
equation (F9), and checking that the result is the same as the one obtained by 
applying the rules to M, to compute Cov(Y,Vpi) for each V . in \ p. This will show 
that the two models are equivalent.
The proof of the second part of the theorem follows a similar path, with the difference 
that we start with model M 2. To define g, the parameters of M 2 are held fixed and 
the parameters of M x are accordingly derived (as done in F9). It is then shown that 
the implied covariance matrices are the same. Raykov et al.’s method is quite general. 
It can be used for checking the Markovian equivalence of any two structural models.
Appendix H: Examples from MacCallum et al. (1993)
Two sets of equivalent models are reproduced from MacCallum et al. (1993). The 
first illustrates how the significance of a parameter estimate for a path between two 
variables varies across equivalent models. The second illustrates how the sign of a 
parameter estimate varies across the models.
Model I
MacCallum et al. narrate this model from a study by Meece, Blumenfeld, and Hoyle 
(1988).
In the original model, the exogenous variable of intrinsic motivation expresses the 
degree to which a student’s learning is characterized by intrinsic interest whereas the 
exogenous variable of science attitudes reflects the extent of a student’s interest and 
enjoyment in science. Task mastery goals and ego-social goals represent differing 
goal orientations in achievement situations. The primary aim of task mastery goals is 
to independently master the task at hand, whereas the primary aim of ego-social goals
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is to demonstrate high ability socially. Finally, active cognitive engagement 
represents a student’s use of cognitive strategies representative of self-regulated 
learning (e.g., reviewing difficult material).36
Original Model Model 2B
.li* Int.
Mot
Sci.
Att.
Ego
Goal
Model 2C Model 2D
, l r
Sci.
Att ' i i ’
Ego
Goal
Task
Goat!
Ego
Goal
Set.
Att
The significance of the coefficient path from science attitude to ego-social goal 
varies across the models.
Model II
MacCallum et al. narrate this model from a study by Sidanius (1988) in the field of 
social and personality psychology.
1 These definitions are exactly quoted from MacCallum et al. (1993:191)
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9
The firs variable in the original model is cognitive orientation, representing the 
interest a person has in politics and the importance he places in understanding 
politics. Print media usage reflects the degree to which people make use of the print 
media in obtaining political information. Political sophistication represents one’s 
knowledge of politics and the complexity with which one thinks about politics. 
Political deviance represents a person’s level of political extremity, and self- 
confidence reflects overall global confidence. Finally, racism is the extent to which 
an individual holds racist attitudes and beliefs towards ethnic groups.37
Prim
Media
Cog.
Orica Racism
Poitt.
Dev.Model 4B
Cog,
Orieo.
Model 4C
Print
Media
Model 4 0
Priiit
M edia
' Self  ^
. Con fid v Racism
Compare the sign of the parameter estimate for the path between political 
sophistication and self-confidence in the Original Model and Model 4D.
37 These definitions are exactly quoted from MacCallum et al. (1993:194).
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Chapter 6
The Economy as an Interactive System
An Appraisal of the Microfoundations Project
1 Introduction
In order to have a useful theory of relations among aggregate, it is 
necessary that they be defined in a manner derived from the theory of 
individual behaviour. In other words, even the definition of such 
magnitudes as national income cannot be undertaken without a previous 
theoretical understanding of the underlying individual phenomena (Arrow, 
1968).
This thesis began with stating some of the difficulties standing in the way of 
establishing a structural model of the economy: Firstly, for social and practical 
reasons, the economy cannot be subjected to controlled experiments in order to 
establish causal relations true of the variables representing the state of the 
economy. Secondly, because of the theoretical difference between a causal and 
statistical relation, the causal structure cannot be discovered by atheoretical 
statistical analysis of aggregate data. And finally, aggregate data are inherently 
imprecise, a fact that aggravates the difficulties in drawing causal inferences from 
observational data. The key to achieving the objectives of macroeconomics is to 
find a way around these difficulties, which make establishment of causal relations 
at the economy level problematic.
These difficulties, according to mainstream economists, can be evaded by 
beginning with a model of individual behaviour. It is argued that we often 
intuitively know how human beings make decisions, and even if intuition fails to 
lead us to the laws of behaviour, we can study human behaviour in an 
experimental environment to establish an empirically accurate theory of 
behaviour. Having established a theory of individual behaviour, we can transform 
it into a theory of the economy using aggregation procedures. Aggregate data can 
then be used to estimate the model and obtain a quantitative model of the 
economy. Since the structure is determined by the laws of behaviour and the 
model is based on behavioural laws, it correctly describes the economy. 
Specifically, it describes how aggregate variables relate to each other, classifies 
them into exogenous and endogenous categories, defines the conditions under 
which the aggregate equations remain invariant, and fixes the interpretation of the
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aggregate model parameters. So, the model provides all the information necessary 
for policy analysis.
The enterprise of deriving the correct macroeconomic theory from microeconomic 
theory, termed the microfoundations project, is the hallmark of modem theoretical 
macroeconomics. Two central assumptions underlie the project. One is that there 
exists or it is possible to establish an empirically adequate theory of 
microeconomic behaviour. The other is that microeconomic theory can be turned 
into a theory of the economy using aggregation procedures, without having to 
introduce any substantive assumption about the economic structure. The last four 
chapters studied some of the commonly accepted tenets in economics about 
individual behaviour. This chapter takes up the second hypothesis which has to do 
with the move from the micro to the macro level.
The search for microfoundations is the concern of all those economists who think 
that macroeconomics is something more than the art of summarising data and can 
establish structural models suitable for analysis of policies. New classical and 
Keynesian economists have both searched for microfoundations. Despite this, 
most systematic attempts to found models of large-scale economic phenomena on 
assumptions about individual behaviour have taken place in new classical 
economics. As a result, this chapter confines itself to an analysis of the efforts 
made in new classical economics. Nevertheless, since the analysis has to do with 
the general issue of moving from individualistic assumptions to a theory of the 
economy, it is equally relevant to any attempt at deriving a macroeconomic theory 
from a microeconomic theory.
There is more than one view of microeconomic theory in new classical 
economics. According to one vision of microeconomics, the basic unit of 
economic analysis is a single decision-maker, either a consumer or a firm. The 
consumer is modelled as an expected utility maximizer and the firm as an 
expected profit optimiser. On this account, a call for microfoundations is a call for 
a model of the economy in which the starting point is an expected utility or profit 
maximisation problem. To model some aspect of the economy, a utility (or profit) 
maximisation problem is set up for an individual and solved subject to his budget
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constraint in order to derive a model of the micro variables of interest. The model 
is then elevated to the economy level. This approach is referred to as the 
“representative agent” modelling approach to macroeconomics.
An alternative view of microeconomic theory in new classical economics is 
presented by the Walrasian general equilibrium theory in which the decision 
problems of various sectors of the economy, each represented by a representative 
agent, are simultaneously solved. To account for uncertainty about future, the 
theory is supplemented by the rational expectations hypothesis. From this 
perspective, the microfoundations project is an attempt to derive the laws of the 
economy from the assumptions of the Walrasian theory and the rational 
expectations hypothesis. Since the Walrasian theory makes minimal assumptions 
about the structure of the economy, this account of the microfoundations thesis is 
known as the strict microfoundations thesis (Rizvi, 1994:357).
This chapter criticises both interpretations of the microfoundations thesis. In a 
nutshell, the representative agent modelling approach conceives of the economy 
as a society of identical isolated individuals. And the strict microfoundations 
approach conceives of the economy as a collection of few sectors, each being 
populated by identical decision makers, who only interact through equilibrium 
prices. However, most macroeconomic phenomena arise from informational 
differences, behavioural heterogeneities, coordination failures, and interactions 
among market participants. Any satisfactory explanation of macroeconomic 
phenomena, therefore, calls for thinking of the economy as a society of 
heterogeneous interactive individuals. In such a society, the relations true of the 
aggregates are fundamentally different from those true of the micro variables, and 
there is no way that the former can be derived from the latter alone. Besides the 
microeconomic relations, one also needs to know a great deal about the structure 
of the society in order to derive the correct form of the aggregate relations.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 characterizes the 
structure of the representative agent modelling approach, describes a 
representative agent-based macroeconomic model, and studies the conditions 
under which the behaviour of a collection of individuals can be modelled in terms
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of the behaviour of a single agent. It then explains why the modelling approach is 
inappropriate for studying the economy. Section 3 takes up aggregation issues 
arising from individual heterogeneity. In particular, it studies the theory of exact 
aggregation to examine how far one can go in accounting for individual 
heterogeneity while preserving a simple, and manageable, relation between the 
laws of micro variables and those of macro variables. Section 4 first discusses the 
strict microfoundations thesis and then examines some of the issues that 
interaction creates for the microfoundations project. Section 5 concludes the 
chapter.
2 The Representative Agent Modelling Approach
Most modem economies consist of millions of decision makers, either as 
individuals or organised groups, each pursuing their own disparate interest in a 
limited part of the economy. These individual and group activities are somehow 
coordinated, leading to certain regularities at the economy level, which form the 
subject matter of macroeconomics. If we were in a position to simultaneously 
study the behaviour of every decision-making unit in the economy and model its 
interaction with other decision-making units, we would be able to predict the 
emergence of macroeconomic regularities by simulating the evolution of the 
economy. However, we are not omniscient and this avenue is closed to us. All the 
same, many individuals or groups often encounter similar choice situations, have 
similar tastes and demographic characteristics, and behave similarly. Moreover, 
individual idiosyncratic differences sometimes neutralise each other in the real 
life. A satisfactory understanding of the economy does not then necessarily 
require simulating the whole system including the details of each decision-making 
unit. It is sufficient to work with an idealised, smaller, model economy in which 
the behaviour of each group of ‘similar’ decision-making units is represented by 
an average unit (agent). Some economists, like Jevons, have taken this 
consideration to an extreme. According to Jevons, “accidental and disturbing 
causes will operate, in the long run, as often in one direction as the other, so as to 
neutralize each other.” Thus, “the general forms of the laws of economics are the
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same in the case of individuals and the nations” (Jevons, 1965 [1871]: 16-17).1 
Hicks has even gone further to suggest that microeconomic theory has greater 
relevance for aggregate data, arguing that the variations in circumstances of 
individual households are averaged out to negligible proportions in the aggregate, 
leaving only systematic effects of variation in prices and budgets (Hicks, 1956).2 
Such thoughts have led to the emergence of a modelling approach that views the 
economy as a single average individual, implying that whatever is true of the 
individual is also true of the economy, hence the nomenclature of representative 
agent modelling.
2.1 The Structure of the Representative Agent Approach
In new classical economics, two central assumptions regarding individual 
behaviour are the expected utility optimisation hypothesis (Friedman and Savage, 
1952) and the rational expectations hypothesis (Lucas and Sargent, 1979). In this 
school of thought, the point of departure in building a representative agent model 
is to specify the optimisation problem of an agent (a household or a firm) and 
solve it subject to his budget constraint and rational expectations. The solution 
yields the individual decision rules and the relationships among the individual 
variables. In the second stage, the well-defined individual model is taken to be 
exactly true at the aggregate level. Aggregate variables are inserted into the model 
to transform it into a qualitative model of the economy or some aspect of it. In the 
final stage, aggregate data are used to estimate the model parameters, turning it 
into a quantitative model of the economy. If the model fits aggregate data, the 
conformity is taken as evidence for the truth, or at least, the empirical adequacy of 
the microeconomic model. If it does not fit the data, the blame is placed on the 
individual assumptions built into the model, like the form of the utility function or 
the variables entering it. In this manner, the new classical representative agent 
methodology seeks to meet all the challenges of macroeconomic modelling. It 
aims to specify the form of the relations linking aggregate variables, the 
conditions under which the model equations remain invariant, and the proper
1 See also Marshall, 1890 [ 1961:174].
2 See Deaton et al. 1981:149.
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interpretation of the macro model parameters. On this interpretation of the 
microfoundations thesis, only those macro models that are grounded on utility 
optimisation subject to rational expectations are regarded as acceptable for policy 
evaluation.
2.2 A Historical Example
Before proceeding to study the requirements of the representative-agent modelling 
methodology, we study a classic representative agent model that has been the 
source of many controversies and insights in the recent history of 
macroeconomics. The study will later help us bring to the fore various 
assumptions underpinning a representative agent model. 3 An issue in 
macroeconomics concerns the relation between aggregate consumption and 
aggregate income. Several empirical studies during the third quarter of the last 
century implied that aggregate income was a good predictor of current aggregate 
consumption (Blanchard et al., 1989, chapter 6). This result seemed to contradict 
the idea that people form expectations rationally, and make their consumption 
decisions according to the permanent income hypothesis. In a classic paper, 
Robert Hall (1978) set out to shed light on this issue by testing the implications of 
the permanent income hypothesis for aggregate income and consumption data. He 
did this by following the representative-agent modelling method.4
According to the permanent income hypothesis, a household chooses how much 
to spend at time t as part of a plan that takes into account future uncertainty in 
income by optimising over time with regard to available wealth.5 To make this 
idea precise, let r be the real rate, T the length of economic life, and m.(.) a
strictly concave one period utility function. Furthermore, let C„ be consumption
by consumer i in period t, Yit income in period t, Ait assets apart from human
3 A thorough analysis of the representative agent modelling approach is given in Hartley (1997).
4 A discussion of Hall’s methodology is given in Granger (1999:42-48).
5 Here, the permanent income hypothesis is taken to be the idea that permanent income is the 
annuity value of current financial and human wealth, and consumption is equal to permanent 
income.
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capital, and S  the consumer’s rate of subjective time preference so that £1 now 
and £(1 + S) 1 next period are equally valued. The permanent income hypothesis 
says that, in each period t, family i decides on its consumption plan by 
maximising the expected lifetime utility
Et in (2.1) denotes mathematical expectation conditional on all information 
available at t including Cit_T, Yit_T, and Ait_T, for T = 0,1,2,.... Hall also assumes 
that the real rate of interest r  is constant, the subjective rate of time preference S  
is equal or less than r, incomes Yit are stochastic and are the only source of
uncertainty, and lets T go to infinity. The first-order necessary condition for 
maximisation of equation (2.1) subject to constraint (2.2) is the famous Euler 
equation
where u (C) = du(C )/dC . This equation says that the expected marginal utility 
next period is the same as marginal utility this period, except for a trend 
associated with the rate of time preference S  and the real rate of interest r. 
Another way to express the same idea is
where y = (1 + d) /(I + r) and £it+] denotes the difference between the marginal 
utility next period and its current expected value. Assuming that expectations are 
rational, £t+l is a random variable with expected value zero at time t, when
(2.1)
subject to the amount of available wealth
(2.2)
E,U, (C,„, ) = [(l + <5)/(I + r)]«; (C,,), (2.3)
ui (Cil+i) yut (C ,) + £il+l, (2.4)
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consumption Cit is decided. Equation (2.4) implies that no information available 
in period t apart from the level of consumption Cit helps predict future 
consumption Cit+l. Once Cit is taken into account, individual income and assets at 
time t or earlier and past consumptions Cit_j , for j  >0 , are irrelevant for 
predicting the next period marginal utility.
Hall simplifies matters by assuming the utility function ui(.) is quadratic,
«,(C») = - ( C j '-C il)2/2 .  where C is the bliss level of consumption.6 This leads 
to the individual consumption function:
According to this equation, the change in individual consumption is the amount 
warranted by innovations in expectations about future labour income. Formally,
variable observed in period t or earlier will have a nonzero coefficient when added 
to the equation.
Hall next assumes that if individual consumption exhibits random walk behaviour, 
aggregate consumption also by and large mimics random walk behaviour. 
Therefore, if the above assumptions are approximately true of a typical household, 
the equation,
6 A bliss utility level is a level beyond which the marginal utility of consumption is negative 
(Deaton, 1992:179). Note that equation (2.5) is based on the assumption that 8  equals r; 
otherwise, the equation includes an intercept.
(2.5)
this means that individual consumption obeys a random walk.7 So, no other
(2.6)
A random walk sequence is an example of a martingale sequence. A sequence Z  is a martingalet
if  E[Zt /  Z ,_ ,, Z t_2 ,...] = Z (_ j. Z t is then a random walk if Z t = Z t_{ + u t where Cov(ut , us ) = 0 
for all t ^  s .
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provides a good approximation of the behaviour of aggregate consumption C,.
The permanent income hypothesis, Hall concludes, rules out any systematic 
influence of any variable on current aggregate consumption other than last period 
aggregate consumption.8 Equation (2.6) can thus be tested by embedding it in a 
wider model such as
C,+1 = XCt + (xCt_{ + pYt + et+l,
and checking the significance of the coefficients a  and (3 . Hall tested equation
(2.6) by regressing aggregate consumption changes on lags of aggregate 
consumption, income and stock prices. He found little predictive power for 
income but rejected nonpredictability for stock prices. He concluded that while 
data on income confirm the permanent income hypothesis, the data on stock 
prices disconfirm it (Hall, 1989:157). Flavin (1981) also studied the relation 
between aggregate income and consumption in a similar setting and argued that 
there was enough predictive power for aggregate income to reject the permanent 
income hypothesis.
2.3 The Requirements of the Representative Agent Approach
Hall’s analysis is a typical example of the representative agent modelling 
approach to the study of large-scale economic phenomena. An analysis of this 
approach calls for addressing three related issues: The first is concerned with the 
conditions under which the behaviour of a collection of individuals can be 
modelled as the behaviour of a single individual. The second is related to the 
plausibility of the conditions. And the third, and in fact the most important, issue 
has to do with the usefulness of the representative agent models for understanding 
large-scale economic phenomena. We begin with the first query.
Significant decisions always involve uncertainty and, as a result, one has to work, 
as done by Hall, with a dynamic model of individual behaviour. Nevertheless, it is
8 Hall’s exercise is an example of testing for non-Granger causality (Sargent, 1987:94).
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convenient to first study the conditions required for the existence of a 
representative agent in a static setting, and then investigate the additional 
conditions that may be needed in a dynamic setting. Consider an economy of n 
consumers and m goods. Each individual i has utility function ui (.), income
(expenditure) X it at time t, and demands Y it = (Yi7] for m goods at time t.
Further, suppose everyone in the economy faces the common price vector 
P* = Ptm) . 9 Each agent i maximises his utility subject to his budget 
constraint, arriving at the individual consumption function:
where Y, = ^  Yit . Finally, let X, = denote aggregate expenditure. Our
question regarding the circumstances under which a representative agent exists 
has two different components. The first concerns the conditions under which there 
exists a macro function F(X ,,Pf) such that
The second relates to the conditions under which the aggregate consumption 
function F(X ,,P ,) can be derived from maximization of a utility function subject
to total income X, and price vector P ,. Before addressing these questions, note
that the setting is quite general in the sense that the individual function f t can
take any form and the variables X it and Yit can be interpreted in different ways.
For instance, as in Hall’s model, Yit can be current consumption and X it lagged
9 A weighted sum of the individual demand functions with each function multiplied by the price of 
the corresponding commodity is equal to expenditure £ Pmfmi = xi '
(2.7)
The aggregate demand of m goods will be
(2 .8)
(2.9)
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consumption. To preserve consistency, for the time being, we take Yit to be 
consumption and X it income.
Gorman (1953) establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
existence of a macro function of the form F(X ,,P ,) in a static setting. Theorem 
(2.1) states these conditions:
Theorem 2.1: Aggregate consumption function (2.9) exists if and only if the 
individual demand functions (2.7) take the form:
that is, if and only if the individual demand functions are (i) linear in income and
(ii) are identical up to the addition of a term that depends only on the common 
price vector (Gorman, 1953).10
Demand function (2.10), known as the Gorman polar form, restricts individual 
differences to the intercept term at (P ), requiring the slope term to be common to
all the consumers.11 If the adding up condition, Y it .P, = X it, is imposed, it follows
that ai (P, ).P, = 0 and b(Pt ).P, = 1. Whenever individual demand equations take
the Gorman polar form (2.10), the aggregate demand function can immediately be 
derived as
Gorman’s theorem requires the individual demand functions to be linear in 
income, which means the proportion of income spent by a person on consumption 
is independent of the size of his income; he spends the same portion of his income 
on goods regardless of how large his income grows. The theorem also necessitates 
identical marginal propensities to consume. That is, the income proportion that 
Bill Gates spends on each good should be same as the income proportion that a
10 For a simple statement of Gorman’s proof see Brighi (1989:5).
11 There is a vast literature on the requirements of a representative agent, including Antonelli 
(1886); Deaton and Muellbauer (1980); Gorman (1953); Green (1964); Heineke and Scheffrin 
(1990); Jorgenson, et al. (1982); Lau (1977, 1982); Lewbel (1989); Muellbauer (1975, 1976); 
Nataf (1948); and Stoker (1984, 1993).
Y# =«,(P ,) + 6(P,)X„ (2.10)
Y,=5>,<P, )+«?,)£,*. (2.11)
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person in a poor comer of the States spends on the good. These requirements, 
taken together, entail that an aggregate consumption equation of the form (2.9) 
exists if and only if total consumption is independent of the distribution of income 
in the economy. If there were two groups of households with different marginal 
reactions to income changes, a transfer of income from one group to the other 
would alter total consumption. In that case, there would be distributional effects 
that are not accounted for by total income.
As an illustration, consider an economy consisting of one rich family and three 
poor families. The rich household receives £50 per month and spends 5% of its 
income on food. Each poor family receives £10 per month and spends 25% of its 
income on food. Aggregate monthly expenditure on food in the economy is £10. 
A transfer of £5 from each poor household to the rich reduces total food 
expenditure to £7. However, if the same amount, i.e., £15, is taken from the rich 
and evenly distributed among the poor households, aggregate expenditure rises to 
£13, even though aggregate income in either case is the same. What effect does an 
increase of £10 in total income have on total expenditure? Again, it all depends on 
who gets the income. If the rich receives the extra income, total expenditure 
changes by 50 pence. But if any of the poor families receives the extra income, 
aggregate expenditure rises by £2.5. The point is that, with different marginal 
responses, knowledge of total income is not sufficient to determine total 
consumption.
Gorman (1953, 1961) also establishes the conditions under which the aggregate 
equation F (X ,,P f) is derivable from maximization of a utility function. The 
result draws on two technical notions. The first is the notion of homotheticity. A 
monotone preference relation > on a choice set X c R j  is called homothetic just 
in case x > y <=» ax > ay for all a  > 0 . 12 Homothetic preferences can be 
represented by a monotonic transformation of a homogenous of degree 1 utility 
function. The second is the notion of integrability. An individual demand function 
is called integrable if it can be generated by maximisation of a utility function
12 Here, homothetic preferences mean that the agent always spends a fixed proportion of his or her 
income on each good (Kirman, 1989:132).
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subject to a budget constraint. Having stated these preliminaries, Gorman’s 
answer to the second question can be stated as follows:
Theorem 2.2 (Gorman 1953, Nataf, 1948): Suppose the individual demand 
function (2.10) is integrable; that is, it can be derived from maximization of a 
utility function w(.). Then, aggregate demand function F(X /5Pt ) exists and is 
integrable if and only if n(.) is a homothetic utility function (See Shafer et al., 
1982, for a proof).13
Market demand function can be interpreted as a consumer demand function if and 
only if each individual demand function / ,  is derived from a homothetic utility
function «(.) common to all the consumers. In that case, for all i, F = f j .14 A
failure of homotheticity makes individual marginal propensity to consume 
dependant on the individual income level, which in turn renders total consumption 
dependant on the income distribution in the society. As an illustration, following 
Shafer et al. (1982), consider an economy with two goods and two consumers 
who have identical but non-homothetic preferences represented by 
u(x>y) = xy + y • Let the prices be (1,1). An income distribution of ml =£1 and 
m2 = £1 leads to a different demand than an income distribution of m, = 2 and 
m2 = 0. In the first case total demand for y is £2 and for x  is zero whereas in the 
second case total demand for y is £3/2 and for x is £0.5. Gorman also shows that if 
households receive strictly non-negative incomes, the homotheticity requirement 
can be replaced with quasi-homotheticity.15
2.3.1 Identical Marginal Propensity throughout Time
Theorem (2.1) and (2.2) provide the conditions for the existence of a 
representative agent in a static setting. As one moves to a dynamic setting, the
13 Also see Brighi et al., (1989), Appendix 1.
14 An assumption underlying the Gorman result is the restriction of zero expenditure at zero 
income.
15 Quasi homothetic preferences generalise homothetic preferences. Homothetic preferences imply 
Engle curves that are linear and pass through the origin. Whereas, quasi homothetic preferences 
allow vertical non-zero intercepts, leading to Engle curves that do not necessarily pass through the 
origin. A utility function creating such Engle curves is called quasi-homothetic. Engle curves 
describe demand as a function of income.
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existence of a representative agent calls for further conditions. To explore these 
conditions, note that theorem (2.1) requires the slope function b(p) to be 
independent of the individual income level. This condition necessitates identical 
marginal propensity to consume over time (i.e., throughout life), regardless of 
whether one is young, employed, or retired. Hall introduces this condition into his 
model economy by assuming that people live an infinite life, which means they do 
not need to worry about their future income.
Clarida (1990) abandons the assumption of infinite life span for individuals, 
noting that the propensity to consume declines monotonically with age (1991:854). 
He then studies the effect this presumption would have on aggregate consumption 
function and its potential for explaining empirical regularities discernible in 
aggregate data. Specifically, he considers a simple economy in which each 
consumer lives for n periods, earns income Yt during m (m<n) working periods, 
and receives nothing during the retirement periods (n-m). Consumption during 
retirement is financed by saving a portion of labour income. Individual income Yt 
follows a random walk with drift g:
yt = g  + Yl-1 +£, (2 .1 2 )
Further, the interest rate is zero and, as in Hall’s economy, every one acts 
according to the life-cycle permanent income hypothesis. In this economy, even 
though individual consumption is a random walk, aggregate consumption is not a 
random walk. In fact, if n is taken to be three and m two, average consumption 
change in the economy follows:
AC, = g + a e , + f ie  t-\ + ye t- i , (2.13)
where the sign ‘ ’ denotes average (Deaton, 1992:169). Appendix (A) explains 
the steps from (2.12) to (2.13). In this economy in which people have a finite life 
span, and face different levels of income during their life, average (aggregate) 
consumption is no longer orthogonal to lagged innovations; both parameters
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P  and y are non-zero. Nor does it respond one for one to innovations in current 
income. The economy exhibits a correlation between consumption change and 
past income (known as ‘excess sensitivity’), and the variance of consumption 
changes is much less than the variance of income changes (known as ‘excess 
smoothness’).16 Therefore, unless one is prepared to assume that households live 
forever, in a dynamic setting the representative agent methodology not only 
requires the households to have identical marginal propensity to consume at any 
time but also to have identical marginal propensity to consume throughout time. 
Or else, aggregation can produce relations that are not representative of relations 
at the individual level.
2.3.2 Identical Aggregate and Individual Income Processes
Another requirement for the existence of a representative consumer in a dynamic 
setting is that individual income and aggregate income follow the same stochastic 
process. If different processes generate individual and aggregate income, and 
consumers lack full knowledge of the aggregate income process, aggregation over 
individual consumption functions can easily create a macro consumption function 
entirely different than the individual functions. Pischke (1995) was the first to 
note this requirement. He considers an economy similar to Hall’s economy but
« n
supposes that individual and aggregate income follow different processes. 
Specifically, he assumes that the average income in the economy follows a 
random walk with drift, i.e.,
He, however, takes individual income to be the average income plus an 
idiosyncratic component that is purely transitory, represented by a white noise,
Yt =g  + Yi-i+£t . (2.14)
(2.15)
16 Since (X is less than 1. See Appendix A.
17 The statement here has draws on Deaton (1992)’s discussion of Pischke’s paper.
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where the innovations et and uit are uncorrelated. The first difference of
individual income is the first difference of the random walk, including the drift 
term plus the first difference of the white noise term:
(2.16)
The households, Pischke notes, are not in a position to infer the contemporaneous 
aggregate shock £,. As a result, they cannot separate the macro shock from the
idiosyncratic component (private shock) uit. Each individual can at best estimate
the sum of the terms from the data, which amounts to estimating the moving 
average process:
Given this result and the conditions defining Hall’s model, the change in 
individual consumption follows ACl7 = (1-/1/1 + r)rjit. Individual consumption is 
thus a random walk,
In contrast, aggregate consumption is not a random walk. It follows a second 
order autoregressive process (Appendix B),
where gt = (1-/1/1 + r)et . The difference would disappear if the households had 
knowledge of the history of aggregate income including current aggregate income 
Yt and were able to infer the aggregate income process. This would enable them
to separate the common contemporaneous shock £t from the private shock uit. In
that case, the aggregate and individual consumption functions would coincide 
(Pischke, 1995:809).
*yu=8 + *h,-Ai?u-1 - (2.17)
c u ~ c u-1 + ( l - A / l  + r )Vit • (2.18)
C, -  (A. +1 )C,_j -  AC(_2  + gt , (2.19)
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In a dynamic setting, then, for a representative consumer to exist the processes 
generating the individual and aggregate incomes should be the same. Or the 
individuals should have complete knowledge of the history of aggregate income 
to infer the aggregate income process. In fact, at a closer look, full knowledge of 
the history of the aggregate income is not enough. It must also be assumed that 
individuals with the same information make the same inferences (Grossman, et al., 
1982). Otherwise, even with full knowledge of the history of aggregate income, 
they may infer different aggregate process, which can result in a difference 
between the individual and aggregate functions. So, in a dynamic setting, the 
representative agent methodology necessitates a variant of the Harsanyi doctrine 
that people with the same information always form the same probabilistic beliefs. 
Critical analysis of the theory of objective Bayesianism has shown fundamental 
flows in the Harsanyi doctrine and in objective Bayesianism in general (more on 
this in Chapter IV).18 Moreover, information on the current aggregate variables is 
hardly available. Even the interested econometricians receive such information 
with a delay of a quarter or more. Also, there seems to be no rationale for the 
individuals to obtain such information. Gathering such information is often quite 
costly.
2.3.3 Absence of Interaction among Economic Agents
Gorman’s result demands the parameters in the individual consumption functions 
be independent of the explanatory variables varying across the individuals. Since 
the aggregate function is derived by summing over the individual functions, the 
same condition must necessarily hold of the parameters of the aggregate function. 
This necessitates absence of any interaction among decision-maker units 
populating the economy. Whenever there are interdependencies, the parameters in 
the aggregate function become dependent on the explanatory variables varying 
across the individuals. The dependence makes the form of the aggregate function 
entirely different than the individual functions, and also makes it impossible to
18 Goodfriend (1992) assumes that the agents observe aggregate income with one lag period and 
use this information to guess about contemporaneous income shock. Consumption change is then 
shown to follow an AR(1) process.
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interpret the aggregate parameters in the same way as the individual parameters. 
To see this, consider Hall’s model again. In setting up his model, Hall regards the 
real interest rate r as constant, thus assuming that it is independent of the (current) 
consumption level. The assumption is reflected in the individual consumption 
function (2.5), restated here as
(! + <?) 
(1 + r) ^ i t  ^ it+ i» ( 2.20)
In this setting, the agent takes the interest rate as given in deciding how to allocate 
his income between consumption and saving. This is reasonable. If he saves a 
little bit more or less, his action won’t affect the real interest rate. But, if everyone 
in the economy makes a similar decision, the real interest rate moves. If 
everybody saves less, the real interest rate rises, pushing asset prices down. 
Alternatively, if everybody saves more, the real interest rate falls, pushing asset 
prices up.19 Contrary to Hall’s assumption, aggregate consumption and the real 
interest rate do not move independently. The real interest rate depends on the 
consumption level and vice versa. One cannot hold one of these as constant and 
let the other vary. So, although in modelling individual consumption the real 
interest rate r can be considered as independent of the individual consumption 
level Cu , in modelling aggregate consumption the assumption that the real
interest rate r is independent of the aggregate consumption level is untenable. It 
would be conceptually wrong to write the aggregate function as
C ,+1 =
( l + D
(1 + r)
C, + £r+l ’ (2 .21)
Since the interest rate depends on the aggregate consumption level, the relation 
between current and future aggregate consumption is nonlinear (Hartley, 
1997:156). In fact, with interaction, significant differences between the micro and
19 A similar discussion is found in Dow (1988:8), Leijonhufvud, (1968: 210-211) and Snowdon 
(1994:370).
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macro consumption function do not end here. If everyone decides to save less, the 
decision increases the real interest rate, lowering the asset prices. This increases 
the opportunity cost of current consumption, thus moderating the increase in 
current consumption actually achieved. Alternatively, if everyone decides to save 
more, the decision lowers the real interest rate, pushing the asset prices up. This 
lowers the opportunity cost of current consumption, hence moderating the 
reduction in the current consumption actually achieved. Such endogenous 
fluctuations in the real interest rate and asset prices restrain intertemporal 
arrangement of consumption. The inhibition can create a tighter link between the 
future consumption and current income than is predicted by Hall’s model, which 
abstracts from fluctuations in the interest rate and asset prices. So, even if (2.20) 
were true of the individual, the aggregate consumption might still include other 
variables besides current aggregate consumption.
A consequence of these considerations is that in an interactive system the 
behaviour of an aggregate variable cannot be modelled in isolation of the 
mechanisms generating the (independent) variables affecting the variable. In the 
above setting, this means that one cannot establish an adequate theoretical model 
of consumption without simultaneously modelling the mechanisms generating 
income, asset prices, and interest rate. Since aggregate consumption also 
influences these variables, the interdependencies necessitate a non-recursive 
model to account for the feedback. So, in an interactive system, although a 
recursive model may accurately describe individual consumption behaviour, to 
describe the behaviour of aggregate consumption, one may have to adopt a non­
recursive (feedback) model.20
To sum up, the existence of a representative individual requires that the dependent 
variable in the micro functions be linear in the explanatory variables, the 
coefficient in the micro functions (except the intercept) be the same across the
20 Aware of the interdependencies between consumption, income, and interest rates in the 
economy, Michner (1984) took issue with Hall’s partial equilibrium approach, arguing for a 
general equilibrium approach to study aggregate consumption. He showed that, in the general 
equilibrium setting, the permanent income hypothesis no longer implies that aggregate 
consumption follows a random walk process. In his simple equilibrium model, aggregate 
consumption change in fact turned out to be a constant function of aggregate current income.
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individuals, the coefficients be constant over time, the mechanisms generating the 
individual and aggregate explanatory variables be the same or the agents have full 
knowledge of the mechanisms generating the aggregate explanatory variables, and 
there be no interaction among the individuals. These assumptions are incredibly 
strong and, even as gross approximation, are hardly true of the modem economies.
2.5 Problems with the Representative Agent Modelling Approach
The analysis has so far been concerned with the requirements of the representative 
agent modelling approach. It has also pointed out that the assumptions are 
incredible, and not, even approximately, true of the modem economies. This is 
not, however, the only problem with the methodology. The more serious problem 
is that it is fundamentally unsuitable for studying the economy. There are several 
reasons behind this claim, briefly stated below:
First, the assumptions underlying the representative agent modelling approach 
give rise to a view of the economy as a society of essentially identical individuals 
operating in isolated homogenous choice situations. In such a society, there is no 
place for money that is a means of exchange among agents operating in different 
decision situations, with different needs, preferences, beliefs, and attitudes 
towards risk (Friedman, et al., 1990:xii). Nor does such a society provide any 
place for the institutions created around money. Monetary institutions are for co­
ordinating among differently situated agents with different needs and beliefs, who 
do not exist in a society of identical individuals (David Colander, 1996:62). To 
give another example, if people had identical preferences, had access to identical 
information, entertained the same beliefs, and encountered identical choice 
situations, there would be no trade in securities. A society of identical individuals 
leaves no place for security markets. These markets arise because people have 
access to different information, make different inferences from the same data, 
have different attitudes towards risk, and so forth. Any attempt at explaining the 
emergence of security markets, their effects on the functioning of the economy, 
and the role of the institutions associated with them demands abandoning the 
straightjacket of the representative agent-based modelling methodology and
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taking individual heterogeneities seriously (Arrow, 1986:212). These 
considerations reveal that the difficulty with the representative agent modelling 
approach is not that it abstracts away certain aspects of the economy. Any 
modelling approach proceeds with abstraction and idealisation. The fundamental 
difficulty is that it abstracts away the very same features that are necessary for 
understanding basic economic phenomena.21
Second, an implication of the methodology is that every proposition true of the 
individual is true of the economy and every proposition true of the economy is 
true of the individual. This implication is wrong. In general, when one moves 
from the individual level to the economy level the causal status of the variables 
affected by individual decisions changes. Coffee scarcity is exogenous to one’s 
decision but it is the people who altogether cause coffee scarcity (Schelling, 
1978:78). Economic growth is exogenous to one’s decision but it is the external 
effects of individuals’ capital accumulation that causes it (Romer, 1994). Asset 
prices are exogenous to one’s decision but it is the individuals’ saving, 
consumption, and investment decisions that determine the prices (Lucas, 1978). 
Interest rate is exogenous to one’s decision but it is the individuals, saving 
decisions that determine it. Coffee scarcity, the interest rate, asset prices, 
unemployment level, economic growth, and population density should be 
regarded as exogenous in modelling individual behaviour. In modelling the 
economy, however, it is the individual decisions that have to be considered as 
exogenous. Thus, it is wrong to think that if a variable is exogenous to the agent it 
is also exogenous to the economy or if a variable is endogenous to the economy it 
is also endogenous to the individual. Failure to recognise this point results in 
fallacious conclusions about the economy.
Theoretical differences between the individual and the economy are not limited to 
the changes in the status of the variables affected by individual decisions. There is 
a multitude of other types of propositions that apply to the individual but not the 
economy or apply to the economy but not the individual. As an illustration,
21 For a list of other phenomena that cannot occur in a society of identical, entirely isolated, 
individuals, see Stiglitz, 1991.
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consider an example from Schelling (1998), which concerns the pattern of sales of 
best-seller novels, fictions, and biographies by new unknown authors. Sales data 
show that the sales of such works in a society follow a logistic path, growing 
exponentially at first, then passing an inflection point, and finally declining 
exponentially until the leftover copies are remaindered. A possible explanation for 
this pattern, Schelling says, is the following. “People who read the book, if they 
like it, they talk about it, some people more than others; the more people who read 
the book, the more people there are to talk about it. Some of the people they talk 
to buy the book; if they like it, they talk about it. Talk is proportionate to the 
number of people who have read the book; if all talk is equally effective, the 
number talking about it grows exponentially. But there is a limit to the number of 
people likely to be recruited; eventually most of those who would be interested 
have already heard of the book, maybe bought it, and when they want to talk 
about it find that there’s hardly anybody left who hasn’t already heard about it. If 
there were initially L potentially interested readers, and N  have now read it and 
want to talk about it, and everybody who has read it meets and talks about it with 
n out of the L per week, there will be N x n x L  contacts per week, with 
N x n x ( L - N )  of them potentially productive, and N  will grow logistically” 
(Schelling. 1998:34). The logistic curve discemable in the data on the sale of 
bestsellers by unknown authors cannot be attributed to a single individual. The 
key to the emergence of the curve is the finiteness of the number of interested 
readers living in a society. The curve is not crucially dependent on the particular 
decision making mechanism driving one to buy the book.22 Similar patterns are 
also likely to emerge in sales data for newly invented durable goods.
Third, a further problem relates to the suitability of the representative agent 
models for policy analysis. Policies are usually designed to influence the economy 
by changing certain distributional aspects of it. Monetary policies, for instance, 
often operate by reducing the consumption of those who are facing liquidity 
constraints. The eventual effect of any such policy surely depends on the
22 See Schelling (1978) for other categories of propositions that are true of a closed interactive 
system but not (true of the behaviour o f each person nor even, necessarily, of any groups smaller 
than the whole system (see especially around 1978:49). Also see Hartley (1997:148-9) for an 
example from rmonetary economics, due to Laidler (1982).
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distribution of assets in the economy (Stiglitz, 1991:26). However, this contradicts 
the central presumption of the representative agent models that the value of the 
aggregate dependent variable (here, aggregate consumption) is independent of the 
distribution of the explanatory variables in the economy (here, income and assets). 
On these models, as long as a policy shift is limited to a change in the distribution 
of the explanatory variables, it has no effect at all on the dependent variable. If the 
possibility of influencing the economy through distributional channels is granted, 
then one has to look for models that do not simply deal with aggregates and are 
sensitive to the distributional features (Martel, 1996:140). Analysis of policies 
calls for knowing the joint distribution of the micro variables affecting decisions, 
predicting how a policy affects the distribution, and determining how the 
distributional change affects the state of the economy as a whole. None of these 
issues can be settled within the representative agent modelling framework.
3 Modelling Heterogeneous Behaviour
The representative agent paradigm is inadequate as a framework for explaining 
macroeconomic phenomena. Essential to understanding of large-scale economic 
phenomena is to think of the economy as a system of interactive heterogeneous 
individuals. Individual heterogeneity and interaction generate considerably 
difficult aggregation issues, making the relation between micro and macro models 
extremely complicated. The interest in aggregation over interactive heterogeneous 
agents is relatively recent (Hansen, 1998:240-1). The reminder of this chapter 
studies some of the aggregation issues directly relevant to the question of whether, 
in the presence of heterogeneity and interaction, the correct form of the aggregate 
model can be derived from the micro models alone. Or inferring the correct form 
of the macro model necessitates a substantial amount of information concerning 
the structure of the economy.
This section concentrates on the aggregation problems arising from individual 
heterogeneity. It starts with a discussion of the fundamental theorem of exact 
aggregation, due to Lau (1982). The significance of this theorem is that it
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specifies the conditions that are necessary in the presence of behavioural 
heterogeneity in order for the micro models alone to determine the aggregate 
model. An analysis of the conditions and their implications enables us to assess 
the success of the microfoundations program.
3.1 The Fundamental Theorem of Exact Aggregation
Individuals differ in many respects that are relevant to economic decisions. They 
differ in their tastes, opinions, information, incomes, demographic attributes, and 
the environment they operate in. Such differences usually give rise to differences 
in preferences, making people with identical income exhibit different patterns of 
consumption behaviour, and thus affect aggregate consumption. Of all possible 
individual heterogeneities, Lau (1982) considers demographic attributes such as 
age and number of children. To spell out Lau’s result, we need to extend the 
framework adopted earlier to state Gorman’s theorems. In particular, the micro 
functions should now include additional arguments to refer to individual 
demographic attributes.23 That is,
where Y it denotes the individual consumption vector at time t, X it individual 
income, A it vector of individual attributes, P, vector of prices at time t, and N  the
Clearly, in addition to the individual demand functions, the economist also needs 
to know the joint distribution of income and attributes in the economy to compute
23 For the theory of exact aggregation see Jorgenson, et al. (1982), Lau (1977, 1982), and 
Heineke et al. (1988).
(3.1)
number of households in the economy. The aggregate demand Yt is given by the 
sum of the individual demands:
(3.2)
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total consumption using equation (3.2). The search for an aggregate consumption 
function involves finding a function that reduces the distributional information 
required to compute total consumption. To achieve such a reduction, the function 
should dispense with the need for full knowledge of the income-attributes 
distribution and make it possible to compute total consumption by using a limited 
number of statistics (indices) summarising the distribution. That is, the desired 
macro function should take the form:
where each function gz( .) , Z = 1,...,L, is an index of the income-attributes
conditions to reduce the information necessary for correctly computing total 
consumption. They include:
(1) The number of statistics (.), I = 1,..., L , in the equation must be smaller than
the number of the micro functions (i.e., l  <  n  ) for any reduction to occur in the 
information necessary for calculating aggregate consumption.
(2) The value of a statistic, summarising some aspect of a distribution, is 
mathematically invariant with respect to the ordering of the units in the population. 
Therefore, to be a statistic, the value of each function gl(X it,...,Xnt, A u...,Ant)
must be invariant with respect to whether individual i possesses attributes A* and 
income x or individual j  possesses attributes A* and income x. Swapping the 
income and attributes of two individuals should leave the value of the function 
unchanged. This means each index function gt (.) must be symmetric with respect
to subscript i through N. The symmetry requirement, as shown in Appendix C, 
necessitates the individual demand functions to be identical up to the addition of a 
term that is independent of the individual attributes and expenditure (Jorgenson, et 
al  1982:113). Formally,
(3.3)
F( 8 i (-^i/ »•••» X  Nt, A );,..., A Nt),..., g^(X yt ,..., X Nt, A 1;,..., A Ni ), Pt)
distribution such as X it and X UA U . Equation (3.3) should satisfy several
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f i ( X inA it,Pt ) = f ( X it, A it,Pl ) + ki(Pl) . (3.4)
Consequently, in order for an aggregation function of the form (3.3) to exist, all 
the individual demand functions for the same commodity must be identical up to 
the addition of a function that is independent of the individual attributes and 
income (Lau, 1982:122).
(3) Index functions g;(.), Z = 1,...,L, must be functionally independent. Or else,
some of the indices play no genuine role in reducing the necessary distributional 
information and can be omitted without harm.
(4) To ensure that each g;(.) plays an essential role, the aggregate function 
F(gl, g 2 ,...,gL,Pt) must also be invertible in the indices That is, there
must be a price vector P, such that F (g ,,g 2,...,gi ,P/ ) is invertible in glt,..,gL. 
To see why invertibility is necessary, consider function 
F(G(gl, g 2 ) ,g 3 ,...,gL,'Pt) • There is no price vector P, for this function such that
F(G(gl, g 2 ) ,g 3 ,...,gL,Ft) is invertible in g,,...,gL. The difficulty is with g t and 
g2, which are effectively a single function, namely, G (Lau, 1982:126). Taken 
together, functional independence and invertibility ensure that the aggregate 
function is represented by a minimal number of index functions gl (.)’s.
Individual demand functions that can be aggregated into an aggregate function of 
the form (3.3) are said to be exactly aggregable. The reason behind this 
nomenclature is that, when there is an aggregate function like (3.3), masking some 
aspects of the income-attributes distribution through aggregation does not 
jeopardize the ability to correctly compute aggregate consumption (Heineke et al., 
1988). Lau (1982) establishes a theorem, known as the fundamental theorem of 
exact aggregation, that defines the conditions under which individual functions
(3.1) can be exactly aggregated:
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The Fundamental Theorem of Exact Aggregation: Aggregate function (3.3) 
exists, is continuously differentiable, and satisfies conditions (1) through (4) if 
and only if the individual functions (3.1) can be written as
f ,  (X , , A , , Pt ) = bl (P, )g; (X , , A ,) + ... + bq (P, )g'L (X , , A ,) + fl, (P,) , 
i = 1 N ,
(3.5)
that is, if and only if the individual demand functions can be represented as sums 
of products of separate functions of prices and individual income and attributes 
(Jorgenson etal., 1982:104).
Equation (3.5) imposes several restrictions on the individual demand functions. 
To begin with, it requires the functions to be identical up to an additive term that 
is independent of the variables varying across individuals. In this regard, Lau’s 
theorem makes no departure from Gorman’s result. Secondly, with identical 
income and attributes, equation (3.5) excludes heterogeneity in marginal 
responses. In this respect, the theorem is a significant generalisation of Gorman’s 
result, which, with identical income, excludes heterogeneity in marginal 
responses. Thirdly, equation (3.5) requires the individual functions to be linear in 
a number of functions of individual income and attributes. However, unlike in the 
case of Gorman’s polar form, index functions ^(X ,.,, A i7) are permitted to 
depend nonlinearly on the individual income and attributes.
When the individual functions are of the form (3.5), each index gt in the 
aggregate equation (3.3) corresponds to the sum of the individual functions 
£/*(X,-,, A/;) , i.e., gt = ^.g*i (X it, A it), (1 = 1  L). Therefore, a corollary of the
exact aggregation theorem is that the indices in the aggregate demand function are 
expressible as sums of some functions, each depending only on xit or A it 
(Jorgenson, et al., 1982:106). As a consequence, the aggregate function can be 
derived from the individual equations by substituting the sum of g*(Xit, A it) for 
the corresponding index function gl (.).
The class of exactly aggregable functions, defined by equation (3.5), is the only 
class of functions where the individual functions alone determine the aggregate
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function and the meaning of the individual parameters fixes the interpretation of 
the aggregate parameters. However, this feature of exactly aggregable functions 
does not imply that if the individual functions were integrable, the aggregate 
function would also be integrable. It is only when the individual functions can be 
stated in terms of two terms g f ( X it, A it) , 1 = 1,2, that the integrability of the
functions guarantees the integrability of the aggregate function, and the existence 
of a representative agent (Muellbauer, 1975, 1976).
Lau’s theorem takes a significant step in claiming the room for individual 
heterogeneity. But the result does not yield much support for the 
microfoundations project. By reflecting on the implications of the theorem, one in 
fact begins to see the complications that individual heterogeneity creates for the 
project, even in simple situations where individual functions are exactly 
aggregable. Recall when the conditions of Gorman’s theorem are in place, 
computing total consumption requires no information about the income 
distribution. As soon as one moves away from this unrealistic situation to a 
situation where the conditions of exact aggregations are in place, one can no 
longer predict aggregate consumption from total income. Instead, one requires 
knowing quite a good deal about the income distribution in the economy to 
calculate the required statistics. To illustrate this point, consider an example 
adapted from Stoker (1993). Suppose an economy of two small and two large 
families, with different marginal propensities to consume. Let the demand 
function for the small families be Yit =b0 (T*t)X it and for the large families be
Yit =bl(Pt) X it. Further, let the attribute vector A., be a qualitative variable, with
Ait =1 denoting a small family and Ait = 0 a large family. The demand function
for each household can then be written as
which is of the form (3.5). The aggregate demand model can be written as
(3.6)
(3.7)
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Now, suppose each small family currently receives £40 as income and spends a 
fourth of his income on goods and each large family receives £60 as income and 
spends half of its income on food. The aggregate equation (3.7) predicts total food 
consumption to be £80. If total income is doubled, depending who receives the 
additional income the aggregate model yields different results. If all the income 
goes to the small families, the model forecasts total consumption to be £130. If all 
the income goes to the large families, the model forecasts total consumption to be 
less then £180. Other income distributions lead to different predictions of total 
consumption. Predicting total consumption using equation (3.7) demands 
information on the amount of total income going to the small or large families. In 
real economies, the micro parameters b, (P,) are not known and econometricians
turn to aggregate data to estimate them. This practice yields useful results if the 
relevant aspects of the distribution of the individual explanatory variables are not 
masked in the data. In the present case, the data should not be so aggregated that 
the total income going into the small families cannot be told apart from the total 
income going into the large families; the income of these family groups should be 
kept separate (Stoker, 1993:1836). As we consider real economies, the diversity of 
market participants turns out to be much richer and more complex and more 
disaggregated information is needed for estimating the correct aggregate model. 
The problem is that such information is difficult to obtain (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980).
This difficulty aside, there is also no guarantee that exactly aggregable functions 
can always be stated in the form of equation (3.5) using a small number of terms 
g](X it, A it). The effort to state individual functions in the form necessary for
exact aggregation may require a large number of terms g*(Xit, A jt) , which
results in an aggregate function with a large number of indices g, (.), again
making it difficult to reliably estimate it from samples usually available in 
practice. In practice, to counter this complexity, the analyst may need to work 
with a simplified aggregate function substantially different from the exact 
aggregate equation. The existence of a true aggregate function is one thing and the 
practicality or usefulness of the function is another thing. The microfoundations
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thesis wrongly implies that not only a true aggregate function exists but also it is 
simple enough to be estimated and used in practice.
3.2 The Effect of Nonlinearity
The requirements of exact aggregation are unrealistic and must be abandoned in 
modelling many phenomena. In reality, a household’s income must reach a 
certain level to enable it to afford a car, purchase a house, save, go on a holiday, 
send its children to private schools, move house, buy a luxury car, and so forth. 
The demand for such commodities is not linearly dependent on income, and, for 
that reason, one has to work with a nonlinear (discrete) individual consumption 
model. If behaviours follow a nonlinear pattern, the exact aggregate function can 
no longer be inferred from the individual functions alone. To correctly derive the 
aggregate function, it is necessary to know in advance the joint distribution of the 
explanatory variables (income and attributes) in the economy (Cameron, 
1990:207). This necessity will remain even if there were no heterogeneity in 
individual functions. A simple example best illustrates the issue.
Following Stoker (1993), suppose that the concern is to study the purchase of a 
single unit of a product such as a car, and that we only observe whether it is 
bought (say Yit = 1) or not (Yjt = 0 ). Further, suppose the value to family i of
buying the product depends on the price of the product Pt and the family’s
overall income X u. To be specific, suppose the net benefit (utility) of the product
for family i is given by 1 + In Pt + fi2 X it. In that case, an appropriate model of
a family z’s decision to purchase the product would be the discrete model:
Yu = f ( X it,Pt)
= 1 if 1 + ^  In Pt +P 2 X it >0
= 0 otherwise. (3.8)
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The objective is to model the aggregate demand Yt = N t iy^ Y it , which is the
proportion of the families who buy the product. How is this proportion to be 
modelled? Surely, it demands estimating the probability that a family buys the 
product, namely, p( 1 + \nPt + fi2 X it > 0) , which, of course, requires
specifying the probability distribution of income X t in the economy. Given the
income distribution, the probability that a purchase is made can be calculated and 
the derivation of the aggregate model will then be straightforward. If the 
distribution of X t is found to be, say, lognormal with lnX, having mean //, and
variance v f , the aggregate model will be:
E, ( y )  =  *[-^-(1 + A In p, + M ,«  -  A  ^ )1 , (3.9)P 2 v, 2
where Et (y) denotes the expected number of families purchasing the product and 
<£(.) is the univariate normal cumulative distribution function. If there were 
behavioural heterogeneity, for instance, if the parameters and p 1 varied 
across the families, further information about the probability distribution of the 
households would be needed to correctly compute aggregate demand and, as a 
result, the aggregate consumption model would further depart from the individual 
consumption models.24
This example points to some significant differences between aggregating over 
linear and nonlinear models. In the former case, when the requirements of the 
exact aggregation theorem hold, the individual models alone determine the correct 
macro model. In the case of nonlinear models, even when the same model is true 
of every individual, the correct form of the aggregate model depends on the 
distribution of the explanatory micro variables, and cannot be inferred from the 
micro models alone. An assumption about the distribution of the micro 
explanatory variables is an assumption about the configuration of the society.
24 See Stoker (1984, 1986 and 1993), and Cameron (1990) for a discussion of aggregation of 
nonlinear models.
361
Thus, in the case of nonlinear models, the microfoundations thesis, which only 
permits macro models that can be derived solely from purely individualistic 
assumptions, falters. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the distribution of the 
explanatory variables can be estimated in a large economy. Economic data are 
hardly disaggregated enough to permit estimation of the distributions required for 
aggregating over nonlinear choice models (Cameron, 1990:212).
3.3 The Effect of Dynamics
Lau lays down the requirements of exact aggregation for a static setting. In 
practice, the agent lives in an uncertain environment and, to make decisions, 
needs to rely on his expectations of the future values of the variables affecting the 
outcomes of his decisions. Ideally, he estimates the expectations based on some 
observable variables whose values are already known. In that case, as in Hall’s 
study, the appropriate model of individual behaviour is a dynamic model, which 
further complicates aggregation issues. Specifically, aggregation over simple 
heterogeneous dynamic models can produce complex model that is different than 
the individual models and cannot be given the same interpretation attributed to 
the micro models. The simplest instance of this phenomenon occurs in the case of 
aggregating over heterogeneous first order autoregressive processes, A/?(l) . 
Consider aggregation of the following two AR( 1) processes:
X it=cx,X 1=1,2 (3.10)
25where elt and e2t are a pair of independent, zero-mean, white noise series. A 
simple calculation shows that the aggregate variable X t = X lt + X 2l follows an 
autoregressive moving average (2,1) process
X t = Q X t_,+j3Xt_2 +7J'_,+71t . (3.11)
25 The stochastic process [Zf , t  =  1,2,3,...} is said to be a white-noise process provided that (i) 
E ( Z t ) = 0 and (ii) Cov(Z t , Z s ) = <r2 for t=s and 0 for t  & S .
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In general, Box and Jenkins (1970) and Granger and Morris (1976) have shown 
that if N  heterogeneous time series are added, each obeying an AR(\) model with 
different parameter values, their sum typically follows an ARMA(N,N -1) 
(Appendix, D). If, as in the real economies, the number of decision-making 
units is large, the true aggregate model contains an extremely large number of 
parameters, making it impossible to estimate it from ordinarily available samples, 
simply because the number of parameters to be estimated exceeds the sample 
size. Also, due to excessive complexity (high number of parameters), the true 
model is not of any practical use (Granger, 1980:230-1). The relation between the 
micro and macro parameters also turns out to be so complicated that it makes it 
problematic to ascribe much of behavioural interpretation to the parameters in the 
aggregate model (Stoker, 1993:1981).
3.4 The Effect of Heterogeneous Environments
Households and firms encounter different environments in the sense that the 
processes generating the variables affecting their behaviours (e.g., income) vary 
across decision makers. The process generating the income of a household 
working, for instance, in the agricultural sector differs from the process generating 
the income of a household working in the banking sector. When there are no 
behavioural heterogeneities, such environmental differences have no impact on 
the form of the aggregate function. However, when there are behavioural 
heterogeneities, environmental differences critically shape the form of the 
regularities emerging at the economy level. Thus, no attempt at modelling the 
relation between the micro and macro levels can ever afford to neglect them. On 
the other hand, the existence of environmental heterogeneities fundamentally 
aggravates the differences between the micro and macro functions. To spell out 
some of the problems raised by environmental heterogeneities for the 
microfoundations project, we return to the example we borrowed from Lippi 
(1988) in the last chapter.
26 See Granger 1999:42-48 for a brief discussion.
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Lippi’s illustration concerns an economy consisting of two consumers with 
demands following the static routines:
(3.12)
Yit and X it are respectively consumption and income of the ith agent at time t, 
and the parameters II,. are different, i.e. IT, ^ I I 2. Moreover, the independent 
micro variables X it follow the autoregressive process:
with ai being different for each individual, and vit being orthogonal white-noise 
processes. The variables representing the state of the economy are aggregate 
demand Yt =YU +Y2t and aggregate income X , = X u + X 2t. A general formula
established in Lippi (1988) shows that the demand function for this economy is 
given by (Appendix, E)\
The error term ut is a white-noise process. The parameters of the aggregate 
model are defined as
x i t = a i x i t - i+v* 0 < a , < 1 , (3.13)
Yt -  aYt_x + fix t + yX t_ x + ut . (3.14)
( n t - k ) a x+ { k - I l 2 )a2 (3.15a)(n,-n2)
P - ] Z-  C° V(n i/Vl/ + n 2V2,»Vl/ +V21) 
Var(yu +v2f)
(Ul - k ) U 2 ax + ( k - U 2 )Ula2
( n j - n 2)
(3.15b)
(3.15c)
Noticeably, aggregate demand equation (3.14) differs from the micro demand 
functions (3.12), containing variables that are absent in the micro functions. The
aggregate parameters, more importantly, relate in a very complicated manner to 
both the parameters of the micro consumption functions (3.12) and those of the 
environmental functions (3.13), which represent the processes generating 
individual incomes.
Lippi’s example is simple but reveals some key points regarding the micro and 
macro relation. To begin with, it illustrates that when people encounter 
heterogeneous choice situations and behave differently the correct aggregate 
model cannot be derived from behavioural equations alone. In addition to the 
behavioural equations, some knowledge of the structure of the economy, such as 
the (causal) process generating income in the banking system, is also necessary 
for deriving the regularities true of the economy. Moreover, as the number of 
heterogeneous individuals increases, and the complexity of the behavioural 
functions and the processes generating the independent micro variables rises, the 
complexity of the true aggregate equation increases beyond control. In fact, with 
both individual and environmental heterogeneities, even if the number of 
decision-makers does not exceed a single digit, the complexity of the correct 
aggregate equation exceeds the complexity of most aggregate equation used in 
practice. Finally, the example reveals that in an economy of heterogeneous 
decision makers, each operating in a different situation, there is no simple link 
between the aggregate parameters and the behavioural parameters. Both the 
parameters of the behavioural equations and those of the functions of the micro 
explanatory variables contribute in a complex manner to the aggregate 
parameters. It is not then appropriate to ascribe any behavioural meaning to the 
aggregate parameters. Inspecting the equalities (3.15a) through (3.15c), one 
wonders what interpretation can be given to the parameters in the aggregate 
equation (3.14) except that they are by-product of aggregation. In fact, the very 
existence of an aggregate (demand) function, which meaningfully relate to the 
micro functions, is in doubt. Economists have rarely come to grip with the issues 
arising from an attempt to aggregate over heterogeneous individuals operating in 
different dynamic situations. But those who have come to realise the severity of 
the complications have felt bound to abandon the nomenclature of a true 
aggregate function. Referring to Theil (1954)’s work on aggregation, Zellner 
(1969) writes:
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His [Theil] main result that the mathematical expectation of macro­
coefficient estimators will in general depend on a complicated 
combination of corresponding and noncorresponding micro-coefficients 
was so disturbing to him that he seriously considered the following 
question in his concluding chapter (1954:180) “Should not we abolish 
these [macro] models altogether?” (Zellner, 1969:365).
3.5 Heterogeneity and Policy Evaluation
The analysis of Lippi’s example has an important implication for the usefulness of 
aggregate models for policy analysis. Economic policies often deliberately seek to 
influence the economy by altering the mechanisms generating individual 
explanatory variables such as income. When decision makers operate in different 
choice situations and there are behavioural heterogeneities, the aggregate model is 
partly defined by the mechanisms generating the individual explanatory variables. 
And so, introduction of a new policy that affects these mechanisms can invalidate 
the aggregate model true of the economy prior to the intervention. Therefore, in 
the presence of individual and environmental heterogeneities, aggregate models 
correctly derived from individual models can yield a very wrong prediction of the 
effects of policies. To illustrate, we consider a simple model discussed in Geweke 
(1986).
Geweke’s model is concerned with an industry in a small country that produces a 
single output Yt , ultimately sold competitively in a world market. The production
technology is the same for all the firms in the industry. To be specific, for the ith 
firm at time t,
Yi t= aX it+dX?t , a > 0 , d < 0 ,  (3.16)
where X it is an input factor used to produce Yt . Firms are distributed throughout 
the country and, as a consequence, the price for the output of each firm Pu varys, 
say, with access to deep-water ports. Output price varies through time but relative
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output prices across firms never vary.27 The output price for the ith firm may be 
stated as
Pit=P,Pi- (3-17)
Input price rt is the same across the country. Equation (3.16) is exactly 
aggregable, making it possible to estimate parameters a and b using time series 
data on the aggregate (average) input factor X t and aggregate (average) output
Yt . Equation (3.16) and (3.17) give rise to average supply function,
_  2 2
rf = — + -T— (3. 18)' 4 d 4dP2 E(Pi2)
where E(.) stands for average.. Suppose the concern is to predict the effect on 
production of an ad rent subsidy that amounts to substituting (3.17) with the new 
price regime
Pit = PtPi + m , w > 0. (3.19)
Supply function (3.18) predicts the effect of the subsidy on average supply to be 
[{r2 / 4dP2 E(P2))((\ + u/P t ) ~ 2 -1)].
However, when the new price regime (3.19) is in place, the actual average supply 
function is
Y = —  + - L  E(Pi + — )-2, (3.20)
4 d 4dP. ' P .
and the actual effect of the subsidy on average supply is
27 This, for example, would be the case if price differentials were due to different transportation 
costs and the relative prices of output and transportation were unchanging.
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[(rt 2 / 4dPl2 )E[(Pi + u/P t ) ~ 2 -  P^ 2] ,
which is different from the predicted change. The change in the mechanism 
generating individual prices invalidates the aggregate production function true 
prior to the intervention. The function cannot then be used to evaluate policies.28 
New classical economists argue for establishing aggregate models on features of 
human behaviour such as tastes that in their view, unlike expectations, are not 
affected by policy shifts. Geweke (1985) warns that the effect of ignoring 
aggregation problems caused by policy shifts may not be less than the effect of 
ignoring shifts in expectations.
The analysis of aggregation over heterogeneous individuals shows how individual 
heterogeneity limits the circumstances under which the microfoundations project 
can be accomplished. It is only when the micro functions are identical and 
(intrinsically) linear, and identical processes generate explanatory micro variables, 
that the individual functions alone determine the macro model.29 If any of these 
conditions fails, substantial information regarding the structural features of the 
economy, including the processes generating the micro explanatory variables, 
would be needed to determine the macro model. This necessity of relying on 
macroeconomic phenomena (i.e., the processes generating micro explanatory 
variables) to model other macroeconomic phenomena undermines the central 
thesis of the microfoundations project that “the economist should start at the level 
of isolated individual” (Kirman, 1989:138; Rizvi, 1994:372). Modelling the 
economy requires beginning with some knowledge of the structure of the 
economy.
4 Modelling Interaction
The analysis of the representative agent modelling approach showed that, for 
studying the economy, one could not take a single individual as the unit of 
analysis. Explaining macroeconomic phenomena requires viewing the economy
28 Kupiec and Sharpe (1991) provide another example.
29 A relation that is not linear but can be made linear by taking the logarithm of each side of the 
equation is called intrinsically linear.
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as an interactive system of heterogeneous decision-making units, which means 
one has to take ‘a collection of interactive heterogeneous individuals’ as the unit 
of analysis. We have studied some of the implications of individual heterogeneity 
for the microfoundations project. We now look at some of the issues arising from 
the presence of interaction in the economy.
4.1 Market Interactions
The earliest model of economic interaction is the theory of Walrasian general 
equilibrium, which is still a basic model of the market in economics (Ackerman, 
1999). New classical economists usually interpret the call for microfoundations as 
the call for deducing the laws of aggregates from the theory of general 
equilibrium joined with the rational expectations hypothesis (Lucas and Sargent, 
1979). The basic idea of the general equilibrium theory is that one cannot model a 
sector of the economy such as the consumption sector while treating the 
influences impinging on the sector by the rest of the economy as constant. 
Various sectors of the economy are interdependent and must be modelled 
simultaneously. The nuts and bolts of the Walrasian theory can be explained by 
considering an economy that, in addition to the consumption sector, has a single 
production sector. Specifically, consider an economy consisting of n consumers 
who own nonnegative initial endowments of capital goods and labour and 
consume q goods, and m firms producing the q goods using as input labour and 
capital services provided by the consumers. The theory introduces several basic 
assumptions about the consumers and firms of the economy. I rely on Leigh 
Tesfatsion’s notes on macroeconomics (2003:2) to state these assumptions, while
• jn
adding to her list the assumption of rational expectations:
Al: Consumers are (subjective) expected utility maximisers.
A2: Firms are (subjective) expected profit optimisers.
A3: “The preferences of each consumer are exogenously given.”
30 Exact quotations are placed inside commas.
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A4\ “The income of consumers comes from dividends and from the sale of capital 
services and labour services.”
A5 : “Market for services and consumption goods are complete. That is, for each 
valued service and consumption good, there is a market price at which it can be 
bought or sold.”
A 6 : “Consumers, taking expected good prices, wages, rental rates, and dividends 
as given, choose demand for consumption goods and supplies of capital and 
labour services to maximise their utility subject to a budget constraint and 
physical feasibility conditions (non-negativity and endowment constraints).”
A7: “Firms, taking expected good prices, wages, and rental rates as given, choose 
supplies of goods and demands for capital and labour services to maximise 
expected profits subject to technological feasibility conditions.”
A 8 : “All purchase and sale agreements are costlessly enforced.”
A9: Expectations are rational.
In addition to these assumptions, the theory introduces certain technical 
restrictions regarding the utility functions as well as production functions 
including continuity, convexity, and monotonicity of preferences. These are to 
ensure the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium, which is a set of relative prices 
and corresponding demand and supply quantities at which all consumers are 
maximising their expected utility conditional on their expected prices and 
dividends, all producers are optimising their profits conditional on their expected 
prices, and markets for all goods clear. Altogether, these assumptions entail that 
the economy is in equilibrium, prices fully reflect all the relevant information, and 
there is no conflict across business plans. In a Walrasian world, a decision maker 
has no need to communicate with others or adjust his decisions to those of others 
in the market. He only needs to consider prices to decide on his optimal course of 
action. Since in such a world all interactions take place through prices, the 
Walrasian economic model is referred to as a model of market or indirect 
interaction.
The call to establish the laws of the aggregates on the general equilibrium theory 
is an attempt to derive the laws of the economy from the above assumptions about 
individual behaviour, firm behaviour, tastes, technologies, and endowments as 
well as the postulates necessary for the existence of an equilibrium (Rizvi, 1994).
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A question taken up by Sonnenschein (1972), Mantel (1976), and Debreu (1974) 
(henceforth, SMD) is whether the Walrasian assumptions impose any restrictions 
on the regularities emerging at the economy level. These theorists, to be precise, 
have inquired if the conditions imply any restrictions for the excess demand curve 
of the economy. The authors have found that, given the Walrasian conditions, 
only three properties carry over from the individual’s excess demand curves to the 
aggregate excess demand curve. They are (i) “continuity, (ii) that the value of 
total excess demand must equal zero at all positive prices, i.e., that the budget 
constraint for the economy as a whole be satisfied (Walras’ law), and (iii) the 
excess demand is homogenous of degree zero (only relative prices count)” 
(Kirman, 1992:122).31 A Walrasian economy can exhibit any aggregate excess 
demand curve that satisfies these three requirements (Appendix F provides a 
simple statement of the SMD theorem).
The roots of the SMD theorem can be traced to the analysis of the subjective 
expected utility theory in the second chapter. The expected utility theory is a 
method for solving a decision problem. Almost any observed behaviour can be 
rationalised by varying the specification of the problem that the agent is trying to 
solve. Substantive implications attributed to the theory originate from the 
exogenous assumptions introduced to specify the agent’s model of his choice 
situation and definition of his decision problem. The assumption that consumers 
(or firms) are subjective expected utility maximisers imposes little restriction on 
behaviour. The other assumption in the Walrasian theory, possibly restricting 
behaviour, is the market clearing condition. Again, as explained in chapter 2, 
when expectations of endogenous variables are involved, which is almost always 
the case in economics, the condition is not adequate to pin down any particular 
behaviour. Infinitely many price vectors usually clear the market.
Also, in the presence of behavioural heterogeneities, including heterogeneities in 
choice situations, regardless of the form of the individual functions, the aggregate 
relations can take unlimited forms. This means it is never possible to derive the 
relations emerging in an economy from the thin rationality assumptions of the
31 Rizvi (1994), Kirman (1989) and (1992) offer accessible discussions of the SMD result.
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equilibrium theory, which takes no notice of distributional features, how people 
model their choice situations, define their decision problems, and interact with 
each other (Kirman, 1989:128). Therefore, even if the Walrasian assumptions 
were plausible, they would still be inadequate for furnishing a foundation for the 
regularities true of economic aggregates. It is wrong to think that “significant 
results could be obtained by starting from very general hypotheses about the 
behaviour of economic agents”, (Ingrao, et al., 1990:316).
The Walrasian theory also provides no explanation of who sets the equilibrium 
prices. It simply assumes that the economy is in equilibrium, implying that prices 
are exogenous to the economy. Moreover, by supposing that all business plans are 
costlessly enforced, the theory rules out the existence of transaction costs, and, 
hence, money, which is a means for facilitating the coordination of the entire 
economy, finds no room in the theory (Debreu, 1959). Finally, by supposing that 
prices convey all the information relevant for decisions and thereby ruling out any 
direct interaction among market participants, the theory excludes the possibility of 
coordination failures. It thus fails to make any room for central macroeconomic 
phenomena that arise from the inability of market participants in a decentralised 
economy to coordinate their actions. Explanation of the process of price 
formation, market crashes, depressions, convergence to equilibrium, the role of 
money, and economic institutions calls for questioning the Walrasian view and 
allowing direct interaction into the models of the economy.
4.2 Non-Market Interactions
Attempts at modelling the phenomena not explainable within the Walrasian 
setting have led a growing number of economists to start thinking of the economy 
as a society of directly interacting heterogeneous individuals. A consequence of 
this change of attitude has been the development of formal models which allow 
for the state of a person (i.e., strategies, preferences, and expectations) to directly 
depend on the states (i.e., strategies, preferences, and expectations) of other 
participants in the economy (Glaeser, et al., 2001). The models are based on rival 
principles and are still highly simple. Nevertheless, they well serve to bring to the
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fore some basic lessons about the relation between the individual and aggregate 
levels in a heterogeneous and interactive system. To illustrate the type of models 
that can possibly account for the phenomena left out by the Walrasian theory, of 
the many approaches to modelling non-market interactions, this section 
concentrates on the more familiar approach provided by the Game theory, which 
views the economy as a many-person game or as a collection of interdependent 
teams (Bryant, 1996).32 After describing a typical game theoretic model of a 
macroeconomic phenomenon, the section derives some general implications of 
this alternative view of the economy for the microfoundations project.
We consider a generalisation of the stag hunt game used by some New Keynesian 
economists to study certain aspects of the economy that appear puzzling from the 
Walrasian perspective. The description is based on the stag hunt production game 
given in Bryant (1994), the coordination game in Cooper (1999), and the model of 
involuntary unemployment in Tesfatsion (2003). As in any game theoretic model, 
the optimal strategy of each market participant in these models depends on the 
strategies of every other market participant. Thus, what is rational for a person to 
choose depends on his beliefs about the preferences, expectations, and strategies 
of others in the market.
Consider an economy consisting of N  agents (or, N  groups of individuals) indexed 
i = 1,2,..., N , living on N  separate locations. Each agent is endowed with L units
of leisure and likes to consume two goods, leisure C, and another commodity C2, 
called bread. Each agent has a strictly increasing and concave differentiable utility 
function u(Cl,C2) . The agents first work (i.e., sacrifices leisure) to produce 
grains, and grains are effortlessly carried out to a location and combined to 
produce bread. N  different types of grains are needed to produce bread, each being 
produced by a different individual. Also, one unit of leisure produces one unit of 
grain and one unit of bread is produced by N  units of grain -  one unit for each 
type of grain. Bread production thus follows the relation,
32 Non-market interactions “are interactions between individuals, which are not regulated by the 
price mechanism. Glaeser, et al. (2001:1). For a survey of the literature on Non-market interactions 
see Glaeser et al (2001), section 2.
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Q ( 8 i 8 n ) = N.mintg, ,..., g N}, (4.1)
where gt is the amount of grain produced by the ith agent, and a surplus of any of
the grains is costlessly discarded as waste. The bread is equally distributed among 
all individuals:
— - ■;- "'') = min(g „ ....g j-  (4.2)N
Each agent is assumed to know the common leisure endowment L, the common 
utility function w(C,,C2) ,  the production function (4.1), the distribution rule
(4.2), and that every one is rational, as well as that every one has common 
knowledge of these rules and parameters.
Each individual should decide how many hours of leisure to sacrifice for 
producing grain. Because of the nature of the production function and the 
distribution rule, a player’s optimal decision depends on the other players’ 
strategies. Let ej be the effort that agent i devotes to grain production gt and e
be the vector of the efforts of the other agents. So, gt depends on e , i.e.,
gt = f ( e n e). Suppose the more leisure is sacrificed the less pleasant it is but if
all individuals equally sacrifice leisure to produce grain, the additional output 
produced by the increased effort more than compensates for the added pain of the 
sacrifice. This means all individuals are better off if all exert the maximum effort 
possible. Let us denote the payoff of agent i from action et when all other agents
take action e by TL(elte) and let e{(e) be the optimal response of agent i when
other agents take action e . Since any effort made by agent i above the minimum 
effort made by some other agent j  is wasted, if other agents are choosing action e, 
it is in the interest of agent i to select e as well. That is, ei (e) = e . The game thus 
has a continuum of (symmetric) Nash equilibria defined by
S = {e e [0, L] III, (e, e) = 0}, (4.3)
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where the subscript in IT, denotes a partial derivative. The set S includes an 
optimal equilibrium corresponding to the case when everyone devotes maximal 
effort level to production. Let denote the optimal equilibrium with s * . The 
continuum of Nash equilibria in S is Pareto ranked as
0 < s < s *. (4.4)
Any Nash equilibrium s below s * is a coordination failure.33 This is in contrast to 
general equilibrium models where all the equilibria are efficient.
This game theoretic model surely abstracts away a great deal of complexities of 
the real world. Yet, by capturing the notion of strategic uncertainty and allowing 
for coordination failure, it provides a general framework for thinking about 
important issues including why economies often go into recessions without an 
observable external shock, why there are business cycles, why there is involuntary 
unemployment, why there are legal and financial institutions, and many others 
matters. Any theory aiming to address these issues should view the economy as an 
interactive system, and refer to the notion of coordination failure, which the team 
production game adequately helps capture (Bryant, 1996; Mankiw, 1993; 
Tefastion, 2003).
Two aggregation issues arise in the above model economy. The first concerns the 
existence of a production function Q = G(L) that correctly maps aggregate leisure
L  to aggregate production Q such that G(L) = N.min{gi,...,gN}. The second
issue concerns the connection between the aggregate function and the micro 
production functions.
To address the first question, note that the game has many solutions. Even when 
the players’ beliefs are consistent, there is a continuum of Nash equilibria. And
33 “ A coordination failure is said to occur when mutual gains, potentially attainable from a 
feasible all-around change in agent behaviour (strategies) are not realised because no individual 
agent has an incentive to deviate from his [sic] current behaviour” (Leigh Tesfatsion, 1994). 
Quoted in Bryant (1996:157).
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each solution gives rise to a particular level of aggregate output. As a consequence, 
aggregate output is not solely a function of aggregate inputs in the economy (total 
leisure available). In fact, depending on what everyone thinks about the strategy 
of everyone else, almost any aggregate output is possible. So, there can 
theoretically be no function G(L) that correctly predicts aggregate output Q 
(bread) from aggregate input L. The existence of multiple solutions calls “into 
question the very meaningfulness of aggregate production functions, and of 
aggregate inputs” (Bryant, 1996:168).
This point can be traced to a criticism of Klein’s (1946) treatment of the 
aggregation problem. Klein argued that “there are certain equations in 
microeconomics that are independent of the equilibrium conditions and we should 
expect the corresponding equations of macroeconomics will also be independent 
of the equilibrium conditions. The principal equations that have this independence 
property [...] are the technological production functions. The aggregate 
production function should not depend upon profit maximisation, but purely on 
technological factors” (1946b:303). Consequently, he rejected using the entire 
micro model with the profit maximisation assumption to derive the production 
function of the economy.
May (1947) criticised Klein’s position by arguing that even the production 
function of a firm is not a purely technical relationship, since it results from a 
decision-making process. He concluded that the aggregate production function is 
also a fictitious entity in the sense that there is no global decision-maker, who 
allocates recourses optimally:
... The aggregate production function is dependent on all the functions of 
the micromodel, including the behaviour equations such as profit- 
maximisation conditions, as well as upon all exogenous variables and 
parameters. This is the mathematical expression of the fact that the 
productive possibilities of an economy are dependent not only upon the 
productive possibilities of the individual firms (reflected in production 
functions) but on the manner in which these technological possibilities are 
utilized, as determined by the socio-economic framework (reflected in 
behaviour equations and institutional parameters). Thus the fact that our 
aggregate production function is not purely technological corresponds to 
the social character of aggregate production (May, 1947: 63).
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In general, because of the dependence of aggregate output on equilibrium 
conditions, if there is a function correctly relating aggregate output to aggregate 
inputs, it theoretically includes among its arguments a variable or variables that 
refer to the conditions. Led by similar thoughts, Colander (1986) rejects the 
conventional aggregate production function Q = f ( K ,L ) , which defines 
aggregate output Q as a function of total labour supply L and total capital K. As an 
alternative, he proposes an aggregate production function that schematically takes 
the form Q — f(K ,L ,C ) , where C represents the degree of coordination in the 
economy.34 A similar consideration, of course, applies to the consumption sector 
of the economy, as what one consumes can also critically depend on what other 
people consume. Without any exception, the theoretical functions describing the 
state of an interactive economy contain variable or variables that refer to the level 
of interdependencies in the economy.
This remark also embodies the answer to the second question, which has to do 
with the relation between the aggregate and individual functions in an interactive 
economy. As it should be clear by now, to be able to derive an aggregate function 
from individual functions, every variable in the aggregate function must somehow 
be defined by aggregating over the variables in the individual functions. But 
variables such as C, which refers to the level of coordination or the web of 
perceived interdependencies in the economy, are not aggregates of any individual 
functions. And so, the functions describing an interactive system cannot be 
derived by aggregating over the individual functions. In fact, to describe 
individual behaviour in an interactive system, the individual model, as in the stag 
hunt game, should include variables referring to the state of the economy. So, to 
be precise, the individual models are not individualistic either; they are of a social 
character.
It is appropriate to close this section with two further points: In theory, it makes 
sense to include in the aggregate functions variables such as C that refer to the 
level of coordination. It is, however, difficult to envision how such variables can
34 This function is quoted in Bryant (1996), where he refers to Colander (1986) but does not 
mention the reference. The underlying idea, though, is vividly explicit in Colander (1996).
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be operationalized. In his later writings, Colander acknowledges the difficulties 
with his schematic aggregate production function, and has become inclined 
towards a purely statistical approach to the study of aggregate data, akin to the 
view of macroeconomics put forward in Basmann (1972) and Sims (1980) 
(Colander, 1996:66). Sims, as we learnt earlier, regards models of economic 
aggregates as efficient summaries of data with no theoretical link to the processes 
at the individual level.
Finally, the game theoretic assumption that the state of every individual depends 
on the state of every other individual is not necessary for multiple solutions. Even 
if the game theoretic framework is weakened, and less extreme forms of 
interdependencies are considered, the multiplicity phenomenon still persists. For 
multiple solutions, it is enough that the states of some of the decision-making 
units depend on the states of some other units (Glaeser et al., 2001).
5 Conclusion
This chapter studied the second issue at the heart of any attempt at theorising 
about the economy, i.e., the nature of the link between the micro and macro 
levels. It started with an investigation into the representative agent modelling 
approach that sees no difference between the laws of a single individual and the 
economy. Even though the approach is still quite prevalent in theoretical 
economic modelling, the conditions under which the behaviours of a collection of 
individuals can be modelled as the behaviour of a single individual are extremely 
restrictive. More importantly, the approach is fallacious. Variables like prices, 
economic growth, interest rate, unemployment level, and inflation, which enter in 
the decision model of a single individual as exogenous variables, are determined 
within the economy. It is thus in principle wrong to extend causal implications of 
individual models to the economy. Also, since from the perspective of the 
representative-agent modelling, individual differences are entirely irrelevant, 
representative agent models are not suitable for the analysis of policies designed 
to work by manipulating some distributional features of the economy.
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These problems demonstrate why the study of the economy cannot be based on an 
analysis of the behaviour of a single individual. One ought to take as unit of 
analysis the behaviour of a group of heterogeneous interactive individuals to study 
the economy. This necessity leads to complications that fundamentally blur the 
relation between the individual and aggregate levels. When there is individual 
heterogeneity, the correct form of the aggregate relations not only depends on the 
form of the individual behavioural models but also on the joint distribution of the 
independent micro variables in the economy and on the mechanisms generating 
them. So, assumptions regarding the joint distribution of the independent micro 
variables and the causal processes generating the variables become an integral 
part of a correctly specified model of the aggregates. As a result, there will be no 
resemblance between the laws of the individuals and those of the aggregates. 
Also, since the parameters in the aggregate functions depend on the parameters 
defining the processes generating the independent micro variables, they do not 
admit any behavioural interpretation.
Additionally, economic policies often seek to influence the economy by changing 
the distribution of variables such as income. In the presence of individual 
heterogeneity, the aggregate model is sensitive to changes in the distributional 
configuration of the economy and the mechanisms generating the individual 
exogenous variables. Thus, a distributional policy change can invalidate the model 
fitted to the economy prior to the intervention. Policy analysis, in theory, requires 
knowing how a policy affects the distributional configuration of the economy, and 
how the distributional change affects the fitted model so as to derive the model 
that would consequently be true of the economy. Information on the distributional 
configuration of the economy, or the mechanisms generating the exogenous 
variables entering individual models, is difficult to obtain, making the task of 
establishing models useful for policy analysis difficult.
Complications arising from individual heterogeneity undermine the aim of 
deriving a macroeconomic model from individual models alone. Yet, the 
complications arising from direct interaction among market participants are more 
detrimental to the microfoundations project. Modelling individual behaviour in an 
interactive environment necessitates introducing into the micro model variables
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referring to preferences, expectations, and strategies of other decision makers. 
Such variables are not aggregable. Moreover, the existence of multiple equilibria 
in an interactive system excludes the very existence of a true aggregate ‘function’ 
linking explanatory aggregate variables (say, capital and labour) to the aggregate 
dependent variable (say, output). If there is a true model involving aggregate 
variables, it must involve a variable or variables referring to the interdependencies 
in the economy. It is though difficult to see how such a variable or variables could 
be operationalized. Nor are they aggregate of any micro variables.
These reflections on the connection between the micro and macro levels in an 
interactive heterogeneous system do not rule out the emergence of regular patterns 
at the economy level that can be modelled statistically. What they reject is the 
claim that the emerging patterns are in any straightforward manner related to the 
processes at the individual level or that they can be given any behavioural 
meaning. The analysis of aggregation issues, particularly those related to the 
effects of interaction, supports the view of macroeconomic models put forward by 
atheoretical econometricians, like Sims (1980), who view large-scale economic 
models simply as efficient summaries of data.
Finally, if the view of the economy as an interactive system is taken seriously, the 
existence of causal relations among economic aggregates such as aggregate 
capital will be in doubt. In that case, there seems to be no point in applying 
structural modelling tools to aggregate economic data. There will be no causal 
relations for them to discover.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Clarida’s Life Cycle Model
As in the text, we state the simplest possible case of Clarida’s model, which is also 
discussed in Deaton (1992). The case is built around an economy with the following 
features:
Assumption 1: Each worker lives for three periods, working in the first two periods 
of his or her life and retiring in the third. It is assumed that only one person is bom in 
each period.
Assumption 2: In period t, each person receives an identical amount of labour 
income Yt while working, but zero during retirement. Consumption during retirement 
is financed from assets accumulated during the working periods.
Assumptions 3: Yt follows a random walk with drift,
Yt = g + Yt_x+Et , (Al)
The per capita labour income also follows a random walk:
27, = 2 g  | 2 r M | 2 et 
3 3 3 3
Assumption 4: Interest rate is zero and each person decides to leave no asset behind.
Assumption 5: Everyone is a pure permanent income life-cycler.1
Note that labour income received by each individual does not follow a random walk; 
by assumption labour income is zero with probability one during retirement. 
Assuming rational expectations, each individual best forecast of labour income during 
the next working period is the current labour income plus the cumulative drift, i.e., 
g  + Yr
2 Y + gA person who is bom in period t thus consumes — —  during his first working 
period and — +- + during the second working period and retirement period.
1 As in the text, permanent income is defined as the annuity value of current financial and human 
wealth, and consumption is accordingly set equal to permanent income.
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The table below shows the individual consumptions during the first five periods of 
the life of the economy.
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6
2Y]+g
3
2r, +S  , *2 
3 2
2 Y,+g  ( s 2 
3 2
Dead
2 Y2+g  
3
2 Y2 + g  ^ £3 
3 2
2T2 + g  ^ e3 
3 2
Dead
2 1 W
3
273+ g  |
3 2
2Y3+g  | *r4 
. 3 2 Dead
2 I W
3
2 T4 + g  (
3 2 . . .
Now consider total consumption change between period 4 and period 3.
A C i= C i_C 3 = t o  + £ l - ^ l - £ L .  (A2)
4 4 3 3 2 3 2
Writing Y4 in terms of Y{ yields
Y4 = 3 g + T, + s 2 + £ 3 + £4 . (A3)
Substituting (A3) for Y4 in (A2) yields
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AC4 = 2g  + ^ -  + ^ -  + ^ - .  (A4)
6  3 6
If we consider total consumption change at time t in general, rather than at period 4, 
then total consumption change for the economy is given by
AC, = 2g + ^ -  + ^ L  + ^  , (A5)
' 6  3 6
which is of the same form as the result stated in the text. Average consumption 
change follows:
— 2  7  _ 2  _ s, ■,ACi = —g  H---- £, H— St_j H . (A6 )
3 18 ' 9 M 18
Appendix B: Pischke’s Incomplete Information Model
The following assumptions characterize Pischke’s economy.
Assumption I: Average income follows a random walk with drift.2
Let Yt stand for average income and g  for the drift term. Then, average income is 
given by
Yt = g + Yt_l +£l . (Bl)
Assumption II: Each consumer income is the average income plus an idiosyncratic 
component that is purely transitory, represented by a white noise
(B2)
The first difference of individual income is given by
AYu =Y, +uit - Y t_x - u it_x
&YU = g + Yt_x +£,+ uit -  Yt_x -  uit_{
A Yu = g + £ ,+ ui t - u il_]. (B3)
Assumption HI: Each person only observes the sum of the contemporaneous macro 
and private shocks and cannot separate them. He only estimates the moving average 
process
This appendix is based on Deaton (1992: 171-173)
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AT„ = g  + rji t - ^ r j il_] . (B4)
Assumption IV: Every household satisfies the infinite-life permanent income model 
(Hall’s model). Individual consumption therefore follows random walk:
The change in average consumption C, is obtained by averaging over (B5):
words, the idiosyncratic components by assumption have zero means over the 
population).
On the other hand, since the derived first difference of individual income is
AT„ = g  + 7// + ^ „ _ 1,
and
(B5)
(B6)
Now, since the real first difference of individual income is
A Yu = g + e ,+ u it +w/,_1
and
we have
AY, = g + e, (B7)
(because uit is white noise, ^ u it / N  and ^ u u_x / N are equal to zero; in other
A Y , = £ 4 7 , ,  = g  + 2 > , , / W + 2 > „ V - N ' ,
we have
AT, =g + r j , - ^ t_ , . (B8)
From (B7) and (B8) we have
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£, =Tlt -^V,-x 
and
rjt = € t + fa7m . (B9)
Combining (B6) and (B9) yields
AC, =(1 +Aj7f_j),
1 + r
AC, = (1 -  + (1 -  - i - )  Ai/,., ,
1+ r 1+r
AC, = (1 -  )At7,_, + (1 -  .
1+ r 1+r
From (B6) we have
AC = AAC , + (1 -  ~ —)e,,
1 + r
which yields the average consumption function as
C, = (A + 1)C_, -  AC,., + (1 -  . (BIO)
1 + r
Appendix C: Lau’s Theorem (1982)
The individual functions f t (Xit, A it, P,) are of the type
f t (X u, A , , P,) = f { X „ , A,.„ P,) + kt (P,) , (Cl)
only if the index functions g, (.) are symmetric.
Suppose g {(.) are not symmetric. In that case, exchanging the income X rl and 
attributes Ar, of agent r with those of agent s changes the value of g, (.). Hence,
X  /, (X„, A„, P,) * (+ . - A».p,) + / .  (x r,> A„. P,) + / ,  (X„ . A „. P,). (C2)
After eliminating the identical terms and reordering, we obtain
385
f s (X r n K ,V t) - f r(X rl,A rt,J>l) * f r(X st,A st,J>t) - f s(X st,A st,Vl), (C3)
which only holds if the individual functions cannot be stated as (Cl). Therefore, in 
order for (Cl) to hold, the index functions gt (.) must be symmetric.
Appendix D: Aggregation over Heterogeneous Time Series
Suppose that X u and X 2t are a pair of series generated by
X\t = cc xX Xt_x + s  Xt (Dla)
^ 2 \t = +^21 ' (Dlb)
where £u and s2t are a pair of independent, zero-mean white noise series. Equation 
system (Dl) can be written as:
(1 - a xL)X u =eu (D2a)
(1 -  a 2L )X 2t = £2l .3 (D2b)
Or,
X u =£u /(\ - a xL) (D3a)
X 2, = &2t /0 ~ a iL) ’ (D3b)
Let X t -  X u + X 2t. It follows that 
(1 -  a,L)X t = (1 -  a xL)Xu + (1 -  a xL)X2t
(1 - a 2L){ 1 - a xL)X t = (1 - a 2L)( 1 - a xL)Xu + (1 - a 2 L){ 1 - a xL)X 2l. (D4)
Using (D3a) and (D3b), aggregate equation (D4) can be restated as: 
( l - a 2L ) ( l - a ]L)X t = { \ - a 2L)£u +(1 - a xL)£2t (D5)
Based on the definition of £u and £2t, the right hand side of (D5) is equivalent to:
(1 -  o£)£t = (1 -  a 2 L)£u + (1 -  a xL)£2t. (D6)
The polynomials are usually written as a t (L) but the sake of simplicity is written here as a tL
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Combining (D5) and (D6) gives the desired result:
(1 -  a 2L)( 1 -  a xL)X t = (1 -  aL)et , (D7)
which is an ARMA (2,1). This exercise is an example of a general theorem proved by 
Granger and Morris (1976) and Box and Jenkins (1970).
Appendix E: Lippi’s Simple Economy4
We work with the two-consumer economy described in the text. Let Ylt denote the 
consumption of the ith agent and X., the income of the ith agent, where i - 1,2. 
Suppose individual consumptions follow the static rules:
[yu = n xx u
j u , u n .  * n ,  (Ei)
\ r 2, =  n 2x »  1 2
while the process generating individual incomes are given by: 
fX  i, = a x X u_x + v„
I *. v   ^ a , ^ a 2. (E2)\X 2i —OC2X  2/_i +v2t
vit s are white-noise process. Also, for the sake of simplicity, assume that vu and v2t
are independent. Aggregate consumption Yt and aggregate income X t are defined as
[Yt =YU +Y2
\ 1 u 21 . (E3)
\X t = X u +X»
The concern is to infer aggregate consumption function Yt = / ( X t). Equation (E2) 
can be restated as
=v„
[(1 - a 2i)X 2, =v2,
where a tL s are polynomials in the lag operator L and a t (0) = 1. Then
4 The proof to follow is a restatement of the proof in Lippi (1988).
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From (El) and (E3), for vector (7 t,X t) we have
(y, 1 fn ,
\ X t )  [} 1 )  \X-2tJ
Combining (E5) and (E6) yields
f Y. W l L  U A (  1
KX 'J 1 1 
Represent (E7) as
\ - a ,L  1
0 1 ~oc2 L j \ V 2 t j
fn ,  n . ' i
\ - a ,L  1
0 1 - oc2 L j
n, n ,Y ' f n ,
l l
And let
f wlt\  fn ,  n . V v J
wV y 2 l J v1 1 ) \ y * j
Like vit, Wit are also white-noise processes. Then, we have
Kx ' j
n, i l
1 - a xL \ - a 2L
y l-a ^ L  \ - a 2L j
1 - I T
n,  - n 2 n , - n 2
- l  l
v n , — n 2 n ,  —i i  2 j wVr 2/ /
To simplify matters, let
A = ( \ - a {L)
B = ( \ - a 2L)
c  = n, - n 2
E = ABC.
Equation system (E9) can be written as
rY. \
K*tJ
E
B - A AYlx -  B Il2
\ W v r 21 y
(E10)
Still to further simplify necessary calculations let rewrite the fist matrix on the right 
hand side of (E10) as
r F  G
\ H 1,
and call it M. Multiplying both side of (E10) by the adjoint of M  yields
r i  - g Y yA  ( f i - g h
0 F I-G Hk- h  f , \ wJ \ Yr It J
(E ll)
From (El 1) we have
j - I Y ' - G X ,  =(FI-G H )W U 
1 -H Y ,+ F X t ={FI-G H )W 2t
(El 2)
Let multiply the second equation in (El2) by a scalar k and subtract it from the first 
one. This yields
(7 + kH)Yt = (G + kF)Xt + {FI -  GH){WU -  kW2t). (E13)
After substituting the definitions of F, G, H, and I  into (E l3), we need only some 
elementary algebra to derive equation
f Yxa xL + Y2a 2L^
n, n 2 Yt =
k - Y,U 2a xL + r 2n , a 2Z 
ri] — r i2
X t + ut , (El 4)
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where
r, = n , - k  
r 2 = k - n 2
ut -W u ~kW2t 
= Cov(Wlt,W2t) = Cov(Uuvu + u 2v2l ,vu +v2l)
Var(W2t) Var(vu +v2t)
The aggregate consumption function of the economy is given by
y ,=
rYxccxL + T2cc2L^
n , - n : Y '- i+ tX .-
^YxYl2a xL + r 2n , a 2Z^
u x- u :
X t_x +Ut . (E15)
Appendix F: The SMD Theorem
There are several variants of the SMD theorem available. To state the theorem in its 
simplest form, following Kirman (1989), consider an exchange economy in which 
there are a finite number / of goods and N  consumers. Define the following notations:
e(a): a positive bundle of initial endowment of all goods for individual a;
</>{a,p ) : a demand function for individual a derived from a strictly convex monotone 
utility function, with P  being the price vector;
Z(a, p) = ^(a, p) -  e(a): the excess demand for individual a\
Z(p) = £ Z (a ,P ) :  the aggregate excess demand function of the economy obtained 
by summing over the excess demands of the N  individuals.
For this economy, the SMD theorem reads as follows (Kirman, 1989:129):
Theorem: Given a continuous function / :  p —» Rl satisfying Walras’ Law, i.e., 
Ef  (p) = 0 for p  in P, then for any positive s  there is an economy e with consumers 
with strictly convex monotone preferences such that
/ ( P) = ZE (P) > for all p  in Ae.
Here Z£ (.) is the excess demand of the economy e and A e is the price simplex with 
prices above s , i.e.,
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{p I YjiPt = 1 and /?,. > 0 for all /}.
The result states that, for any arbitrary function / :  Ae —» Rl satisfying the Walras 
Law, there is an economy with N  consumers with strictly convex monotone 
preferences whose excess demand function for prices in Ae coincides with the
arbitrary function. This means the aggregate excess demand function of an economy 
of N  consumers with strictly convex monotone preferences can be any arbitrary 
continuous function satisfying the Walras Law. The standard restrictions on the 
preferences do not further restrict the class of functions to which the excess demand 
function belongs.
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Finale
T he m oral ...  is this: if  you pu t very little in, you get very  little 
ou t (Sonnenschein, 1973:405).
This thesis has studied some general issues at the heart of the theoretical approach 
to macroeconomics. The issues relate to the possibility of establishing an 
explanatory and predictive microeconomic theory, and transforming it into a 
theory of the economy as a whole using aggregation methods. It is now time to 
bring together the results of the analysis:
Early in the thesis, we showed that the proposal that homo economicus behaves 
like a decision scientist, understood in terms of one or another expected utility 
theory, contributes very little to the understanding of behavioural matters and 
hence economic phenomena. These theories take as given how the agent specifies 
his choice situation and defines his decision problem. They only state how he 
solves an already well-structured decision problem. But accurate prediction and 
explanation of behaviour depend critically on how the agent models his choice 
situation and defines his decision problem, rather than on how he solves an 
already well-structured decision problem. To predict how an agent models his 
choice situation, and defines his decision problem, one needs a theory of how he 
processes information, models the causal structure of his choice situation, adapts 
goals, forms preferences, and modifies them as a result of subsequent experiences 
or new information. Without such a theory, there is no prospect for accurately 
predicting or explaining behaviour in a dynamic and changing environment.
The proposal to model homo economicus as an intuitive econometrician is an 
intriguing and substantive step towards understanding how the agent models his 
choice situation and modifies it in response to new information. The trouble is that 
there is no ‘tight enough’ theory of statistical learning capable of fully, and 
accurately, explaining the central phases of learning from data -  in particular 
model formulation and re-specification. Reflection on nonparametric inference 
reveals that there can be no algorithm that receives an ordinarily sized sample and 
yields the model that, given the data, best approximates the underlying data 
generating mechanism. The choice of a model at a deep level requires various 
subjective judgements. With ordinarily sized samples, even nonparametric
learning of an interpretable model of few variables, representing a simple choice 
situation, is theoretically impossible. In real-life inference situations, learning of 
an interpretable model of several variables calls for starting with a parametric 
model.
However, any statistical theory of parametric learning necessarily presupposes a 
reservoir of models or, more precisely, a reservoir of basic probabilistic 
assumptions that can be used for creating models. It also requires knowledge of 
the pre-estimation implications of the models, and methods for exploring their 
post-estimation consequences. None of these can be explained within a statistical 
theory of parametric inference. Therefore, within the framework of the intuitive 
statistician hypothesis, any explanation of how the agent comes to model his 
choice situation is necessarily bound to be incomplete.
Statistical theories of causal inference are also of limited power. Because of the 
possibility of selection bias, mistaking concomitants for genuine causes, taking 
barren proxies for real causes, aggregation over heterogeneous units, and so on, 
the class of explanations possible in general for a statistical dependency or 
independency is larger than the class of causal explanations. As a result, an 
essential step in drawing causal inferences from observational data is to first 
exclude non-causal explanations. Only then do statistical tools become relevant 
for inferring causal conclusions. Even at this stage, statistical analysis can at best 
infer a class of statistically indistinguishable models, which in practice usually 
have little or nothing in common. Selecting a causal model calls for substantive 
causal background information at every level. However, for the reasons 
mentioned above, this information cannot come from a theory of statistical 
learning.
One outcome of this analysis is that the description level at which the 
econometrician (statistician) works is inappropriate for establishing a predictive 
model of human learning. To specify how a person processes data, conceptualizes 
his environment, models his choice situation, defines his decision problem, and 
learns from experience, it is necessary to work at a far deeper, and more refined, 
level of description. One, in particular, needs to establish a theory of cognition, 
object representation, pattern recognition, and even preference formation, as well
393
as a detailed history of the person’s experiences (Arthur, 1994). A precise theory 
of human cognition and decision-making may eventually arise. However, because 
of the level of description the theory is defined for, the theory may not be of much 
use for economic analysis. The basic problem in establishing a predictive theory 
of economic behaviour is of mismatched levels -  a useful theory of behaviour 
may require working at a description level useless to economics.
The connection between the individual and aggregate levels is also highly 
complex. To explain large-scale economic phenomena it is necessary to view the 
economy as a society of interactive, and heterogeneous, agents. However, the 
regularities that emerge at the aggregate level in an interactive and heterogeneous 
economy are not directly related to the laws operating at the micro level. The 
regularities are the joint outcome of individual interactions and the processes 
characterising the physical and institutional environment. In light of this, 
modelling the emergent regularities requires starting with a great deal of 
information about the structure of the economy. It is, therefore, wrong to attribute 
any purely behavioural interpretation to the regularities. Moreover, due to the 
ubiquitous existence of multiple equilibria in models of interactions, the relations 
that emerge among economic aggregates are statistical. They are not causal.
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